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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the reform of health systems from an international and an economic perspective. Its 
main unifying theme is to investigate the role played by incentives in the performance of health systems and 
their reform. In the first part, the thesis reconsiders the economic reasons that form the basis for public 
intervention in health markets, both in financing as well as in service provision. In fact, one of the key 
elements introduced with health reforms in the last few years has been greater competition in health insurance 
and provision, among private as well as public providers. It is thus interesting to start the analysis by revisiting 
the effects of competition in health markets on the basis of more recent contributions in microeconomic theory, 
our aim being to ascertain what would be the major deficiencies of unregulated markets, and to investigate into 
the impact of different public corrective measures. Chapter 2 looks at the effects of competition in the health 
insurance market and at the impact of different forms of public intervention to correct market failures. Chapter 
3 presents a model of oligopolistic competition between two health providers, and it investigates the potential 
role of quality and/or price regulation as a means to extend coverage/improve quality beyond the point reached 
in correspondence to the market equilibrium.
Then, the thesis focuses on the new resource allocation, contracting mechanisms and payment systems for 
providers (RAP reforms) implemented over the last few years, within the public sector, or intended to 
discipline the relationship with health care providers. Chapters 4 gives an introduction to the RAP reforms, 
their justification and main components. Chapter 5 focuses on payment systems and on efficiency issues, while 
Chapter 6 on the equity consequences of RAP reforms.
Chapter 7 and 8 look at the health reforms implemented over the last decade in the former socialist countries. 
The evolution of health systems in those countries provides interesting lessons, illuminating the major 
weaknesses and limitations of the health reform model that has been prevailing and proposed world-wide over 
the last decade. Chapter 8 presents a qualitative study of the impact of the health reforms in Georgia, focusing 
specifically on the phenomenon of out-of-pocket payments, formal and informal, which currently are the 
prevalent source of funding for health in the region. A concluding chapter (Chapter 9) summarises some of the 
main findings of the thesis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The Research Questions,
Outline and Methodology
1.1 Q u estion s a n d  O utline
This thesis is a study of the reform of health systems from an international and an economic 
perspective. Its main unifying theme is to investigate the role played by incentives in the 
performance of health systems and their reform.5
In fact, incentive problems caused by imperfect information have been at the core of the economic 
research on health systems. There are two characteristic market failures in health. The first is the 
principal-agent problem associated with the fact that nurses and doctors have better information than 
patients as far as appropriate treatment is concerned, as well as at times differing interests in that 
treatment, both financially and in terms of appropriate effort. The second source of market failure 
concerns the health insurance market. Health insurance plays an essential role in health care. 
Outside of routine care, medical expenses are relatively large and occur randomly, precisely the sort 
of problems for which there should be a large demand for insurance. However, in most developing 
countries health insurance is simply not available to the vast majority of people. The reasons are the 
standard ones of adverse selection, cream skimming and moral hazard which, in general, are severe 
enough to prevent the efficient and equilibrate functioning of health insurance markets.
Because of the absence of an effective private insurance coverage, the potential market failures in the 
provision of medical services, and for other reasons, such as equity, governments have generally 
been prominent players in health financing and provision. The principal means of intervention have 
been either direct provision of services at highly subsidised rates, or the sponsorship of social 
insurance programs for paying private and public providers of services. However, the public 
acceptance of responsibility for health services does not eliminate all of the problems that prevented 
an efficient market from emerging in the first place. In industrialized countries, public provision,
5 Health systems’ organisation and performance are obviously influenced by social, cultural and historical 
factors, but we believe that "incentives matter", in the sense that different financial arrangements, regulatory 
structures and degrees of market exposure are likely to strongly influence health outputs and outcomes, in a
17
while effectively handling the lack of insurance coverage by charging low fees for expensive 
procedures, has been plagued by serious problems associated with incentives facing providers. As a 
result, quality of services has frequently been a major issue in public provision. While private 
providers, usually paid fee-for-services, have an incentive to over-treat, a problem made worse when 
insurance is available, salaried civil servants create the opposite problem of having insufficient 
incentives to provide conscientious care. Provider institutions, reimbursed according to their inputs 
and historical expenditure, are unaccountable to patients and isolated from other providers’ 
competition, and thus have no incentive to improve quality of services or to use resources 
efficiently.6
These quality/efficiency problems because of market and government failures have been much more 
severe in low income countries (see Chapter 6), where government institutional capacity and 
consumers are weaker, and private providers are less developed. Furthermore, in these countries with 
few exceptions, public health systems have also largely failed on equity grounds, because publicly 
funded services have disproportionately benefited the better off.
Over the last two decades, in order to respond to some of the above flaws, several governments in 
industrialized as well as in poor and middle income countries embarked on broad health reforms. 
x Such reforms became known as internal or quasi market, or managed competition health reforms, or, 
where the focus was on changing the criteria according to which financial resources would be 
distributed within the health system, resource allocation and purchasing (RAP) reforms (see Chapter 
4). The American health economist Enthoven (1985, 1991) was the first to articulate the conceptual 
framework behind these reforms, followed by several other scholars at the beginning of the ‘90s (see, 
for example, Maynard, 1991, and Le Grand, Bartlett, 1993).
The United Kingdom was the first among West European countries to implement health reforms 
inspired by the quasi-market model. Almost in the same period, comparable reform proposals began 
to be discussed in other countries of continental Western Europe, such as the Netherlands and Italy, 
of Latin America, such as Chile and Colombia, in some of the former socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Georgia and Estonia, in a 
few countries in East Asia (Thailand), and in Africa (Zambia).
sense that abstracts from the particular cultural and social influences that characterize each country.
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In fact, each of these countries implemented some different variation of a common reform model, 
adapting it from its previous institutional structure. For example, in designing the managed 
competition model, Enthoven considered a country (the USA) characterized by a plurality of health 
purchasers and insurers, competing with each other. This was the situation also in some countries of 
Latin America, such as Colombia. However, when the managed competition model was adapted to 
health systems characterized by universal health insurance coverage and a monopsonistic public 
purchaser of services, it took a different shape. However, a few core features are shared by all 
countries (see Chapter 4):
>  Greater exposure to market forces (particularly in health provision), with the purchaser- 
provider split, and the creation of public-private competition.
>  New criteria for allocating financial resources across regions, districts, purchasers7 and 
providers8 (RAP reforms) within the public sector.
>  The extension of decentralized public agencies' (local governments, health purchasers and 
providers) degree of financial and managerial independence.
>  (On occasion), reform and partial “liberalization” of the revenue collection component of 
the health system, with the creation of a plurality of social health insurance funds, greater 
use of co-payments from patients, greater role for private health insurance and for 
community-based schemes.
The research in this thesis is aimed at providing an analysis of the above reforms from an 
economist’s perspective, focusing on the impact of the new incentive system and institutional 
framework on efficiency and on equity. It is divided in three main parts, closely connected to each 
other.
In the first part, the thesis revisits the economic rationale for public intervention in health markets, 
both in financing as well as in service provision. In order to do so, it first analyses the dynamics of 
competition in health markets and the characteristics of market equilibria, building upon recent 
contributions in microeconomic theory. Our aim is to describe equilibria in unregulated markets, 
both in provision as well as health insurance, and to investigate the impact of different public 
corrective measures. The central questions we pose in this first part are the following: “How would
6 Similar problems have also been common in other parts of the public sector, such as education.
7 The purchaser is an agency interposed between patients and providers, whose role is to “organize specific 
types of health care for a designated population (whether defined by geography, employment type or voluntary 
enrolment)” (Rice and Smith, 2000, p. 1). See Chapter 4.
8 In the thesis, we refer to both individuals and institutions supplying health services as health providers.
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1) the level of coverage in the private health insurance market, and 2) the quality/price of provision 
set by the private sector be characterized?” “What would be the impact of different government 
interventions?”
Chapter 2 looks at competition in the health insurance market, and analyzes the impact of different 
forms of public intervention to correct market failures. It also introduces in an accessible way some 
of the core features of the so called ‘economics of information’ models, the analytical framework 
developed in economics over the last twenty years to analyse market interaction in situations 
characterized by imperfect and asymmetric information among economic agents.
Chapter 3 focuses on the provider side. It presents a model of oligopolistic competition between two 
health providers, and it investigates the potential role of quality and/or price regulation as a means to 
extend coverage/improve quality beyond the market equilibrium level.
Understanding the dynamics of market competition in health insurance and in health provision would 
allow evaluating health policy interventions in a new light. The two chapters show that the impact of 
any health policy intervention, such as a demand or a supply side subsidy or an increase in the rate of 
co-payments or the imposition of a Minimum Quality Standard, depends on the characteristics of the 
equilibrium that prevails in the market before the public interventions, and on how that intervention 
impacts upon that equilibrium.
The second part of the thesis focuses on the internal market reforms implemented over the last two 
decades in several countries. The central question the thesis addresses in this second part is the 
following: “What are the core characteristics of the reforms that have been implemented, and what 
are their key consequences for equity and efficiency?” Chapter 4 introduces the reforms and to the 
conceptual framework we propose to assess their impact. Chapter 5 focuses on payment systems 
(PS) and on efficiency issues, and presents an original principal-agent model to investigate the 
properties of the second-best optimal contract between a purchaser and a provider of health services.
The first five chapters of the thesis are mainly theoretical. The market interaction in the health 
insurance and the health delivery markets, as well as the possible reaction of purchasers and 
providers to different resource allocation and payment systems have been analysed in the health 
economics literature either through principal-agent models or through monopolistic competitive 
models. The thesis will present both type of models, and build upon the more recent developments
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in the literature to analyse specific aspects of the health market interaction in service delivery (in 
Chapter 3) and the payment system component of the reforms (in Chapter 5). The relative advantage 
of principal-agent theory is that it recognises and models explicitly the potential conflicts of interest 
between different actors or agents, emphasising asymmetry of information as the critical problem in 
the discipline of insurers and providers. This theory can also have both a positive content and a 
normative content, clarifying in which direction and to what extent different government 
interventions (including regulatory regimes, subsidies, etc.) are likely to modify the overall 
performance of the health system. The relative advantage of monopolistic competitive models is that, 
unlike principal-agent models, they explicitly consider the effects of competition among a plurality 
of health providers.9
The last three chapters of the thesis look at the health reforms implemented over the last decade from 
an empirical perspective, giving account of the existing evidence and presenting an original study on 
the impact of the reforms in the Republic of Georgia. These chapters illuminate the major 
weaknesses and limitations of the health reform model that has prevailed world-wide over the last 
two decades.
Chapter 6 reviews the evidence available from developing countries on the distribution of health and 
health benefits, clarifies what we mean by an equitable or more equitable allocation of health 
resources, and finally reviews our empirical and conceptual understanding of the equity impact of 
different reform allocation and purchasing (RAP) reform components. Chapter 7 presents an 
overview of the evolution of health indicators and health expenditures in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union over the last few years. Chapter 8 zooms on the reforms in a particular 
country, Georgia, and looks specifically at the constraint to accessibility of services posed by the 
raise of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments as the main source of revenue for health providers. Chapter 
9, the final chapter, summarises some of the main results of the thesis.
While the agenda sketched above is certainly ambitious, it is hard to cut off the analysis without 
doing injustice to the complexity of the policy questions involved. If focused only on the market 
failures, the research may lead to excessive enthusiasm for public provision, as is sometimes 
demonstrated by reformers in the United States. If focused entirely on the problems of public 
provision, there will be a tendency to fall back on solutions of "letting the market handle it" as is still 
heard sometimes in Europe. If only the polar cases are examined, the research risks losing relevance.
9 See, for example, D. Dranove and M. Satterthwaite (1992).
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It is important to show the unifying policy problems —the difficulties in insuring against health risk 
and encouraging high quality, cost-effective care- before limiting the analysis to more digestible 
pieces. At the same time, it is important to show that the institutional arrangements experimented in 
the last two decades in several countries, based on the introduction of market incentives and 
mechanisms within the framework of a public health system, may lead to the emergence of new 
dilemmas and trade-offs. The thesis attempts to shed light on some such trade-offs and to be a guide 
for better health policy analysis and intervention.
1.2  M ethodology
This is a thesis which aims to be policy-relevant and to be of interest not just for an academic 
audience, but for a broader audience of health policy experts. One of its original features is its 
ability to build up a coherent conceptual framework considering contributions from several 
theoretical (from health economics and microeconomic theory), policy-oriented, and empirical 
works.
In order to achieve this aim, my strategy has been to provide both survey papers and more rigorous 
theoretical contributions in the first part, and a more empirical analysis in the second part. To explain 
it through a metaphor, the survey papers should accompany the reader in an introductory “skating- 
tour" across the broad iced lake of the relevant literature concerning the issue at stake in each 
Chapter, while the models are holes in the ice, to go deeper in the analysis of specific issues. In fact, 
the “lake" of the literature relevant for this research proved to be immense. The hard-core economic 
literature alone comprises part of welfare economics, agency theory and its applications to the theory 
of regulation, incomplete contract theory and oligopoly analysis, and their application to agents' 
behaviour in health markets. More broadly, the lake encompasses all the health economics and 
policy-oriented literature that has investigated into the role of government intervention in health 
markets, from an equity and from an efficiency perspective, the literature that has dealt with equity, 
its measurement and its implications, plus the policy-oriented literature developed in each country 
and at the international level to analyse health reforms implemented during the last two decades. I 
wanted to give an account of at least some of this immense and diverse research edifice.
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The two “holes in the ice” or theoretical models developed in the thesis build upon some of the more 
recent developments in the theory of regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) in Chapter 5, and in 
industrial organization (vertical competition models) in Chapter 3.
On the empirical part, most of the information presented in the first six chapters is taken from other 
studies, but the evidence presented in Chapter 6 on the Republic of Georgia is original.
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Chapter 2: Adverse selection and the Health
Insurance Market
2.1 In trodu ction
This chapter investigates the way adverse selection influences health insurance market outcomes. 
Adverse selection represents just one of the sources of market failure that justify government 
intervention in health, as highlighted in the theory of welfare economics. Thus, before analysing the 
problem of adverse selection, the central theme of this chapter, it is useful to briefly outline also the 
other sources of market failure in health markets. The other key reason for government intervention, 
equity, is discussed extensively in Annex 2,1, while moral hazard is briefly introduced in Annex 2.2.
2 .2  S ou rces o f  M arket F ailure in  H ealth
The two fundamental theorems of welfare economics (Arrow-Debreu, 1952) are the starting point of 
the neoclassical economics analysis of health markets. The two theorems show that, if certain 
conditions are satisfied (convexity of the production set and price-taking behaviour by firms, 
convexity, continuity and monotonicity of preferences and price-taking behaviour by consumers, 
complete markets and perfect information, absence of externalities and public goods10) competitive 
equilibria are Pareto efficient 11 (1st theorem), and that any Pareto efficient equilibrium may be 
reached as a competitive equilibrium by appropriately redistributing initial endowments across 
individuals through ex-ante lump-sum transfers (2nd theorem)12.
Health care markets violate some of the conditions necessary to achieve Pareto optimal equilibria for 
the following reasons:
>  First, there are specific health services, such as sanitation and health promotion, which are 
non-excludable (free riders cannot be excluded from consumption) and non-rival (use by
10 See Varian, 1992, p. 326.
11 A given allocation of resources is Pareto optimal (strong Pareto optimality) if it is not possible to further 
improve the welfare of any individual without decreasing that of another one.
12 The terminology used in general equilibrium theory refers to Walrasian, rather than competitive equilibrium. 
All is requested to characterize the market interaction is that firms and consumers are price-takers.
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one consumer does not preclude use by others). Hence, they would not be offered by the 
private for-profit sector: in the language of welfare economics, they are public goods. 
Second, there are services, such as immunisations, which are in principle excludable and 
rival, but entail large positive externalities. By receiving immunization, an individual 
reduces the probability of contagious infection not only for herself, but also for others. This 
means that the social benefits of immunization and other preventive interventions against 
communicable disease are larger than the private benefits, and that, if not subsidized, 
private for-profit providers would supply a sub-optimal quantity of services 13.
>  Transactions in health markets are largely decided by supply. Physicians dispose of better 
information than patients do concerning the appropriate diagnostic and treatment 
procedures, as well as having differing interests from patients, both financially and in terms 
of appropriate effort.
>  Imperfect and asymmetric information characterize the health insurance market. Adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and the impossibility of writing complete, long-term contracts can 
prevent the efficient functioning of the market.
Note that according to neoclassical economics the above sources of market failure are necessary, but 
not sufficient conditions to justify public intervention14. Moreover, once an agreement is reached 
over the relative advantage of public intervention, one must still solve the problem of finding the mix 
of public policies that in each circumstance are most appropriate to address the particular source of 
failure that prevents markets from achieving efficient outcomes (see also Annex 6.4, on the limits of 
redistribution). Two broad dimensions must be specified:
a) The first concerns the choice of an appropriate mix of governmental instruments. These 
include: 1) provision of information; 2) taxation/subsidization of the private sector; 3) 
regulation; 4) direct investment. As we shall see in this and the following chapter, each of 
these different forms of interventions produces a distinct impact on market equilibria.
b) The second dimension, for those services that the government chooses to directly provide, 
concerns the design of an appropriate organization system through planning of human and
13 Under-provision problems are more severe when people lack information on the benefits of such 
interventions (see analysis in the text, below).
14 It has been proved that apparently sub-optimal private market equilibria may in fact be constrained Pareto- 
efficient, such that there is no room for improvement, once the same information constraints that limit markets 
are imposed also upon public action (Harris and Townsend, 1981). This is the case, for instance, within a pure 
moral hazard context in the health insurance market. In macroeconomics, similar conclusions that restrict the 
possibility of improving upon macroeconomic equilibria are reached, once we abandon the hypothesis that 
individuals' expectations are myopic or slowly adapt to policy changes (see Sargent and Wallace, 1985).
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physical infrastructure, and a mix of information and financial instruments.
In other words, proving the possibility of a Pareto-improving public intervention in the market is the 
first step of a complicated policy analysis exercise. It is then necessary to define how any corrective 
public intervention could and should be articulated.
This Chapter will illustrate in detail these different options and their impact in the case of insurance 
markets with adverse selection. We shall show that in general some positive level of cross-subsidies 
across different risk groups characterizes second best equilibria15, and that the free market equilibria 
may fail to sustain such cross-subsidization. Thus, adverse selection can be used as the justification 
for the provision of compulsory universal public health insurance. The claim is that, due to adverse 
selection, the government would in any case bear a significant share of total health costs even if it 
chose to take care only of those individuals and risks who are not insured privately. By forcing 
everybody in the same insurance pool, the government could guarantee stability of health financing 
and make the cross- subsidies across risk-groups more transparent. In fact, the government has many 
different options to correct market equilibria, and maintain a positive level of cross-subsidy among 
different risk groups. The options available are to provide full or partial public insurance with or 
without the possibility of complementing it with private insurance, and with or without the 
possibility of opting out of the public scheme. Alternatively, the private insurance market could be 
regulated, for instance through the imposition of a standard contract or of a minimal insurance 
guarantee. As we shall see in the second part of this chapter, the above interventions entail different 
results in terms of efficiency.
2 .3  A dverse  S e lec tion
Adverse selection is defined as the strategic behaviour by the more informed partner in a contract 
against the interest of the less informed partner(s). In the health insurance market it is relevant 
because each individual chooses among the set of contracts offered by insurance companies (in the 
following referred to as “plans”) according to his/her expected probability of using health services. 
In brief, those who foresee an intense use of health services will tend to choose more generous plans
15 In other words it is in the low risk group's interest to provide some form of subsidy in favour of the high-risk 
individuals as a means to achieve a degree of coverage closer to their preferred full coverage contract (see 
analysis in the text, section 2.7).
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than those who expect a limited use of them. In the extreme case, for each premium and extent of 
coverage set in any plan, those who will decide to purchase it are only those who expect to sustain an 
amount of health expenditure greater or equal to the premium they need to pay. Then, without 
adjustments to prevent adverse selection, insurance companies would end up with a loss on each 
customer, regardless of the premiums they charge.
However, insurance companies do anticipate adverse selection and devise contract offers in order to 
screen individuals, so that they can charge each potential customer a premium commensurate to 
his/her expected cost of coverage. 16 These screening strategies by insurers generally hinder the 
achievement of an efficient risk pooling across individuals. The market can be trapped in a sub- 
optimal equilibrium, where insurance companies offer only incomplete coverage, in spite of the fact 
that there is a positive demand for more comprehensive insurance.
There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that adverse selection is an important phenomenon
in health insurance markets. Cutler writes (1996, p.30): "Almost all health insurance systems where
individuals are allowed choice of insurance have experienced adverse selection. Medicare enrolees
who choose managed care17 are healthier than ...[those] who do not. The Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program...has adverse selection between more and less generous policies. The spread in
premiums between more and less generous policies is 68% greater than benefits alone would
dictate.. .And almost every large firm that has encouraged employee choice has found the cost of the
most generous policies increases sufficiently rapidly that these policies are no longer viable” (this
last phenomenon is known in the literature as a "price death spiral" and it is a consequence of
adverse selection; see below). It is expected that the phenomenon of adverse selection will become
more severe in the USA and other countries, if the current trend continues, which is characterized by
increasing competition in the health insurance market and by the diffusion of new employment-
related schemes where individuals are brought to face the true marginal cost of their health coverage. 
18
16 This “screening” strategy is even more critical to success in the market whenever there is regulation in place 
that does not allow health premiums to reflect individual risk (premium rate restrictions), or does not permit to 
acquire information on potential customers' health condition before finalizing contract offers.
17 Managed care plans impose stricter controls and restrictions over use of health services than traditional 
indemnity plans.
18In the past, employers would pay a large share of the premiums. Increasingly, employees are offered lump­
sum transfers for health insurance and they face almost entirely the relative marginal costs of alternative plans.
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In this chapter we will first illustrate the problem o f adverse selection (AS) by way of two examples, 
and then present a selective survey o f the theoretical literature that has described the impact of the 
phenomenon o f AS on market equilibrium. In the second part, the paper analyses different policy 
options to correct market equilibria. We shall try to provide for the first time a unitary representation 
of a set o f concepts that have developed piece-meal over a period o f more than twenty years. Given 
the aim o f our survey and the broadness o f  the existing literature, our attention is focused on giving 
an intuitive understanding of the main results, rather than in presenting them in an analytical rigorous 
form. Whenever possible, we will make use of diagrammatical proofs. Chapter 5, which adopts a 
similar analytical framework o f a principal-agent model with asymmetric information to study the 
purchaser-provider relationship, will describe in detail the mathematical properties of this family of  
models.
2 .4  Two Exam ples
The first example builds on a similar case presented by Cutler and Zeckhauser (1997). Consider two 
health plans, a generous (G) and a moderate (M) plan, offered in a particular market composed of 
two types of individuals, high-risk and low-risk, each group making up 50% of the entire population. 
Suppose that the cost o f treating individuals under the two plans, and their gains in benefit from G 
vis-a-vis M, are as follows:
Table 2.1: Resource Cost and Benefit from Health Insurance Coverage (D=Denarius)
• Moderate Plan Generous Plan
Low-risk
High-risk
40 D 
70 D
60 D 
100 D
• • - . 
15 D
40 D
Let us assume that insurance market is perfectly competitive so that in equilibrium premiums must 
be equal to expected costs. First note that the first best or full-information (FB) equilibrium in this 
example would see the high-risk individuals enrolled in the generous plan for a price of 100 D (G-
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M=difference in benefits=40>30=difference in costs), and the low-risk individuals in the moderate 
plan for a price of 40 D (G-M=difference in benefits=15<20=difference in costs).
However, the above FB equilibrium is not sustainable with incomplete information, when insurers 
only know that each potential customer can be either low or high-risk with equal probability19. At a 
price of 40 both groups would buy the moderate plan, which would start making losses (if both 
groups purchase M, is expected cost of coverage is 55D (40*0.5+70*0.5).
Now consider the following situation. Initially a unique plan, the generous one, is offered in the 
market. If the market is competitive in equilibrium such plan must break even, and it would thus be 
offered to everybody for a price of 80D (60*0.5+100*0.5). Then, let us assume that the moderate 
plan is devised and offered for a price of 64D, which is low enough to attract low-risk individuals. 
All low-risks would switch to the new plan (they can save 16 in exchange for a benefit loss of 15), 
while the high-risk individuals would stay with the generous plan (their net benefit loss from 
switching would be equal to 24=40-16).
However, once the low risk have moved away from G, at the original price equal to 80D the plan, 
now burdened with all high-risk individuals, would become unprofitable, while M at a price of 64D 
would be making a positive profit. Thus, the forces of competition would lead to an increase in the 
price of G and a decrease in the price of M. When the price differential between G and M exceeds 
40D (given the above assumptions, it will eventually do so, because in equilibrium premiums must 
reflect relative expected costs), all high-risk individuals will also switch to M. Then G, the generous 
plan, is terminated, and, when this happens, if the price of M is below 55, M would also become 
unprofitable, because once it shoulders all risk types its price must exceed 55 (=70*0.5+40*0.5). 
When the ‘pooling equilibrium’ (see below) in M is restored, new opportunities to undercut M, by 
offering yet ‘more’ moderate plans that attract low-risks, may arise. The market may be 
characterized by chronic instability.
Now, consider the equilibrium that the market would reach by changing Table 2.1’s figures for net 
benefits as follows:
19 Insurance companies can also compute the expected cost of coverage for each of the two risk-groups 
separately and the expected costs of the plan that pools together both groups.
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Table 2.2: Resource Cost and Benefit from Health Insurance Coverage (D=Denarius)
Resource cost o f  coverage Resource cost o f  coverage Benefit
generous
difference
moderate
(money equivalent)
Moderate Plan
. . . . . . .  .. . ......
Generous Plan
Low-risk 40 D
High-risk 70 D
60 D 
100 D
25 D
60 D
Both groups are made more “risk averse” in this second example: they both value being in the 
generous plan more than in the previous example. As before, suppose that insurers do not know each 
individual’s risk type. It is clear that the full-information equilibrium, which would in this case see 
both risk groups purchasing the generous plan for a price o f 60 (low-risk) and 100 (high-risk), cannot 
be an equilibrium with incomplete information. Moreover, starting from the same initial situation 
considered above (generous plan offered for a price o f 80D), it is profitable for low-risks to switch to 
the moderate plan as long as it is offered for a price lower than 55D (which is the price where the 
amount low-risk individuals save by switching to M, 80-55 = 25, is equal to their net benefit loss 
from switching). Again, when low-risk individual abandon the generous plan, its price will need to 
rise up to 100D, which is the average cost to cover high-risks. At the same time competition will 
lead to a further decrease in the price o f the moderate plan, down to 40D (=expected cost o f coverage 
o f low-risks). Unlike the previous example, however, a price differential o f 60D (100-40) is not 
sufficient to induce high-risks to switch to the moderate plan (in fact, they are just indifferent 
between switching to M and maintaining G). Thus, in this case the situation in which high-risks pay 
100 for full insurance and low-risks pay 40 for incomplete coverage is a stable market equilibrium (a 
‘separating equilibrium’; see below). With incomplete information, low-risks are worse off than in 
the full information equilibrium, as they obtain only partial insurance. The market “sorts” out low- 
risks from high-risk individuals by offering plans with less than optimal coverage. Low-risks would 
be willing to pay an additional 25D to get full coverage (and the cost o f the additional coverage for 
them would only be 20D in case o f perfect information); obviously, this option is not available to 
them in case of incomplete information, because by purchasing G they would be ‘confused’ with 
high-risks, and would have to pay more than their marginal cost o f coverage.
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2 .5  R o th sch ild -S tig litz  an d  E quilibrium  in  C om petitive  
In su ran ce M arkets
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) were the first analytically to investigate the problem of adverse 
selection in the insurance market. We begin our survey of the theoretical literature by presenting a 
detailed summary of their model, which is then going to be used to illustrate all the subsequent 
developments in the literature.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analyse a situation where individuals are subject to exogenous shocks 
to their wealth. We can imagine that such shocks (named “accidents”) can be provoked by diseases 
that prevent individuals from continuing their normal activities.
Individuals’ wealth prospects depend on whether or not any insurance is available in the market: 
without insurance, wealth is equal to Wj=W, if no ‘accident’ occurs, and to W2=W -d if it occurs, 
where “d” is the amount of the expected wealth loss. If insurance is available, in the simplest case 
one can assume that insurance companies offer an indemnity contract or plan, with a reimbursement 
equal to a A2 if an accident occurs in exchange for a premium (paid in any case) equal to cti. 
Individuals’ wealth with insurance becomes respectively: W j = W- cci if no accident occurs, and W 2
= W - a! + a A2 -  d = W + a 2 - d, where a 2 = a A2 - a b is the net indemnity, if an accident occurs. 
Suppose an accident occurs with probability p. Then, if insurance is available one can represent 
individuals’ preferences for wealth in the two states in the following way20:
V(p, auOk) = (l-p)U(W -aO + pU(W + a 2 - d) (2.1)
Given p, the probability that an accident occurs, each individual chooses the level of insurance that 
maximizes V(') with respect to {cti,a2}. Rothschild and Stiglitz (hereafter, R.-S.) assume that 
individuals are risk averse, i.e. U ” ( ) < 0 21, and that they cannot influence the amount of the 
indemnity, nor the probability of obtaining it (no moral hazard).
20 The expression in the text writes utility as a linear function of probabilities. In order to do so, the 
description of preferences under uncertainty must satisfy a set of conditions. See: Varian (1992, pp. 172-176).
21 Thus, V( ) being a linear combination of concave functions, is quasi-concave.
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On the supply side of the market insurance companies are considered risk-neutral and only interested 
in expected profits. A contract offer Q  consists of a bundle {a i,a2} containing a specific indemnity 
(‘amount of insurance’) that the individual can buy in exchange for a specific premium (in the 
diagrams that follow we will refer interchangeably to contracts Q  or to {a i,a2}, the net premium- 
indemnity pair which identifies each contract). R-S assume that the insurance market is perfectly 
competitive, which implies that in equilibrium expected revenues from premiums are equal to 
expected costs from indemnity payment, but at the same time that individuals can buy at most one 
insurance contract, thus recognizing that insurance companies are able to ration the extent of 
insurance coverage22.
The expected profit associated with a contract to an individual with probability p of incurring an 
accident which would trigger the payment of an indemnity equal to a A2is the following:
7t (p, a l5a 2) = (1-p) a j  -  p (a A2 - aO = (1-p) cti -  p a 2 (2.2)
The equilibrium concept R-S adopt is that of Nash-Coumot, where each agent maximizes his/her 
objective function independently of other agents’ reaction, and the equilibrium set of contracts is 
defined by the following conditions:
I. Customers maximize expected utility.
II. No contract within the equilibrium set entails negative expected profits.
III. No contract outside the equilibrium set, if offered, would make a positive profit.
Finally, R-S assume that, when deciding to sign a contract, individuals know “p”, the probability that 
the accident occurs, while insurance companies do not.
2 .5 .1  Equilibrium w ith  Identical Custom ers
Let us first consider the equilibrium with identical customers. Figure 2.1 represents on the horizontal 
axis wealth if no accident occurs, and on the vertical axis wealth if it occurs. Situations of full
22 Later literature pointed out at the inconsistency of the two above assumptions. In theory each consumer 
should be able to buy unlimited quantity of a given good offered under competitive conditions at the prevailing 
market prices. R-S’s assumption of quantity constraints over the available extent of insurance coverage would 
be more compatible with the assumption that the market is oligopolistic.
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insurance correspond to points on the bisetrix, while situations of incomplete insurance lie to the 
right of the bisetrix (where Wi >W2).
Consider a representative individual, whose expected wealth in the two states without insurance is 
represented by point E. The individual is exposed to an accident with probability p, and in that case 
she/he sustains a loss equal to d. Each point to the “North-West” of E can be reached by purchasing 
a specific insurance contract, uniquely identified by a premium oti and a net indemnity a 2 in case the
accident occurs. Segment EF represents the zero profit, or ‘actuarial (fair) odds line. If any 
insurance company accepted to trade wealth in the two states with the individual at a rate equal to the 
slope of EF (do^/doci = (l-p)/p = -dW^dWO23, it would gain a zero expected profit, because expected
revenue ((1-p) cq) would be equal to expected cost (pa2). By contrast, starting from point E, all
points to the “South-West” of EF would entail a positive profit, and all points to the “North-East” of 
EF would result in a loss for the insurance company.
Thus, the above conditions I, II and IE constrain equilibrium contracts to belong to the set along the 
‘zero profit’ line, where 7i(p, a ^(*2 ) = (1-p) - pci2 = 0 24.(Assumption 1)
Figure 2.1 also represents individuals’ preferences concerning combinations of wealth in the two 
states through a map of indifference curves. Given risk-aversion, the indifference curves are convex 
25. Given any indifference curve, all the points to the “North-East” of it entail higher utility, and all 
the points to the “South-West” entail a lower utility.
23 The expression is obtained by differentiating equation (2.2), the zero profit condition.
24 In other words, the zero-profit line identifies the “best” budget constraint available to the individual for 
trading income in the two states. Each individual finds her/his preferred contract along that “best” budget 
constraint.
25 A mathematical property states that the level curves of a quasi-concave function are convex. Being V( ) 
quasi-concave, its indifference curves are convex.
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium with Identical Customers
C5-
W-d
W-cc,
The equilibrium contract lies in correspondence to the highest indifference curve compatible with the 
budget constraint EF (point C5 in Figure 2.1). In correspondence to C5 the slope of the indifference 
curve is equal to the slope of EF. From the equation of the indifference curve:
( l-p)[dU(W  p/dW ^dW  j + p[dU(W 2)/dW2]dW2 = 0, (2.3)
If we denote: dU( )/d W |= U ’(W |) and dU( )/dW2 =U ’(W2), the slope of the indifference curve is 
equal to:
dW2/dW ! = [ U W i) /U ’(W2)][(l-p)/p] (2.4)
The tangency condition entails:
=  =  (2.5)
U  (W 2) p p
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Thus, given that individuals are risk averse and insurance companies are risk neutral, the first best is 
characterized by full insurance26.
2 .5 .2  Equilibrium w ith Two Classes o f Custom ers
Let us now consider a market consisting of two groups of customers27. They are characterized by the 
same utility function for wealth in the two states, U(.), but by different accident probabilities.
h
•  high-risk individuals, with probability of accident = p
1 h 1
•  low-risk individuals, with probability of accident = p , with p > p
Let the percentage of high-risk individuals be equal to X RS. The average probability of accident is
EXP h PQ 1
then equal to: p = X p + (1 - X )p
it is possible to distinguish between two types of equilibria:
•  pooling equilibria, in which both risk groups purchase the same insurance contract. In any 
pooling equilibrium, the zero profit condition (Assumption 1 above) must hold across all the 
individual types:
EXP EXP
(1-p )o ti-p  a 2=0 (2.6)
•  separating equilibria, in which different risk-groups choose different contracts. In any separating
equilibrium, Assumption 1 above requires that each of the separate contracts yield zero expected
profits. In the case of just two risk groups:
h h 1 1
(1-p ) ^  - p a 2 = 0, and (1-p ) a i - p a 2 = 0 (2.7)
In Figure 2.2 we denote with the letter L and H the indifference curves and zero profit lines relative 
to respectively low-risk and high-risk individuals. Note that the slope of the zero profit line for low- 
risk individuals (L, with a slope equal to (l-pVp1) is steeper than that relative to high-risk individuals
26 In fact, if the insurance premium were set at a higher level than the actuarially fair premium, the extent of the 
insurance coverage chosen by individuals would be lower (incomplete coverage). However, under R-S’s 
hypothesis of free entry in the market, any plan with a premium above the “fair-odds” level would be undercut 
by competition until the zero-profit equilibrium is reached.
27 We will frequently refer to them as risk-types or risk-groups.
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(H, with a slope equal to ( l-p h)/ph ), because the probability o f the accident occurring and the 
insurance company paying the indemnity is lower for low-risks. From equation (2.4) note also that 
the slope of the low-risks’ indifference curve passing through each point (W^; W 2 } is steeper than
that of the high-risks’ indifference curve through the same point. In other words, each indifference 
curve of high and low-risk individuals can intersect only once (“single-crossing property”). Finally, 
we have replicated in Figure 2.2 segment EF from Figure 2.1, which should now to be interpreted as 
the zero profit line for pooling contracts. Contracts on segment EF are the best individuals can hope 
to receive from insurers when they are all purchasing the same contract.
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium with Two Classes of Customers
W
The first result R-S prove is that, when there are two different risk groups and information is 
incomplete, first best equilibria are no longer sustainable, as they violate the high-risk group 
incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint (for a detailed explanation of the meaning o f the IC 
constraint, see Chapter 5). The IC constraints entail that, whenever different contracts are offered to 
each risk-type, they must be devised so that each individual would prefer the contract specific to its 
own risk-type vis-a-vis the contract set for any other risk-type. No one can be cheated or forced to 
buy a contract different from the contract she/he prefers among those available in the market. In our 
insurance market example there are just two risk-groups or types, high and low risk, so, if  we denote
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by Ch and C1 the set o f contracts meant respectively for the high-risk and the low-risk groups, the I.C. 
constraints can be written as follows:
V(ph, Ch ) > V(ph, Cl ) and V(p‘, C1) > V(p‘, Ch) (2.8)
As Figure 2.2 above shows, first-best equilibria violate the first o f these constraints. If both contracts 
Ci and C2, the first-best contracts, are available in the market, all individuals would clearly prefer Q  
to C2, because Q  still provides full insurance coverage and greater wealth in both states. Q  would 
then be unprofitable, because only contracts on segment EF, such as C 3  and C 4 ,  or contracts to the 
‘south-west’ of EF can be sustained as pooling equilibria.
The second, important result that R-S graphically prove is that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium. 
Figure 2.3: Impossibility of a Pooling Equilibrium
EXP
As Figure 2.3 indicates, any contract on segment EF, such as contract C3, can always be upset by a 
new contract offer in the shaded area, such as contract C6. All low-risk individuals are induced to 
purchase the new contract, which lies on a higher indifference curve for them, while high-risk
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individuals would continue to purchase C3. The latter contract, however, when burdened with only 
high-risk individuals, would become unprofitable and would be terminated28.
The only possible equilibrium with different risk-types is a separating equilibrium, identified in 
Figure 2.4 by contracts C2 and C7. As Figure 2.4 indicates, when these two contracts are offered, 
high-risk individuals purchase contract C2, characterized by full insurance, while low-risk 
individuals purchase contract C7. Contract C7 is the preferred contract by the low-risks among all 
contracts that respect the high-risk group's IC constraint (V(ph, C2 ) > V(ph, C7)29. Both contracts 
break even (contract C2 lies on the high-risk zero profit line, and C7 lies on the low-risk zero profit 
line). Thus, contracts C2-C7 satisfy conditions I, n, and El above, and they are a separating 
equilibrium.
Note that in any separating equilibrium the low-risk group receives incomplete insurance (C7 lays to 
the right of the bisetrix), similarly to the situation described in the numerical example in Table 2.2. 
Note also that point C7 is not at the tangency point between any indifference curve for low-risks and 
their budget constraint. When R-S published their seminal work economic theory still lacked a solid 
foundation for welfare analysis under conditions of imperfect information, but they had the intuition 
that the separating equilibria reached by the insurance market entailed a welfare loss. Low-risk 
individuals obtain less than optimal coverage while high-risk individuals do not improve their 
situation with respect to the first best. It is as if high-risk imposed a negative externality on low-risk. 
R-S also proved that the separating equilibrium is in general30 Pareto inferior to a set of contracts 
characterized by some positive cross-subsidy from low-risk to high-risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976, pp.644-645), thus anticipating a key result which will later on be rigorously proven on the 
basis of second best analysis (see section 2.7).
28 The impossibility of pooling contracts derives from the “single-crossing” property.
29 In fact, in correspondence to the separating equilibrium C2 C7 the high-risk incentive compatibility constraint 
is binding, which means that high-risks are indifferent between C2and C7. Given C2, any contract along the 
low-risk group zero profit line above C7 would be purchased by both groups and would therefore yield negative 
profits (when both groups purchase the same contract, such contract must lie on segment EF).
The result does not hold if the percentage of high-risk people is high enough.
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Figure 2.4: Separating Equilibrium with Two Risk Types
w2
w ,
R-S also proved that a separating equilibrium may fail to exist, in which case the competitive 
insurance market has no equilibrium (as previously discussed -see Figure 2.3- any contract that pools 
both risk groups together, cannot be a stable equilibrium). This occurs when the cost o f pooling for 
low-risk is not significant, while the cost o f separating and thus accepting incomplete insurance is 
high, which is a situation that can arise under the following circumstances:
>  When low risk individuals are characterized by a high degree of risk aversion.
>  When the two groups are characterized by a similar probability o f incurring the event for 
which they demand insurance.
>  When there are few high-risk individuals.
Figure 2.5 illustrates a situation in which a separating equilibrium fails to exist:
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Figure 2.5: Impossibility of a Separating Equilibrium
/N
C2
W!
In the figure above, the potential separating equilibrium where all high-risk purchase C2 and low-risk 
individuals purchase C7 is upset by a contract that attracts both risk groups. Consider, for example, 
contract Cg, which lies on segment EF and so it is sustainable when both groups purchase it. Figure 
2.5 indicates that Cg is preferred by both groups to contracts C2-C7.
Graphically, one can see that the potential separating equilibrium is unstable whenever at least a sub- 
segment of EF, the pooling contracts zero profit line, lies above Lj, which represents the low-risk 
indifference curve in correspondence to the separating equilibrium31. Analytically, one can prove 
that there exists a threshold minimal percentage o f high-risk individuals equal to XKS, which is a 
function of low-risks’ degree of risk-aversion and o f the risk differential across risk-types (ph-p'), that 
guarantees the stability of the separating equilibrium in the R-S model.
31 Thus, the condition that must be satisfied for the separating equilibrium to be stable is that the low-risks’ 
indifference (Lj in the above figure) curve must be ‘steeper’ than the zero profit pooling line EF in 
correspondence to C7.
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2 .5 .3  Final Remarks on the R-S Model and Introduction to  Subsequent 
D evelopm ents in  the Literature
R-S describe the market interaction between potential customers and insurers in a situation of 
information asymmetry, where insurance companies do not know individuals’ likelihood to fall in 
the situation (the ‘accident in R-S’s terminology) against which they demand to be insured. In order 
to improve available information on customers’ risk, insurance companies can diversify plans and 
offer less expensive contracts characterized by limited coverage. Such contracts tend to be preferred 
by lower risk groups, and they can lead to separating equilibria. However, these equilibria may be 
sub-optimal, or/and unstable. The R-S’s result is robust to changes in hypotheses as long as 
individuals with different risk properties differ in some characteristics that can be linked to their 
purchase of insurance and, somehow, insurance companies can discover that link.
R-S’s analysis can be well applied to health insurance markets, where patients are characterized by 
private information over their health status and this information influences their decision to buy 
insurance. Younger and healthier individuals, and all those who feel it is unlikely they will become 
ill, would not value comprehensive insurance coverage as much as those who believe they would 
make more intense use of health care services. Insurance companies, in turn, know that patients' 
purchasing decision is influenced by their (perceived) likelihood of utilizing health care services, and 
offer ‘cheaper’ contracts characterised by incomplete coverage -fo r example by expanding the list of 
excluded conditions- in order to screen healthier individuals (‘the good risks’). Once the ‘good’ 
risks are out of more comprehensive insurance schemes, the latter remain burdened exclusively with 
individuals affected by chronic disease or likely to undergo costly treatment, and their relative price 
tends to rise. In extreme circumstances, over time these more ‘generous’ health insurance schemes 
may remain accessible only to a thin, wealthier minority of the population willing to pay ever- 
increasing premiums, or be altogether terminated.
2 .6  E quilibrium  R efin em en ts
Building on R-S’s contribution, one stream of microeconomic literature, labelled as "equilibrium 
refinements", changed the hypotheses underlying firms' or individuals' behaviour in order to 
overcome R-S’s puzzling result that in certain circumstances no equilibrium may exist in the 
insurance market.
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R-S assumed that both agents, insurers and insured, follow a myopic (Nash) behaviour, which means 
that neither of them anticipates the other’s possible reaction when deciding their strategy. Wilson 
(1976) was the first to remove this hypothesis and suppose instead that insurance companies behave 
strategically, in accordance with the analysis of firms’ behaviour in oligopolistic markets. Wilson 
gives the following characterization of the equilibrium set of contracts (compare them with 
conditions 1,11, and II in section 2.5):
I. Customers maximize expected utility.
n. No contract in the equilibrium set entails negative expected profits.
HI. There is no potential new contract offer outside the equilibrium set that is profitable, when all loss- 
making contracts are withdrawn from the market as a result of the new contract offer.
Thus, unlike R-S, Wilson imposes that any deviation from the equilibrium must continue to be 
profitable even after all non-profitable contracts are discontinued.
A second contribution to the literature of "equilibrium refinements" is that by Grossman (1979), who 
makes the hypothesis of “dissembling” behaviour by high-risk individuals. According to Grossman, 
all potential health insurance customers know that in equilibrium any loss-making contract will be 
withdrawn from the market. Therefore, when high-risk individuals submit their application for 
insurance, they self-restrain their choice between the set of contracts chosen by low-risk and the set 
of contracts which would not be unprofitable even if chosen only by high risk (which in our 
proceeding analysis was identified with contract C2 characterised by full insurance). In other words, 
high-risk ‘dissemble’ as low-risk by choosing the same contract low-risk choose, as long as this 
allows them to enjoy a level of utility higher than in C2. By anticipating insurers' screening strategy, 
they realize that any other strategy would ultimately lead them to be all together excluded from the 
market.
Under Grossman and Wilson’s hypotheses the same set of equilibria are selected. The R-S 
separating equilibrium holds when the proportion of high-risk X is greater than a certain threshold 
XRS32. However, when X < XRS the pooling equilibrium preferred by low-risks becomes a stable 
equilibrium. When the percentage of high-risk individuals is small enough, low-risk prefer to cross- 
subsidize contracts for high-risk in the pooling equilibrium rather than to accept a lower level of
32 Where A.RS is the same percentage of high-risk individuals that guarantees the existence of the separating
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coverage in the separating equilibrium. Thus, the pooling equilibrium preferred by low-risk becomes 
stable (at the point of tangency between segment EF and a low-risk group’s indifference curve L4 in 
correspondence to contract Ci0in Figure 2.6). Let us explain why.
Figure 2.6: Under Wilson's and Grossman's Hypothesis, the Pooling Equilibrium Preferred by
the Low-Risk Group Becomes Stable
C2
w,
Recall that in the R-S model any new contract offer in the shaded area to the South-East in between 
L4 and H4 was able to upset Cio by attracting only low-risk individuals. However, any new contract 
offer in the shaded area would lead to terminate contract Cio, because the latter would remain 
burdened only by high-risk individuals and it is above the high-risk group zero profit line HE. 
However, once Ci0 is withdrawn, any new contract in the full area would become unprofitable, 
because it lies above the zero profit pooling line EF.
Thus, under Wilson's hypothesis, the new contract is not a profitable deviation from Ci0 (see 
condition III for equilibria discussed above). The same is true under Grossman's hypothesis of 
strategic behaviour on the part of individuals, because high-risk would immediately ‘follow ’ low-risk 
individuals in any deviation from C 10 in the full area, thus making any such deviation immediately
equilibrium in the R-S model.
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unprofitable. If they didn't, they would immediately be ‘recognized’ as being high-risk, and would 
receive contract C2 on the high-risk zero profit line EH.
A third contribution to the literature of "equilibrium refinements" is that by Miyazaki and Wilson 
(M-W, 1977). These two authors adopt Wilson’s (1976) definition of equilibrium, but they relax the 
zero profit constraint hypothesis. According to M-W, loss-making contracts can remain in the 
market, as long as insurance companies are able to cross-subsidize unprofitable contracts with 
profitable ones. They show that under this new hypothesis the equilibrium is always characterized by 
a positive cross-subsidy across contracts, unless the percentage of high-risk X is greater than a certain 
threshold XMW, in which case the R-S separating equilibrium prevails. M-W equilibria tend to 
become unstable as competition in the market becomes harsher and the incentive to terminate 
unprofitable contracts increases.
There are several other contributions to the literature on ‘equilibrium refinements’, which we can 
only briefly mention in the last part of this section. Riley (1979) extends the R-S’s model to a 
continuum of risk-types under the same behavioural hypotheses, and shows that the insurance market 
may fail to reach a stable equilibrium under any assumption on the distribution of risk types. Riley 
also modifies R-S’s hypothesis of Nash behaviour on the part of the insurers and develops the 
concept of Reactive Equilibria, according to which insurers do not offer contracts that they know 
will become unprofitable if their competitors’ reaction is taken into account.
Stiglitz (1978) extends the analysis of insurance market equilibria to the case of monopoly, showing 
that when there are only two risk groups the only possible equilibrium is separating, in 
correspondence to which high-risk achieve full insurance and low-risk individuals may be only 
partially insured. Under monopolistic conditions, low-risk individuals are subject to terms that make 
them indifferent between buying insurance or be uninsured and, if the percentage of high-risk 
individuals is large enough, they end up buying no insurance. Thus, although the distribution of 
surplus is obviously more favourable to the insurer in monopoly than in competition, some of the 
qualitative results that characterize competitive markets are confirmed and in fact reinforced in the 
monopoly case.
Newhouse (1996) shows that if there are positive transaction costs, the pooling equilibrium can 
become stable even under R-S behavioural hypotheses, because the net gain from upsetting any 
equilibrium contract can be more than compensated by the additional transaction costs necessary to
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devise a new contract. Newhouse’s intuition is that partial market imperfections in the insurance 
market may actually be beneficial because they limit the net advantage of underwriting competitors’ 
contractual offers. Ercinosa and Sappington (1997) confirm the same result, by showing that market 
power and scale economies can facilitate the coincidence between socially preferred and market 
outcomes in the insurance market (see below). In the spirit of the literature on ‘contestable markets’, 
they show that if there are positive sunk-costs (costs of entry that cannot be recovered) there exist 
market equilibria where the incumbent insurance company cross-subsidizes loss making contracts 
(those on high-risk) with profitable ones (those on low-risk). The intuition is that if scale economies 
were significant, any insurance company that served all risk customers would face lower average 
costs because it would be able to spread its fixed costs over a larger pool of customers. This could 
more than compensate the potential advantage of screening specific risk types.
The above literature points at the fact that phenomena, which are normally considered negative 
because they hinder the full display of the “beneficial effects” of competition in other markets, in the 
insurance market may in fact play a positive role. However, as Newhouse (1984) noted, transaction 
costs may also exacerbate the effects of the adverse selection problem. If it is difficult to change 
contract conditions, insurers will be extra-careful before making an offer to a potential high-risk 
consumer, which may become a permanent liability in the company’s budget. If it is impossible or 
too costly for an insurer to risk-rate a new applicant, the insurer may either reject the applicant or ask 
a disproportionably high premium.
In summary, the contributions to the literature known as ‘equilibrium refinements’ highlight that the 
final characterization of the equilibrium in the health insurance market will depend on the type of 
prevailing market structure (which determine insurance companies’ conduct and constraints). Some 
of R-S’s original conclusions are confirmed, and others are further specified, such as those 
concerning the stability of pooling equilibria and of equilibria characterized by positive cross­
subsidies, under different hypotheses concerning agents’ behaviour and market imperfections.
2 .7  Second B est (SB) E qu ilibria
A second stream of literature set the foundation for welfare analysis under conditions of imperfect 
information, by looking at the properties of Second Best equilibria. Such equilibria emerge when the
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individuals' maximization problem is not only constrained by resource availability but also by agents' 
incentive-compatibility constraints.
The core concept, first developed by Harris and Townsend (1981) and then explicitly applied to the 
insurance market by Crocker and Snow (1985), is that of constrained Pareto-efficiency. A market 
allocation is constrained-Pareto efficient, or second best, if it is Pareto efficient among all possible 
allocations satisfying:
- resource constraints;
- incentive compatibility, or self-selection constraints.
In other words, Pareto-constrained are ‘the best’ equilibria (in terms of agents' utility) that can be 
achieved whenever a self-selection or incentive compatibility constraint (according to which agents 
must be induced to reveal their private information; see Chapter 5) is considered alongside a resource 
constraint. Let us define Ch = { a h i , a h 2} the set of contracts meant for the high-risk group and C1 = 
{ a 11, a 12} the set of contracts meant for the low-risk group. The formal structure of the problem to 
characterize SB equilibria is the following:
Max «, pV(ph, Ch) + (l-p)V(p', C1) (2.9)
Subject to:
1. Xit(p\ C") + (1-X) TtCp1, C1) = Xld-p") a \ - pV2] + (l-X)Kl-p') a 1, - p 'a '2] > 0  
(Resource, R, constraint).
2. V(ph, Ch ) > V (p\ C1) and V(p', C1) > V(p', Ch)
(Incentive-Compatibility, IC, constraints).
p is an arbitrary weight given to high-risk in the welfare function: p E  [0,1].
SB contracts are Pareto-efficient contracts among those satisfying constraints 1 and 2 above. If we 
exclude equilibria characterized by over-insurance 33 (where individuals would end up with higher 
wealth in case the ‘accident’ occurs), it is possible to prove that all SB equilibria (see Harris and 
Townsend, 1981) satisfy the following necessary conditions:
a) C h provides full insurance to high-risk.
33 Formally, we are imposing that A. > p, i.e., the proportion of high-risks is higher than their weight in the 
social welfare function.
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b) High-risk are indifferent between Ch and C1
c) Any losses (gains) on high-risk contracts Ch are exactly compensated by gains (losses) on low- 
risk contracts C1.
In Figure 2.7, the segment C7F (a subset of the curve J ^ 1) identifies the set o f (separating) contracts 
for low-risk that, in combination with full insurance contracts for high-risk individuals along C2F, 
satisfy conditions a), b) and c) above, and are thus potential candidates for SB equilibria. Note that 
C 2 - C 7 ,  the R-S separating market equilibrium discussed before, belongs to the set o f potential SB 
equilibria candidates. In correspondence to C2-C7 both contracts break even, and there is no cross­
subsidy between risk groups: condition c) above is trivially satisfied.
Figure 2.7: Second Best Equilibria
W2
Let us identify the second best contracts among all the possible candidates (contracts that satisfy 
conditions a, b and c above) in a graphical example, illustrated in Figure 2.7. As we move along J!F 
starting from C7 and correspondingly move towards F from C2, the cross-subsidy from low risk in 
favour o f high-risk becomes positive: in correspondence to these contracts, low-risk are paying 
progressively more than a "fair-odds" premium (moving to the left o f segment EL along J'F) to 
receive more complete coverage (moving towards the bisetrix); by contrast, high-risk individuals are 
paying progressively less than a ‘fair-odds’ premium and still obtain full coverage (moving to the 
right, or North-East, o f segment EH along the bisetrix). Note that in Figure 2.7 by moving from C7
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along J*F low risk individuals initially increase their utility level (graphically, they are able to reach 
progressively higher indifference curves), even if they are paying more than a fair-odds premium for 
this additional insurance. They are able to receive more complete coverage than in C7i while still 
separating from high-risk. Their preferred equilibrium is in correspondence to point Cn, at the 
tangency of JhJ ! and their highest indifference curve. In parallel, high-risks increase their utility 
moving from C2 to C 12 (they still receive full-insurance and pay progressively less for it). Thus in 
Figure 2.7, C2-C7 is not a SB equilibrium34, and by introducing the possibility of a positive cross­
subsidy across risk-groups, one can move from Pareto-dominated towards Pareto-superior equilibria 
(such as Cn-C12).
If we further increase the degree of redistribution or cross-subsidy across risks beyond Cn-Ci2 
(converging towards F from Cn-Ci2), high-risks’ utility further increases, while low-risks’ utility 
decreases. Thus, in is not possible to increase both groups’ utility beyond Cn-Ci2 and still respect 
necessary conditions a,b and c for SB equilibria. All combinations of contracts along FJ1 from Cn to 
F for low-risk, which correspond to contracts from Ci2 to F for high-risk, are not comparable 
according to the Pareto criterion, and they all represent (constrained) Pareto-optimal or SB contracts. 
F is the pooling SB contract preferred by high risk individuals. In correspondence of F the cross- 
subsidy is highest.
Note that the above analysis of SB equilibria provides a significant, yet unusual, rationale for 
redistribution across risk groups in the health insurance market. Traditionally, the desirability of 
cross-subsidy from low to high risk groups has been justified on the basis of equity, by pointing out 
that it ought to be a public responsibility to care for the health needs of those, like the old and the 
chronically ill, who would otherwise be unable to buy insurance at a premium that reflects their 
health risk, or to pay directly for services. Or it has been justified by appealing to a life-cycle 
argument: the young and healthy (low-risk) accept to pay more because they know that in the future, 
when they will become old and sick, they will in turn be able to benefit from subsidized health 
insurance coverage (see Annex 2.1). The above analysis provides a third justification of 
redistribution, by showing that even without considering the future, in fact it may be welfare 
improving and in low-risk individuals’ interest to provide some form of subsidy in favour of the 
high-risk, as a means to achieve a more complete level of health insurance coverage for themselves.
34 Instead, see Figure 2.8 for a case where C2-C7 is a second-best equilibrium.
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2 .8  O ptim ality  o f  M arket Equilibria
It is possible to utilise the conceptual framework sketched above as a benchmark to analyse the 
optimality of private insurance market equilibria and the welfare impact of different government 
interventions in the health insurance market, according to different behavioural hypotheses. As we 
showed in the preceding sections, if  in equilibrium each contract must break even, the market cannot 
provide both separation o f risks and cross-subsidization. Thus, if a positive level o f cross­
subsidization characterizes SB equilibria, the R-S separating equilibrium is not SB optimal (in Figure 
2.7, we indicated that C2-C7 , the R-S separating equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by Cn Ci2). 
However, this last conclusion does not necessarily hold, and we now turn to a graphical example 
where it doesn’t, illustrated in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Case Where the R-S Separating Equilibrium Is SB Optimal
A
w
In the above figure, C7 is at the point of tangency of J*F and the low-risk group’s map of indifference 
curves (in correspondence to Lj). Thus, any further movement towards F along J'F would lead to a 
decrease of the low-risk’s utility level, and would not be a Pareto improvement.
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In conclusion, the (Second Best) optimality of market equilibria depends on the value assumed by 
some key parameters (among others, individuals’ degree of risk-aversion, the probability of the event 
which individuals buy insurance against, and the variability and volatility of the risk in the insured 
population). Which characterization of these parameters leads to a situation such as that described in 
Figure, 2.8, as opposed to that prevailing in Figure 2.7? The literature indicates that the R-S 
separating equilibrium is more likely to be SB optimal, as it is in Figure 2.8, when the percentage of 
high-risk individuals is sufficiently large, or when the degree of risk aversion of low risks is low, or 
when the risk differential among different risk groups is higher. The intuition is that all of these 
parameters increase the cost of cross-subsidizing high-risk individuals. For example, if the 
proportion of high risk individuals is above a certain threshold A.MW35, the extra benefit low-risk gain 
from increasing their insurance coverage relative to the R-S equilibrium level is not sufficient to 
justify the extra costs they must sustain to cross-subsidize all high-risk individuals. The same result 
holds if low-risk individuals are not very risk-averse, or if their probability of incurring the event for 
which they could buy insurance coverage is low. It turns out that the threshold A.MW is greater than 
A.rs, the percentage of high-risks beyond which the R-S separating equilibrium exists and is stable, 
under Wilson's as well as Grossman’s hypotheses. This leads us to state the following important 
result: there is an interval: XRS<X<XM™, where X describes the share of high-risk individuals over the 
total, in correspondence to which the R-S separating equilibrium exists, but it is (Second Best) sub- 
optimal.
By contrast, when X < XRS, under Wilson's as well as Grossman’s behavioural hypotheses, the 
pooling equilibrium preferred by low-risk is stable. Such pooling equilibrium is never SB optimal 
because it violates condition a) above, valid for all SB equilibria, i.e., it does not provide full 
insurance to high-risk.
However, the pooling equilibrium may not be Pareto comparable with the second best pair of 
equilibrium contracts preferred by low-risks36, or with the second best equilibrium contract preferred 
by high-risk37. The comparison between pooling equilibria and SB contracts is illustrated in Figure 
2.9 below. In general, from a pooling equilibrium it is possible to reach Pareto-superior points by
35 It turns out that the Miyazaki-Wilson pooling equilibrium exactly coincides with the second best equilibrium 
preferred by low-risks whenever X<XMW. Otherwise, under the M-W hypothesis, the R-S separating 
equilibrium is selected. Thus, M-W and SB equilibria coincide.
36 Contracts Cn and C 12 in Figure 2.7 may be characterized by a level of utility for high-risk lower than in the
2.7 may entail a level of utility for low-risk lower than in the pooling equilibrium
pooling equilibrium 
Point F in Fisure
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allowing a restructuring o f cross-subsidies that separates the different risk groups (moving towards 
the frontier in a North- East direction in the figure).
Figure 2.9: Second Best and Pooling Equilibria
In this and the following sections we shall analyse the effects of different policy options meant to 
correct health insurance market equilibria, using the analytical framework first developed by 
Neudeck and Podczeck, 1996 (hereafter N-P). The set o f policy options we consider is the 
following:
1. Public provision o f insurance/subsidies,
l.a  Full public insurance.
l.b  Partial compulsory public insurance, without or l.c  with the possibility of acquiring 
supplementary coverage from the private sector (the so-called ‘topping up’ o f insurance),
l.d  Full public insurance with the possibility of opting out.
Set of 2nd best Pareto optimal 
equilibria
Market
pooling
equilibrium
F=Full insurance poolin; 
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Ut High Risks
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2 .9  Policy A n a lys is
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1.e Risk-adjusted premium subsidies.
2 Regulation of the private insurance market.
2 .a Standard contract w ith full-coverage.
2.b Minimum insurance.
2.c Premium rate restrictions.
In discussing all the above 8 cases, we will maintain Grossman’s hypothesis concerning dissembling 
behaviour on the part o f high-risk individuals (see section 2.6). According to this hypothesis, no loss- 
making and cross subsidized contracts are maintained in the market equilibrium.
2.9 .1  Public Provision of Insurance
Let us first analyse the options o f full or partial public insurance. In the latter case the government 
may or may not allow individuals to purchase supplementary insurance from the private sector. Let 
us suppose that under public insurance all risk groups are required to contribute the same amount to 
the scheme (thus forcing a cross-subsidy from low to high risk individuals), and the public insurance 
scheme must on average break even (the expected total amount o f contributions must equal the 
expected total benefits disbursed).
Figure 2.10: Full Public Insurance and Partial Public Insurance
W2
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Graphically, one can see that starting from the initial endowment E the introduction of a compulsory 
full insurance scheme would be equivalent to ‘forcing’ both risk groups along the pooling line EF up 
to the pooling, full insurance equilibrium in F, which is the SB equilibrium preferred by high-risk 
individuals. Point F is characterized by the greatest level of redistribution across risk types and may 
be not Pareto-comparable with the market separating equilibrium C2-C7, because low risk may be 
better off in C7 than in F.
Partial public insurance brings both risk groups along the pooling line EF towards, but not ‘all the 
way to’ the bisetrix, say to point D. Figure 2.10 shows that, starting from point D, it is possible to 
reach Pareto-superior points by allowing individuals to purchase supplementary insurance from the 
private sector. By these means, in the above figure from point D the separating contracts Cn -Ci2 
can be reached. Contract Cn is the preferred one by low risk individuals among second best 
contracts.
Thus, the above analysis highlights two important results: 1) moving from a situation of public full 
insurance to one of partial insurance is likely to lead to a decrease in the high-risks’ utility. 2) From 
a situation of partial public insurance, it is always optimal to allow a ‘top-up’ of public benefits for 
all risk-types. In fact, by varying the “generosity” of the public insurance scheme (each level of 
coverage corresponds graphically to a point along segment EF) and by allowing supplementary 
private insurance all second best contracts can be obtained as separating market equilibria. The more 
comprehensive is the extent of public insurance coverage, the greater is redistribution from low to 
high-risk individuals and the higher is the utility enjoyed in equilibrium by the latter group.
The third type of corrective intervention in the health insurance market we consider is the provision 
of a full public insurance scheme, with the possibility of opting out. In situations characterised by 
universal compulsory public insurance schemes, those who believe in competition as a means to 
stimulate greater efficiency in the health care market are in favour of this possibility (for the 
experience in Chile, see following Case study). The claim is that allowing those who are dissatisfied 
with the public scheme to opt out and to enrol with private insurers would create incentives for 
greater efficiency and better quality services. Instead, those who oppose such move towards 
liberalization of the health insurance market claim that private insurers would just cream-skim the 
“good” risks and leave all the “bad” risks to the public scheme. In the language of the R-S model, 
the public scheme would lose the low risk individuals’ and would remain burdened with all the high- 
risk individuals.
Let us illustrate this case in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.11: Full Public Insurance with Possibility of Opting Out
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Suppose that starting from E the government initially offers insurance contract C12 to everybody. 
The contract is characterized by full insurance and it is preferred to the separating contracts C2C7 that 
would prevail as the competitive equilibrium only by high-risk individuals. Note that if purchased 
by everybody the contract would be profitable (it is below EF, the pooling zero profit or ‘fair-odds’ 
line), but if purchased only by high-risk individuals it needs to be subsidized, because it is above the 
‘fair odds’ line for high risks, EH. Suppose that a (net) proportional tax t is imposed on all 
individuals who decide not to purchase Q 2.
If purchased only by high-risk, the total per capita loss on contract C i2 would be equal to W*- 
W6+t+phd (contract C x2 would guarantee with certainty wealth W* instead of an expected after-tax 
endowment equal to Wo-t-phd). To compute the total subsidy it is necessary to determine the 
fraction o f net beneficiaries to taxpayers, which, under the hypothesis that C i2 is purchased only by 
high risk individuals, in equilibrium is equal to the fraction of high-risk individuals in the population. 
As before, suppose that the population fraction that is high risk is equal to X. Then, the lump sum 
(capitation) tax on initial endowments necessary to sustain contract C i2 would be equal to:
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Xu + (l-X)U = X( W* - Wo + ti + phd)
t, = X/(1-X)(W* - Wo + phd) (2.10)
In Figure 2.11, the tax switches the low risk individuals' initial endowment from E to E' and their fair 
odds line from segment EL to E'L'38. After the tax, low risk individuals (unlike high-risks) would 
still be willing to opt out of C i2, and purchase a new contract such as Cn.39 Contract Cn is actually 
the best insurance contract low risk can receive along their after tax ‘fair odds’ line (E’L') among all 
the contracts high risk individuals would not prefer vis-a-vis C i2 (so it is the best contract compatible 
with separation between risk groups). Finally, note that, being on the after-tax ‘fair odds’ line (E'L'), 
a private insurer would break even by offering Cn, and by attracting only low-risk individuals40. 
Thus, Cn-C12 is a candidate SB equilibrium, and it is possible to show that it is in fact the only 
feasible SB equilibrium, given the government’s full insurance contract offer in Ci2. Cn-Ci2 is in 
fact the same SB equilibrium preferred by low risk individuals we analysed in Figure 2.7. It is 
possible to prove that starting from a different initial full insurance contract on segment Ci2-F and 
thus from a different tax on initial endowments, any of the equilibria that belong to the set of SB 
equilibria can be reached.
We can utilize the same conceptual framework, to illustrate the effects of a risk-related premium 
subsidy in favour of high-risk individuals, funded through a mandatory contribution to a solidarity 
fund imposed on low risks. The subsidy would be earmarked to purchase a specified health insurance 
plan (in Figure 2.11, the full coverage plan Ci2), and it would be exclusively based on individuals’ 
relevant risk characteristics (the lower the risk, the higher the contribution, or the lower the subsidy). 
Unlike a premium tax deduction, it would be unrelated to the premium amount that individuals pay41. 
The subsidy would increase the affordability of the full-insurance contract for the high-risks (who, in 
Figure 2.11 can purchase contract C\2 , above their ‘fair-odds’ line), and at the same time it would
38 A similar shift, for clarity not represented in the above figure, would occur to high-risk individuals’ budget 
line.
39 Note there is no contract offer along the zero profit pooling line EF that low-risk individuals would prefer 
vis-a-vis Cn (so there cannot be any pooling equilibrium).
40 Any attempt to further undercut Cn in order to attract low risk individuals (for example, with a new contract 
offer in Z, or any other point in the shaded area in-between the two indifference curves passing through Cn) 
would lie to the right of E'L', and would thus be unprofitable.
41 When the amount of the deduction increases with the total premium that individuals pay, their “fair odds 
line” (which is their budget constraint, showing the best rate at which they are able to exchange wealth 
between the two states) changes inclination. Then we would observe a substitution as well as an income effect, 
and most likely a more comprehensive insurance coverage in equilibrium (unless a large negative income 
effect compensated the substitution effect).
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shift the low-risks’ ‘fair-odds’ line from EL to E L '42. By paying the premium subsidy to the high- 
risk, in fact low-risk individuals would be able to achieve higher insurance coverage.
Equal results would also be obtained by imposing an opting-out fee to be paid only by those (low- 
risk individuals in our example) who deviate from the initial full-insurance contract. This would be 
the case if government levied on all individuals a tax equal to ti, and at the same time opened up the 
possibility of opting out of mandatory insurance (contract Ci2 in Figure 2.11)
Drawing a conclusion from all of the above findings, we can say that, although risk selection does 
occur when the insurance market is liberalized (the pooling equilibrium is upset, and a separating 
equilibrium prevails), the government may still achieve second best outcomes, provided low risks 
can be forced to continue to contribute to the public scheme when they are not any more benefiting 
from it. In the case of Chile, discussed in Case Study 2.1, that is precisely what seems to have 
happened: the wealthier segments of the population have in theory been allowed to ‘opt-out’ of the 
public scheme (FONASA) and enrol in private schemes (ISAPRES), but in practice they have been 
required to continue to contribute to the public scheme. High (low) risk individuals are made (better) 
worse off than in the full public insurance pooling equilibrium after the introduction of the 
possibility of opting out; yet, SB equilibria can still resist if a compulsory cross-subsidy across risk 
groups is maintained43.
Van de Ven et al. (2000) and Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) provide a detailed analysis of the different 
ways through which risk-adjusted cross subsidies may be implemented, and of the different possible 
risk-sharing mechanisms among different clients, insurers and a solidarity/compensatory fund (see 
also Chapter 6). In the implementation of the risk-adjusted subsidies two main issues arise. The first 
concerns the criteria to define the different risk categories, and the second the criteria to compute the 
subsidy/contribution for the different risk categories. In the above example, with just two risk 
groups and only one subsidised “residual” public insurance contract, the low risk self-selected 
themselves by opting out of the public scheme. With more than two risk categories and several 
plans, van de Ven suggests adopting a nationwide, standard rating model as a basis to compute the 
subsidy value per risk category. He also proposes that the government mandates that insurance
42 As before, insurers’ interest to selectively attract low risks through contract in the shaded area (with 
contracts such as Z) would be eliminated.
43 Another critical issue, not considered above, concerns the difficulty of maintaining a political consensus for 
the cross-subsidy in favour of the high risks, once it does not provide any more direct benefit to those who are 
supposed to remain its net-contributors. These issues are similar to those discussed by Hirshman (1970) in 
assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of "voice" vis-a-vis "exit" mechanisms (see Chapter 6, and 
Annex 6.5 on the political limits to redistribution.
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companies share their information concerning their clients’ health “riskiness”. He claims that by 
these means insurers’ incentive to select risks would be contained, leaving open the other beneficial 
dimensions of competition (on quality, cost, etc.). For the computation of the cross-subsidies, 
Newhouse (1989) proposes that a combination of prospective risk-adjustment methods, and of 
retrospective health cost/utilization-information could be used. Purely prospective risk-adjusters are 
able to capture only a small fraction of the variability in individuals’ future health expenditure, while 
just using past health expenditure would hinder insurers’ incentives to improve efficiency, and to 
search for the more cost-effective providers in the market.
Case Study 2.1: Health Insurance Reforms in Chile44
Initiated by the Pinochet regime in the ‘80s, health reforms in Chile allowed people in the higher income 
groups to enrol with private insurers (ISAPRES). The government continued to directly finance a sub-set of 
providers, used by the non-insured population, or by those insured with the public residual insurer (FONASA). 
Health reforms in Chile were severely criticized, on the basis of arguments similar to those we discussed in this 
Chapter. The critics claimed that, in the absence of a regulatory framework, private insurers would cream- 
skim the good risks (the rich and healthy), whilst the public sector would remain burdened with the poorer and 
less healthy segments of the population.
Following the reforms, the predicted segmentation of the health insurance market into those privately insured 
(approximately one fourth of the population) and those left with public coverage did occur. FONASA, the 
“residual” compulsory public insurance scheme, currently covers virtually the entire elderly, chronically sick 
and economically weak segments of the population. However, the evidence also shows that such evolution has 
not been accompanied by a tangible worsening of health utilization or health indicators for the poor. Two 
properties still characterised the Chilean health financing system after the reforms:
1. The government still required those who decided to opt out of the public system and who enrolled 
with ISAPRES, the private schemes, to contribute through taxation to the public scheme FONASA.45 
Over the ‘80s and ‘90s, the public scheme actually received significant additional funding (see 
below).
2. Unlike several other Latin American Countries, the public subsidy in favour of the private insurance 
schemes ISAPRES, which serve the upper segments of the population, has been kept at negligible 
levels. The government only spends 4% of its general revenues to subsidize health expenditure of
44 Most of the evidence hereafter reported is from W. Savedoff, 2000, Is Anybody Listening? Ignoring 
Evidence in the Latin American Health Reform Debates.
45 Moreover, contributions were set as a fixed percentage of income with no capping, so that there can be 
hardly any price competition among insurance companies to attract healthier customers by underwriting
57
those who opt out of the public insurance scheme (all of which are employed and with incomes above 
the average).
Milanovic (1995) compared distribution of benefits from the public health system in Chile and in the UK 
and Hungary, which, unlike Chile, have preserved a universal public insurance system, and concluded that 
Chile is characterised by the most progressive distribution of benefits.
Figure 2.12: Distribution of Public Sector Benefits in Health Services.
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Source: Savedoff (2000), based on Milanovic (1995)
Bitran (1998) confirms the same results: in Chile 72% of the public health system beneficiaries are from 
income groups earning less than US$144 per month. The above results are not surprising, given that in Chile, 
unlike Hungary and the UK, public facilities are mainly used by those who are enrolled with FONASA, who 
belong to the poorer segments of society.
More importantly, the evidence available shows that the health benefits offered by FONASA are currently 
quite comprehensive, and that the health system continues to be easily accessible to all. Sapelli and Vial 
(1998), using need-adjusted health service utilization measures, show that the distribution of utilization is 
rather even across income groups, and that the poor do not seem to be overly discriminated by the existing 
two-tier system. By looking at the distribution of medical visits and days of hospitalisation by socio-economic
existing contracts.
Chile
Hungary
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group (see Figure below), they conclude that there is no significant relationship between income and 
utilization.
Figure 2.13: Expenditures on Services by Income Quintile
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Source: Savedoff, based on Sapelli and Vial (1998).
2.9 .2  Regulation of the Private Insurance Market
In alternative to direct public provision/subsidization o f insurance, the government could try to 
regulate the private insurance market. This is the alternative advocated by those who consider 
private insurers more effective than public agencies at managing health insurance funds, and at 
stimulating greater efficiency, and quality o f services from providers. According to this view, 
governments should not impose any cross-subsidies, but simply impose a regulation on the market so 
that all can enjoy a minimal level o f benefits. N-P (1996) show that this argument is actually 
mistaken, by proving that whichever form o f regulation is imposed on the market (unless it is 
regulation forcing subsidies across risk-types, and limiting insurers’ ability to select clients), it will 
not eliminate the possibility o f chronic instability and, more importantly, the incentive to risk- 
select46.
46 This section also reviews and builds upon N-P’s (1996) analysis.
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The first form of regulation considered consists of an obligation imposed on all private insurance 
companies to offer a standard contract with full coverage, open to any individual who wants to 
purchase it. In this case private companies would be free to offer any other contract they wish, 
alongside the standard contract. N-P show that with this form o f regulation no equilibrium may 
exist. Let us consider Figure 2.14 below.
Figure 2.14: Standard Contract With Full Coverage
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Suppose that the initial market equilibrium is the R-S separating equilibrium C2-C7 described in 
section 2.5. The standard full insurance contract imposed by regulation must lie on segment C2-F
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along the bisetrix (contract offers to the south-west of C2 are ineffective, as nobody would choose 
them, while contract offers to the north-east of F are unfeasible). Assume that such standard contract 
is in C 12. As we showed before, low-risk individuals have always an incentive to deviate from Cn  if 
other contracts are offered in the market. For example, consider contract C 14, in the shaded area 
above (below) the low (high) risk indifference curve through Cn  and to the left of the low-risk after 
tax fair odds line. If Cu were offered, low risk would accept it and stop purchasing the standard 
contract C 12. Then, no pooling equilibrium exists, and in order to sustain Ci2.as part of a separating 
equilibrium, it is necessary to maintain a positive cross-subsidy from low to high-risk individuals 
(see discussion in section 2.9.1, and Figure 2.11). However, market competition to attract low-risks 
will make such cross-subsidy unsustainable. From Cu competition to attract low risks will lead to 
further lower (increase) the premium (indemnity) charged (given) to them. With a risk-related 
subsidy, we showed that the equilibrium contract for low-risks would be found on Cn, along 
segment E'L' 47. E’L’ was the budget line for low risks when they were forced to subsidize the 
standard contract Ci2, and it would still be, were all insurance companies enrolling the same share of 
high and low risk individuals. However, insurers can try to further undercut Cn by new offers such 
as Z, which are profitable (being to the left of EL) as long as the insurer who is offering them is able 
to attract all low risk and to maintain a share of high-risk individuals equal to that of its competitors. 
Thus, the standard contract policy leads to chronic market instability, unless all insurance companies 
are required to have the same proportion of high and low risk clients48.
Let us clarify illustrate this point by a numerical example. Consider a situation where each high-risk 
individual receives $20 over his/her "fair odds" premium in the standard contract C 12. Suppose there 
are 10 high-risk individuals, so that the total cross-subsidy to high risk is equal to $200. Suppose 
there are two competing insurers in the market, each of them shouldering half of the high-risk 
individuals, so that the total cross-subsidy that each insurance company needs to collect from low 
risk clients to sustain the standard contract is equal to $100. If there are 20 low risk individuals, and 
if low risk clients are evenly distributed between the two competing insurers, each of them would 
have to pay $10 = $20 (l/3)/(2/3 ) 49 above their fair-odds premium to subsidize the standard contract 
for high risk. In terms of figure 2.14, such cross-subsidy would shift the low-risk clients’ zero profit 
line to E ’L’. However, suppose that one of the two insurance companies offered a new contract,
47 C11-C12 is the only possible separating equilibrium when E’L’ is the low risk individuals’ fair-odds line. See 
Figure 2.11 and relative explanation in the text.
48 As C12, the standard contract, must remain on offer, Cn-Ci2 would be the only possible separating 
equilibrium if all insurance companies shared the same risk composition of clients.
49 See expression (2.10) in the text.
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such as Z in Figure 2.14, which attracts all low-risk individuals, at the same time maintaining an 
equal share of high-risk individuals (who are still purchasing the mandatory standard contract Ci2). 
In the new situation, the amount that each of the 20 low risk individuals that shifts to contract Z 
should have to pay above their fair-odds premium to cross-subsidize the standard contract would be 
only $5 [$5 = $20(1/5)/(4/5)]. At the same time, the other insurer, burdened with half (5) o f the 
high-risk individuals, and with no low-risk individuals left, becomes unable to subsidize the standard 
contract. Thus, the imposition o f a standard contract may cause chronic instability in the market, as 
competitors try to undercut each other to attract low risk individuals.
The second form of regulation we consider consists of a minimum insurance requirement. In the 
graphical representation below, a minimum insurance requirement is considered equivalent to 
imposing a lower bound on the wealth level in case the accident occurs, measured on the vertical 
axis.
Figure 2.15: Imposition of a Minimum Insurance Requirement
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In Figure 2.15, if we initially consider a situation where the R-S separating market equilibrium C2 C7 
prevails, we can distinguish among three cases:
•  A minimum insurance requirement comprised between M! and M2. In this case the minimum 
insurance constraint is binding only for low risk individuals, while high-risk can continue to 
purchase C2 in equilibrium. The high-risk individuals’ indifference curve through C2 (Hi in 
figure 2.15) lies above the highest indifference curve for low risk along the pooling line EF (L4  
in Figure 2.15), which implies that the utility low risk individuals can gain by still separating 
from high risk (choosing a point along Hi between C7 and C 15) is higher than the maximum 
utility they can achieve in any pooling equilibrium. Then, low risks choose a separating contract 
along Hi, between C7 and C 15, while high risk will choose the separating equilibrium contract C2.
•  A minimum insurance requirement between M 2 and M3. In this case low risk individuals prefer 
to switch to the pooling equilibrium C 10, which gives them a higher utility (L4 in Figure 2.15). 
The high risk group will also switch to contract Ci0, which provides them with a utility level 
higher than C2. This pooling equilibrium is stable, because any deviation to the “right” of the 
pooling line EF, meant to selectively attract low risk, will in fact also attract high-risk 
individuals, and will then be unprofitable.
•  A minimum insurance requirement at a level above M3. In this case the equilibrium will be 
found on the pooling line EF in correspondence to the intersection with the minimum insurance 
requirement. In the extreme case, the regulator can impose the frill insurance pooling 
equilibrium in F.
Hence, setting the minimum insurance requirement in correspondence to more comprehensive levels 
of coverage progressively forces the pooling equilibrium in the market. Note that in general the 
equilibrium with a minimum insurance requirement is not second best and cannot be compared with 
the market equilibrium. However, by imposing a minimum insurance requirement the regulator can 
limit insurers’ practice to undercut existing contracts in order to attract low risk, and can stimulate a 
positive cross-subsidization across risk types.
The last form of regulation we consider is premium rate restrictions50. In terms of the above graphs, 
such form of regulation entails a restriction on the allowable gap between the rates charged to high- 
risk and to low-risk individuals, which is equivalent to forcing insurers to maintain a set of loss
50 To prevent insurers from rejecting new applicants or from cream-skimming high risk individuals, the 
regulator may complement premium rate restrictions with a periodic open enrolment requirement.
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making contracts that need to be subsidised. However, similarly to the case of the standard contract 
regulation, imposing rate-restrictions may actually exacerbate the impact of adverse selection, as 
insurance companies struggle to dilute the share of loss-making contracts in their pool by 
discouraging subscription of high-risk individuals, and by fiercely competing for low risk 
individuals.
2 .1 0  C onclusion
This chapter has discussed the consequences of adverse selection on the functioning of insurance 
markets. To isolate the effects of adverse selection from other confounding factors, it has considered 
a benchmark situation with no moral hazard and characterized by perfect competition. We have 
shown that the full information equilibrium is characterized by complete insurance coverage, and by 
different rates charged to the low and high-risk individuals. However, with incomplete information 
insurance companies compete to attract low risks, by offering less expensive contracts characterized 
by less comprehensive coverage. The separating equilibrium is characterized by less than optimal 
coverage, and, if insurers and insurees behave myopically, no stable equilibrium may exist. By 
contrast, second best equilibria are generally characterized by a positive cross-subsidy across risk 
types.
The government can intervene in the health insurance market in two ways: by directly 
providing/subsidizing insurance, or by regulation. Following Neudeck and Podczeck (1996), we 
show that the two forms of intervention do not lead to identical results.
Provision/subsidization of insurance, supplemented with private insurance or with the possibility of 
opting out, can lead to second best equilibria. When they are characterized by positive cross­
subsidies between risk-types, SB equilibria demand that the government is able to subsidize 
contracts with higher than average premium/benefit ratios, and to tax contracts with lower than 
average premium/benefit ratios.
By contrast, regulation of the private insurance market by imposition of a standard contract or by 
restricting premium rates can exacerbate the problem of adverse selection, and lead to chronic 
market instability. The only ways to guarantee SB equilibria through regulation are either a) to
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impose limits to the possibility of undercutting existing contracts through a minimum insurance 
requirement; b) directly prohibit the possibility of selecting individual customers.
The conclusions of the theoretical literature are of great practical relevance. Recent reform plans in 
Germany, Holland and other European countries (see Chapter 7, for the case of the Czech Republic), 
as well as Latin America, which intended to progressively develop competition among several 
insurers as a means to indirectly improve service provision, foresaw the creation of a public 
compensatory fund to manage financial cross-transfers among insurers characterized by different risk 
pools. In the intention of reformers such cross-transfers should have eliminated the incentive to 
screen risks, but in several countries their efficacy has so far been limited, given that only imperfect 
risk adjusters such as age, gender and region of residence could be used as criteria for deciding 
which contracts to subsidize. The evidence shows that demographic criteria alone are indeed weak 
predictors of future health expenditure, and they are thus not able to adequately correct the 
consequences of adverse selection (Van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1992. See discussion of risk and 
need adjusters in the context of RA mechanisms in Chapter 6 ).
In countries such as the US that have traditionally relied on private insurers and competition to cover 
health risks, new forms of regulation are continuously proposed to limit insurers’ incentives to risk- 
select and to respond to the other sources of market failures. One of the more interesting reform 
proposals was articulated by Diamond (1992), who suggested that insurers (health plans) be required 
to serve all members of any Health Alliance (whose members would be geographically-defined, or 
be based on employment). Competition for the market (to serve all the members of any Health 
Alliance) would be preserved, but competition within each market (to select some members within 
any Health Alliance according to their risk) would be prohibited.51
No country, however, has yet found a completely satisfactory equilibrium between the need to 
stimulate more competition on the insurers’/purchasers’ side, and the need to preserve universal 
insurance coverage and equity52.
51 The Clinton’s administration initially endorsed Diamond’s proposal, but then rejected it after the defeat in 
the 1992 Senate elections (see also case study in section 6.5.1). So far, in the US the more severe 
consequences of risk-selection are tamed through Medicare and Medicaid, the government funded insurance 
programs that cover the elderly, and some of the poor and more vulnerable members of society, who would 
otherwise not be able to afford to pay a premium commensurate to their health risk.
52 See discussion of the first trade-off, Chapter 6, section 6.5.1
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A nnex 2.1 E quity: a  J u s tif ic a tio n  f o r  G overnm ent
In terven tion  in H ea lth
If we look back in history and read the main documents left by those who first advocated a strong 
state involvement in the health sector in Europe, we see that the core arguments behind their 
proposals were in fact rather different from those provided within modem economics. Interestingly, 
the same applies to education and social security. Thus, it is worth also re-visiting these arguments, 
as they have profoundly influenced the way public intervention has been shaped.
Equity rather than efficiency concerns seem to he at the heart of the first proposals for extending 
insurance coverage, and then guaranteeing universal health insurance. Those committed to universal 
health coverage believed that by nullifying the “price barrier” it would have been possible to obtain 
equality of access of all citizens to those services, like education and health, reckoned as 
fundamental rights to each person53. Beveridge, who backed the plan for the establishment of a 
National Health Service, praised a service that could provide treatment “to every citizen without 
exception, without remuneration limit and without an economic barrier at any point to delay recourse 
to it” (Beveridge54, 1942, p. 162).
Thus, those who argued for a universal health insurance system wanted to eliminate in health the 
function of market prices in rationing resources according to ability to pay. One could argue that the 
more immediate way to do that would have been to equalize purchasing power differentials across 
individuals, by providing targeted subsidies to the poor. By these means, it would also been possible 
to maintain decentralized, price-based co-ordination mechanisms in the health system. The recent 
debate on “vouchers” for education, and for some health services, points towards that direction. 
However, those who created the modem welfare state and National Health Service in the United 
Kingdom and then in other European Nations opposed these targeted demand-side subsidies as a 
means to improve access, because they opposed the old British system of assistance based on the 
Poor Laws, which was precisely based upon means-tested, targeted subsidies. According to its 
“founding fathers”, the new welfare state was on the contrary to be based on universal contributions 
and benefits (insurance principle), reflecting the association of equals aimed at protection against the 
principal uncertainties of life. Social stigma, associated with means-tested benefits, had to be 
eliminated. By using a modem economic terminology, one can say that behind the implementation of
53 Tobin, J. On limiting the domain of inequality. Journal of Law and Economics 1970; 13: 263-277.
54 Beveridge, W. Social Insurance and Allied Services. London: HMSO, Cmd 6404, 1942.
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universal health insurance schemes, there was a life-cycle argument based on equity as well as 
efficiency: the young and healthy (low risk) accept to contribute to funding social services because 
they know that in the past as new-borne, and in the future when they will become old and sick, they 
were and will be able to benefit from subsidized health insurance coverage themselves. At the same 
time, it is implicitly assumed that such interpersonal and intergenerational cross-transfers can be 
most effectively implemented at the National level.
A further step, followed by some but not all countries, was to try to guarantee more even levels of 
care opportunities to everybody, and this necessitated a uniform distribution of physical 
infrastructures with comparable standards across the country. This last goal was considered 
exceedingly difficult to achieve within a system based on market or “quasi-market” incentives. 
Hence, the aim was pursued with the formation of a National Health Service, based not only on 
universal health insurance, but also on the right to uniform standards of provision across the country. 
This was first implemented in the UK, then in Scandinavian countries, and then in South Europe (in 
Italy in 1978).55
By contrast with more recent debates and the central focus of modem economic theory, problems of 
incentives for the armies of civil servants that were created (which included teachers, doctors, nurses, 
administrators, etc.) were completely overlooked. Hence, having completely eliminated 
decentralized resource allocation and co-ordination mechanisms, National health services replaced 
them with central planning. In the UK, after the creation of the NHS in 1948, hospitals and other 
health providers were nationalized, and the delivery of most health services was organized through 
public, vertically integrated agencies. Most production decisions, such as volume and mix of inputs, 
salaries for health workers and other personnel, and investments, were taken at the central level. At 
the local level, Health Authorities, the public agencies locally responsible for planning and provision 
of health services, directly managed hospitals. At the same time, total resources for health were 
directly rationed by the government, who each year determined the global budget for health 
according to disposable resources and political priorities.
55 Other industrialized countries, among which France, Germany and Canada did not follow the UK path and 
did not create a National Health Service. They opted for a mixed system, where universal health coverage is 
guaranteed, but not all health providers are nationalized. These countries substituted risk-related premiums 
with income-related contributions, but at the same time left a decentralized, although highly regulated, delivery 
system. By these means, they intended to maintain some private economic incentives on the supply side, for 
example linking doctors’ and providers’ payment to the services they actually provide.
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Annex 2 .2  An in troduction  to (dem and-side) m oral h azard
First, consider the subsidization of a certain pharmaceutical product by a private or a public 
insurance scheme. The subsidy makes the product less expensive at the point of service and may 
result in a demand-side “moral hazard” effect, depending on the size of the demand and supply 
elasticity. The point can be illustrated graphically:
Figure 2.16: Demand-side Moral Hazard
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Supply=marginal cost
Q* Qo
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Suppose Q represents the level o f consumption of the pharmaceutical product, and that marginal cost 
(cost o f providing each additional unit) is constant, so that supply is infinitely elastic, as in the figure 
above. Efficiency requires that equilibrium consumption be at the level Q*, where marginal cost 
(which, at each level o f consumption, is a measure o f the value o f the additional resources society 
has to commit to provide an extra-unit o f the product) and aggregate demand (the sum o f individual 
demands, which is a measure o f social marginal willingness to pay for the product) are equal.
However, if the pharmaceutical product is available for free at the point o f service, consumption is 
increased up to quantity Q0. In other words, people consume “too much” of the subsidized 
pharmaceutical product, because it is available for free (in fact some people may still have to sustain 
transportation costs and other costs not considered here).
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In the above situation, a co-payment is able to reduce the level o f consumption to a level closer to the 
optimal level. For example, the following figure shows that by imposing a co-payment equal to M  
the level o f consumption is reduced to Qm, a level closer to the optimal level. Evidence shows (se, 
for example, the results o f the Rand Experiment Group, Manning et al. 198756) that people tend to 
abuse consumption of certain health services such as pharmaceutical products, outpatient specialist 
visits or hospital elective care, when they are offered totally for free. In these cases, co-payments can 
play a role in “screening” demand and make sure that only the more justified claims (in terms of  
willingness to pay) insist on the scarce resources available for health.
Figure 2.17: The Role of Co-payments in Limiting Over-consumption
drug Q
M
of
Demand
Supply = Marginal Cost
Qm*
Quantity or drug Q
However, quite extensive evidence indicates that for other types o f health services demand is not so 
much influenced by price (empirical studies from developed countries in general estimate quite low  
price elasticity for medical service -roughly = - 0.2 on average). For example, the demand 
containment effect is likely to be negligible for emergency care. When elasticity is low, the demand 
containment effect o f co-payments is negligible.
56 W. Manning et al. (1987), Health insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomised 
Experiment, American Economic Review 77: 251-277.
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Figure 2.18: Inelastic Demand. Service Consumption Level Is not Affected By Co-payments
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In conclusion, every time co-payments are raised, we are likely to observe some demand reduction, 
unless demand is completely inelastic. However, the real question is whether co-payments are 
discouraging unnecessary recourse to treatment, or are they excluding those who are unable to pay?
Consider that the extent o f demand for health services and its elasticity are also influenced by 
information, wealth and cultural attitudes, so that it varies significantly across different socio­
economic groups. Thus, individuals who share the same health condition (have the same health 
needs) and face the same prices, in fact use health services very differently. For instance, poor people 
in rural areas may not use health services even if a small co-payment is imposed because they are not 
aware of the benefits they could receive from them, or simply because being in “poor health” is 
accepted as a normal condition, rather than an accident to be cured. A recent study on Indonesia that 
investigated into the consequences o f the imposition of higher co-payments for health services in a 
selected group of districts showed that demand elasticity for the poor was much higher than for the 
rich (Gertler and Molyneaux, 1990).
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Chapter 3: Quality and A ccessibility of Health 
Services
3.1 In trodu ction
This Chapter focuses on the relationship between the dynamics of competition, and quality and 
accessibility of care. It studies the competitive interaction between service providers in the health 
sector through a model of vertical differentiation57, along the lines first developed by Gabszewicz 
and Thisse (1979, and 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984). In the first part, the model 
characterizes the different possible market equilibria when two health providers are competing with 
each other and are supplying health services of different quality. In the second part, the Chapter 
discusses the role of public regulation imposing a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) on the low 
quality provider, or a universal coverage constraint through or a Price Cap (PC). Our main purpose 
is to build upon the existing literature on vertically differentiated markets to study the dynamics of 
competition for the provision of health services, paying particular attention to the impact of 
competition on quality and accessibility of services. The model presented in this chapter aims to 
improve upon existing theoretical results (Wauthy, 1996, Tirole, 1988, Ronnen, 1991), by 
considering the impact of positive quality-enhancing fixed costs on market equilibria, and in 
comparing equilibria under different forms of competition and regulatory regimes
For all health services that are excludable (approximately 95 percent of the supply of health services) 
the private sector (not-for-profit and for profit) plays a significant role both in financing and in 
provision in almost all countries. In developing countries the private sector has a particularly 
prominent role in provision of primary care and elective secondary care health services (Berman, 
1995; Bennett et al., 1997)58. For instance, it has been estimated that in India over 80 percent of
57 Vertical product differentiation is defined in the following way: “Given two distinct products, if they were 
sold at the same price, then all consumers would choose the same one (the highest quality product)” (Shaked 
and Sutton, 1987). Shaked and Sutton (1983) show that markets where quality-enhancing costs fall primarily 
on fixed costs are "natural oligopolies", that means they remain concentrated, with few competitors occupying 
the whole market, even when market size increases (the so-called "finiteness property").
58 Note that in several countries (particularly sub-Saharan Africa) the not-for-profit (NFP) private sector is as 
important as the for profit (FP) sector and the government sector in service provision, especially in the poorer 
areas. There is evidence suggesting that in fact NFP facilities charge higher user-fees than government 
facilities, and that patients still use them more than government facilities probably because their services are
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outpatient contacts take place in the private sector (Yazbeck, 2000). The same was true in all 
Western European countries until the decade of the 1920s and 1930s, when governments started to 
play a more significant role in service provision in several places.
Also in the few developing countries where the public delivery system infrastructure is more 
developed, the evidence suggests that 'bypassing" of low-quality public facilities in favour of private 
facilities is a widespread phenomenon (see Chapter 6 ), and that service quality has a strong effect on 
utilization (Alderman and Lavy, 1996).
Understanding market interaction in service provision would provide a rigorous basis to evaluate 
regulatory policies, such as the imposition of a Minimum Quality Standard, or price regulation, or 
subsidization and taxation of the private health sector. Such forms of intervention in the health 
sector are complementary to, but to an extent also alternative, to direct service provision.
Our contribution is complementary to that by Hammer (1998). Hammer highlighted the importance 
of considering cross price-elasticity between private and public supply and demand in evaluating 
public interventions. Whilst the latter relationships are characterized by substitutability between the 
public and private sector, we show that for quality of services the public private interaction is one of 
strategic complementarity59.
3 .2  The M odel
Providers' interaction is modelled as a two-stage game where the players simultaneously choose 
quality first and then choose prices or quantities (the case of price or B errand competition in the last 
stage is analysed in the following, while the case of quantity, or Cournot competition is described in 
Annex 3.1). Both providers know their competitor’s quality level, before the last stage of the game 
is played60. We solve this game by backward induction and characterize the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium of the game61.
perceived as being of better quality (for Kenya, see Mwabo, Ainsworth, and Nyamete, 1993; for Zambia, see
Nakamba, Hanson and McPake, 2002, for Uganda, see Giusti, 2000).
59 In simple words, qualities are strategic complementanes if an increase in public services' quality makes it 
convenient for the private sector to increase its quality as well (and vice-versa). We prove that this is actually 
true in our model.
60 Our model does not explicitly consider information issues. The hypothesis is that the quality of each
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A market where two goods of different quality are supplied is called vertically differentiated if one 
of the two goods is unanimously preferred to the other if they are sold at the same price (see first 
footnote at the beginning of this chapter). Considering the perceived qualities of the two goods, low
quality, q t and high quality, qh , as vectors composed of n characteristics z u and z ih (Lancaster,
1955) where i=l,...,n, the two goods are vertically differentiated if and only if: z u > z ih for each
i=l,...,n, with strict inequality for at least one i. This property must hold for all potential consumers 
in the market.
Suppose two health providers are competing to serve a specific market area. For instance, consider 
the interaction between two clinics in a small town, or between two physicians who are the sole 
providers in a rural area and compete with each other for patients. For some reason not investigated 
in the model, one of the two providers is able to initially make a larger investment in quality- 
enhancing fixed-costs62. Once the quality investments are completed, the higher quality provider's 
services would be preferred by all to the services offered by her competitor, if their services were 
available at the same price. The higher quality provider has two possible strategies: 1) either she sets
provider's services is known both by the other provider and by patients when the price game is played in the 
last stage. This may be considered as a first approximation to a more realistic model, which would explicitly 
consider information problems. Then, quality would be perceived with an error (possibly different for different 
individuals) and investing in quality may positively influence the provider's probability of being perceived of 
higher quality.
61 For a formal definition of sub game-perfect equilibrium, see Fudemberg and Tirole, Ch. 3, p. 92. Sub 
game perfect equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept for dynamic games. Sub game 
equilibria are strategies, which are equilibria not only of the whole game, but also of any proper sub game. The 
game we consider has just one sub game, which is the price game played in the last stage.
62What defines a higher quality health service is an extremely complicated and disputed issue. In considering 
health quality dimensions, one critical distinction is between those elements of quality that mainly contribute to 
technical or medical quality and those, such as the quality of ancillary services in hospitals, that are part of 
perceived quality but do not significantly add to health outcomes. This distinction is not the focus of our 
analysis.
Another distinction that it is possible to draw is between dimensions of quality that mainly contribute to fixed 
costs and those that mainly contribute to recurrent costs. The first group of quality variables consists of the 
quality of equipment, of premises, the level of doctors and nurses' training and, more in general, comprises all 
the endowment in physical and human capital at each provider's disposal. It is realistic to assume that these 
dimensions of quality take time to be adjusted, and must be set before the provider decides what prices to 
charge for services and what volumes of service to deliver. Once investments in physical and human capital are 
decided, by and large their cost cannot be retrieved (they are sunk in the economists’ terminology). The second 
vector of quality variables, usually considered in the health economics literature under the name of "intensity 
of treatment" (see Chapter 4), consists of such inputs as time spent with each patient, quality of 
communication, level of client-orientation, etc. Such dimensions of quality directly depend on nurses' and 
physicians' effort, can be varied on a daily basis and are part of the variable costs. We assume that such 
variable quality dimensions are the same for the two providers. In our model, marginal costs are constant, and,
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a price low enough to pre-empt the entrance of the other competitor in the market, or 2 ) she sets a 
price high enough so that the low quality provider can enjoy a positive market share, by attracting 
(part of) those who have a lower marginal willingness or ability to pay for quality. In turn, the lower 
quality provider may cover all the patients that are left out by the high quality provider, or he may set 
a price and a quality level such that a part of the market remains uncovered (those with the lowest 
marginal ability/willingness to pay for health services). As we shall see, the range of taste parameters 
and the shape of the cost function determine the strategies chosen by the two providers and 
boundaries between the diverse possible equilibrium configurations63.
3 .2 .1  A ssum ptions
Assumption 1 (supply side): When supplying a service of quality q t , with q t £  [0, q +), i=h ; I and 
q h >- q n  each provider pays for quality-development costs according to the fixed cost function
F { q i ) = q f  /  2 .  There is a finite limit to the quality available and each provider supplies just one 
type of quality.
Assumption 2: Patients' indirect utility from consuming health care services is always greater than 
zero 64, and equal to:
V(x,p) = xq t — Pi ,  where p { is the price of service65 of quality q t , with q t £  [0,g +) , and x 
represents a taste parameter, uniformly distributed over the interval ( x , x )  with x - l  and with unit 
density.
Note that the type of health service considered here is indivisible and each patient can have at most 
one unit. We can think of it as a composite commodity (a “package”) comprising several diagnosis- 
treatment services. The patient can decide not to undergo treatment, but once she does so she has to 
buy the whole "package".
without loss of generality (it would only change all results by a constant), we can set them equal to zero.
63 There may be a range of parameters corresponding to which more than one strategy is feasible, and in that 
case to determine the optimal strategy we need to compare the profits levels achieved in correspondence to 
each of them and choose as an equilibrium that which gives the highest profits (see section 3.2.6).
64 The characterization of preferences above follows Mussa and Rosen, 1978. Indirect utility is equal to zero if 
the patient decides not to be treated.
65 For the services provided by the public provider we can think of p i as comprising all the co-payments 
(formal and informal) directly imposed on the patient.
74
Also note that the hypothesis that x ,  the minimum taste parameter, is positive is equivalent to 
considering on the demand side only those who would search for care, if services were provided for 
free, and at least at a minimum positive quality level. Imposing the restriction that x  =1 allows us to 
exclusively focus on one single parameter, 3c, as a measure of preferences’ diversity, or of total 
market size. Patients characterized by higher values of x  are willing to pay more to access higher 
quality services, perhaps because they dispose of better information concerning their health status, or 
because they suffer from a more severe illness. The parameter x  can also be interpreted as patients' 
marginal rate of substitution between income and health expenditure66. According to this 
interpretation, a lower x would correspond to a higher marginal utility of income and to a lower 
income.
Assumptions 1 and 2 above are sufficient to completely characterize preferences and the technology 
for the health service in question.
3 .2 .2  Market Demand
In the private duopoly situation, given a quality and a quantity/or price choice by the two providers, 
patients can be divided into three groups: those who decide not to purchase any medical treatment, 
those who purchase the low quality service and those who buy the high quality service. Any of these 
three demand ‘segments’ may be empty in equilibrium (for example, if the market is fully covered 
the first ‘segment’ is empty). The total size of the potential market is measured by: x  - 1 .
Let us denote by x l and x m the values of the taste parameters that separate the three groups (which 
we will denote as ‘threshold levels’ in the following), i.e., the value of the taste parameters for, 
respectively, the marginal patient (who derives the same utility from purchasing the low-quality 
service or from not purchasing), and the indifferent patient (who is indifferent between purchasing 
the high and the low quality services). From the utility function specified above, the marginal 
patient’s taste parameter is characterized as follows:
66 This interpretation of the parameter x  has originally been introduced by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979,1980), 
Shaked and Sutton (1982,1983,1984) Bonanno (1986) and Ireland (1987).
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Whereas the "indifferent" patient’s taste parameter is derived as follows:
X Qh Ph ~  X Ql Pi'
x m = £JlZ E l  (3 .2 )
<7h ~ <li
If x l = —  < 1, in equilibrium all the market is covered. If x l >  x m, in equilibrium all the market 
is served by the high-quality provider.
Note that in our model, following Wauthy (1996)67, the complete or incomplete market coverage is 
an endogenous result of the price and quality game. More precisely, for any value of the upper taste 
parameter x  , it is the low quality provider that determines whether or not the market is fully covered 
in equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, the choice of a higher quality/lower price by the low-quality 
provider will increase the equilibrium degree of market coverage.
3 .2 .3  C om petition in  the Last Stage: Bertrand C om petition
As it is customary in dynamic games, the game that defines the market equilibrium is solved by 
backward induction, starting from price competition (Bertrand competition68) in the last stage of the 
game. When the two providers strategically set their prices, they have already determined their 
qualities, so that qualities can be considered as exogenous parameters in the last stage. We first 
derive step by step the equilibrium under the hypothesis of incomplete market coverage, in order to 
clarify the dynamics of the game, and then characterize the range of taste parameters for which such 
equilibrium holds.
67 Unlike our model, Wauthy (1996) does not consider any quality enhancing costs. In our model, the 
equilibrium that prevails will depend both on the range of taste parameters, as well as on the cost structure.
68 Equilibrium quantities and revenues are derived for the case of Coumot competition in Annex 3.1.
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When the market is not fully covered and both competitors are active in the market, the demand 
functions for the high and the low quality services are respectively given by:
(3.3), and:
y l = x m - x l =  Ph- (3.4)
Qh ~ <Zi Qi
Providers simultaneously find equilibrium prices by maximizing:
m ax n *  = { x  - x m )p h (3.5)
ph
maxTT,5  =
pi
r \
x m
\  Ql J
Pt (3.6)
Subject to:
P , > 0  (3.7)
Pi > Qi (3.8)
From the first-order conditions of the above problem, one can derive the following reaction 
functions:
p l =  1 / 2 [x{qh - g , ) + p f  J (3.9)
p f  = { \ / 2 ) ^ - p Bh (3.10) 
9*
The two reaction functions show that, given quality, the two equilibrium prices are strategic 
complementaries. When the low-quality producer increases its price, the high quality producer is 
induced to increase its price as well, and vice versa. The two equilibrium prices and market shares 
are the following:
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_ b _  2*9*(?*-?,)
Pi' — a--------------
4 4 / , - 4 ,
(3.11)
_S _  XQl{*lh 4 1 ) i~i\P i ---- --------------- (3.12)
4? * - 4,
y° = - — i s -  (3.13)
4 4* - 4 ,
y ?  =  A Xq" (3.14)
4 4/, - 4 ,
In correspondence to the above equilibrium prices and market shares, the ‘threshold’ taste
i  b  b
parameters x  and x  are equal to:
/  =  P L  =  * k ^ Z 3 ll (3.15)
4/ 4 4/, ~ 4 j
^  =  p Bh - p f  = x {2 q h - q t ) (316)
4 * - 4 i  4 4a “ 4/
The constraint that the market be not fully covered in equilibrium requires that: p f  > x q ,  =  q, ■ 
Substituting the equilibrium price (equation 3.12) in this inequality, one finds the following 
condition:
P i  = x(ck - q ! ) >1  (317)o r :
4/ 4 <lh-<h
x  > 4 q n qi (3.18)
9 a ~ 9 i
Thus, given two quality choices in the first stage of the game, equilibrium is characterized by 
incomplete market coverage whenever the range of "taste" parameters (or, according to the other
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interpretation of the parameter ‘x \  the range of patients’ ability to pay for health services) is broad 
enough69. The precise range of taste parameters where the incomplete market coverage solution 
holds can be determined only after analysing the first-stage quality game.
3 .2 .4  C om petition in  th e  First Stage: Equilibrium Q ualities
Substituting equilibrium prices obtained in the last stage into the revenue function, one obtains:
A2
(3.19)n B  B B (  V ^ X( l h~ Phyh ~\fih QlA a
I 4 ?* - 4 /
Rt = p f  y f = (9* -%{— ]
L4 9 * - 9 /  J
(3.20)
Note that for any quality choice: 0 < q { < g +and such that q h > q {, equilibrium revenues are
positive. By differentiating their quality in the first stage of the game, the two providers are able to 
set prices above marginal cost (which is equal to zero in our case) and earn a positive profit70. The
two providers simultaneously determine qualities, given the above equilibrium prices p f  and p f
by maximizing71:
Maxqh7rh = Rh ~ F ( q h} =  p h {qh) yh {qh) —F {q h) (3.21)
M a x ^ n f  =  R? -  F {q , )  =  p f  (q , ) y f  (q, ) -  F { q , )
Subject to: q t e  [0, q +) and q h > q r
69 See next section for an intuitive explanation of this result.
70 Compare this result with the traditional result under Bertrand competition that the only Nash equilibrium of 
the game is characterized by prices equal to marginal cost (equal to zero in our case).
71 In the Cournot case (see Annex 3.1), equilibrium qualities are analogously determined, replacing R f  , 
Bertrand equilibrium revenues in the first stage of the game, with R f  , Cournot equilibrium revenues.
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It is possible to prove that both the high quality and the low quality producers' revenue functions are 
concave in quality (Motta, 1993), and that the above maximization problem has a unique solution72, 
where both providers earn a positive profit. Choi and Shin (1992) show that when there is no fixed 
or variable cost of quality provision, the equilibrium levels of quality are such that q t = ( 4 / l ) q h .
By adopting a quadratic fixed cost function, F(q )  =  qf  1 2 , Motta (1993) shows that a real solution 
to the maximization problem above is in correspondence to the equilibrium qualities:
q f  =  0.2533T2 (3.22)
Thus, q f  =  0.2 q f ,  and Choi and Shin’s (1992) result that the two equilibrium qualities when the
market is not-fully covered are a fixed proportion of each other is confirmed with positive quality-
enhancing costs, although q f  is now a lower fixed proportion of q f . In correspondence to solution
3.22, constraint 3.18, which must hold in order for the market not to be fully covered in equilibrium, 
requires that:
d p x  4
q f < q Bk - = - r  (3-23)
x  - 1
Recall that x e  (l, jc)  . Given the above equilibrium qualities, this constraint holds if and only if73:
0.2 < - » 3c > 4.7 (3.24)
x  - 1
72 Being F- {g)  convex, the first order conditions are sufficient conditions for a local maximum. Being
F * ( ) > 0  also the conditions for a global maximum are satisfied (Ronnen, 1991). For the particular 
quadratic specification of quality-enhancing fixed costs, Motta (1993) also proves that equilibrium levels of 
quality are stable, as neither competitor has an incentive to leapfrog the other.
In case of Bertrand competition and, as in the case of Choi and Shin (1992), no costs for developing quality,
if we denote by x  the upper limit and by x mjn the lower limit of the "taste" parameter, Wauthy (1996) 
showed that the incomplete market coverage prevails in equilibrium whenever x  /  > 8,66 .
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Hence, we can now give a numerical value to the intuition presented in equation 3.18. If differences 
in preferences and/or in ability to pay for health services are broad enough, once the higher quality 
producer has chosen its profit maximizing quality (by positioning itself to serve the upper segments 
of the market), there is still enough room for the low quality producer to target medium-range 
sections of the market, and leave out the poorest/or those less willing to pay. Note that the above 
results hold as long as the providers cannot price-discriminate among patients (first degree price 
discrimination): they must charge the same price for the same quality service, independently of who 
is purchasing it.
3 .2 .5  The Case o f Full Market Coverage
The market equilibrium was derived under the assumption of incomplete market coverage. How do 
the above results change when the low-quality producer decides to cover all the market74? Then, the 
demand faced by the low-quality producer becomes:
y, = x m - x l = — — — - x  = — — ^ - - 1  (3.25)
Qh ~Qi Qh ~Qi
In case of Bertrand competition in the last stage, we derive the price equilibrium with full market 
coverage in the last stage of the game by maximizing:
max(x -  x m }p h (3.26)
ph
m ax(xm - l ) Pl (3.27)
ss.p[ > 0
P i ^ Q i
(3.28)
(3.29)
74 Tirole (1988, p. 96) was the first one to characterize equilibria with full market coverage. He made the 
hypothesis of constant variable costs and no fixed costs. He also failed to recognize (Wauthy, 1996) the 
existence of a range of parameters where a comer solution prevails.
81
The interior solutions of such maximization are as follows:
p. 2Z-1) (330)
p , ------------    (3.31)
In correspondence to the above equihbrium prices, the constraint that p t is non-negative requires
that Jc > 2 . If x  < 2 , the high-quahty provider pre-empts the market. In other words, the size of 
the market is too “narrow” (or, preferences are not differentiated enough) to allow more than one 
provider to profitably enter the market75.
The constraint that the market be fully covered ( p t < q t ) requires that:
x  < 2qh +-qi■ (3.32)
Qh  “ f i
Recall that the incomplete market coverage required that x > ^qh qi .
Q h ~ Q i
Hence, there is an intermediate range of the upper-limit taste parameter
- i - ~  >
< x  <
 ^ Qh ~Qi Qh~Qi j
<  3 f  <  l i l Z i L  ] ,  e q u i v a l e n t  t o :  , J  £ z l  <  qo <  q0 Ez1 ( 3 . 3 3 ) ,
x - 1  X + 1
where prices obtained under the hypothesis of full-market coverage ( p *, p *h) lead to an equihbrium 
characterized by incomplete market coverage (they are therefore inconsistent), whilst optimal prices 
p f , p f , obtained under the hypothesis of incomplete market coverage, in fact lead to fully cover the
75 In this case equihbrium prices would be: 
— nPi
Ph = Qh
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market (constraint 3.8 is binding)76. Within such interval, a “comer solution” for p { prevails (which
we will denote by p f ). p f  is set exactly equal to q t , the level at which the marginal patient is just
indifferent between purchasing the low-quality service and not purchasing, and all the rest of the 
market is covered. Let us look at the equilibrium prices and market shares in correspondence to such 
comer solution. Straightforward computations show that:
P ° = M i = q ,  (3-34)
(3-35)
Equihbrium market shares are as follows:
y l = \ *  + - —  (3-36)
2  2  q „ - q .
y? = i - « —i — — —  (3.37)
2  2  q h - q ,
3 .2 .6  Equilibrium Q ualities When the Market is  Fully Covered
Let us now turn to the quality game in the first stage. As it was the case under incomplete market 
coverage (equation 3.21), optimal qualities are found by substituting equihbrium prices and market 
shares under the assumption of complete market coverage in the revenue function of both 
competitors, and by maximizing:
= p „ ( q h) y h(q (3.38)
Maxq n, = q , y ,  ( q , ) - q f / 2
76 The existence of a comer solution in between the unconstrained prices with uncovered and covered market 
was first recognized by Wauthy (1996). Note that moving from an incomplete to a full-market coverage 
situation changes the price elasticity of the demand faced by the low quality producer. Until the market is fully 
covered, by reducing its price, the low quality producer is able: 1) to gain market shares vis-a-vis the high 
quality producer; 2) to increase the size of the market, which is covered in equihbrium. Once the market is 
fully covered, competition is limited to market shares. Under full-market coverage demand is more rigid, and
83
Subject to: q. G [o, q * ) ,  q h > q l
The optimal qualities will be different in case the interior (case a. below) or the comer solution (case
b) prevails in the last stage of the game.
a. When prices are set according to equations (3.30 and 3.31) in the last stage of the game, x m, the 
value of the taste parameter separating those who purchase the high-quality services from those who
quality provider's profit function is decreasing in quality77, and therefore the unconstrained
never satisfied for p t >  0 ,  regardless of the value taken by the taste parameter. Hence, the
equilibrium qualities with unconstrained choice of prices under full market coverage, can never be 
sustained as an equilibrium under our characterization of the taste and technology (cost) parameters.
b. In correspondence to the comer solution for prices (equations 3.34 and 3.35 above), the 
computation of the optimal qualities is analytically complicated. However, it is possible to prove (see 
Appendix 3.2) that the system of First Order Conditions 78 is characterized by a unique solution for
—  < 1, defined for any 2 < x  <  4 .7 .  Such solution finds a lower bound and can be approximated
1 *h X
purchase the low-quality service, is independent of q t and q h, and equal to: x m = ------- . The low
equilibrium quality q { would be set equal to q t = q ^ n = 0  (in parallel, q h would be equal to:
q*h = > 0 , independently of q t ). However, in correspondence to q* =0, constraint 3.29 is
4h
by the following expression:
the equilibrium price is set at a comparatively higher level.
77 That is because market shares are not influenced by quality, whereas p t is inversely related to q t :
d p ' / d q ,  = 9  k *  q ‘^ X 2 ) / 3 q , < 0 .
78 The first order conditions lead to the following system of two equations (see Appendix 3.2):
The above system has real solutions, provided x >  1 + 2 q® and x  > 2-JqQh
84
o 2 ( x  2 )  0  ,<5 -jrvv
9' = ( ^ + 4x - 4 ) g> (139)
Note that solution 3.39 satisfies constraint 3.33, necessary for the corner solution to prevail in the last 
stage of the game, whenever 2<Jc<4 .7 .  79 By contrast, outside the range of the upper taste
parameter , choosing the comer solution p j  =  q t cannot be part of a
V Qh Ql Qh Ql
sub-game perfect equilibrium80.
qfAlso note that the above equilibrium quality ratio —  is increasing in x  , the upper limit in the range
Qh
of taste parameters, for any x  < 4 .7 . When x  = 2 , the threshold value below which only one 
provider is left in the market, qf  = 0 .  As x  tends to the value where the incomplete market
0
solution would prevail (equal to 4.7 in our example), —jr- tends to the same ratio as the optimal
Qh
qualities in case of incomplete market coverage (value equal to approx. 0 . 2  in our example).
Let us summarize the characterisation of equilibria under the hypothesis of full market coverage. By 
solving the game by backward induction, we have first proved that an unconstrained choice of 
equilibrium prices and qualities is not able to sustain an equilibrium with complete market coverage.
Only when prices are set according to the “comer solution” in the last stage of the game ( p f  = q t ), a
79 0 x  4 q q 2{x  2) n   . cIn fact, the constraint q h —-----< q t with qt — r_ > —*qh is satisfied only for x  < 4 .5  and not
x - l  [x + 4 x - 4 )
for x < 4 .7.  This is because qf  is a lower-bound approximation of the exact solution. If we used the latter,
we would find that when x  = 4.7 (the threshold value of the taste parameter in correspondence to which the
market becomes fully covered), the equilibrium relative qualities are qt = 0 . 1 9 q , identical to those found in
h
(  „ °  „b \
case of uncovered-market price equilibrium in the last stage. 0.19 = %  = %
^ Qh Qh J
80 In order to be a sub-game perfect equilibrium, a strategy must be a Nash equilibrium in any sub-game. The 
last stage of the game is a sub-game. Outside this intermediate range of parameters the strategy of setting
p f  = M i ~ Qi would be an “empty threat” on the part of the low quality provider in the lat stage of the 
game, even if it could be a Nash equilibrium for the whole game.
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quality level qf  and qf  A in correspondence to which the full market equilibrium can be sustained, 
if the upper taste parameter x  is equal to: 2<Jc < 4 .7 .
In summary, the set of sub-game-perfect equilibria is dependent on the value assumed by the upper 
taste parameter, and is characterized as follows:
Proposition 1:
When x  >  4.7 the equilibrium with incomplete market coverage prevails. The lower quality 
provider sets a quality level, which is a set proportion of the higher quality level provider.
When 2 < x  <  4.7 the equilibrium characterized by full market coverage prevails. The low quality 
provider sets its price in correspondence to the comer solution p t — q r  Within this range of the 
taste parameter, quality q t increases as preferences become more diversified ( x  increases). The 
quality ratio approaches the incomplete market coverage equilibrium as x  —» 4.7.
When 1 < x  < 2  the market is pre-empted by the higher-quality provider. In this case, p h is set 
exactly equal to q h.
3 .2 .7  Introduction to  th e  A nalysis o f th e  Im pact o f the Im position o f a 
Minimum Q uality Standard (MQS)
In this section we analyse what are the implications of the above analysis for the assessment of a 
minimum quality standard (MQS) policy that imposes a floor on q t , the quality of the low-quality
provider. The impact will depend on whether a incomplete or a complete market coverage 
equilibrium prevails before the MQS is imposed.
i) Incomplete m arket coverage. As indicated by Ronnen (1991), in case of Bertrand competition in 
the last stage, starting from a situation of incomplete market coverage the imposition of a MQS on 
the low-quality provider always bears a positive welfare enhancing effect. A MQS policy that
increases the equilibrium quality chosen by the low quality producer { q f ) leads to an increase in:
• market coverage;
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• the share of the market taken by the high quality producer;
• the level of quality chosen by the high quality producer.
Then, consumer surplus is unequivocally positively affected, and so does welfare (Ronnen, 1991, pp. 
497-498, see also common results under Bertrand and Cournot competition in the Annex). The 
above result highlights an extremely important, and yet neglected role of a MQS regulation: the latter 
does not only serve the purpose of enhancing service quality for those that already utilize health 
services, but may also be a tool for safeguarding, or enlarging market participation.
o 2(jc — 2) 0ii) Full market coverage. Suppose that initially q t = / 2 — ^ —r q h and that a MQS is imposed
( x  I 4 x  4* J
on q ° . Up to the quality threshold in correspondence to which constraint 3.33 is binding, the low
quality provider will continue to choose the comer solution for prices (namely p * = p® =  q t ) and 
progressively raise quality standards to comply with the regulation. However, beyond a certain
x  — 2 x  ■ x  — 2
threshold (where q t =  q h — ------—  = q h-—----- ), the low quality provider will switch to the
X  +  * n v n  X  +  1nun
unconstrained choice of prices (according to equation 3.31). Thus, the imposition of a MQS will 
maintain the equilibrium characterised by full market coverage, improve the level of quality 
produced by the low quality provider and by these means increase consumers’ welfare, but it would 
also lead to lower profits for the low-quality provider and to higher prices charged by both providers 
(see Appendix 3.2 for a formal proof of this last result), and by these means reduce welfare. The net 
effect will depend on the relative evaluation of price-quality variations by consumers.
Also note that if the government cannot subsidize the low-quality provider and if the Minimum 
Quality Standard is set too high, profits for the low quality producer may become negative and then 
only one provider would be left in the market. In this latter case, the MQS would lead to a greater 
concentration in the market and higher prices (lower coverage).
The analysis in this section provides only the first step towards drawing the full welfare implications 
of the impact of different forms of government intervention, including subsidization of the private 
sector, price and quality regulation, or direct provision. A full welfare analysis should be based on 
the specification of a public welfare function, with quality and accessibility of services among its 
arguments. We leave such further developments to subsequent research.
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3 .3  C onclusion
In this chapter we analysed the market equilibrium in a vertically differentiated market where health 
providers compete on price and quality of care. We indicated that market equilibria can be 
characterised by full or partial coverage depending on the characterisation of patients’ preferences, 
and of quality-enhancing costs. The above analysis suggests that when preferences for health 
services are relatively uniform, equilibria characterized by full market coverage would prevail, 
whereas, as the range of taste parameters broadens, equilibria characterized by incomplete market 
coverage progressively emerge. By comparison with previous models characterised by linear quality- 
enhancing costs, our analysis also suggests that incomplete market coverage equilibria are more 
likely when the structure of these costs is characterized by decreasing returns to scale.
The above model also indicated that the anticipation of the intensity of competition determines how 
‘distant’ from each other providers set their equilibrium quality levels. Under full market coverage, 
competition in prices is likely to be harsher, because there is no more "free space" to occupy and the 
two competitors compete against each other for their relative market shares. Ex-ante, this has an 
impact on the determination of optimal qualities, because, anticipating harsh price competition in the 
second stage (which in the long-run could threaten to drive both competitors' profits down to zero), 
in the first stage providers move their quality further apart from each other. By so doing they make 
their services less substitutable of each other, and thus they relax price competition in the last stage. 
In this case the imposition of a MQS leads to higher quality, but it can also produce higher prices and 
in the limit, crowd out low quality providers from the market.
As the range of taste parameters broadens, the quality set by both providers increases 
(dqi /  d(x  -  jc ^  ) > 0 ). The quality chosen by the low-quality provider increases more than 
proportionally until a certain threshold is reached (which is inversely related to the "steepness" of the 
cost function), after which it remains as a fixed proportion of his competitor’s quality (qt = 0.19*^).
The intuitive explanation is that, once the size of the market is large enough or preferences for health 
services are diversified enough, competitors do not need to differentiate their qualities as much in 
order to relax price competition, because there is room to always cover untapped segments of the 
market, without taking those away from the competitor. Thus, in correspondence to equilibria 
characterized by incomplete market coverage, quality levels tend to be closer to each other. In case
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of incomplete market coverage in equilibrium, the imposition of a MQS regulation unequivocally 
leads to positive welfare effects.
Thus, building upon Wauthy’s (1996) analysis (Wauthy (1996) adopted a different specification of 
the quality-enhancing cost function), our model confirmed his principal result, although the range of 
taste parameters where the different solutions prevail is obviously different. More specifically, 
comparing our model to Wauthy (1996), one can see that explicitly considering positive (fixed) 
costs:
♦ Broadens the range of taste/income parameters in correspondence to which market equilibria 
characterized by incomplete coverage prevail.
♦ Narrows the range of taste/income parameters in correspondence to which equilibria 
characterized by complete market coverage prevail. At the same time, by contrast with Wauthy’s 
results, we showed that the full-market coverage equilibria can only be maintained under our 
specification of the costs parameters only if the low-quality provider sets his price at a level that 
makes the marginal patient indifferent between purchasing or not.
♦ Leaves unchanged the set of taste parameters in correspondence to which the market is pre­
empted by the high quality provider.
What are the predictions of the above model? There are several of them, summarized here. 
Focusing first on the relationship between quality and accessibility of services, we can underscore 
the following points:
♦ Interpreting the health systems' historical evolution in light of the above analysis, one can observe 
that in the first phases of the epidemiological transition and health systems' development, 
preferences for health care tend to be more similar across the population, as incomes and 
expectations are also lower and less dispersed. In such a situation our analysis predicts that all 
patients will be served by the private providers, but quality differential will be more pronounced 
(perhaps with untrained providers serving poorer patients). By contrast, as people’s expectations 
increase and become more diversified, quality of care will improve, but at the same time private 
providers will increasingly leave out the lower segments of the population. Our analysis predicts 
that the market equilibrium will be characterised by an upper tier of the population given high- 
quality services, a middle tier served given lower quality services, and a lower tier excluded from 
the market.
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♦ Considering different health services at any given point in time, another question of interest is the 
following: ‘For which services different equilibria are more likely to prevail?” As we indicated, 
the key parameters are relative to preferences and technology. For more costly and sophisticated 
services (such as tertiary care services) quality-enhancing costs are likely to increase more 
rapidly, and the distribution of preferences to be more dispersed across the population. By 
contrast, the hypothesis of similar tastes across the population is more realistic for basic or routine 
care. Then, our model predicts that for the former group of services a more significant share of 
the population will be left out, because of the equilibrium choices of prices and quality. However, 
it also predicts that the problem of controlling quality is more urgent for basic rather than more 
complicated services, because providers will tend to diversify more quality levels for basic 
services, to decrease the intensity of competition.
To summarize the key characteristics of the oligopolistic equihbrium, we can recall the following 
results:
♦ For any quality choice: 0 < q i < °o and such that q h >  q t , equilibrium profits are positive. By
differentiating qualities, the two providers are able to set prices above marginal cost (which is 
equal to zero in our case) and earn a positive profit.
♦ Given quality of service provision, as the low-quality provider increases its prices, the high- 
quality provider increases its prices as well, and vice versa. Thus, the two equihbrium prices are 
strategic complementaries (by contrast, quantities are strategic substitutes; see Hammer, 1998).
Finally, we are also interested in studying the reaction of the higher quality producer to exogenous 
changes in the quahty set by the low quality producer, starting from the market equihbrium level, 
and under the hypothesis of incomplete market coverage:
♦ Increasing the quality of the low quahty provider, q t , in the short-term (when q h is fixed) leads 
to:
a. decreases in the prices charged by the high-quality provider, p h ;
b. decreases profits for the high-quality provider. Note that the effects are not linear. The 
decrease in p h caused by an increase in q t is stronger the lower is the initial quahty
offered by the low-quahty provider (the second derivative of p h with respect to q t is 
positive, under both Bertrand and Coumot competitive settings).
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The two qualities of service are strategic complementaries, which means that the 
increase in the quality of one of the two providers leads to an increase in the other 
provider’s quahty.
A nnex 3 .1  C om er-Solution: E quilibrium  Q u ality  Levels
When the comer solution prevails for prices ( p °i = q L), from maximization problem 3.38 one can 
derive the following First Order necessary Conditions:
{x - 1 -  2q t \ q h -  q t f  -  q \  = 0 (3.56)
(*2 “ 4QhX<lh ~Qi f  ~qf  = 0 ( 3 -5 7 )
with x  >2, q h > q t >  0
To solve the above system from the first equation 3.56, derive:
Substitute (qh — q t )2 from equation 3.58 in equation 3.57:
4 q l - x q 2h = 2 q f - ( x - l ) g f  (3.59)
q - ,
Define /  =  —  < 1. Divide each member of 3.59 by q h. Then one obtains:
Qh
_  ( 5 c - l ) / 2 - 3 f 2 
2 / 3 - 4Qh = ~ ~h — :—  <3-60)
Now, divide each member of equation 3.57 by q 3h:
_ x 2 + x 2f 2 - 2 x 2f - f 2
Qh ~ ---------7-------9-------- -^------ (3.61)
4(l + /  2 / )
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The last two equations 3.60 and 3.61 can be combined, thus obtaining a cubic equation in / :
z ( f )  = / 3 (i _  j 2)+  2 / 2( j  + x 2 - 1)+ / ( 4 - x 2 - 4 x )+  2(x -  2) = 0 (3.62)
with /  =  —  < 1 
Qh
Let us study the function z(f):
1.
a. when f=0, z(f) =2 x -4 > 0, because x >2;
b. when f=l, z(f) =-1
c . l i m ^ ^  z ( f )  —> becansel — x 2 < 0 .  However, we are not interested in values of 
Thus, for 0<f<l, there is at least a solution z(f) = 0, for each x .
2. Let us compute the first and second derivative of z(f):
z ' { f )  =  3 f 2{ L ~ x 2) + 4 f ( x  + x 2 - l ) +  ( 4 - x 2 - 4 x )  (3.63)
z " ( / )  = 6 / ( l - x 2)+ 4 (x  + x 2 - l )  (3.64)
We want to find the relative max and min of the cubic equation in f: z’(f)=0.
— l ( x  +  x 2 - l ) ± ^ 4 ( x  + x 2 - 1 )2 — 3 (1  -  JC2 X4  -  4jc — JC2) 
f =    (3'65)
Forx>2: (x + x 2 - 1)>0, ( l - x 2)<0, ( 4 - 4 x - x 2)<0.
The product under square root ( 3 ( l - x 2) ( 4 - 4 x - x 2)) is positive, and therefore the whole 
expression under square root is smaller than the square of the term outside the root, which implies 
that the numerator of expression 3.65 is negative for each x . The denominator is also negative, and
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so the two solutions of 3.65 are both positive. In turn, this entails that the cubic expression 3.62 has 
its relative max and min in correspondence to f>0. Let us compute the derivatives in:
f=l: z’(f)=3
Thus, between fE(0,l), the function z(f) has a relative min, which implies that the solution to 
equation 3.62 is unique (there is only one point where the graph of z(f) crosses the horizontal axis 
between 0 and 1. Let us see the graph of z(f):
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium Quality Ratios in Correspondence to the Corner Solution for Prices
Legenda: m  =  X  in the text.
The unique solution f*: z(f)=0 is comprised between
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The above two values are the intercepts in f=0 of the tangent to the cubic 
( z T = 2 (3 c-2 ) + / ( 4 - J c 2 -43c)) and of the segment AB (dashed blue segment in the above 
picture).
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A nnex 3 .2  Public-Private In terac tion  in  H ealth
In this Annex, some of the possible channels of interaction between public and private provision are 
investigated within a simple graphical supply-demand framework.
Whenever the public sector offers or subsidizes health services that the private sector already 
provides, this is most likely to influence the way the latter operates. There may be "crowding-out" or 
"crowding in" effects, as well as variations in quality of services offered by the private sector.
Recognizing the role of the private sector would change the perspective according to which priorities 
are defined in the public sector. As Hammer (1997, p. 48) writes: "Government investment, like any 
other government intervention, should be justified in terms of the social benefit the project will have 
over and above that which would occur without public sector involvement. For any investment 
opportunity, the focus of analysis should be on the difference between social and private benefits- 
not on the costs and expected returns to private goods themselves".81
Focusing on service provision, note that new evidence is beginning to emerge from studies in 
developing countries showing the significance of public-private interaction. For example, in a multi­
country study in several African sub-Saharan countries, Alderman and Lavy (1996) found a 
significant reduction in the use of private facilities determined by greater availability (measured as 
the reduction of distance from the closest facility) or higher quality of public facilities (mainly 
measured as improved drug availability). In a study on Indonesia Gertler and Molineaux (1995) 
showed that public and private fees are correlated and that demand changes depend on both prices. 
Alderman and Gertler (1989) used sensitivity analysis to study the effects on demand for Pakistan 
public and private facilities of changing public service fees. Again, the estimated cross-price 
elasticity between public and private services are significant.
81 As another example, by contributing to subsidize health plans for high risk people or to directly finance 
medical treatments for most catastrophic illnesses, the government may bring about a greater welfare gain than 
by providing primary care services that are already accessible in the private sector totally for free (see analysis 
of adverse selection in Chapter 2, and Chapter 6). Note that catastrophic care services in fact tend to occupy 
low levels in priority scales based on Medical Intervention Cost-Effectiveness analysis (see Annex 6.4, and 
Hammer and Berman, 1995).
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The change in the equilibrium will be influenced by demand and supply elasticity82, and by demand 
cross-price elasticity, which measures how demand for a certain good or service is affected by the 
change in the price of another good or service. If the two goods are complementary, cross-price 
elasticity is negative, if they are substitutes, it is positive83.
In order to illustrate the importance of measuring also cross-price elasticity across different medical 
services, suppose that in country X the government decides to impose co-payments on 
pharmaceuticals prescribed during outpatient care visits, while those prescribed in hospitals remain 
for free. Then, we may suspect that people would search admission in hospitals just to receive free 
prescriptions.
To measure such substitution effect between drugs received in outpatient and inpatient care, the 
relevant concept is that of demand cross-price elasticity. If Q0 is volume of pharmaceuticals 
demanded outside the hospital, Qi? is volume of pharmaceuticals demanded inside the hospital, P0 is 
the price of drugs at the point of service outside the hospital and P; is the price at the point of service 
inside the hospital (equal to zero in our example), and m individual income, we have two demand 
functions for pharmaceuticals for each consumer:
Q0=f ( P o , P i , m )  
Q i =f ( P o , P i , m )
The percentage change in demand of drugs inside the hospital, due to a 1% increase in prices of 
pharmaceuticals purchased outside the hospital is measured by the cross-price elasticity of Q, with 
respect to P0
aa pQ
e QiP0 ~
a
The greater is the above elasticity, the greater will be the substitubility between pharmaceuticals 
purchased inside and outside the hospital. In case of perfect substitubility, any increase in the price
82 Demand (price) elasticity for any particular good or service is the percentage change in market demand for 
that good or service determined by a 1% percent change in its market price. Supply elasticity is similarly 
measured.
83 The absolute value of such elasticity conveys information on how “close” to each other the markets for the 
two goods or services are, and how strong the influence of changes in one market on the other market 
equilibrium is likely to be.
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of drugs purchased outside the hospitals above the price paid in the hospital, will result in a complete 
collapse of the “market” for drugs outside the hospital and no revenue would be collected through 
the higher co-payments.
Considering the supply elasticity is equally important. Let us take an extreme example, and suppose 
that government chooses to provide a demand subsidy for a health service which is already in short 
supply (there is no unused capacity in place). Suppose also that at least in the short term doctors and 
equipment cannot be reallocated from other services to increase the supply of that service.
Figure 3.2: Inelastic Supply- Subsidy Leads to Price Increase
Demand
after
'emand earmarkedPs
b e f o r e subsidy
•ked
subsi*
Suppl
P
Q o
In the above situation the increased demand causes only a price increase, equal to the amount of the 
subsidy. There is no adjustment in the quantity supplied. Moreover, if the subsidy is given only to a 
sub-group of the population (for example, trough a social insurance scheme exclusively for formal 
sector employees), the price increase may make the subsidized services unaffordable to the rest of 
the population.
Hence, the best public intervention on the supply side is different in case when private supply is 
elastic and when it is inelastic. When it is inelastic, as in the above example (which is generally true 
for more sophisticated health inputs and more complex services), the only way of changing the
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market equilibrium supply is to directly supplement it with public delivery. There is little crowding 
out of private suppliers, even with significant changes in equilibrium prices. A totally different 
course of action ought to be followed when supply is elastic, as it might be the case with primary 
care services. If supply is elastic, public delivery leads to strong crowding out of private suppliers, 
such that in extreme situations (as illustrated in the figure below) total supply may not change 
despite public intervention. In these situations, it is also important to measure the degree of 
substitutability between private and public services, and the way to measure is to estimate the 
demand cross-price elasticity between public and private services. If such elasticity is not significant, 
it means that the market for private and public care may be considered as totally independent 
markets. Even if private supply is elastic, there would then be no crowding out because of increase of 
government supply.
Figure 3.3: The Impact of a Health Information Campaign, and the Crowding-out of Private
Providers
Price c 
reproductive 
health
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►emand informationservices
Private Supply =Marginal Costinformation
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Total supply = private +public
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Reproductive health 
services
In the figure above, the information campaign shifts demand for reproductive health services 
significantly outwards. The new equilibrium is characterized by price P* and equilibrium quantity 
R*. Considering that price too high, the government might want to provide extra reproductive 
services at a lower price in the public sector. However, in the above figure (1) there is perfect 
substitubility between public and private services and (2) private supply is very elastic (sensitive to
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price). Due to (1) the private sector has to lower its prices to maintain market shares. If supply is 
elastic, as in the above example, public supply crowds out private supply (the private sector does not 
provide any service for a price lower than Pmin). In the new equilibrium (P”” and R” ), the volume 
of reproductive health services is not significantly different from the private equilibrium, and 
cheaper public services simply substitute for more expensive private ones.
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Chapter 4: Health Reforms
4.2  In tern a l m a rk e t reform s
In this and the following chapters we will focus on the resource allocation, purchasing and payment 
system (briefly RAP) components of the internal market reforms that, following the UK and the US 
examples, took place in several lower income countries over the decade of the ‘90s. In this Chapter 
we will provide a broad overview of the reforms, their rational and main components. We will also 
introduce the conceptual framework, based on the notion of trade-offs, which informs our reading of 
the impact of the reforms in this and the next chapters. Chapter 5 is dedicated to a more in depth 
analysis of payment systems (PS) and contracts between purchasers and providers in health. Chapter 
6 looks more in detail and presents the empirical evidence on the impact of the reforms from an 
equity perspective. Chapter 7 provides an empirical analysis of the impact of the reforms in the 
Former Socialist Economies, and Chapter 8 presents a study of the impact of the reforms in Georgia.
As we anticipated in Chapter 1, the internal market or managed competition reforms, which took 
place in several industrialised and middle income countries from the beginning of the decade of the 
‘90s, emphasized the role of competition among providers as a means to achieve more efficient and 
client-oriented delivery of publicly financed health services, and that of the health purchaser as an 
agency be interposed between patients and providers to “discipline” the market. Purchasers would 
“organize specific types of health care for a designated population (whether defined by geography, 
employment type or voluntary enrolment)” (Rice and Smith, 2000, p. 1). The motivation of the 
purchasing role was justified as follows: by creating purchasers charged with the role of screening 
demand and of bargaining with providers on patients' behalf it would be possible to enhance 
demand’s sensitivity to quality and/or cost, and still not renounce universal insurance coverage 
where such coverage was already in place. These institutional purchasers would be better informed, 
and have a greater bargaining power than patients did. Moreover, their purchasing power, unlike 
patients', could be easily equalized (by financing/subsidizing them according to a capitation formula, 
for example).
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According to the theory behind the reforms (Enthoven, 1985), the government should have retained 
only the role of (partially) financing specific health services, and of externally regulating quality of 
care.
In the UK, the reforms became known as “internal or quasi market” health reforms because they 
intended to replicate “market-type” mechanisms for the purchasing and payment of publicly funded 
health services.84 In the UK, the reforms had three main components:
a) split of Health Authorities (HAs), previously the local authorities in charge of hospitals and all 
other health service providers, into provider and purchaser units;
b) corporatisation of hospitals, progressively turned into Hospital Trusts with separate budgets and 
semi-independent management, mainly funded according to contracts set with HAs and GP Fund 
holders;
c) creation of GP Fund holders (GPFHs), alongside Health Authorities, on the purchaser side85. 
GPFHs would be groups of primary care doctors administering an independent budget, based on 
capitation funding, and used to pay for their own services and for the referrals of their patients to 
higher-levels of care.
Parallel to the above reforms, in countries such as the USA which traditionally relied more on private 
financing and provision of health care services, profound changes were also under way. First, a 
process of integration and increased co-ordination among independent units was taking place. 
Several indemnity insurers were evolving into new organisations, Preferred Provider Organisations 
and Health Maintenance Organisations, whose distinguishing feature was Managed Care. Managed 
Care is characterised by a much more pervasive control over providers' diagnostic and therapeutic 
decisions, mainly obtained through contractual discipline. The new contracts set prospective 
payments for providers (see below analysis of payment systems), quantity ceilings and utilisation 
reviews, and sometimes imply exclusive dealings, or other forms of vertical restriction. In other
84 According to the theoretical model first proposed by the American economist Enthoven, providers would 
compete for health contracts, and GP Fund holders would compete alongside Health Authorities for public 
funding on the purchaser side. Competition was meant to promote a more efficient and consumer-responsive 
system, by offering: "greater rewards for those working in the NHS who successfully respond to local needs 
and preferences" ("Working for patients", 1989, pp.3-4). "Working for Patients" is the title of the White Paper 
outlining the reforms for the British National Health System.
85 In 1997 the new Labour government initiated a reform plan replacing HAs and GPFHs with Primary Care 
Groups (PCG), later renamed Primary Care Trusts (PCT) on the purchaser side. PCT are commissioning and 
service provider agencies with an assigned pool of patients larger than that formerly administered by GPFHs, 
but generally smaller than HAs; they should promote a new coordination of community and primary care 
services. However, the key features of the 1991 internal market reforms are still preserved.
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words, in these second group of countries a “spontaneous” evolution in the market (mainly driven by 
employers’ need to achieve better control over escalating insurance costs) was creating the purchaser 
role (taken mainly by former indemnity insurers but also by groups of doctors), without an explicit 
intervention by government.86
Following the UK and the USA, during the ‘90s other European countries (such as Holland and 
Italy) and several other middle income countries of Latin America (such as Colombia), of Central 
and Eastern Europe, and of Asia implemented reforms inspired by the internal market model. The 
experience with these reforms in Colombia is presented in Box 4.1.
Case Study 4.1: Evidence from Colombia 87
The 1993 Colombian health reforms strengthened the health revenue collection and pooling systems, they 
changed the criteria for allocating resources within the health system, and made health providers autonomous 
(hospital corporatisation). The core reform components were the following:
• On the resource mobilization front, the government raised the payroll tax rate on formal sector 
employees from 8 to 12 percent (the same rate holds for self-employed workers who report a salary 
above the national minimum), and hypothecated for health a fixed share of local governments' 
revenues (25% of the total local governments’ revenue, according to Law 60 of 1993). Such revenue 
mainly consists of transfers from the central government, plus minor local taxes.
• The creation of a national contributory insurance scheme for formal sector employees, managed by 
Empresas Promotoras de Salud (EPS), and of a national subsidized insurance scheme, managed by 
Administradoras del Rigimen Subsidiado (ARS). The EPS and the ARS receive a capitation funding 
for each beneficiary (la Unidad de Pago por Capitacidn -  UPC), which is larger for children under 5, 
for the old and for women in fertile age, and they guarantee coverage of, or directly provide a prefixed 
package of health services to their beneficiaries. In prospect, the benefit package should become 
equal for all Colombians (Plan Obligatorio de Salud, POS), but so far it is more generous for those in 
the contributory regime than for those in the subsidized regime (approximately twice as expensive per 
capita, US$127 as opposed to $68 per capita in 1998).
• The creation of a national compensatory fund (Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantia, FOSYGA), entrusted 
with the role of supervising the financial flows in the system, of cross-subsidizing EPS in deficit with
86 In fact, the USA government, under the Democratic Presidency of Clinton, drafted a comprehensive plan of 
reforms (“Health Security Act”) inspired by the managed competition model first proposed by Enthoven 
(1985). The plan was proposed to Congress, and later on rejected by the Republican Party (see case study 4.4, 
in the text).
87 This Case Study draws on a paper by Londono, Jaramillo and Uribe (1999).
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resources from those in surplus (Subcuenta de Compensacidn), and of providing parts of the subsidies 
for ARS (the other part -69% in 1999- is provided by municipal governments)88.
• The transformation of hospitals and other health providers into independent Prestadoras de Servicios 
de Salud (IPS), legally regulated as ESE (Empresas Sociales del Estado) and mainly funded by EPSs 
and ARSs according to the services provided to the insured population. Thus, direct subsidies to 
providers, previously assigned mainly by local governments, should have been progressively 
substituted by activity-based payments, according to the services rendered to the insured population. 
However, recently the central government stopped the process of phasing out of these subsidies.
The evidence available from Colombia after 1993 shows weaknesses and gaps in the reform process. 
Nonetheless, overall it shows a positive impact of the health reforms on equity and efficiency. In particular, 
some key macro-indicators of equity seem to have improved, in spite of the several difficulties encountered in 
the reform process, and in spite of socio-economic hardships the country continued to experience while the 
health reforms where in progress89.
Looking first at the changes in social health insurance coverage, the evidence indicates that the Colombian 
health system before the reforms was extremely fragmented and inequitable, with marked differences in access 
to health services and their quality90. As a result of the weaknesses of the pre-payment schemes, the poorest 
decile of the population was spending on health a share of their income up to ten times higher than the richest 
decile, and approximately half of those who reported illness did not seek care because they were unable to 
pay91.
After the reforms the number of people insured through both the contributory as well as the subsidized regime 
has sharply increased, raising the total number of people insured from 23% to roughly 60% of the total 
population. The improvement was particularly significant for households belonging to the poorest expenditure 
quintile in the country, who increased their health insurance coverage in the subsidized regime more than 
tenfold, and those belonging to the second quintile, who increased coverage approximately six times. In year 
2000, of the total poor population in the country 35.3% was covered by the subsidized regime, 10.7% by the 
contributory regime, and 53.9% as yet did not have health coverage. Other major achievements of the reforms 
were the following: A) Between 1993 and 1997, health subsidies for the poorest quintiles of the population 
increased by 200%; and those for the second poorest quintiles by more than 100% (Sanchez and Nunez, 1999).
88 The central government should also match FOSYGA's subsidies, a mechanism known as paripassu'. 
However, due to the difficult fiscal situation, such contribution was frozen.
89 The growth rate in Colombia has been negative for most part of the last decade, unemployment raised from 
7% in 1994 to 22% in 1999, and the civil war created hundred of thousands of displaced people.
90 Social security covered health risks for approximately half of the workers in the formal sector; among these, 
only 20% enjoyed health coverage extended to their families. Overall, 72.2% of the adult working population 
in Colombia (and 90.8% of the poorer decile) was excluded from any social security benefits. Only 23% of the 
total population (approximately 7 million Colombians) enjoyed any form of health insurance coverage.
91 Molina C.G. et al. (1993).
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Meanwhile, health subsidies for the two quintiles of the most affluent sector of the population decreased 70% 
and 14% respectively. B) Disparities in the allocation of resources for health across regions and departments 
have been reduced with the process of decentralization and with the introduction of capitation-based resource 
allocation criteria92. C) Most importantly, utilization of services has increased across all income groups, as the 
following table shows:
Table 4.1: Colombia. Health Services Utilization Distribution, 1993 -1997 .25
Ambulatory Consultations Hospitalizations
1993 1997 Change % 1993 1997 Change %
Quintile 1 340,856 605,840 78% 176,045 205,982 17%
Quintile 2 436,223 827,147 90% 216,108 245,473 14%
Quintile 3 549,161 1,232,268 124% 201,606 322,482 60%
Quintile 4 590,331 1,384,333 135% 200,060 296,628 48%
Quintile 5 598,863 1,362,215 127% 179,550 333,724 86%
TOTAL 2,515,384 5,411,803 115% 973,369 1,404,289 44%
Source: Londono, Jaramillo and Uribe, 1999
Also the reform component which gave hospitals full autonomy had a significant impact (McPake et al. 2002). 
Before the reforms in Colombia efficiency indicators in the public sector were extremely poor. For example, 
occupancy rates in public facilities were lower than 40 %. As explained before, the reform programme 
included the creation of a purchaser-provider split and the transformation of public hospitals into ‘autonomous 
state entities’. These were intended to contract with multiple competing insurers and the local health secretariat 
for the provision of services. A study aimed to track hospital performance in the post-reform period in Bogota 
(McPake 2002). Trends in hospital inputs, production and productivity, technical quality, patient satisfaction 
and finances, and qualitative data based on interviews with hospital workers were collected. There was some 
evidence of increased activity and productivity and sustained quality despite declining staffing levels. The 
following two figures show trends, respectively in total admissions and in bed occupancy rates.
92 The Corporation for Research and Development (CRD), and the Medellin Economic Faculty (CEDE) found 
that, between 1987 and 1995, regions that at the beginning of the period had relatively less public resources, 
witnessed a greater increase in funds available, and that as a result inequalities in per capita available by 
department have decreased. Bossert (2000) confirms the same results.
25 Adapted from Sanchez F. y Nunez J. (1999). The numbers presented do not correspond to the total of the 
services offered in the country. They correspond to the estimations of the CASEN (1993) and of Quality of 
Life (1997) Surveys.
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Figure 4.1: Trends in Total Admissions
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Figure 4.2: Trends in Bed Occupancy Rates
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As the two figures above indicate, both number of admissions and bed-occupancy rates either remained stable 
or raised after the reforms. Qualitative evidence suggests that hospital workers have noticed considerable 
changes, which include greater responsiveness to patients but also a heavier administrative burden. 
Unfortunately, no data is available.
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4.2  Resource a lloca tion , pu rch asin g  and p a ym en t sys tem  
(RAP) reform s
Resource allocation, purchasing and payment systems mechanisms define the criteria according to 
which funds, collected through different revenue sources and pooled together, flow within the health 
system, eventually reaching service providers93. Their place in relation to the other dimensions of 
health financing and service delivery can be visualized in Figure 4.3, taken from Preker et al. (2001).
Figure 4.3: Financial Flows within a Health System
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RAP reforms, namely, changes in the criteria according to which funds flow within the health system 
eventually reaching service providers, were a key feature of the internal market or managed 
competition reforms described in the previous section.94
93 Note that health financing includes both the alternative ways to fund health services, by collecting and 
pooling resources for health, as well as the criteria for distributing resources across purchasers and providers. 
RAP reforms are meant to change the latter, and not the former.
94 However, note that internal market reforms frequently included wider changes, which also affected sources 
of revenue and the organization of service provision, as the Colombian case study just presented demonstrates
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This chapter will describe six key elements within RAP reforms. The first five intervene on the 
supply side, and the last one on the demand side:
• the interposition of a purchasing agency between patients and providers, entrusted with the 
role of commissioning/contracting services from (semi)independent providers;
• redesign of resource allocation criteria for purchasers, and of payment systems for providers, 
moving from input-based and retrospective towards prospective payment systems;
• redesign governments’ priorities across services or levels of care, and limit public financing 
to a more restricted set of services (in several developing countries this component of RAP 
reforms has been identified with the introduction of the “Basic Benefit Package, or BBP);
• provision of explicit financial and other incentives/enablers to providers, linked with their 
ability to reach the poor/cure diseases that primarily affect the poor.
• financial incentives for patients/clients, such as vouchers, to stimulate consumption of 
specific health care services, such as prenatal care and institutional delivery.
All RAP health reforms implemented over the last twenty years in industrialized as well as middle 
income countries included a different combination of the above six elements. Table 4.2 synthetically 
illustrates their principal objective and content.
At the same time, some countries changed some specific RAP mechanisms, for example payment systems for 
providers, without affecting other dimensions of health financing or resource allocation.
Table 4.2: Different RAP Reform Components
RAP reform 
component
Purchasing/contr
acting
Explicit 
incentives for 
providers to 
reach specific 
groups/cure 
certain diseases
Explicit 
incentives 
for patients 
to use 
specific 
services
RAP
arrangement
addressed
Purpose
Activities
To make or to buy 
decision
Strategic 
purchasing; more 
transparency and 
results-orientation 
in public sector; 
engagement of the 
private sector in 
service provision. 
Definition of
contracts and
service
agreements,
increased degree
of market
exposure for
providers
Whom to 
purchase for?
Reduction of 
exclusion of the 
poor from public 
services/sharper 
targeting
Equity-motivated 
risk-adjusters to 
correct capitation 
funding. Explicit 
financial 
incentives for 
providers to 
cover the poor, 
or to provide 
care against 
diseases that 
affect the poor 
(ex. TB).
Whom to 
purchase for?
Increase 
utilization of 
essential 
services by 
the poor
Specific 
enablers or 
incentives 
(such as 
vouchers) 
that
contribute to
treatment
and
travelling
expenses
Principal Max impact on disease burden, cost Allocative and productive efficiency.
Objective effectiveness, correction of market Consumer-responsiveness.
failures
Equity, Financial protection
Resource
allocation criteria
What services to 
subsidize and what 
to exclude?
Strategic definition 
of priorities for 
public financing 
and provision.
Redefinition of 
priorities across 
services according 
to cost-
effectiveness or 
other criteria.
What are the rules 
(formula) for 
transferring public 
funds?
New criteria for 
allocating 
resources across 
regions, districts 
and purchasers.
From retrospective 
to prospective 
resource allocation.• : ' • 71. - ■ -
. ':V ' / ;  • \  . ...
' ' :
Providers'
payment systems
How to pay? How 
much to purchase 
and at what 
prices?
Redefinition of- ■. . , ■
the incentive 
regime for 
providers.
Output/performan 
ce based payment 
systems for 
providers; ; 
capitation based 
funding of 
primary care 
physicians
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4 .3  M otiva tion  o f  RAP R eform s
Several European Nations in the post World War II period provided universal health insurance 
coverage to their populations and created National Health Services to deliver uniform standards of 
care across different geographical areas (see Annex 2.1). The first NHS was created in the UK in 
1948; then, during the 1950s, ’60 and ‘70s several other West European Nations followed. The 
planning and delivery of most health services was organized through public, vertically integrated 
agencies. Most production decisions, such as volume and mix of inputs, salaries for health workers 
and other personnel, and capital investments, were taken by government at the central and or the 
local level. By these means, public health services effectively guaranteed an unprecedented degree of 
equality in access to health services, even if a certain degree of discrimination continued mainly 
because of cultural barriers and uneven education. National Health Services were also comparatively 
more effective in controlling total health expenditure.
However, over the 1980s this publicly financed, government-led, top-down approach to planning and 
delivery of health services was increasingly criticized for its inefficiency and poor results. According 
to these critiques, central planning, lack of accountability and of financial or other incentives linked 
to performance for health workers, created a rigid and non client-responsive delivery system. At the 
same time, the political and bureaucratic process, which determined the total amount spent and the 
share attributed to different services, hardly reflected consumers’ preferences or any other economic 
rationale. Actual resources spent on health could not respond to the new expectations about standards 
and diversification of care that, during the last fifty years, accompanied the constant increase in 
income and education levels.
Over the post WWII period several middle and lower income countries established and staffed an 
extensive network of health facilities at the primary, secondary and tertiary level. Given their 
colonial inheritance and socialist orientation, several of them tried model their health system 
organization on the basis of West European National Health Services. The Alma Ata Declaration, 
subscribed in 1978 by all Nations but a few, marked the high point in this struggle to achieve “free 
health care for all”. In reality, MIC and LIC did not and do not have the tax base and public 
resources that could finance the operation and functioning of a universal public delivery system. 
Instead of following the European path towards publicly financed, publicly provided health care 
systems, because of tight fiscal and other political economic constraints, LIC with a few exceptions 
(see Box 4.1) ended up with a (mainly) public, but (mainly) privately financed delivery system. In
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rural areas, unqualified or semi-qualified private providers continued to be the first contact for the 
majority of poor households, unable to afford formal private or public services. Over time, a private 
delivery sector -for profit and not-for-profit- also grew in these countries. The private sector entered 
in a sort of awkward symbiosis with the public delivery system, where the private sector benefits 
from the disorganization and the lack of financial resources in the public sector, and where the public 
sector can survive unchanged because the frustrations its imbalances continuously create (among 
patients, as well as physicians and nurses) are relaxed by the possibility of exercising/seeking private 
services. In this situation, doctors and other health employees, supposedly employed full-time in the 
public sector, increasingly earn most of their income in the private sector, and use their public 
employment mainly to gain a clientele for their private activity and to utilize expensive equipment 
they could not otherwise afford.
In summary, in the majority of these poorer countries, a combination of government and market 
failures more severe than in industrialized Nations have resulted in poor spending choices, distorted 
allocation or resources, poor quality of services, unequal distribution of resources for health care in 
favour of the rich (see Chapter 6), etc. The government health care system has been incapable of 
universally providing at acceptable standards even essential services such as maternal and child care. 
A number of studies has found a high level of absenteeism in government facilities (see for example, 
results from study in India presented in WDR 2004, The World Bank: WDR, 2004, Chapter 2, Table 
1.2b), widespread dual job holding by doctors, and that "bypassing" of low-quality services offered 
by public facilities is a common phenomenon (Akin and Hutchinson, 1999. For Kenya, see Mwabo, 
1993; for the Dominican Republic, Lewis et al., 1992, and for Pakistan, PIEDR, 1994). The high 
price-elasticity of demand for government health services, particularly observed for child services 
and among the poor (for Uganda, see Giusti, 200095 and for Indonesia, Gertler and Molyneaux, 1990) 
may conceal a low evaluation of these services.
Box 4.1: The relationship between government health expenditure, level of income, and health 
outcomes
A stream of literature has recently questioned the effectiveness of publicly-financed and provided services, 
particularly curative services, in achieving better health outcomes. In a multi-country regression, Pritchett et al, 
2001, found that the level of health expenditure and health inputs officially recorded, such as the number of
95 In 1997 a natural experiment was recorded in Uganda. Non-profit facilities raised their user-fees in August 
(up to roughly US $ 1.5 per child outpatient visit, and up to US $ 7.5 per adult outpatient visit) and then 
lowered them again in November, after the government committed to subsidize them. Giusti (2000) recorded 
extremely wide variation in service use, especially for childcare.
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doctors or number of health facilities, produce a negligible impact on priority health outcomes). By contrast, 
other evidence (see for example Wagstaff, 2004) indicates that in countries characterised by better governance, 
there is link between health expenditure and health outcomes. The evidence also indicates that real, as opposed 
to “paper”, health inputs and service quality do produce a strong impact on utilization and on outcomes 
(Alderman and Lavy, 1996). For instance, Lavy et al. (1996) show that in Ghana drug availability and weekly 
hours of availability of physicians produce a strong impact on child survival, on child height and weight for 
height.
These studies also question the effectiveness of the traditional ways of channelling foreign assistance in the 
health sector to developing countries, mainly focused on the expansion of the infrastructure base of the 
government health sector. While these continuous investments have made a tangible difference to physical 
infrastructure and delivery capacity, the outcomes in terms of actual improvement in services -  particularly to 
the poor and disadvantaged groups -  have not been as obvious.96
By looking at the variations across countries and at the few success stories available, it is also becoming 
recognizable that the results obtained by a few countries in terms of health outcomes and in terms of quality 
and accessibility of essential health services are achievable also at relatively low levels of economic 
development. For example, the international evidence indicates a strong relationship between average national 
income (measured by per capita GDP) to priority health outcomes, but it also shows that this relationship is by 
no means universal or automatic because a few low income countries perform exceedingly well in terms of 
health outcome. Among the good performers given the level of socio-economic development, we find Cuba, 
Sri Lanka, the Indian State of Kerala, and Costa Rica. For instance in 1997 Cuba and Costa Rica had a per 
capita Gross Domestic Product respectively equal to $3,100 and $3,810, an under-five mortality equal to 9 and 
13 respectively, and a life expectancy equal to 75.7,76.0 years, which are indicators comparable to those of the 
wealthiest countries of West Europe and North America (World Bank, 1999). In 1998 life expectancy in Sri 
Lanka was 73 years, and the infant mortality rate was 15.4 per 1,000 live births; in 2001 income (GDP) per 
capita was only US$837. By comparison, in Brazil GDP per capita was $2,940, but 20 percent of children were 
still reported as undernourished, the infant mortality rate was 50 per 1,000 live births, and life expectancy was 
about 67 years (World Bank 1999).
In conclusion, the evidence indicates that public services, particularly public health services, can potentially 
make a huge difference for the poor. In a study based on a sample of 35 countries (where nationally 
representative household surveys were conducted), Bidani and Ravallion (1997) show that public health 
spending matters for the poor (measured as those below US$2 or US$1 per day at 1985 purchasing power
96 A similar point is stated in the 2001 HNP Chapter for the PRSP Sourcebook: “One point needs emphasizing, 
namely that funds linked to PRSPs -whether debt relief or IDA credits- will have a far greater impact on poor 
countries’ health levels if they are accompanied by a thorough review of existing policies, and by a willingness 
to link new spending with reforms that make health systems work better, especially for the people they tend to 
serve less well -the poor (2001 HNP Chapter for PRSP Sourcebook, p.5).
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parity), although its impact is insignificant on the richer segments of the population and on the population as a 
whole. More recently, Gupta et al. (2001) reach similar results. These results are not surprising, if we consider 
that the poor are less able to substitute private care for public care, when the latter is lacking or is of extreme 
poor quality (see Chapter 6, section 6.2).
Against the background described above, RAP reforms can be easily justified: they are an attempt to 
respond to the above issues of efficiency, quality, and equity in the public as well as the private 
sector, and increase the “value for money” that patients obtain from the health system. Their premise 
is the recognition that “incentives apply to governments and not just to markets" (Stiglitz, 1999, 
pp.3-4). Hence, some RAP reform component try to replicate within the public sector some market- 
type incentives also for public providers, in order to grasp some of the advantages of markets vis-a- 
vis government provision in terms of flexibility and efficiency (see below, Table 4.2 from Preker and 
Harding, 2003), but at the same time to respond to the accessibility and quality issues that affect 
private markets.
Table 4.3 Comparative advantages and disadvantages of the public and private health sectors
Issue Public Sector Private Sector
Equity and 
access
•  Targets services for poor and vulnerable 
populations
•  Attentive to geographic disparities
•  Individuals who can pay favoured; the poor and 
vulnerable excluded or ignored
• Services concentrated in population centres
Public health, 
preventive 
and curative 
care
•  Emphasis on preventive and public 
health services (public goods with large 
externalities)
•  Extensive system of hospitals and 
curative care centres often maintained
•  Little attention to preventive and public health 
services without special incentives
•  Emphasis on curative care services valued by 
paying customers (private goods)
Management •  General dependence on political and 
legislated direction
•  Difficulty recruiting qualified managers
• Hierarchical bureaucracy with diffused 
accountability
•  Commitment to public service 
compromised by vested personal 
interests
•  Restrictive range of discretionary 
authority, less flexibility, less innovation
•  Greater reliance on information for decision-making 
and planning
• Recruitment of managers limited primarily by 
cost/benefit considerations
• Smaller and more focused authority structures
• Greater synergy between business and personal 
interests
• Broader range of discretionary authority, greater 
flexibility, more innovation
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Issue Public Sector Private Sector
Customer
orientation
•  Heterogeneous constituency with wide 
range of expectations
•  Limited attention to customer 
convenience and comfort
•  Indirect accountability for customer 
satisfaction
•  Focuses on relatively narrow range of customer 
needs and wants
•  More attentive to customer convenience and 
comfort
•  More direct accountability for customer satisfaction
• May exclude poorest and sickest
Flexibility •  Extensive infrastructure of owned 
facilities
•  Restraint of civil service system
• Slow to respond to changing market 
conditions because of political and 
budgetary commitments to ongoing 
programs
•  Adaptable access to infrastructure through rentals 
and leasing
•  Flexible employment and pay practices
•  Quicker response to changing market conditions
Financing •  Access to tax revenues
•  Weak incentives to be cost from sales or 
contracts conscious or cost efficient
•  Programs financed primarily through 
historic budgetary allocations
•  Limited access to private capital or 
donations
•  Dependent on revenue flows
•  Attentive to cost and price
•  Needed but unprofitable services possibly curtailed 
or discontinued
•  Resources assigned to profit centres
•  Sensitive to cross-subsidization and cost shifting
•  Access to capital markets or donations
Competition •  Possible monopoly on selected services 
reinforced by regulation and 
subsidization
•  Subject to competitive pressures from public and 
private providers
•  When entering the market, interested in increasing 
contestability and, once successful, interested in 
decreasing contestability (to restrain competitors)
Source: Harding and Preker (2003), The World Bank.
Note that RAP reforms have not been justified because they intended to improve services 
specifically for the poor. However, the above discussion suggests that any health reform that 
succeeds in improving quality and effectiveness of health services in general, without reducing 
accessibility, it is also likely to have ipso facto  a positive impact on the poor (see Chapter 6), because 
it is the poor who mostly have to rely on the government for financing their health expenditure (see 
Chapter 6, section 6.2).
4 .4  M ain RAP Reform  C om ponents
The following sections will briefly describe the six main components of RAP reforms introduced in 
section.
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4.4.1 Resource Allocation Criteria
‘Resource allocation’ (RA) criteria define the flow of financial resources from the centre to 
decentralized levels of government (such as regions and districts) and to health purchasers. RA 
criteria are closely related to payment systems, a term usually utilized to indicate reimbursement 
criteria for service providers. Over the last two decades, several of the industrialized countries 
implemented resource allocation (RA) reforms in the health sector, as well as other sectors such as 
education. They shifted from mainly retrospective criteria (based on historical allocations), towards 
population-based, prospective RA formulas for financing local levels of government and health 
purchasers. A resource allocation (or payment system) is referred to as retrospective, when the cost 
of the activities implemented (in terms of volume of inputs and unit cost of service) are completely 
reimbursed ex-post, and prospective when the amount given is determined ex-ante (for example, 
according to the population covered), and completely independent of the actual costs incurred.
4 .4 .2  The Priority Setting  Com ponent o f RAP Reforms
During the decade of the ‘90s several countries have introduced explicit rationing or priority setting 
policies, based on the definition of an essential package of health services (BBP, Basic Benefit 
Package, or ESP, Essential Services’ Package), whereby government financing is limited to a subset 
(in terms of services or people covered) of all the health services demanded by the population. In 
some cases, rationing/reprioritization policies have been implemented at the sub national level (for 
example in Oregon, USA). In other case, such as Uganda, reprioritization policies defined at the 
central level have clashed with the concomitant decentralization process97. In low-income countries 
(LIC) the definition of the services to be included in the BBP was heavily influenced by the 1993 
World Development Report (World Bank, 1994).
97 In the case of Uganda, for example, the amount of public funds spent on primary health care at the district 
level declined dramatically following decentralization despite it being a clearly stated national priority. The 
response there was to shift back towards a direct allocation approach in the short term by earmarking funds to 
the health sector. This has caused problems, as some saw it as inappropriate decentralization. They thought 
that the new RA processes, by allocating a block grant to the local level, was supporting capacity building and 
more effective management at district level. Others saw it as a legitimate move by Government to ensure 
national priorities were followed. Recently in Uganda the process of decentralization has been moving ahead 
again. The role of district hospitals in delivering primary health care services has now been recognized and 
attempts are being made to allow these units to qualify for Poverty Action Fund financing.
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The content of an essential service package is obviously extremely important. Ensuring equal access 
to an inappropriate range of services does not get us very far -  for example a pro poor policy requires 
a greater focus on those diseases which disproportionately affect the poor, and on those services that 
are likely to lead to the greatest health improvements for the poor. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the 
two main principles which should guide the priority setting process (the process of deciding what is 
‘essential’ and what is not should be: a) correcting market failure; and b) improving the pro poor 
impact of health policies. Annex 4.1 discusses to what extent these two principles have guided the 
design of reprioritization policies. Moreover, the theoretical discussion leads to the conclusion that 
priorities should be defined as packages of services across levels of care, rather than as particular 
levels of care; however, because of administrative and political economic constraints, where 
reprioritization policies have concretely been implemented they have mainly consisted in the 
redistribution of resources across levels of care (away from tertiary and towards primary care). For 
example, in Bangladesh, the Essential Service Package has been defined and measured as: ‘all 
primary care interventions delivered at thana (district) levels and below’.98
4 .4 .3  Purchasing/C ontracting
The interposition of a purchasing agency between patients and providers is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Until two decades ago, in every health system resource allocation decisions were 
organized either from the central government, as in National Health Systems, or directly through 
private patients-providers interaction, with little control over them by third-party insurers.99 
“Purchasing” reforms were introduced first in some industrialized countries, such as the UK (1990), 
and then during the ‘90s in several middle income countries. As explained before, all of these 
countries entrusted newly formed agencies (such as social insurance funds, or groups of mainly 
primary care doctors), or existing ones (such as local authorities, or private insurers in the USA and 
Latin America) with the purchasing role. Purchasers discipline their relationship with health 
providers through service agreements or “contracts”. Here the term “contract” is used loosely, 
referring both to the situation where there is a formal legal agreement between two private and
98 Such definition excludes ESP services being delivered in hospitals, and it assumes that all spending at thana 
and below is on essential services (Bangladesh Public Expenditure Review 1999/2000).
99 For instance, neither the British nor the American health systems, which exemplified the two opposite 
mechanisms for allocating resources among industrialized countries, had agencies entrusted with the 
purchasing role. The British National Health System was, at least formally, a centralized and vertically 
integrated system where Health Authorities, the public agencies locally responsible for planning and provision 
of health services, directly managed hospitals. By contrast, in the American health system insurers reimbursed 
health providers mainly on a retrospective, fee-for-service basis (see discussion in the text).
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totally independent institutions (as it is normally the case in the USA health system, or other health 
systems where purchasers are private agencies), as well as where the purchaser and/or the provider 
are public agencies under the umbrella of a National Health Service or a Social Insurance Fund (as in 
several European countries).
4 .4 .4  Paym ent system  (PS) reforms
Several countries of Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa implemented PS’ reform over the last 
decade. The general trend has been to move away from input-based PS, towards activity, case-based 
payment systems, such as DRG-based payments for hospitals, and capitation payments for primary 
care doctors. With the new resource allocation criteria introduced through RAP reforms, part of the 
financial risks for unexpected increases in unit costs and volumes of service is shifted from the 
central government on to health purchasers, and, in turn, to providers through prospective payment 
systems. We present the major PS and the impact of PS reforms in Chapter 5.
4 .4 .5  Supply-side In centives in  Pro-Poor Health Programmes
Some countries have introduced explicit performance-related financial incentives, particularly in 
their vertical programs against communicable diseases, to achieve better coverage and improved 
health outcomes among the poor. For example, explicit financial incentives to improve immunization 
coverage was introduced under GAVI, the global vaccine initiative, where an amount equal to US$ 
20 is assigned for each additional child immunized (DP3) in countries with immunization coverage 
rates comprised between 50 and 80 percent. Similar explicit financial incentives, to be given directly 
to providers, are being considered under the Global Fund to fight malaria, TB and HTV/AIDS.
4 .4 .6  Dem and-side In centives in  Pro-Poor Health Programmes
Explicit demand-side incentives can also and have been utilized to stimulate consumption of specific 
health and reproductive health services. Their rationale is to stimulate demand for health services, 
which is usually lower among the populations needing them most (see Annex 2.2), particularly 
services with large positive externalities (such as vaccinations, maternal and child care, 
communicable disease treatment; see Chapter 2). To stimulate the consumption of these services by
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the poor, specific enablers or incentives are given (such as vouchers that contribute to treatment and 
travelling expenses) that lower the opportunity cost of receiving care (cost that includes time lost for 
gainful employment, travelling, etc.).
4 .5  Trade-offs in  RAP R eform s
In principle, the optimal RAP arrangement should be easy to find. Simply, it is the one which would 
induce providers to perform high quality, cost-effective treatments in an efficient way, while at the 
same time promoting an equitable allocation of resources within the health sector. In reality, such 
optimal RAP arrangement does not exist, as we shall see in this and the following chapter, trade-offs 
among potentially equally desirable aims occur. Each reform component is appropriate to achieve 
only one of those aims, and, by doing so, in general, it moves the health system further away from 
achieving other equally desirable aims.
Note that the health policy literature does not, on the whole, talk in the language of trade-offs. This 
has the (probably unintended) implication that it is possible to achieve all objectives simultaneously, 
if only the right policy intervention, being it a specific resource mobilization or resource allocation 
mechanism, or a specific payment system for providers, can be found. In contrast, we argue that in 
general each health reform component comes with potential negative “side” effects. Given the 
existence of trade-offs, health reforms should contemplate a plurality of interventions (in resource 
mobilization and allocation, payment system, management, etc.), able to reinforce each other and at 
the same time to correct the potential negative impact of each intervention taken in isolation.
In this section, we introduce a conceptual framework which will be utilized to illustrate the potential 
trade-off between equity and efficiency. Let us utilize a graphical illustration of the (expected) 
Health Frontier (HF)100 for two individuals, Mr. Rich (R), and Mr. Poor (P):
100 The Pareto Frontier is the set of all Pareto optimal allocations. Each point on the health Pareto Frontier for 
Mr. Poor and Mr. Rich is found by fixing the level of expected health of one of the two, and by maximizing 
expected health for the other.
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Figure 4.4: RAP reforms. Moving Towards the Health Frontier and/or Improving the Health 
of the Poor?
Health Frontier
Health Poor
Health
Rich
The above figure simplifies a situation where the achievable health gains are constrained by the 
available amount o f resources, and where the choices on the use o f the existing health resources may 
create an equity-efficiency trade-off. Each point in the graph represents the (expected) health, or 
health gains for the two individuals associated with a different allocation o f health resources and a 
different incentive structure within the health system. The down-sloping Health Frontier (HPF) curve 
represents the set o f optimal points, where it is not possible to further increase expected health gains 
for one o f the two individuals, without decreasing them for the other.
Suppose that in the initial situation the health sector is characterized by a suboptimal equilibrium 
(point e in the graph), where, due to a distorted allocation o f  resources or lack o f incentives, the 
system is not attaining the maximum health gains for the two individuals. Graphically, the allocation 
in correspondence to point e is not optimal, being an allocation internal to the HPF.
Suppose that:
a. efficiency is measured by the sum o f the health gains for the two individuals101, and
b. equity is measured by the difference in the total health enjoyed by the two individuals 
(egalitarian view, see Chapter 6).
101 Note that the concept of efficiency used here is different from that of Pareto-efficiency. It is possible to 
increase the sum of the health enjoyed by the two individuals also by moving towards points where one of the 
two individuals is worsening her/his health status.
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Starting from point e, graphically one could represent an increase in the level of efficiency (for 
example, because a new capitation-based payment system for providers is introduced; see next 
Chapter) as a movement towards the curve HF. However, as the graph indicates, there are three 
different ways by which one can move towards the HF. The first is to move from point e in area C. 
Note that this would not represent a Pareto improvement (see Chapter 2), because Mr. Poor is 
adversely affected by the change (although losing less than what Mr. Rich gains). It also leads to 
worsen equity, according to the above measure, as the health differential between the two individuals 
widens. The second and third ways are to move from point e in areas A or B. Note that this would 
represent a Pareto-improvement, as both individuals are experiencing positive health gains from e to 
any point in A and B. However, improving efficiency by moving to A or B is not the same. Starting 
from e, in B the health differential between the two individuals widens (and so equity worsens), 
whereas in area A inequality is also reduced.
In conclusion, starting from any inefficient initial equilibrium, we can point at the existence of an 
equity-efficiency trade-off any time as a consequence of health reforms health outcomes improve 
overall but also health disparities widen.102
4 .5 .1  Trade-offs in  RAP Reforms: Purchasing
In this section, we introduce a first example of the trade-offs associated with RAP reforms, focusing 
on the purchasing/contracting component. The next chapter, Chapter 5, will investigate more in 
depth the different trade-offs associated with the payments systems component.
In purchasing/contracting, we shall describe the following trade-offs:
1. Between the aim of avoiding adverse selection, which can be achieved by having purchasers 
with large risk-pools, and the aim of allowing greater choice for clients and consumer- 
responsiveness, which can be achieved by stimulating competition among purchasers, and 
containing their size and market share.
2. In contracting, the trade-off between the aim of maintaining uniform standards of care 
everywhere, which requires central control, and the aim of enhancing results-orientation and 
performance, which require more competition and incentives at the individual level.
102 For a critical review of the different concepts and measures of equity currently used, see the section on 
equity in the text. In Figure 4.5, note that if we were only interested in the absolute health of the poor (as 
argued by Rawls, 1971), and not in overall disparities, movements towards points in area B will be judged
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Purchasers: Consumer Choice and Client-Responsiveness versus no Risk 
Selection
Under the new RAP arrangements, a trade-off arises between the aims of limiting risk selection and 
of pursuing a positive redistribution across different risk-types through the pooling mechanisms, and 
those of increasing purchasers’ consumer-responsiveness and patients’ choice.
Reformers would like purchasers to reflect patients’ legitimate preferences. For example, to promote 
through contracts ‘good’ providers and to penalize ‘bad’ ones, according to patients’ perceived 
quality. Regardless of all other possible forms of regulation and control, the only true guarantee that 
purchasers will take into account patients’ preferences in their choices is to allow patients to leave 
them when they are dissatisfied (to allow them to vote with their feet), and to financially penalize 
those purchasers that are not able to attract patients. A precondition for this to happen is that patients 
be free to choose among several different purchasers. Otherwise, providers would most likely be able 
to collude with purchasers against patients’ interest, and unsatisfied patients would have no 
alternative. Following these principles, several RAP reform proposals (for instance, Poland and 
Czech Republic among former socialist countries, and Mexico, Chile and Colombia in Latin 
America) intended to create and safeguard competition among purchasers.
At the same time, at least in health systems in principle committed to universal insurance, reformers 
also require that purchasers continue to guarantee coverage at equal standards, and not to select 
patients, according to their health risk or income.
The two above aims, to safeguard “good” purchasing through competition and to promote equitable 
and efficient pooling, are intrinsically in conflict with each other. The reason is because the same 
issues that plague private health insurance markets, which were investigated in depth in Chapter2, 
resurge for purchasers if/when they are allowed to compete with each other. The “market” or “quasi- 
market” equilibrium may well be suboptimal103, whereby “low or good risks” might receive 
incomplete coverage and “high or bad” risk individuals may not be covered. “High” risk usually
positively from also an equity perspective. See also Case Study 6.2, based on Waters (2000).
03 The theory of insurance markets with adverse selection proved that some positive level of redistribution in 
general characterizes second best equilibria across different risk groups. The free market equilibria may fail to 
achieve such cross-subsidization, because, in Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1997, p. 74) words, "One of the natural 
methods that insurance companies use to compete, underwriting, destroys or considerably limits what
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coincide with the old, or chronically ill individuals, and so competition and market segmentation 
may lead to under coverage or outright exclusion from each purchaser’s pool of the more vulnerable 
segments of society.104
As far as this trade-off is concerned, the ‘size’ of the purchaser (measured by the number of people 
covered) is a critical dimension. As the size of the pooled population increases, the degree of 
consumer-responsiveness decreases, because competitive pressures become weaker, and because 
purchasers become more distant from patients. However, also the incentive to risk select potential 
customers diminishes, as the purchaser can exploit substantial economies of scale in risk pooling, 
and cross-subsidies within their pool become easier to sustain (see Chapter 2, section 2.6). In 
addition, the larger is the risk-pool, the lower is the variability in individual income, and so the more 
efficient it is, due to a very simple statistical reason that we explain in Box 4.2.
As far as risk-selection is concerned, in health matters are made worse by the extreme concentration 
of risks.105 For small purchasers, who receive a capitation-based Resource Allocation106, have a 
disproportionate share of high risks, and are unable to dilute them in a large pool of insurees, risk 
selection may become the only financially viable strategy.
In theory, as we mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 2, the resource allocation criteria can 
provide a strong incentive not to risk-select, by providing appropriate rewards to purchasers who 
recruit and retain high risks (risk adjusters107). Insurers/purchasers that have a disproportional share
insurance markets can do".
104 Note that this problem cannot be solved simply by assigning the pooling and the purchasing function to two 
different agents. Even if resources are collected and pooled “upstream” (at the central level), prospective 
resource allocation and payment systems shift all or part of the financial risk “downstream” on to purchasers or 
the lower-level agent who is paid prospectively (see discussion on payment systems in Chapter 5 ).
105 Evidence from several countries shows that in each country approximately five/seven percent of the 
population is responsible for roughly two-thirds/three quarters of total health expenditure
06 Rice and Smith (2000) write: “A number of methods can be envisaged for funding the purchasers -which 
we have defined in the text as resource allocation mechanisms-. They can be summarized under three 
headings:
- (a) full retrospective reimbursement for all expenditure incurred;
- (b) reimbursement for all activity on the basis of a fixed schedule of fees (using, for example a system of 
diagnosis related groups);
- (c) prospective funding on the basis of expected future expenditure, using fixed budgets.
These three forms of resource allocation imply a progressive shift of risk from the national funder towards the 
health care plan. The trade-off described in the text is relevant if and only if (b) or (c) are in place, which is the 
situation in all countries that have implemented RAP reforms. See also discussion of payment systems for 
providers, in Chapter 5.
07 Note that the ‘risk” adjusters that serve redistributive aims are conceptually different from those that are 
meant to limit risk-selection. The former can also be based on geographic and social variables, while the latter 
are based on individual data. However, the use of both types of risk-adjusters becomes more difficult and less
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of chronically ill people, for instance, could receive a premium support or subsidy from a 
compensatory fund, which would make these clients more attractive to them. However, existing risk 
adjusters can predict only a minor part of service utilization and expenditure in the future, and 
therefore they cannot completely eliminate the incentive to risk-select.
Another way to prevent risk-selection would be to allow small purchasers to reinsure with larger 
ones, but then their incentive to curb expenditure would also be diluted accordingly. The point is that 
in order to limit risk-selection, it is necessary to pay a price either in terms of less competition, less 
consumer-responsiveness, or in terms of less tight incentives for cost control (see also next chapter 
on payment systems for health providers).
Box 4.2: Risk-pooling and the size of the purchaser
Risk pooling can be represented as a mechanism through which risk-adverse individuals insure against their 
risk of income variations, by pooling together their resources. Consider n individuals, and let each individual’s 
income be a stochastic variable y, , where i= l,...,n , characterized by a certain statistical distribution, with 
expected value equal to m and variance equal to Oj. For simplicity, assume that the stochastic variables y\ are 
independent and that the expected value and the variance are equal for all individuals (m=p, var ys =<r, for 
each 0- Consider what happens if in each period individuals pool their incomes into a mutual insurance fund, 
that then assigns to each one the mean of the aggregate income received, thus compensating the variations in 
individual incomes occurring over time. The variance of the aggregate income received by the fund is equal to 
n times the variance of individual incomes (the variance of the sum of independent stochastic variables is equal 
to the sum of the individual variances):
( " 'I nvar(y) =  varl ' £ y l
V i=l J 1=1
However, after the individuals pool their income in the insurance fund, the variance of individual income is 
equal to the variance of mean income. This is equal to 108:
Z —  =  rcvarf —  j =  n — var(yf) =  =  —
likely to limit negative side effects of competition, when purchasers are smaller and when competition among 
them is more intense.
108 In the following equation, we refer to a very simple propriety of variance, namely that: 
var{ax + b ) = a 2 varx  .
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Thus, by pooling their income together through a risk-pooling mechanism, individuals are able to obtain 
income equal to the mean income, with a variance equal to (1/n) of individual variance. It is clear that as the 
number of people in the pool increases, the variance of the mean income shrinks approximating to a situation 
of certainty (Central Limit Theorem). Also, note that the “risk-pooling” function is conceptually distinct from 
the redistributive function that may also be achieved by pooling funds. In our example, redistribution of 
income across individuals may be achieved if ex-ante different individuals had different expected income. By 
joining the pool the rich would then trade an expected higher income with greater variability with a lower 
expected income with lower variability. Again, ceteris paribus increasing the size of the pool would increase 
the convenience of pooling.
In conclusion, in the choice of the purchaser’s size (number of patients or maximal number of 
patients that the purchaser can “cover”) a balance between the terms of the consumer- 
responsiveness, effective risk-pooling trade-off must be found. The optimal size of purchasers will 
depend on the risk distribution of the population, on how accountable even large purchasers can be 
made to pressures from patients, and on the existing possibilities of risk adjusting or re-insurance. 
Each country must find its own “optimal point” along the lines of this trade-off. We briefly discuss 
in the Case Study that follows the debate that took place during the ‘90s in the US and the UK 
concerning the optimal size of the purchasers, in light of the trade-off just explained.
C ase study 4.2: Purchasers in  the USA and th e UK
We can represent in a graph the point chosen by the different purchasing reforms proposed in the UK and the 
USA at the beginning of the 1990s, along the terms of the above trade-off:
Figure 4.5: Purchasers: Trade-off Between Consumer-Responsiveness and Effective Risk
Pooling
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In the US, new institutional purchasers (health alliances) were envisaged by the Health Security Act (the 
Democratic Administration’s plan of reform of the health system presented in 1993). The policy debate centred
on the role and "size" which health alliances would take. The first issue was the relationship of the new 
agencies vis-k-vis health insurers. The plan envisaged that health alliances would initially take the role of 
purchasers ("demand sponsors"), but not replace insurers. However, it was intended that over time a process of 
integration between insurers and providers in health care plans would progressively eliminate from the market 
traditional ‘passive’ insurers. Second, the "size" of the population covered by each health alliance, and their 
mutual relationship (competition, versus territorial demarcation of each one’s area of operation) was debated. 
Finally, the Health Security Act came out with a proposal for health alliances which was extremely different 
from that originally planned by Enthoven, the health economist who first inspired the managed competition 
model and suggested interposing purchasing agencies between patients and providers. It is interesting to briefly 
describe that debate in the light of the trade-off explained above. Enthoven (1985, 1991) envisaged a system 
strongly based on competition both on the provider as well as the purchaser side. Therefore, he was in favour 
of the abolition of tax-exemptions in order to enhance price-sensitiveness of consumers, and wanted small 
health alliances in direct competition with each other. By contrast, the Health Security Act, ultimately 
preferred to emphasize the aim of universal coverage, and planned large health alliances to maximize 
economies of scale in risk pooling (competition for the market was left, but not competition within each 
market). Note that, also because of the strong opposition to the Health Security Act by private insurers, the 
Act was abandoned when the Democratic Party was defeated in the 1994 Senate elections. In terms of the 
above trade-off and relatively to the European experience, the American system continues to favour consumer- 
responsiveness of purchasers and does not really prevent risk-selection. Risk-selection is only partially 
mitigated as insurers are allowed to fix premiums according to experience rating (which, however, makes the 
American health system perform very poorly in terms of "equity of access"; see Chapter 6), and by direct 
government intervention through the programs Medicare and Medicaid which offer basic coverage to some of 
those excluded from private coverage.
In the case of the UK, the 1991 quasi-market reforms were introduced within a system that intended to 
preserve universal coverage of the population. The purchasing role was assigned to District Health Authorities 
and GP Fund holding schemes. The former were able to take full advantage of large risk pooling, while they 
largely remained unaccountable to the patients they served. By contrast, GP fund holders were much smaller in 
terms of population covered, could be abandoned by unsatisfied patients, and actively compete to find better 
conditions of service for their clients. However, their ability to manage risk was never really tested 
(Matsaganis and Glennester, 1994), because they always had the possibility to shift more expensive patients to 
HAs, and to game the system (for example, by recurring to emergency admissions).
In 1997 the new Labour government initiated a reform plan replacing HAs and GPFHs with Primary Care 
Groups (PCG), later renamed Primary Care Trusts (PCT) on the purchaser side. PCT are commissioning and 
service provider agencies with an assigned pool of patients larger than that formerly administered by GPFHs, 
but smaller than HAs; they should promote a new coordination of community and primary care services. The 
key feature of the 1991 internal market reforms, the purchaser-provider split, is still preserved.
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One final observation on this first trade-off: as purchasers integrate downstream and start directly 
offering a wide range of health services (as in the case of American Health Maintenance 
Organizations, or of health purchasers in several countries of Latin America), the incentive for risk 
selection can be limited, because cost reductions may be achieved more effectively by intervening in 
the process of service provision instead of selecting less risky and costly patients. However, the 
drawback of this solution is that it may cause restrictions in the availability and the quality of 
treatment, as the trade-offs concerning payment systems indicate (see Chapter 5).
Efficiency versus the Right to Equal Treatment
The second trade-off we discuss is between the objective of promoting more productive efficiency 
through competition and contracting out of services, and the objective of maintaining similar health 
service standards everywhere.
The RAP health reforms initiated in many countries are based on the view that one of the more 
important factors explaining providers’ inefficiency and scarce consumer-responsiveness is the lack 
of competition. Thus, as we wrote before, wherever they have been introduced, RAP reforms have 
always emphasized the need of more competition.
However, as competitive pressures in the health care delivery market grow, phenomena of horizontal 
and vertical segmentation similar to those described in Chapter 3 are likely to arise. As we saw there, 
all service markets are characterized by the fact that product quality is very important and 
preferences are heterogeneous: therefore, providers will try to relax the competitive pressure, by 
differentiating their services from those of their potential competitors. Horizontal (variety) 
differentiation, such as geographical differentiation, is exactly what reformers seem to intend: by 
horizontally differentiating their services, providers specialize in those services where they enjoy a 
comparative advantage in terms of knowledge of market conditions or technology. As a result, 
patients are given wider choices, and efficiency is enhanced.109
109 Intense horizontal segmentation also brings the less desirable result that price competition is reduced (as 
each provider concentrates on a particular market niche), and therefore that the endogenous pressure for cost 
containment could be quite modest in the long term. However, incentives for cost containment may still be 
introduced by appropriately designed payment systems and contracts between purchasers and providers, as we 
shall discuss in the next chapter.
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By contrast, vertical (quality) segmentation is not at all the result that RAP reforms, particularly in 
countries committed to universal coverage at similar standards of care, would like to see. By 
vertically differentiating their products, providers attack market sections characterized by different 
ability to pay, focusing either on low quality, low cost (and low price) services, or on high quality, 
high cost (and higher price) services (see Chapter 3). In the presence of a public provider bound to 
universal coverage operating alongside private competitors allowed to serve those who are able to 
pay directly or through private insurance coverage, vertical segmentation can degenerate in cream 
skimming, whereby private providers attach only the profitable part (‘the cream’) of the market, 
leaving the unprofitable part ( ‘skimmed milk’) to the residual public provider. In the health sector, 
the “cream” could be constituted by elective services, or in terms of individuals, they are identifiable 
with higher income individuals, while the “skimmed milk” would be those unable to pay the cost of 
their treatment. Cream skimming can lead to a degradation of public services, for two reasons:
• By distilling out the profitable sections of the market, private providers may interrupt the
cross-subsidies that allowed to sustain higher standards of care for the unprofitable sections
(see also Chapter 2, section 2.4);
• The ‘cream’ is usually also the informed part of the market that can put pressure for a
general service improvement (in Hirschman's terminology, by exerting ‘voice’, rather than
‘exit’). Once they are gone, the public provider is left with a pool of weaker and less 
informed clients, which may accept worse service conditions.
Phenomena of cream skimming inevitably occur when the health market is liberalized. Regulation of 
contracts between purchasers and providers and of the private market for care can correct risk- 
selection, or cream-skimming resulting in under-treatment of patients. However, such corrections 
entail tempering individual incentives and restoring central control. Again, in disciplining the 
competitive rules in the health delivery market, purchasers need to find a balance between the need 
to maintain uniform or at least minimal standards of care, and that of enhancing results-orientation 
and performance thorough competition.
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A nnex 4 .1 : The D ebate on R esource P r io r itisa tio n  P olicies
Beginning in the late ‘60s, early ‘70s, a concern for the provision of primary care services, and 
against an exclusive focus on hospitals and specialized care, progressively emerged in developing 
countries, as exemplified in the Alma Ata declaration (WHO, 1978)no. Then, during the ‘80s and 
‘90s, a consensus progressively emerged within the health research community to utilize burden of 
disease and cost-effectiveness as the principal criteria 111 to determine priorities for public health 
intervention. On the basis of such criteria, the World Development Report (1993) advocated that 
priority for public funding be assigned to a minimum ‘package’ of cost-effective services (Basic 
Benefit Package, or BBP).
The 1993 WDR’s recommendations gave rise to several thorny issues concerning the definition of 
priorities for public financing and provision, which have not yet been resolved. In the debate that 
followed the publication of the WDR, two among several others points of critique centred on the 
WDR’s lack of attention for:
>  Implementation/incentives issues. Theoretical cost-effectiveness (MICE) computations used 
in the WDR were abstract, derived in ideal settings, and ignored a host of complicated 
feasibility/implementation/incentive issues. Filmer et al. (1998) showed that if one 
considered the evidence on actual public sector cost-effectiveness (PSCE) from developing 
countries, one would reach estimates of cost effectiveness several orders of magnitude 
higher (worse), than those estimated by theoretical MICE computations. Thus, part of the 
international research effort after the publication of the WDR has tried to articulate and test 
new ways to improve efficiency and quality of public delivery in developing countries.
>  The role of the private sector, and the public-private interaction. Policy recommendations in 
the WDR 1993 failed to recognize the simple reality that health interventions by the public
110 Traditionally, public intervention in health was focused on expanding the delivery system, through physical 
infrastructure investment and increase in the number of doctors and nurses.
111 Medical intervention cost-effectiveness (MICE), the principal criterion, ranks interventions according to 
their ability to achieve a certain outcome (lives saved or disability-adjusted life years gained) per unit cost, 
according to best practice protocols. Burden of Disease (Body) studies provide estimates of how important 
different health disorders are (for instance in terms of Daly’s lost) to the total BD Criteria for essential 
package was, in the end, a combination of magnitude of burden + MICE of interventions. However, Gwatkin’s 
work on disease burden in poorest groups showed that these two criteria led to different conclusions.
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sector do not take place in a vacuum. The recognition of the private/public differential 
ability in providing/financing different health services has lead to revisit the criteria for 
determining priorities.
This angle of looking at priorities for public intervention, sometimes called the welfare economics 
perspective, bears important consequences for equity. For instance, even if most primary care and 
outpatient services are in general more cost-effective than most inpatient care services112, the 
potential for cost-recovery is much greater for the former than the latter. Catastrophic episodes that 
require inpatient care are in general the less predictable health events and the more costly to treat. In 
the absence of private insurance coverage and/or direct subsidization of hospital care, the majority of 
the population could not afford them.113
A recent contribution by Musgrove (1999) tried to reconcile the principles of welfare economics and 
those of cost-effectiveness. Musgrove provides a decision tree on the rational use of public financing 
in the health sector based on the two set of principles. 114 His contribution revamped the debate on 
prioritization criteria, and other scholars have forcefully proposed again the argument that cost- 
effectiveness should not be a criterion used to determine public resource allocation priorities 115. 
Recently, Filmer and Hammer (2002), using the criterion of welfare loss/market failures, plus equity 
considerations, recommend that priority should be given to (i) pure public goods, (ii) services with 
large externalities (such as water & sanitation, immunization services), and (iii) services for 
catastrophic illness.
112 Medical treatments for most catastrophic illnesses tend to occupy low levels in priority scales based on 
MICE analysis, as they are relatively more expensive and rarely resolving (see Hammer and Berman, 1995).
113 In the language of welfare economics, the private market equilibrium is characterized by market failures 
that entail welfare losses.
114 Mangrove’s (1999) decision tree starts with the welfare economics questions, by asking if the service 
proposed for public funding is a public good, or it bears significant positive externalities. If it does, the next 
step is to rank it vis-ii-vis other services with the same characteristics in terms of cost effectiveness or benefit- 
cost analysis. In contrast, if the service is question is a private good, or does not entail significant externalities 
(such as most curative care services), the decision tree asks whether risk of catastrophic costs are involved and 
whether the proposed beneficiaries are poor or not. Again, all interventions for which the answer is positive 
are ranked according to cost-effectiveness.
115 Jack (2000) points out that cost-effectiveness is a criterion to compare alternative services, once it has 
already been decided that those services are worth of social protection and therefore that the government 
should subsidize them (because they are non-rival or non-excludible, because there are significant externalities 
involved, or to correct insurance market failures, or because the services create a pro poor impact, or, more in 
general, because health is considered as a human right, or a merit good. Merit goods are goods that the 
government should subsidize beyond the level that individual preferences would dictate. The concept was 
initially developed by the German school of Public Finance, and later introduced into the mainstream of Public 
Economics by R. Musgrave.
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Chapter 5: Optimal payment system s?
5.1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter presents a survey of the theoretical literature that has investigated the main payment (or 
reimbursement116) systems, or PS, for health providers and the incentives associated with each of 
them. The second part of this Chapter investigates the properties of a specific second-best optimal PS 
in a context of asymmetric information. A PS is defined as a set of rules defining the criteria 
according to which a provider of health services receives financial compensation. This can be linked 
to inputs, the number of patients, their diagnosed health related condition, the type and the cost of 
care given, a combination of the above, and/or other factors. PS determine the way financial 
resources are distributed among provider facilities and individual health care providers.
PS play a particularly important role in the health sector, due to the peculiar interplay of demand and 
supply. Probably more than in any other market, when demanding health services individuals are 
often largely uncertain about the appropriateness of the service they are receiving. Any health 
service is an experience good, a good whose appropriateness and quality can be ascertained only ex­
post. Even ex-post, the appropriateness of any individual health service is difficult to assess precisely 
because the patient often receives a multidimensional service (diagnosis, advice, treatment...), and 
because the final outcome, ‘good health’ or 'health improvement', which is what people really 
demand, depends on factors other than the kind of care received, the output produced. The lack of 
information and the particular psychological condition of patients produce crucial consequences for 
the interaction between demand and supply. It is the doctor, and not the patient, who generally 
chooses the amount and the type of services that the latter receives.117
116 As we will not specifically be concerned in this work with the issue of who actually pays for health 
services, whether the government, a social insurance fund, or competing private insurers, we will not explicitly 
distinguish between payment and reimbursement.
117 We can better understand how peculiar is the interplay between demand and supply in the health sector by 
contrasting it with the ordinary interaction that takes place in other markets. Consider for example what would 
happen if at the onset of each winter consumers had to buy new cloths, naked and just knowing that they feel 
cold, but without being aware of the quality and the price of the options available in the market...and what 
makes demand even weaker in the case of health is that winters are not generally foreseeable.
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Hence, market outcomes in health are largely determined by the incentives, as well as the cultural 
influences and professional ethics on the basis of which providers act, without strong influence from 
the demand side.118 Payment and reimbursement criteria, in turn, are critical to determining those 
incentives, and that is why different payment systems can lead to completely diverse outcomes, in 
terms of accessibility, quality and cost of services offered within the health sector.
5 .2  M ain PS
In this section, we list the principal payment systems for providers and introduce some of the 
incentives associated with each of them, as illustrated in the economics literature. First, it is 
important to distinguish between PS for individual providers and those for provider facilities (such as 
hospitals, clinics or health centres). Some PS are the same for both institution facilities and 
individual providers, and, in general, the criteria for paying the latter are very much influenced by 
those for the former. Yet, this is not necessarily always the case. For example, in several countries of 
Western Europe physicians employed in hospitals and other facilities continued to receive seniority- 
based salaries even after the reimbursement criteria for their provider facility had been radically 
changed, from an input towards an output-based PS.
5 .2 .1  Main PS fo r  health  provider fa c ilitie s
Focusing first on facilities, until two decades ago across OECD and developing countries one could 
find two prevailing PS:
• In public health systems provider facilities were mainly reimbursed according to inputs and 
historical expenditure. Financing was distributed separately for the different line items of the 
provider’s budget (so much for salaries, so much for capital, so much for consumables, etc.), and 
the total budget was generally rolled over from year to year with minor adjustments. Because at 
any level of activity the amount received by any facility depended on its “size” in terms of 
personnel, capital and other inputs, the incentive was to expand these inputs, beyond the 
technically efficient level.
118 Similar, although less severe, problems arising from the asymmetry of information between supply and
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• In parallel, in the private sector providers were mainly paid retrospectively (that is, with full 
cost-reimbursement), on a fee-for-service basis, directly by patients and/or by indemnity 
insurers. In a fee-for-service PS the revenue facilities (and individual doctors) receive depends 
on the volume and the value of the services they provide. Thus, those OECD countries, such as 
the US, where this kind of PS was more widespread, over time experienced a more pronounced 
growth in health expenditure, in absolute terms as well as a proportion of GDP. One stream in 
the US health economics literature also underlined that, when reimbursement to providers is 
activity-and-cost-based (as in a fee-for-service system), there is no incentive to focus on 
technological progress that could lead to less costly treatments. Providers can gain by making 
use of ever more costly treatments and equipment, and even by inducing demand and supplying 
services above the level that would be clinically justified. This phenomenon, named ‘supply- 
induced-demand’, was first studied by Evans (1974). Later, Fuchs (1978) emphasized the 
welfare-reducing shift in the demand curve induced by providers through advertisement, and 
Robinson and Luft (1985), Dranove (1988), and Mooney and Ryan (1993) gave a theoretical 
explanation of supply-induced demand, by pointing at the imperfections in the agency 
. relationship between physicians and patients. Over the last three decades the phenomenon of 
supply-induced demand has also been extensively studied in the empirical literature. The first 
study was that by Roemer, 1961, who found a strong correlation between supply and utilization 
of health services (by examining the cross-sectional correlation between bed-supply and 
utilization, Roemer found that "a bed built is -roughly- a bed half-filled"). Subsequent literature 
found a positive association between physicians’ ownership of testing facilities and the number 
of referrals for diagnostic tests (see for example, Crane,1992, and Mitchell and Scott, 1992), and 
strong evidence in favour of the supply-induced demand hypothesis. However, much of the 
literature documenting phenomena of supply-induced demand has recently been questioned for 
its econometric shortcomings. By using TSLS regression analysis119, Dranove and Wehner 
(1994) found evidence in favour of supply-inducement of child-births120 (!). Thus, despite a 
good economic understanding of the rationale behind the supply-induced demand phenomenon 
under fee-for-service PS, its empirical relevance is still controversial.
demand occur in other sectors, such as the financial investment or legal advice markets.
119 Instrumental variables are used to take into account the endogeneity problem of the explanatory variables.
120 This lead them to question the identification of the demand inducement econometric models, as they found 
that the "exogenous" instrumental variables used in the first stage of the TSLS estimation, which are the same 
as those traditionally used in most empirical works aimed at estimating supply-induced-demand, in fact are not 
exogenous.
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In the last twenty years, in all OECD countries and some developing countries new and more 
sophisticated PS have been introduced, as part of RAP reforms. The general trend has been to move 
away from input-based or fee-for-service PS, towards case-based PS, such as DRG-based payments, 
or cost-and-volume and block payments (particularly for government-owned hospitals).
At this point, a brief explanation of the terminology used in the literature on PS is needed. Output-
based PS can be fee-for-service, or case-based, or cost-and-volume based. Case-based (cost-per-case
or fixed-price, according to US terminology) PS, first introduced in the US Medicare system (1983)
and later on adopted in several other countries, link payment to hospitals to the number and the
severity of the cases they treat. Each patient is classified in a specific “diagnostic” group according
to his/her principal diagnosis and, correspondingly, a fixed reimbursement is given to the hospital for
treating the patient. When this PS was introduced, all pathologies were classified in 470 different
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG); since 1983 the number of DRG categories has been expanded 
121several times. In the late ‘80s and ‘90s, case-based PS were adopted in several developing and 
former socialist economies (FSE) to pay for inpatient care (the first government to adopt them in 
Latin America was Brazil and among FSE was Hungary; see Chapter 7), in some cases with the 
same classification system (DRG) as in the USA, in other cases with other classification systems (for 
example, the “Nosology-based” system in several of the Former Soviet Union countries). Lower 
income countries (one example is Poland) have sought to experiment with case-based PS based on 
simpler classification than the DRGs, to reduce administrative costs, prevent manipulations, and 
provide stronger incentives for cost-control.
With a cost-and-volume PS, similarly to a cost-per-case payment, providers receive additional 
funding for each extra case they treat, but additional units of service are reimbursed at a 
progressively lower unit price, according to a schedule agreed upon in advance (see second part of 
the chapter).
Finally, a fixed-budget, or lump-sum, or block payment gives the health provider facility a fixed 
budget for the provision of a pre-specified volume of services over a certain period of time, 
determined ex-ante and completely independent at the margin of the number and the actual cost of 
the services provided.
121 Presently, DRG codes are based on the 9th revision of the International Classification of diseases.
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Fee-for-service and input-based payments are frequently referred to as retrospective PS, because the 
cost of services is completely reimbursed ex-post. On the opposite side of the spectrum, lump-sum 
or “block” payments are referred to as purely prospective, because the amount given is fixed ex-ante. 
At times, cost-per-case or fixed price payment systems are also referred to as prospective payments. 
In fact, these PS are only partially prospective, because the level of funding per “unit of service” is 
fixed, but not the total revenue that the provider unit receives, which is dependent on its volume of 
activity.
Moving from fee-for-service, towards case-based, cost-and volume payment systems and block 
payments progressively increases the part of providers’ payment that is fixed ex-ante, thus increasing 
also the financial risk associated with unexpected increases in the volume or/and the cost of services 
(see analysis, hereafter).
5 .2 .2  Main Paym ent System s fo r  individual health providers
The PS for provider facilities described in the previous section can also be used to pay individual 
providers. For example, the payment correspondent to the input-based PS for facilities is that based 
on salary for individual providers. In this case, the input paid for is time. Until two decades ago, this 
was the prevailing PS for individual providers throughout the world in government delivery systems. 
Health workers received a fixed salary mainly dependent on their seniority, and they were included 
in the civil service. By contrast, in countries where private provision and financing prevailed, fee-for 
service PS were mainly used also for individual providers. In recent years, a PS for individual 
providers and specifically primary care doctors which has become more prevalent is the capitation 
PS. This consists in a lump sum payment for each patient enrolled with a particular physician, which 
can be adjusted in relation to age, sex and past medical record of each patient. Two variants are used 
to determine enrolment: in the first, each patient resident within a specific geographical area is 
automatically enrolled with the same physician; in the second, each patient can choose his/her 
primary care physician, also among those practicing outside his/her area of residence.
5 .3  The T heory o f  R egu la tion  an d  I ts  R elevance f o r  th e  
A n a ly s is  o f  R eim bursem en t S ys tem s in  H ealth
The impact of the change from retrospective to prospective PS (refer to section 4.4.1 for an 
explanation of the meaning of retrospective and prospective PS) have been explored at length
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in economic studies on other sectors, such as water, gas, electricity and telecommunication, 
within the so-called new theory of regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Ma wrote in 1994: 
“The change from retrospective reimbursement to prospective payments in the health sector 
resembles the change from rate of return regulation to price-cap regulation in the 
telecommunications industry and in other public utilities" (Ma, 1994, p. 96). Hence, before 
directly examining the change in providers' incentives in the health care sector, it is worth 
briefly mentioning the main results of the new theory of regulation concerning PS.
5 .3 .1  Price-Cap (PC) Regulation (Littlechild, 1983)
Under PC regulation, the regulator sets a maximum for the prices of a particular basket of 
goods that the regulated firm supplies. The regulated firm is able to supply any quantity of 
those goods at a price equal or lower than the PC. The major advantage of price-cap 
regulation is that providers can fully internalise the savings from any cost reduction they 
achieve, thus creating incentives to enhance productive efficiency. In the ‘80s and ‘90s PC 
regulation has been adopted in the UK and in several other countries to regulate the public 
utility sectors.
One particular way to set the PC is that suggested by Shleifer, in his model of Yardstick 
Regulation (1985). In synthesis, Shleifer argues that by imposing a fixed price for the product 
of any industry, based on the average costs of production in the industry, the regulator can 
reproduce conditions of perfect competition, where each firm in the industry faces an 
infinitely elastic demand at the prevailing market price, and minimizes costs taking those 
prices as given. Thus, yardstick regulation would achieve productive efficiency and first best 
equilibria.
To function according to Shleifer’s theoretical model, the industry or sector subject to 
yardstick regulation needs to satisfy the following prerequisites:
•The number of firms active in the industry must be large enough such that no one is 
able to influence the yardstick price by colluding with the other firms.
•Shocks idiosyncratic to each firm’s cost must not be significant. Thus, the mix of 
inputs and the production processes used by the different firms in the industry must 
be similar.
•The product must be homogeneous or, at least, consumers can easily ascertain the
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quality of the differentiated products/services.
In addition, the regulator must commit not to rescue firms in difficulty, and to let them go 
bankrupt in case of insolvency.
Some of the above conditions are normally violated in practice. Specifically, the main issues 
brought out by the literature that has investigated “real life” examples of PC regulation, 
mainly in the public utilities’ sectors, concern the following aspects: a) how to set the price- 
cap, so that it is at the “appropriate level” and does not recreate the same distortions in 
production as the Rate of Return regulation did (mainly overcapitalization, as the allowed rate 
of return was dependent on the capital investments); b) how to weight the different items that 
are part of the regulated basket of goods or services; and c) how, and how frequently to 
change the PC over time so that it adequately reflects changes occurring in the industry.
a) To set a PC, ideally the regulator should have detailed information on the industry costs 
(average costs in case of Schleifer’s model). However, this cost information is not available. 
Thus, in fixing the PC, the regulator needs to make an assessment, based on an imperfect 
knowledge of some of the regulated companies’ cost structure obtained through specific 
surveys, or based on reported costs by the regulated firms, or on some subjective assessment 
If the cap is set too high (relative to the first best level), firms are able to gain extra-profits. In 
extreme situations, the price-cap may de facto become ineffective, in the sense that prices 
prevailing in the absence of any regulation would in any case have been lower. By contrast, if 
the price-cap is set top low, production may become unprofitable, and the PC prevents new 
investors to get into the market or induces existing ones to leave.
b) Because of administrative and information constraints, each price cap generally groups 
under the same basket different products from production processes, which are related but 
still distinct. The ceiling on prices is generally calculated as a weighted average of all the 
prices of these different products. The theory indicates that neutral weights, which are weights 
that the regulated firms cannot influence -such as the share in total revenues of each of the 
regulated products in the basket, ought to be used. However, revenue information is in 
practice not used, again because of lack of market information and other regulatory 
constraints. Then, weights are often based on the proportion of allocated inputs (such as 
labour) to produce each item in the basket. These inputs, though, are a strategic decision 
variable for the regulated firms, and so distortions in the production process are likely to arise
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after the PC is imposed, to loosen regulatory constraints. Such distortions may be more severe 
if firms also produce products not subject to PC regulation, and whose productions process is 
closely related to those who are.
c) A separate set of dynamic issues arises in the context of a Price Cap regulation. The PC 
needs to be adjusted over time, to reflect inflation and changed conditions in the industry. 
According to the literature, the PC should be revised using a price index (PI), calculated as 
follows: PI < RPI - X, where RPI is the Retail Price Index, and X is a parameter fixed by the 
regulator to reflect cost-saving innovations in the industry.
Note that the length of the period between two consecutive adjustments is a critical factor: if 
it is too long, firms may over-exploit favourable changes in the industry environment, such as 
a technological revolution, or may be unduly penalised in case of unfavourable shocks; if it is 
too short, the regulated firms do not have any incentive to reduce costs or innovate, because 
this would result in a tighter price regulation (ratchet effect). When short-term rules are 
utilized to discipline a long-term relationship, another possible adverse effects is the “hold 
up” effect (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). This is the regulated firms’ tendency to uphold 
investments which could reduce recurrent costs (such as investments in new machineries). 
Regulated firms tend to under-invest if the value of the investment cannot be recaptured, once 
it is “sunk”, when they fear that at the next round of negotiations their PC will be reduced, 
because of the recurrent cost savings obtained through the capital investment.
5 .3 .2  Are the conclu sions o f the PC and yardstick regulation literature 
applicable to  health  m arkets?
Several contributions in the recent health economics literature (reviewed in the following 
sections) have proposed the use of case-based PS for health services and goods on the basis of 
theoretical conclusions similar to those reached by Shleifer (1985) and the theory on PC 
regulation. The fixed-price PS would allow providers to fully internalize any cost 
reduction/increased efficiency, and recreate perfectly competitive conditions in the regulated 
health delivery market. However, as we shall see, the same constraints that prevent PC or 
yardstick regulation to achieve first best results in other sectors are relevant in the health care 
sector. Some of the most severe constraints are the following:
• Costs (marginal and average) in correspondence to different levels of production are 
extremely difficult to compute for health care services. PCs are calculated on the
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basis of in depth studies of a limited number of providers (as in case on the DRG 
system introduced in Italy in 1994), or on the basis of International prices (for 
example in determining price caps for pharmaceuticals in West Europe).
• Shleifer’s results are critically based on the hypothesis that the product is 
homogeneous or that quality is easily verifiable. This should be contrasted with the 
importance of the quality dimension, and at the same time the uncertainty that 
surrounds its measurement in the health care sector. If quality is not verifiable, or it 
is not enforceable122, introducing Price Cap regulation can provoke extremely 
negative results. Providers compete by lowering their quality standards, instead of 
eliminating inefficiencies, as the model of yardstick competition predicts.123
5 .4  P aym en t S ys tem s: M ajor Trade-offs
The following are the main trade-offs associated with providers’ payment systems:
• between creating the incentive to enhance quality, and to contain costs;
• between the objective of avoiding risk-selection and that of stimulating productive
efficiency.
• between the aim of containing providers’ surplus, and that of inducing them to supply an 
optimal level of services.
• between administrative accessibility and convenience, and ability to flexibly respond to 
individual circumstances and provide more complete information.
As we shall see, the “optimal” payment system finds a second-best equilibrium -o r a balance- 
between the above trade-offs. In the rest of this chapter, we will analyze in detail how the theoretical 
literature has dealt with some of the above trade-offs. Let us just mention here that other dilemmas - 
not analysed here- may also be relevant. For example, for PS in health care there are dynamic issues 
similar to those mentioned in section 5.3.1, point c above, related to the optimal length of the 
regulatory “contract” that disciplines the PC.
122 This is the case when quality clauses of health contracts would be observable by both purchasers and 
providers, but are not verifiable by third parties and therefore not enforceable by courts.
123 Moreover, in presence of asymmetry of information on providers’ efficiency, fixed-price reimbursements 
may induce providers to retain higher than optimal surpluses. See model hereafter.
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5.4.1 Quality Enhancem ent - Cost C onsciousness Trade-off
In the RAP reforms implemented, in order to create the proper incentives for cost-control both 
purchasers and providers are increasingly subject to prospective funding, and they have to bear the 
extra-costs associated with unexpected increases in the volumes of activity and/or in the unit cost of 
treatment. Unfortunately, there is no single reimbursement system that is able to provide incentives 
for cost containment, without at the same time creating the incentives for quality skimping.
Several models in the literature have analysed the problem of finding the PS able to “optimally” 
balance the provider’s (the agent) cost reducing and quality enhancing efforts, in the context of a 
“hidden action” or “(supply side) moral hazard” principal agent model. These models include the 
following: Ellis and McGuire (1986); Ellis and McGuire (1990); Allen and Gentler (1991); Glazer 
and McGuire (1994); Hodgkin and McGuire (1994); Ma (1994); Rogerson (1994); Chalkley and 
Malcomson (1995 and 1998); and Ma and McGuire (1997).
We can graphically represent the position where the different PS stand along the lines o f this trade­
off:
Figure 5.1: Providers and Type of Reimbursement 
a Fee-for-service (cost-plus)
Quality 
improvement- 
no dumping of 
patients
DRG-based reimb.
Cost-and-volume  
ffl Capitation
■ Block contract
Cost containment
As the above figure shows, moving from fee-for-service towards DRG-based reimbursement, cost­
and volume contracts, capitation funding and block contracts progressively increase the part of 
providers’ payment that is fixed ex-ante. The incentive to contain costs increases, but so does the 
incentive to skimp on quality, and dump patients who are exceedingly costly to treat.
139
To understand the basic forces at play, we will refer to the simple formalisation developed by 
Hodgkin and McGuire (1994). Their model represents a health provider’s quality maximization 
problem, assuming that its objective function directly considers both quality (intensity of treatment, 
I) as well as profits (or financial surplus, denoted by the letter “B”). Profit is equal to revenue minus 
cost, plus any exogenous payment Y (such as donations) the provider receives. Revenue depends on 
the volume of services produced, X, as well as on their unit price, p (assuming this price is paid by a 
third-party public or private insurer or purchaser). In turn, the unit price p consists of a lump-sum 
transfer, a , and a partial cost reimbursement, (3c, with 0<(3<1. Following Ellis and McGuire (1986), 
the expression “ l-(3” is named “supply-side cost sharing”, the fraction of unit costs directly borne by 
the provider. Finally, both the volume of services supplied and their unit costs positively depend on 
quality (intensity of treatment). Thus, similarly to the model in Chapter 3, in this model it is assumed 
that the provider always needs to increase costs in order to improve quality.124 Following are the 
basic equations of Hodgkin and McGuire’s (1994) model.
The provider chooses quality (I) in order to maximize its objective function:
M ax!U{B,I} = max Ui{[(a+|k(I)) -c(I)]X(I) + Y; 1}
The equilibrium condition for an optimum is that:
(dB/dl) UB + Ui = 0 
That is:
[(p-c)dX/dI - X(dc/dI)(l-(3)]UB + Ui = 0
Hodgkin and McGuire identify two different effects of any payment system:
♦ (p-c)dX/dI =VOLUME EFFECT. By this channel, the provider is induced to increase the quality 
of services supplied any time the payment it receives for each case treated is higher than its 
marginal cost.
124 See Kesteloot and Voet (1998), for the consequences of considering also cost-reducing quality 
improvements.
U = U(B, I) UB,U ! >0; UBB,U!! <0 
B = R-C +Y
R = pX with X = X(I) dX/dl =X’( ) > 0 X"< 0
p = a+Pc 0<|3<1
C = cX with c = c(I) dc/dl = c '() > 0 c" > 0
(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)
(4.5)
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♦ X(dc/dI)(l-(3) (SUPPLY-SIDE) MORAL HAZARD EFFECT. By this channel, the provider is 
induced to reduce the quality of services supplied any time the payment it receives for each case 
treated does not fully cover the cost of providing it.
The supply-side moral hazard effect implies that, as providers bear an increasing share of the 
(marginal) cost of providing quality, they tend to skimp on it. As pointed out by Ellis and McGuire 
(1986), moving towards more prospective payments increases the degree of ‘supply-side cost 
sharing’, and thus can lead to reductions in equilibrium quality of services.
Note that according to Hodgkin’s and McGuire’s model the profit or not-for-profit nature of 
providers is important because it influences their objective function (increasing or decreasing their 
genuine concern for quality, captured by the term Ui). A benevolent hospital will do exactly what a 
welfare maximizer agent would want it to do with a fixed budget (this being the definition of 
“benevolence” in this context). In this case a pure block contract achieves first best results (Chalkley 
and Malcomson, 1998).
Finally, an important contribution in the literature on optimal payment is that by Chalkley and 
Malcomson (1995, 1998), on the basis of Ellis and McGuire (1990 and 1993), and Ma (1994). In the 
context of a multi-task, “hidden action” principal-agent problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1992), 
they analyse the problem of providing incentives for cost containment and quality enhancement. 
They prove that, by relying on the ‘volume effect’, a cost-per-case or fixed-price payment system 
can induce providers to choose both an efficient (first best) cost-reducing effort, as well as an 
optimal (first best) quality of services.125 The “volume effect” (or “demand channel”, as Chalkley 
and Malcomson (1995) rename it, pointing that its magnitude depends on the sensitivity of demand 
to quality, dX/dl) can induce health providers to maintain services at an optimal quality level.126 
However, the “demand channel” does not work under the following circumstances:
♦ if there are capacity constraints on the supply side;
♦ if patients’ perception of quality is uncertain;
125 In fact, the above models apply to contracts in health a well-established result in agency theory, which states 
that when the agent is risk neutral, in hidden action models it is optimal to pay the agent so that he/she/it fully 
internalises the principal’s objective function, and then to redistribute any surplus through lump-sum transfers 
(Loeb and Magat, 1978).
126 We precisely show the effects of the “volume effect” or “demand channel” in Annex 5.1.
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♦ if  there is a moral hazard effect on the demand side ( see Annex 2.2. Patients tend to overconsume 
health services when insured because they do not face the full marginal cost) that makes it 
optimal to explicitly ration the volume of services;
♦ if patients are constrained in their choice of providers; or
♦ if  the volume of demand for treatment and quality are substitutes in patients’ demand (for 
example, if patients make up for a lower quality by consuming more, for example by visiting 
doctors more frequently; see Ma and McGuire, 1997).
In normal circumstances one of the above constraints applies, and so the only way to achieve an 
optimal level o f quality of services is to directly reimburse part o f the quality enhancing costs 
sustained by providers. Thus, the optimal payment system is in general not fully prospective or fully 
retrospective. We summarize some of the key results o f the theoretical literature on providers’ 
optimal payment systems in the table that follows:
Table 5.1: Optimal PS under different hypotheses on market structure and information
Technology and cost Optimal payment systemProvider Demand
Benevolent and risk-neutral Known Known Block contract
Block contract + cost-per-case up to the 
number of patients that the purchaser wants 
to be treated
2 Benevolent and risk-neutral, but Unknown 
limited capacity to borrow to cover a 
financial shortfall
Known
3 Self-interested and risk neutral Responds to quality in a Known, with no capacity Cost per case (Fixed price)
desirable way and is able to constraint, and depending
pay for quality improvements on a hidden action effort
variable
4  Self-interested and risk-neutral Does not respond to quality 
either because of information 
asymmetry or because no 
other option is available
Mixed payment, with a prospective as well as a 
retrospective component in order to encourage 
both quality enhancements and cost reduction
5 Self-interested and risk neutral It is optimal to explicitly 
ration treatments to contain 
demand’s moral hazard
Mixed payment, which partially reimburses 
providers for unexpected rise in cost or 
volumes
6 Self interested and risk-neutral Capacity c o n s t r a in t is  Mixed-payment 
binding
Mixed payment7 Risk averse
8 Risk neutral Cost is not observable and Non-linear mixed-payments, in order to
depends on variable that induce providers’ to reveal their cost and to
providers cannot reduce information rents,
influence, at least in the 
short run
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5 .5  The o p tim a l PS w hen  c o s ts  a re  n o t observable
5 .5 .1  Introduction
Building upon Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1993), in this section we analyse 
the characteristics of an optimal PS when there is asymmetric information in cost variables that are 
not under the direct influence of providers. These variables may depend on the average severity of 
illness of the pool of patients that seeks care from each provider, or on the quality of training for staff 
and administrators, or of the infrastructure). We show that under these circumstances the optimal 
payment is not linear in the number of cases treated (it is not fixed-price), and must be dependent on 
the provider’s reported cost.
The aim of the model we propose is to contribute to the literature on optimal PS or “contracts” in the 
health sector (see Malcomson and Chalkley, 2000). In this literature, the term contract is used 
loosely, to indicate an agreement (for example between a purchaser of health services and a 
provider), where payment from the purchaser is made contingent upon the services the provider will 
supply over a certain time period.127 The distinction between a real contract (such as that between a 
private insurer and a provider), and a service or regulatory “agreement” imposed by a government 
purchaser to a health care provider is blurred, and the term contract is used to indicate both 
situations. Using the more rigorous terminology on PS introduced in the first part of this Chapter (see 
section 5.2.1), the model that we present investigates the optimal properties of an output (or activity) 
based PS offered to a private provider, when the purchaser is a public agency at least partially 
interested in pursuing social goals.
5 .5 .2  The Model
Consider a situation in which a health care purchaser makes a “contract” proposal to a hospital. This 
proposal defines a payment schedule t(x), function of the level of services (or number of patients) 
“x” that the hospital managers agree to deliver (treat). Suppose x is a routine surgical operation. The 
purchaser’s proposal is a “take-it or leave it” offer.128
127 See also discussion on purchasing and contracts in Chapter 4.
128 The hypothesis is that the contract cannot be renegotiated ex-post.
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Assume that ex-ante, when the contract proposal is devised, the purchaser does not know the 
hospital’s level of efficiency, or the local conditions that may influence provision costs. For example, 
costs may depend on ex-ante capital investments that cannot be varied over the contract period and 
that cannot be verified by a third party in case of dispute, or may depend on patients’ average 
severity of illness when they are admitted to the hospital, which is known only to hospital 
managers.129
Assumption 1: Formally, let us assume that the hospital is characterized by the following cost 
function 13°:
C  = C ( x , p )  =  P  +  ( \ +  p ) x  (51)>
where (3 is a cost parameter known only to the hospital managers (we shall refer to it as the hospital 
“type”), which influences both fixed and variable costs, and x is the level of services (x>l).
Assumption 2: The provider managers know the value of (3, but the purchaser managers only know 
that (3 is uniformly distributed on [0, l] .131
5.5.2.1 The Objective Functions of the Hospital and the Purchaser
The health economics literature that has dealt with agency problems usually models the purchaser as 
either a profit or a welfare maximizer agent, depending on its ownership status, and the provider as 
maximizing a single objective function, generally consisting of a combination of profits and other
129 Or, alternatively, costs may be adversely influenced by the strength of local Labour Unions, or by other 
local input markets conditions that the provider knows but cannot influence, and that no third party is able 
precisely to verify. Chalkley and Malcomson (1999) and De Fraja (2000) also consider situations where cost 
of treatment is influenced by severity of illness.
130 Note that Cpx> 0. This property, known in the literature as "single-crossing property", states that a hospital 
with a lower 3 is able to increase the supply of services at a lower marginal cost than a hospital with a higher 
p. It implies that as the number of treatments supplied increases, cost differentials among hospitals of different 
type widen. This assumption allows avoiding "pooling" solutions, in which hospitals with different 
characteristics are treated equally.
131 Note that the uniform distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate property: F(P)/f(P) is non-decreasing 
in P. F(P)=P, f(p)=l, d[F(P)/f(P)]/dP=l.
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I.
variables that are positively correlated with patients’ welfare (such as quantity and quality of 
services)132. For simplicity, we will assume that:
Assumption 3: the provider’s objective function coincides with that of its managers, and the latter 
maximize profit or financial surplus.133 If the hospital receives a payment (“transfer”) equal to t(x), 
and it incurs a financial cost equal to C(x,p), managers’ utility is the following:
UH = s(t,x,p) = t(x) -  C(x,P) = t(x) -P-(1+P)x (5.2),
Assumption 4: The purchaser’s objective function is increasing in the level of services (number of 
patients) that the provider delivers (treats), and it is decreasing in the payment given to the hospital:
UP= V(x)-t(x) = Klog(x)134 -  t(x) with K >1 (5.3),
The above characterization of the purchaser’s objective function can be justified for several reasons, 
for example: 1) because the purchaser maximizes consumer surplus, which in turn could be 
positively associated with the level of services; or 2) because of positive waiting lists for the routine 
surgical treatment x, and pressure from the central regulatory agency or the central government to 
contain them.135
132 There is an ample literature that has specifically studied hospitals’ objective function. It can be roughly 
divided in two strands. The first one has modelled the hospital as a unitary decision entity, whose behaviour 
can be reduced to the maximisation of a single objective function, whilst the second one has considered 
explicitly the different agents present within the hospital, whose interests are partially in conflict with each 
other. In the first strand, we find Rice (1966) (non-profit hospital maximising quantity), Newhouse (1970) and 
Lee (1971) (doctors maximising quality). In the second one, the most important contribution is perhaps that by 
Harris (1977), who criticises the unitary representation of hospitals' behaviour and explicitly represents the 
conflict between specialists and managers. Specialists behave as agents of patients, and their objective is to 
maximise intensity of treatment. Managers, on the contrary, are interested in maintaining the hospital financial 
equilibrium, which depends on the payment the hospital receives. Thus, there is generally a conflict between 
the resources that specialists demand and the amount that managers are willing to provide.
133 In case of public hospitals, it would be realistic to assume profit maximisation as long as this would allow 
managers to pursue other objectives, such as the enlargement of the hospital, increase of managerial perks, or 
peaceful relations with the hospital personnel.
34 Note also that gross welfare associated with treating x patients is concave in x. To motivate the concavity 
assumption, consider that, given a certain forecast of the population’s needs for x, the purchaser’s management 
plans to first satisfy the more urgent cases. Then, as x increases, the marginal utility of additional services 
diminishes. Also, the purchaser’s managers might be increasingly concerned with budgetary limits. Note that 
we do not assume, as it is normally done in the literature, that the purchaser considers the shadow cost of 
collecting public funds.
135 Or the purchaser could also want to expand production beyond current demand. Consider for example the 
situation in many poor countries or rural areas, where people may not be informed about the potential benefits 
of any particular health treatment. In this case, the public agency which purchases services may desire a level
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5.5.3 Results:
a) The Optimal Contract When Cost Is Observable
Let us first consider the case when the value of the cost parameter P is observable. The purchaser’s 
preferred value of x, denoted by xre, is defined by solving the maximization problem:
x ra = Arg max M [Klog(x) -  t(x)] (5.4)
Subject to the constraint that the hospital must achieve at least a minimum financial surplus 
(Participation Constraint or PC):
When cost is observable the PC (5.5) holds with equality, because the purchaser is able to reduce 
payment to a level just sufficient to cover the cost of service provision. Then, the maximization 
problem becomes:
The first-order-conditions define the following FB level of activity136, as a function of (3:
x FB i p )  =  ——  for each pe [0,1], (5.7)
1 + 0
Proposition 1: If p ’ < P” , xFB(p’)> xFB(p” ). When cost is known, in equilibrium a less efficient 
hospital (higher P) treats fewer cases than a more efficient hospital (lower P).
Proof: dxFB(P)/dP<0
Proposition 2 indicates that the above optimal contract with perfect information can be implemented 
by simply paying specialists according to a linear function of the number of patients that demand 
treatment (according to a fixed-price PS).
of services superior to existing demand.
136 We will assume throughout the chapter that the value of K is large enough so that gross marginal utility is 
larger than marginal cost for values of x<l, that the necessary first order conditions for a local maximum are 
always sufficient conditions for a global maximum, and that they are satisfied for positive values of x. The
UH = t(x) -p-( l+p)x > 0, for each p and x (5.5)
max.xE*! Up }■ = [Klog(x) - (P+ x(l + P)) -UH] with UH = 0 (5.6)
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Proposition 2: The FB level of activity (x=xFB) can be implemented by a contract in which payment 
to the hospital t(x) consists of two parts:
• a fixed lump sum transfer;
• a fixed-price (or cost-per-case) payment per patient treated:
" )  = - £ -  (5,8)
The proof is straightforward (see Annex 5.1), and it relies on the ‘volume effect’ described in section 
5.4.1. This result was first proved by Chalkley and Malcomson, 1995.
b) The Optimal Contract When Cost is  Not Observable, and Cannot be 
Varied Over the Contract Period
In case of incomplete information, the purchaser faces an adverse selection problem, deriving from 
its ignorance of the hospital cost parameter, the need to preserve the hospital budget balance, and 
hospital managers’ interest in exploiting the information asymmetry.
In this situation (when the purchaser’s managers do not know (3), it is not efficient to link payment to 
the cost reported by the hospital managers, unless the purchaser devises a payment schedule that 
makes it always convenient for the latter to report truthfully. In fact, following Baron and Myerson 
(1982), to find the second-best contract, one can apply the revelation principle and represent the 
interaction between the purchaser and the hospital as a direct revelation Bayesian game, where the 
strategy of the latter is a mapping from the set of possible cost-types into itself [b((3), b being the cost 
parameter that the hospital managers report to the purchaser managers, and (3 the true cost 
parameter]. The purchaser’s strategy (named ‘revelation mechanism’) is a collection of proposals 
(t(b), x(b)) specifying a payment and a certain number of cases, functions of the cost the hospital 
managers report. The revelation principle guarantees that the equilibria of the direct revelation game 
coincide with the equilibria of the original game, if we focus on ‘incentive compatible’ revelation 
mechanisms, where the hospital managers truthfully report the cost parameter (3. The incentive 
compatibility or truth-telling (IC) constraint can be written as follows:
equilibrium volume will be the first integer number below the equilibrium x.
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s®, (3)137 = t((3) - C(x(P),P) > s(b,(3) = t(b) - C(x(b),(3), for eachp, (5.9)
The timing of the revelation game is as follows:
Time 0: Nature draws a cost parameter from F(|3) and reveals it to the hospital managers.
Time 1: The purchaser devises a second best (SB) contract (that defines a certain number of cases 
and a corresponding payment, both functions of the cost parameter (3 that hospital managers report). 
Following a standard result in the literature, we can solve the purchaser’s maximization problem as 
an optimal control problem (all the proofs are confined to Annex 5.2).
The equilibrium value of x = x SB is defined by the first order conditions, valid for each (3:
V A x SB) - C J x SB, i3 ) - ( j ^ ) C /k( x SB,j3) =  ^ r ~ ( l  + f i ) - ^  =  0  (5.10)
, which give the following second best level of activity, function of (3:
x SB( p )  =  - ^ —  , for each Ps [0.1], (5.11)
1 + 2 P
Proposition 4. Under asymmetric information, the optimal level of activity for each provider type is 
a non-linear decreasing function of the cost-type (3 reported by the latter, according to equation
(5.11).
Let us analyse the shape of the optimal level of x as a function of (3. In equilibrium the purchaser’s 
marginal expected benefit from purchasing an additional unit of service from a provider of type 
[|3,|3+d(3] (the probability that the provider’s cost parameter is indeed between [(3,(3+d(3] is f((3)d(3), 
must balance the additional expected payment to the hospital. Such marginal payment consists of 
two parts: first, the expected payment to compensate the hospital for the cost of providing an 
additional unit of service. The second is an incentive to offset the hospital managers’ interest in 
misreporting costs. This second component gives rise to what is known in the language of regulation 
theory as an ‘information rent’ or surplus. Such surplus increases as x increases, because the cost
137 The first parameter is the cost parameter revealed by hospital managers, while the second is the hospital’s 
true cost-parameter. Assuming that the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied, from now on we will 
denote s((3,|3) simply by s(|3).
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differential among hospitals of different type widens (Cpx>0). Thus, to limit the information rent, the 
purchaser penalizes those hospital managers who report relative higher cost by reducing the level of 
services to be purchased from their hospital. As a result, in equilibrium all hospitals but those whose 
managers declare being of the most efficient type are kept at an activity level lower than the first best 
level (xSB(P) < xra for each P except for p = O).138
Proposition 5:
a. In correspondence to the optimal contract, all hospital managers except those who report their 
hospital being the least efficient, enjoy a positive net surplus. Such surplus (named “information 
rent”) is equal to:
* “ o®) = j =fa + T-TZXtP = 1-/9 + ilog3 -ilog(l + Ip)
p  d p  p  1 +  2  p  2  2
(5.12)
b. The total payment that the hospital receives is equal to: tSB(P) = C(xSB(p),P) + sSB(P).
Note that the optimal xSB is a monotone decreasing function of p. Thus, it is possible to invert it, and 
to obtain a function p=p(x), which is also monotone decreasing, and write the optimal payment as a 
direct function of x.
T ( x SB) =  t ( p x 5B)) =  C ( x SB, P ( x SB)) + s SB ( P ( x SB)) = ^  + | l o g 3  + | l o g x
(5.13)
Equation 5.13 shows the characteristics of the optimal payment system under conditions of 
asymmetric information. It shows that higher activity levels come with higher total budgets (so the 
optimal payment is dependent on level of service). By deriving T(x) with respect to x one obtains:
d T { x SB) d C  d C d p  d s SB d p  x  + l
—   -  = —  +  — + ----------—-= -------  (5.14)
d x  d x  d p  d x  d P  d x  2 x
138 By doing so, the purchaser makes it more costly for efficient types to mimic less efficient service providers.
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Proposition 6. With asymmetric information over cost, the optimal payment schedule is non-linear 
in x: dT(xSB)/dx is decreasing in the volumes purchased.
With asymmetric information over costs, a cost-per-case or fixed-price payment system (which is 
linear in activity levels) would not be optimal because it would not respect the incentive 
compatibility constraint, and would thus induce any hospital manager to report a cost level higher 
than the true one.
Equation (5.14) implies that additional levels of service (or number of patients) are compensated at 
decreasing unit rates. Mathematically, T(x) is a concave function of x:
Note that in correspondence to any incentive-compatible mechanism, being dsSB/d(3 = - dC/dp (see 
equation 5.18 in Annex 5.2), the last two terms of equation (5.14) cancel out. Then, dT(xSB)/dx is 
equal to 3C/3xSB. In words, expression (5.14) indicates that in correspondence to the optimal 
contract, each provider receives as marginal reimbursement a sum corresponding to the marginal 
cost of the “marginal” provider-type at each level of activity. The “marginal provider-type” is the 
provider that is assigned -and self-selects- precisely that specific equilibrium level of activity (and 
corresponding payment) along the optimal payment schedule.
5 .6  C onclusions
When devising new payment systems for health providers, health reformers may have indulged in 
the idea that all valuable objectives (productive and allocative efficiency, effectiveness, quality of 
services, and equity) could be achieved simultaneously with a simple PS, if only the right system 
could be found. However, the existing theoretical literature tells us a rather different story. It points 
at the fact that in most situations a choice has to be made among different objectives, in the sense 
that those PS that are more adequate to achieve some of them are completely incapable, or even 
harmful, to achieve others. We have also shown that the optimal PS and the impact of any PS on 
quality and other relevant variable depend on market conditions, on the information that agents can 
have access to, ad on the variables they can influence. For example, the “demand channel” (patients’
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positive response to quality improvements) may be used to induce providers to offer higher quality 
services, but in a context characterized by capacity constraints this “demand channel” cannot work.
If the theoretical analysis is correct, then one must draw the conclusion that a PS that is optimal in 
any circumstance in fact does not exist, but it is really dependent on the priority objective(s) one 
chooses. Our analysis also indicates that the accompanying institutional and informational 
framework is crucial in determining the performance and the constraints associated with any PS. 
Payment systems ought to be used flexibly, to be properly matched to the changing priorities and 
market conditions, and be accompanied by effective supervision to minimize the distortions they 
may cause and to fully bring out their potential.
In the second part of the chapter we described the characteristics of the optimal PS, or, by using the 
terminology of the theory of regulation, “contract”, between a purchaser and a provider of health 
services when costs are not observable. The model builds upon the analytical framework first 
proposed by Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1993). The second best contract 
identifies a level of services (number of patients) to be treated and the corresponding payment as 
functions of the cost of provision reported by the hospital managers, and it displays the following 
features: 1) the volume of services purchased from the hospital is inversely related with the latter’s 
cost; 2) in general, it is lower than the full information level of services; 3) the hospital managers 
enjoy a positive information rent in equilibrium, which increases with the level of services that the 
hospital supplies; 4) more efficient hospitals are assigned a higher total payment than less efficient 
ones and 5) additional levels of service (number of patients) are reimbursed at decreasing rates. The 
model we presented is static, and thus it is unable to describe the dynamic interaction that takes place 
in reality between purchasers and providers, where learning over costs takes place over time and 
where additional pieces of information enter in subsequent negotiations once they become 
available.139 Moreover, the model does not explicitly consider the impact of competition between 
different providers, which could provide the purchaser with useful information to be used in 
contracts.140
139 In other words, the PS analysed in section 5.5 is optimal, given the prior information of the purchaser, but it 
is not ex-post efficient, once the cost parameter is common knowledge. The features of the model presented 
above may be realistic in contexts characterized by rapidly varying costs for exogenous reasons, for instance 
following a technological shock that rapidly changes the way certain diseases are treated. Or, if overhead costs 
are significant and providers can easily shift such joint costs from one service to the other, and contracts are 
dealt separately for each single specialty and service.
140 In fact, the above model can easily be extended to consider the case in which the purchaser faces many 
different providers of unknown efficiency. In that case, an important result of the existing literature is that, as 
long as different providers are subject to the same exogenous shocks, relative performance evaluation can 
improve the terms of the contract in favour of the purchaser. In fact, the possibility of making comparisons
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Despite the above limitations, it is arguable that the need to overcome the existing asymmetry of 
information concerning costs and other key contractual variables (for instance quality) should 
become a central concern in shaping real-world contracts between health purchasers and providers. 
According to the model we described, purchasers should vary the levels of services demanded from 
each provider in order to elicit information about their cost level, and providers that are (relatively) 
less efficient should be assigned “contracts” with lower levels of services and lower budgets. The 
optimal payment system is a cost-and-volume PS, and not fixed-price.
In conclusion, the model presented here has mainly a prescriptive content, but it is nonetheless of 
interest to see whether some of its “predictions” have been borne out in real-world situations. The 
evidence from the 1991 quasi-market reforms in the UK (for the UK, see for example, Propper, 1996 
and 1997 and Audit Commission, 1997), suggests that:141
• after the purchaser-provider split is introduced, purchasers become more cost-sensitive, build 
up managerial expertise and develop new Management and Information Systems (MIS) that 
would allow them to compare costs, activities and quality of care of different providers;
• in spite of the strict regulation often existing on the range of reimbursement prices, 
providers start to use prices strategically, and sometimes accept ‘volume discounts’ to secure 
a higher ‘share of the market’ in exchange for lower (unit) prices;
• as a result, successful providers start achieving surpluses, sometimes well-above the 
mandatory rates set by regulation;
All these results are predicted by the model that we proposed in this chapter, and suggest that the 
latter could be considered as a good starting point to further study the purchaser-provider interaction.
among different providers would also shift the balance in favour of prospective payments, because the 
possibility of misstating costs is limited when the purchaser can make comparisons. The model presented could 
only be used to study a situation in which the number of providers is taken as exogenous. In that case, where 
health contracts were auctioned among several bidder-providers characterised by different values of (3, it would 
be possible to show that a contract proposal characterised as in the text would be able to select the most 
efficient provider (McAfee and McMillan, 1986 and 1987; Laffont and Tirole, 1987). A slightly different and 
more complex formalisation would be required to compare the advantages of introducing many regulated 
providers, relative to a bilateral monopoly situation (two recent articles in which market structure is 
endogenised are Auriol and Laffont, 1993, and McGuire and Riordan, 1995).
141Refer to Chapter 6 for a throughout review of the evidence available from other countries on the impact of 
the purchaser-provider split, and the new PS.
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A nnex 5.1 P ro o f o f  P roposition  2
To induce the provider to choose to treat the purchaser’s preferred number of cases, it is necessary to 
structure the payment system in such a way that the provider maximizes its surplus by choosing x = 
x FB. x ^ i s  defined by the following first order condition:
Vx (xra) - Cx (x™. P) = 0, for each P (5.16)
In our model, the provider chooses the number of cases to be treated by maximising:
MaxxUH= s(t,x, P)=t(x) -  C(x,P)
Assume also that in correspondence to x™, the fixed component of payment is adjusted such that the 
provider’s participation constraint is satisfied. When payment is determined as in Proposition 2, the 
provider’s objective function becomes:
s ( x , 0 )  =  ( - p f ) x - 0 - (  \  +  p ) x  (5,17),
The first order conditions are satisfied by x =xFB, the purchaser’s preferred number of patients 
treated. QED
A nnex 5 .2  P ro o f o f  P roposition s 4  a n d  5
To define the optimisation problem we must first redefine the Participation and the Incentive 
Compatibility constraints of the direct revelation game.
First, consider the Incentive, or truth-telling constraint (IC, equation (5.9) in the text).
We denote:
s(b,P) I b=p = s(P); t(b) | b=p = t(P); x(b) I b=p = x(p); 8s(b)/5b I b=p = 3s/3p and dx(b)/3b | b=p = 5x/8p.
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From: s(p) = t(p) - C(x(P),p) > s(b,P) = t(b) - C(x(b),P), VP, by differentiating s(b,(3) = t(b)- 
C(x(b),P) at the truth-telling optimum (when b, the cost parameter reported equals the true parameter 
P), and using the envelope theorem, we derive the following two conditions for the IC to be satisfied:
1) A necessary condition for the incentive compatibility constraint to hold:
a _ „  L „  ....---------------------------- \b — f j  =  [ j , from which one can derive the Necessary Condition:
db
^ -  =  ~ ( x ( p ) , p )  =  - { \  +  x SBm  (5.18),
a p  d p
2) The first order condition stated above must hold for all possible Ps. We can therefore differentiate 
it with respect to P, obtaining (the second term is derived applying Young's theorem):
d(F.O.C)/dp= [S.O.C.] - [C px (dx/db)b=p ] = 0.
To satisfy the second order conditions, the first term must be negative. The second term must then
be positive. Given that - C px is negative (hypothesis 2a), dx/dp must also be negative. Thus, a
sufficient condition for the IC constraint to be respected is the following:
£ * 0  (5.19)
d p
Second, consider the Participation Constraint (PC) (5.5). Given that Cp > 0, s(b,p) is monotone 
decreasing in p. Thus, if the PC is satisfied for p=p1= l, it is also satisfied for all other P, lower than 
P1. Moreover, since leaving payments to the hospital is costly, the PC constraint will be satisfied as 
an equality at p 1=l:s(P1= l) = t(l) -  (l+2x) = 0.
Hence, taking into account the IC and the PC constraints, the purchaser’s maximisation problem can 
be rewritten as follows:
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m a x ^ X flo g tf  P ) ) - [ 1 + X (  P Xl + P ) ] P ) ]  dp w p  (5 20)
subject to:
a )  U ( p ‘ )  =  t ( P ' )  -  C M P 1) , ? 1)  =  t ( l ) - ( l + 2 x )  =  0
b ) d Udp
b = P
|§ ( x(.p),p) = -(l + xSB{p.)) 
d p
c)£*0
d P
Let us temporarily ignore constraint c). We will explain the general approach to this maximization 
problem, and then just state the results with our particular specification of the objective and cost 
functions (equation 5.10 in the text). From:
s{P) = s { p l) - \ — dP  (5.21),
pdp
where (31 is the upper limit of the cost parameter (and (3° is the corresponding lower limit), 
considering the PC and the necessary condition for the IC constraint, one can write:
rdC
s {P )  =  \ ~ ^ { x { p ) , P ) d P  (5.22)
J d p
Thus, the objective function of the purchaser becomes:
/?! pP
Maxx= { \y(x<M -  C(x(p),p)-\^(x(p),P)dPWP  (5.23)dC_
Po P d P
There are two equivalent methods to solve problem (5.23):
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Method 1:
We can integrate by parts the last term of equation (5.23), thus obtaining the following expression:
Then, by multiplying and dividing the integral in (5.24) by f((3), the objective function of equation 
(5.23) becomes:
Finally, by inserting the values of V(.) and C(.) in the text (respectively, expressions 5.1 and 5.4), we 
obtain the first order conditions in equation (5.10) and (5.11).
Method 2:
We can apply optimal control theory to solve maximisation problem (5.23) subject to constraints a),
b) and c) in equation (5.20). The Hamiltonian is the following:
p'p'j c drJ \ j - ( x { p ) , P ) d P ) d F ( p )  = J F ( M ^ - ( x { p ) p ) } d P
Bn B  • Bn *
(5.24)
J V {x {p ) ) -C (x (p ) ,p ) M M  dF(p)ftp, dp (5.25)
H=WMP)-C{xiP),P)-s<Mf(£)-V
dC{x{P),/3)
dP
(5.26)
where p(|3) is the Pontryagin multiplier.
Taking ‘x’ as the control variable, and ‘s’ as the state variable, we obtain by the maximum principle:
The boundary of s(p) at p=p0 , the lower bound, is unconstrained. Hence the Trasversality Condition 
at p=p0 (M'(Po)s(Po) = 0 )  implies: j lx ((30) = 0, and integrating (5.27), one obtains: p(P) =F(p).
Finally, by substituting V() and C() with the values in the text (expressions 5.1 and 5.4), and by 
maximising the Hamiltonian with respect to x((3), we derive equations (5.10) and (5.11).
Let xSB(P) be the Second Best solution. The last constraint we have to check in maximisation 
problem (5.20) is constraint c), i.e., dxSB/dp must be non-increasing in the hospital's type. The 
implicit function theorem implies that:
sign dxSB/dP = sign d(F.O.C.x)/dp
d m
(5-28)
Given Cpx>0, the above expression is always negative if F(p)/f(p) increases as P increases, which is 
true in case of the Uniform distribution.
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Chapter 6: The Equity Impact of Resource Allocation 
and Purchasing (RAP) Reforms
6.1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter studies the equity impact of resource allocation, strategic purchasing and payment 
system (RAP) reforms in health. In the first part, the chapter reviews the evidence on the distribution 
of health and health care utilization across socio-economic groups in developing countries. Such 
evidence shows a striking consistency in the association between poverty and poor health, and that 
the distribution of health benefits across socio-economic groups is highly unequal, favouring the 
wealthier segments of the population. Then, the chapter investigates into the meaning of equity in 
health: we argue that the concept of an equitable distribution of health resources is not as 
straightforward as it first appears. Hence, assessing changes at the margin may be difficult, and 
different equity principles and measures would lead to opposite conclusions.
In the second part, the chapter presents the empirical literature that has investigated the impact of 
RAP reforms from an equity perspective. We argue that some RAP reform components, such as the 
new resource allocation mechanisms, produced a strong pro-poor impact, but that the evidence of the 
impact of other components, such as the new contracting mechanisms and payment systems for 
providers, is much more mixed, and that these may well have generated adverse equity impact.
One of the main conclusions of the paper is that the evidence available on the RAP reforms’ impact 
on equity is largely inconclusive. The lack of a scientifically rigorous evidence base to evaluate the 
RAP reforms is partially due to intrinsic measurement difficulties. Aggregate measures of equity, 
especially those concerning distribution of health outcomes, change slowly, while most RAP reforms 
in developing countries are quite recent. However, the lack of conclusive evidence is also caused by 
an insufficient attention to monitoring and evaluation the equity dimension of the RAP reforms. For 
instance, one can hardly find any data to evaluate the impact of RAP reforms where the change in 
utilization of essential health services is measured disaggregated by socio-economic groups. We 
hope that in the future new and more conclusive evidence will soon be brought to bear on some of 
the tentative results presented here.
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6 .2  E vidence on E xistin g  In eq u a litie s  in  H ealth
The evidence available on distribution of health and health resources across socio-economic groups 
is presented in studies for the most part not related to the evaluation of specific health reforms. We 
briefly present this evidence in this section.
Regardless of the diversity of the existing studies in terms of measurement approaches to equity and 
poverty, study design and geographical focus, the empirical evidence indicates a striking consistency 
in the association between poverty and poor health. Beaglehole and Bonita (1997, p .l) assert that 
poverty is the most important cause of preventable death, disease and disability.
Inter country comparisons present evidence on health inequalities across countries, and their 
evolution over time. Some of the key findings are the following:
• The bulk of mortality and morbidity affects people living in the developing world. 98% of 
the deaths between birth and 15 years and 83% of the deaths between 15 and 59 years occur 
in the developing world (Murray and Lopez, 1996).
• These inequalities have not decreased over time. Gwatkin, 2000b, analyzing World Bank 
data set, concludes that in the period 1970-1990 infant mortality differentials across 
countries declined in absolute terms, but that they increased in relative terms ("While infant 
mortality in 1970 was around 6.5 times as high in the poorest as in the richest countries, it 
was over 11 times as high by 1990 (Gwatkin, 2000b, p. 19)". He also points at the fact that, 
unlike under-5 mortality figures, adult mortality differentials did unequivocally narrow over 
time.
• Over 30% (53% in sub-Saharan Africa) of deaths in the developing world occur in children 
younger than 5 years. In terms of DALYs lost the three main groups of disease are perinatal 
disorders, lower respiratory infections, and diarrhoeal diseases, all of which are prevalent in 
the developing world, especially in the poorest countries and among the younger and poorer 
segments of the population.
• Life expectancy is strongly associated with income per capita. However, the relationship is 
not linear (Preston, 1980) and is characterised by high variability, as different countries with 
similar level of income achieve widely different results in mortality rates and life 
expectancies (see Chapter 4, Box 4.1).
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More recent literature has looked into the relationship between poverty and health within countries. 
The main findings of this literature are three: A) mortality is related as much to socio-economic 
inequalities (in asset ownership, expenditure, income, education attainment, etc.) within countries, as 
it is to differences in absolute wealth/income amongst them; B) within each country, mortality rates 
are positively correlated with levels of deprivation (for example, Anand and Ravallion, 1993, show 
that a significant part of the impact of income per capita on mortality withers away once we 
explicitly consider the share of the population in poverty as an explanatory variable); C) there is 
increasing evidence that demonstrates an independent positive impact of social capital on health 
outcomes (see the evidence presented by Subramanian et. al., 2001; Kawachi et. al., 1999).
Investigations of health differentials across socio-economic groups in low and middle income 
countries are based on two major sources of evidence: Living Standard Measurement Surveys 
(LSMS) and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). While LSMS contain very accurate 
information of households’ level of consumption and expenditure, there is less detailed information 
on health seeking behaviour and health outcomes. By contrast, DHS data contain very accurate 
information over health status and health service utilization, especially for reproductive, maternal 
and child care services, but no information on households’ income or expenditure. The two above 
main sources of evidence are discussed respectively by Gwatkin et al. (2000) and by Wagstaff 
(2000).
On the basis of DHS data collected in over 40 developing countries, Gwatkin et al. (2000) analyze 
inequalities across socio-economic groups in: a) infant and under 5 mortality; b) levels of 
malnutrition; c) incidence of diarrhoea and acute respiratory infection; d) fertility rates; e) 
information on HTV/AIDS; and f) use of Maternal and Child Health services. They adopt a wealth 
index developed by Filmer and Pritchett (1998)142 to divide the population into different wealth 
quintiles according to reported asset ownership, and show that disparities between poor and non-poor 
vary enormously across countries. The tables below present some of their key findings. On average 
across countries, a child bom in a household belonging to the lowest wealth quintile is roughly twice 
as likely to die before reaching 5 years, than a child bom in a household from the highest wealth 
quintile. Inequalities are highest in the Latin American/Caribbean region.
142 Filmer and Pritchett (1998) use information on household wealth and assets from DHS questionnaire and 
develop a wealth index using through principal components analysis. They then apply this index to the study 
of education attainment in 35 countries.
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Table 6.1 and 6 .2 : Intra-Country Disparities in Infant and Under-Five M ortality143 
6.1. Infant M ortality
Region No. of 
Countries
Poor-Rich Ratio Concentration Index144
Mean Range Mean Range
Sub-Saharan Africa 21 1.67 1.11 to 2.46 -.081 -.003 to -.141
Asia/Near East/North 9 2.33 1.42 to 3.93 -.125 -.051 to -.195
Africa
Latin 11 2.66 1.26 to 4.18 -.145 -.043 to -.251
America/Caribbean
Total 40 1.87 1.11 to4.18 -.106 -.003 to -.251
6.2 Under-Five M ortality
Region No. of 
Countries
Poor-Rich Ratio Concentration Index
Mean Range Mean Range
Sub-Saharan Africa 21 1.79 1.27 to 2.60 -.095 -.040 to -.164
Asia/Near East/North 9 2.69 1.69 to 4.60 -.147 -.084 to -.210
Africa
Latin 11 2.99 1.55 to 4.67 -.167 -.071 to -.259
America/Caribbean
Total 40 2.06 1.27 to 4.67 -.124 -.040 to -.259
Source: Gwatkin, 2000b
An interesting finding of Gwatkin et al. (2000) is that countries with lower mortality and morbidity
rates among children are in general also characterized by wider disparities across socio-economic
groups. This finding seems at odds with the non-linear relationship between income and health,
143 Two patterns of the data worth noting are that under-five mortality rates are more concentrated than infant 
mortality rates (this could result from problems of underreporting of infant mortality), and that the standard 
deviations are extremely large (so that parameters are not statistically significant for several countries).
144 The concentration index is equal to: 1 — 2 f MR,  (w, ) d w , where MR is the cumulative proportion ofJo
mortality rates among children graphed against the cumulative proportion of their households’ wealth 
(i= l,...,5). A negative (positive) value of the concentration index indicates inequality favouring the rich (poor).
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characterized by diminishing returns to scale, and could be explained by one or a combination of the 
following reasons:
a) Rates of diffusion of health-promoting innovations are different across different segments of 
society, first benefiting the wealthier segments of society.
b) Increase in per capita income is associated with increases in income disparities.
c) Societies experience varying degrees of health disparity because some of them put in place 
policies that make the health-income relationship more elastic while others do not.
d) A potential negative health externality occurs associated with being poor in a richer country.
Using LSMS data, Wagstaff (2000b) compares data on infant and under-5 mortality rates from 9 low 
income countries. His study finds significant inequalities in infant and under-five mortality rates 
across quintile-expenditure groups in all countries, although the estimates are not as pronounced as 
in Gwatkin et al. (2000). For six countries Wagstaffs estimates are directly comparable with 
Gwatkin’s.145
145 A third set of measures is presented by WHO (1999). The WHO estimates are not based on household data. 
They extrapolate the mortality rates at different incomes from information on the average mortality and on the 
distribution of income. The WHO estimates show stronger inequalities than those derived from household 
data. According to these estimates, those who live in extreme poverty (less than 1 US dollar adjusted for 
purchasing power parity) are five times more likely to die before reaching the age of 5 years than those above 
the poverty line, and two and half times more likely to die between the ages of 15 and 49 years.
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Table 6.3: Concentration Indices for Infant and Under-Five Mortality within Six Developing 
Countries as Measured by Different Studies
Country Infant Mortality Under-Five Mortality
Country Info. Sheets 
(Gwatkin et al.)
Wagstaff Country Info. Sheets 
(Gwatkin et al.)
Wagstaff
Cote d’Ivoire -0.107 -0.095 -0.115 -0.096
Ghana -0.093 +0.018 -0.135 -0.028
Nepal -0.060 -0.109 -0.096 -0.132
Nicaragua -0.094 -0.150 -0.124 -0.162
Pakistan -0.051 0.000 -0.084 -0.017
Vietnam -0.143 -0.009 -0.159 -0.016
Un-weighted Mean -0.091 -0.064 -0.119 -0.076
Sources: Wagstaff, 2000b; Gwatkin, 2000b
The evidence also indicates that given all the other determinants of health (see Annex 4.1), even 
large disproportionate increases in the use of services by the poor would produce relatively smaller 
reductions in health disparities (for example, see Victora, 1999, on the health impact of a MCH 
program which carefully targeted the poor in the city of Pelotas, Brazil).
Information on health inequalities and on their determinants is much more developed and detailed in 
high income countries. In general, the literature has found persistent health inequalities, a strong 
relationship with income inequalities and levels of deprivation, but weak links with specific health 
systems’ characteristics. For example, a recent study on the causes of health inequalities and their 
link with socio-economic deprivation and health systems’ characteristics in industrialized countries 
by Van Doorslaer et al. (1997) found that the USA have the highest level of health inequalities, 
followed by the UK, the Netherlands and then all the other West European Countries and Japan, 
where the extent of health inequalities across socio-economic groups are the lowest. Inequality is 
statistically significant in all countries. By regressing health inequalities on: a) total pro-capita health 
expenditure; b) public share in total health expenditure; c) total GDP per capita; d) Gini coefficient
163
for income distribution, they find that only the last term, income inequality, produces a statistically 
significant positive association with health inequality, whilst income per capita, total health 
expenditure and even the public share seem not to matter. Their finding seems to confirm the 
importance of the “relative” pathway through which income and income distribution may affect poor 
health (Subramanian and Belli, 2001).
6 .3  The d is tr ib u tio n  o f  b en efits  fro m  h ea lth  care
The evidence presented by Gwatkin et al. (2000) also indicates that the distribution of utilization of 
health care services is extremely unequal across socio-economic groups. In spite of the fact that 
poorer segments of any society suffer disproportionably for death and morbidity, the wealthier 
segments utilize health services both in the private as well as the public sector disproportionably 
more than the poor. Even those services, such as interventions against communicable diseases, which 
address diseases mostly concentrated among the poor, are unevenly utilized more by the rich.
The following figure aggregates data for 43 developing countries on immunization of children146 for 
households belonging to different expenditure quintile groups. It shows that immunization services, 
which in principle would provide disproportionate health benefits to poorer households who are 
currently suffering from communicable diseases, are in fact utilized more by wealthier households. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa children belonging to the top quintile households are twice as likely to receive 
immunization services than those belonging to the poorest households.
146 Data presented in: HNP and the Poor: An Integrated Policy Framework for Improving the Outcomes for the 
Poor, by Soucat and Wagstaff (2001).
Figure 6.1: Inequalities in Immunization Rates between Wealthier and Poorer Households
Immunization Rates among Poor and Rich
(Source: Gwatkin, Poverty Data Sheets)
AH Couitries (43 coutries) Sub-Saharan Airica (22 Comtnes) Tanzania
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Source: Soucat and Wagstaff, 2001
A series of benefit-incidence studies147 that focused on the benefits dispensed by public health 
systems to different socio-economic groups indicated strong pro rich inequalities in the distribution 
of benefits from government = expenditure on health care services, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A study by Gwatkin (2000b) summarizes the results of this literature as follows:
147 Benefit-incidence studies compute the average subsidy for the different types of care (usually, primary, 
outpatient specialist care, inpatient care) from budgetary information and from data on service use. They 
estimate the subsidy going to each group from information on the distribution of utilization by income group of 
the different service-types.
Mathematically, benefit incidence is estimated by the following formula:
Xj = health sector subsidy enjoyed by group j,
Uy = utilization of service i by group j,
Uj = utilization of service i by all groups combined,
Sj = government net expenditure on service i, and
e,j = group j ’ s share of utilization of service i
Thus, incidence studies do not consider therapeutic benefits, nor adjusts for different need across quintiles. 
They estimate the financial redistribution and do not consider the revenue side. They also do not convey any 
information about the reasons behind differential use of services across socio-economic groups. For a review 
of the early literature, see Birdsall and Hecht, 1995
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Table 6.4: Percentage of Financial Subsidy from Government Health Services Accruing to 
Poorest and Richest 20% of the Population: Continent Averages
Region Primary Care Hospital care
Outpatient Inpatient Total Hospital care
Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest
Quintile Quintile Quint. Quint. Quint. Quint. Quint. Quint.
Africa 15 (7) 23 (7) 12(2) 36 (2) 16(2) 34(2) 10(5) 33 (5)
Asia 21(2) 16(2) 7(1) 41(1) 5(1) 41(1) 13(1) 22(1)
E.
Europe
16(2) 22 (2) " — — — 12(2) 29 (2)
Latin
America
— — — — “ — — --
Total government health care expenditure
Region Poorest Quint. Richest Quint.
Africa 12 (7) 30 (7)
Asia 19 (5) 21 (5)
E. Europe 13 (2) 27 (2)
Latin America 29 (8) 14 (8)
Source: Gwatkin 2000b.
Note: Each figure in parentheses indicates the number o f countries included in the continent average that 
appears immediately to the parentheses ’ left.
Note that according to the above table only in Latin America government expenditure on health care 
seems to be pro poor. In Latin America only Brazil shows a pro-rich distribution of public 
expenditure on government-run facilities However, the estimates available do not take into account 
the public subsidy to social security, which covers only formal sector employees and that accounts 
for over half of total public health expenditure in several LA countries.148 Inequalities in service 
utilization are starker in the poorest countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. A benefit incidence study in
148 In general in LA public services fulfil mainly the residual role of providing basic services for those unable 
to pay, whilst the wealthiest segments of society utilize private facilities (see Chile Case Study, Chapter 2). 
Those employed as civil servants or formally in the private sector are frequently reimbursed by their own 
employment category’s insurance or sickness fund, frequently subsidized by government sources. Moreover, 
note that because benefit incidence studies do not take into account the revenue side, they tend to overestimate 
the redistributive impact of government health expenditure. In most developing countries, the main sources of 
financing it for the government are indirect taxation, payroll contributions and out-of pocket payments, which 
are all regressive.
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seven countries in Africa shows that the richest 20% of the population receive well over twice as 
much financial benefit than the poorest 20% from all (inpatient as well as outpatient) government 
expenditure (Castro Leal, F., Dayton J., Demery, L. and K. Mehra. 1997). In all but two of the seven 
countries (rural Kenya and South Africa), the richest 20% also gain more than the poorest 20% of the 
population from primary care expenditure. In a study on Indonesia149, Van de Walle (1998) 
concludes that the redistributive impact o f public health expenditure is negligible. Using benefit 
incidence measures, only in Malaysia and in the Philippines public health expenditure seem to be 
pro-poor (Castro-Leal, 2000). In a benefit incidence analysis on India, Mahal et al. (2001) show that 
the public subsidy for health is regressive, with the rich getting almost three times more than the 
poor, as the following figure indicates.
Figure 6.2: Share of the Public Subsidy for Curative Care according to Income Group
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Mahal’s study in India also indicates that different health services are characterized by an opposite 
redistributive impact. By measuring the cumulative benefits o f different services for different socio­
economic groups using a Lorenz curve, Mahal et al. (2001) show that the public subsidy to hospital
149 Note that even if benefit incidence analyses in Asia show less unequal distributions than in Africa, the share 
of public expenditure over the total is on average much lower in the former than in the latter continent. A 
larger share funded by private out-of-pocket payments entails a larger burden on the poor, and overall health 
benefits more skewed in favour of the rich.
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care (inpatient and outpatient) is more pro-rich than the subsidy to outpatient care provided by 
primary health care facilities (PHC) 15°, as the following figure shows:
Figure 6.3: Subsidy Benefits Concentration Curve by Type of Care
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The disproportionate use by the wealthier segments o f society is due to better information, social 
norms more conductive to healthy behaviours (such as use of preventive services) and other demand 
side differences across socio-economic groups (see Annex 4.1). Hence, even if a new health program 
or service were to be made universally available (so that the poor would not suffer from higher 
financial barriers to entry, or need to travel longer distances), in general the rich would still end up 
utilizing the service more than the poor (see, for example, evidence on change in service utilization, 
after the introduction o f a new Maternal and Child health (MCH) program in Ceara, Brazil, presented 
by Tendler and Freedheim, 1994). However, the higher utilization by the rich is also due to:
150 Within hospital care, inequalities across socio-economic groups are stronger for rural than for urban 
populations, suggesting that in India the rural poor cannot access hospital care. Also, stark differences exist 
across Indian states. Kerala is the only state with a pro-poor record for curative services. In three states, 
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, distribution of curative services is not statistically different from 
equality, whereas in all other states benefits’ distribution is strongly pro-rich, particularly in North and North 
East India (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar).
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1) an uneven geographical distribution of public expenditure, health facilities, human resources and 
other inputs, which are concentrated urban and wealthier areas;
2) high user-fees (for the most part informal or under-the-table (see Chapter 8) for services provided 
in public facilities.
1. For example, in Bangladeshw and Karnataka, India, the more developed districts receive a 
higher share o f government total expenditure on health, as illustrated in Case Study 6.1.
Case stu d y  6.1: D istribution  o f hea lth  b en efits  in  B angladesh  and in  
Karnataka, India
A measure of general development is provided by the Human Development Index, which incorporates infant 
mortality, literacy, and GDP per capita into a single index (1 is the highest level possible, 0 the lowest). UNDP 
computed HDIs for each district in Bangladesh (UNDP, 1996). The relationship between the HDI and public 
spending per capita is illustrated in the figure below. The general trend suggests that districts with weaker 
development, as measured by the HDI, receive lower funding by the Government.
Figure 6.4: Relationship between Human Development Index and Public spending per Capita
in Bangladesh (1 BTaka = US$ 0.025-0.030. Bangladesh 1999-2000)
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A Public Expenditure Study in the state of Karnataka, India (2004) found similar results. The study indicated 
that in per capita terms the Government of Karnataka was giving more to relatively more developed districts 
relative to underdeveloped districts. As Figure 6.5 indicates, the trend marginally improved over time but in 
2002 still wide disparities persisted.
Figure 6.5 Per Capita Health Expenditure in constant prices in 9 Districts
□  Total of 2 Dev Dist 69.02 67.24 57.57 66.73 58.35
■  Total 3 Med Dist 44.19 51.99 47.65 51.48 48.99
□  Total 3 Un dev Dist 35.57 41.22 38.63 44.04 40.08
Year
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Source: Public Expenditure Review, Health Sector, GoK, 2004
2. Most poor and middle income countries do not perform well also in terms of financial
protection, particularly against health related catastrophic expenditures. In most poor 
countries OOP payments constitute the principal source of financing for health care services
(see Chapter 8). For example, in India they are estimated to contribute up to 80 percent of
the total financial resources for health care. A recent study found that nearly 25 per cent of 
those hospitalized fell below the poverty line because of huge medical costs (World Bank, 
2001). Most o f these payments go to private facilities and providers, but there is also 
evidence o f a significant level o f OOP payments for services received in government 
facilities, some o f which are unofficial and are not recorded as user-fees revenue. The 
analysis o f the NSS data (1995-96) indicated that nearly 23 per cent of the people 
interviewed in rural areas cited financial reasons for not availing treatment from government 
health care unit. This percentage was only 15 per cent in 1986-87. Such high prices 
discourage a wider utilization o f inpatient services.
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The inequalities analyzed here for public services in utilization o f services across socio-economic 
groups, because o f demand factors, the uneven geographical distribution o f facilities and the high 
OOP payments associated with seeking care (legal user fees or, more frequently, illegal informal 
payments), are starker in private health care services. These services are almost exclusively financed 
by OOP payments in low income countries, or private health insurance, in high income countries. 
Everywhere, higher quality private services, particularly in urban facilities and from formally 
qualified specialists, are extremely expensive and not accessible for the poor. For example, in 
Karnataka India, the average price for medical services paid per episode o f hospitalization was found 
to be equal to Rs. 3,291 in a public facility, and Rs. 13,313 in a private facility, according to a health 
utilization and expenditure survey done by the Government o f Karnataka. Similar results, with 
private services costing 4-5 times more than public services, were found in a recent survey in 
Bangladesh (World Bank, 2005). Thus, even if and where public health expenditure is pro rich, the 
poor still rely on the public sector more than any other socio-economic group, particularly for 
essential services, such as deliveries and immunizations. By looking at immunization, attended 
deliveries and other services, Gwatkin (2000b) shows that the negative outliers in terms of 
distribution of utilization are countries such as Turkey and Morocco, which mainly rely on private 
financing and provision. This is illustrated by Mahal et al. (2001) for institutional deliveries in the 
case of India.
Figure 6.6: Distribution of Institutional Deliveries per 1,000 Births in Public and Private
Facilities According to Income Quintile
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Finally, note that the evidence concerning the distribution of health care leads to different 
conclusions in industrialized countries. These countries achieved a fairly even distribution of the 
financial burden and of utilization rates across socio-economic groups, although there are still 
pockets of under-served poor. Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 2000 look at the distribution across 
income groups of utilization and need-adjusted utilization rates across 10 European countries, plus 
the USA. Their paper highlights the following results:
• Utilization of all services is pro-poor in high income countries. Hospital use, which is pro­
poor everywhere, influences this result. However, for some of the countries utilization 
patters are not significantly pro poor.
• Utilization rates become less pro-poor and even moderately pro-rich once we take into 
account of increasingly precise indicators of need (need-adjusted utilization rates). Van 
Doorsaler et al. utilize age, sex, self-assessed health status (SAH) measures and a vector of 
chronic conditions to adjust for need.
• Utilization is pro-rich for outpatient specialist care. The existence of a GP gate-keeper role 
does not seem to influence the rate of specialist visits, which remain pro-rich even in 
countries such as Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, where patients do not have direct 
access to public specialist visits.
• The presence or absence of universal public health insurance does not seem to significantly 
influence the distribution of utilization rates. The US and Switzerland do not emerge as 
outliers, and in outpatient care show similar pro-rich results as countries such as Sweden and 
East Germany, characterized by universal insurance.
• For 6 countries, it has been possible to separately analyze GP visits. These turn out to be 
evenly distributed everywhere, but in Belgium and in Ireland, where they are pro-poor. It is 
not possible to determine whether the pro-poor distribution in Belgium and Ireland depends 
on the exemption of poorer individuals from outpatient care co-payments or from other 
confounding factors.
• During the 1990s inequalities seem to have been widening in some rich countries (for the 
UK, see: Report of Health Inequalities, 1998). The increasing health inequalities are 
generally ascribed to the rising income and other socio-economic inequalities, and not to 
health system’s specific variables.
172
6 .4  W h at Is th e  M eaning o f  an  E qu itab le  D istr ibu tion  o f  
H ealth  an d  H ea lth  B en efits?
In general, the literature on equity and health has taken a strong egalitarian position151, refuting 
market allocation mechanisms as a benchmark to follow for health services, and advocating a strong 
role for the government to re-equilibrate the distribution of resources for health care, both across 
countries and within each country in favour of the poor and those in more need. In the measures 
more widely utilized in this literature, such as the concentration index, any departure from the state 
of perfect equality in the distribution of resources for health is considered as inequitable. In assessing 
how much additional care over and above what the individual could him/herself afford or choose, 
this literature has presented several principles of equity, based either on equality of access, or 
equality of utilization, or (re)distribution of health care treatment according to need. In the following 
section we briefly present these principles.
By contrast, a minority position within the literature claimed that the extent of market correction and 
of individual protection should be limited to a minimum also in the health care sector. In poorer 
countries this minimum would include essential services such as maternal and child care, perhaps 
some emergency services, but should exclude most other health treatments (World Bank, WDR 
1993). Allocation of resources in the health care sector should be left mainly to individual choices 
and market allocation criteria.152
A more detailed discussion of the assumptions at the basis of these two opposed positions concerning 
equity in health is presented in Annexes 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.
151 For a careful and clear review of the existing measures of health inequalities, both in utilization and 
outcomes, see Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000.
152 For example, proponents of the Public Choice Theory (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977) underscore that it is 
not at all guaranteed that public intervention will achieve more equitable results than markets. According to 
this theory politicians and civil servants are in general self-interested individuals who utilize their public 
offices to consolidate their personal power and wealth, and their decisions hardly reflect their constituencies’ 
welfare.
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6 .5  l£quity in  h ea lth  care. The d iffe ren t e g a lita r ia n  
p r in c ip le s
Equality of access and equality of utilization: According to Le Grand (1982), potential equal 
access to treatment means that individuals should face the same money and time costs for using 
health services. Mooney (1983) also defends this principle, claiming that it is more respectful of 
individual preferences than the principle of equality of utilization or treatment: faced with the same 
costs of accessing treatment, individuals may still choose different levels of treatment. By contrast, 
Olson and Rodgers (1991) argue that equal access actually means that everybody can potentially 
consume the same amount of health services. Hence, opportunity costs must be the same (travelling 
time and other costs included) across income groups, and the poor must be subsidized for their health 
consumption by the rich until their opportunity cost for treatment is equalized. Pushing Olson and 
Rogers’s (1991) argument to its logic conclusion, Le Grand (1991) argues that equality of access 
ultimately requires that Choice (or Opportunity) Sets be the same for all individuals.
Distribution of health care according to need. Another commonly advocated equity principle for 
redistribution of health resources is need.153 This view advocates equal treatment for equal need, and 
that those who are in greater need should come first. The literature has proposed different definitions 
of need. Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) summarise them as:
• need as severity of illness;
• need as ability to benefit;
• need as the minimum amount of resources required to exhaust capacity to benefit.
Each of the above definitions of need leads to different conclusions concerning the equitable 
distribution of health care services. Assuming for the purpose of illustration Quality Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYs) as a measure of the quantum of health that each individual did or could enjoy154, we 
illustrate some of these conclusions in table 6.5.
153 The literature refers to the two principles of horizontal and vertical equity. The two principles were first 
articulated by the Greek philosopher Aristotle: the horizontal equity principle states that equals should be 
treated equally, whereas the vertical equity principle states that those who are unequal should be treated 
differently. Applied to health provision they are usually translated in the principle that access or use of health 
services should solely be based on need, and independent of socio-economic condition or of any other non­
need related characteristic (such as gender). Applied to health financing they are usually translated in the 
principle that contribution to funding of health services should be in direct relationship with one's ability to 
pay.
54 The principle limitation of QALYs is that they attempt to measure quality of life on the basis of “expert”
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Table 6.5: Equity and (re)distribution of health resources
Item Retrospective health Prospective health
Health from health care Previous QALYs gained from 
health care
Expected QALYs benefit from 
health care
Health not from  health 
care
Previous QALYs enjoyed 
without health care
Expected QALY profile 
without health care
According to the ability to benefit exception of need, in this example we would advocate the criteria 
on the top-right cell to distribute health services. Equity would demand that expected QALY gains 
be equalized across individuals. The perspective is forward looking and would give priority to those 
most able to benefit from health care. There are two exceptions of the notion of “capacity to 
benefit”. One is to consider “marginal capacity to benefit (MCB)”. Equalizing MCB across 
individuals is the principle that maximizes incremental health benefits from health care. This is the 
most straightforward and widely used efficiency principle in health economics, but it is also 
sometimes advocated as an equity principle in the literature. In fact, it can lead to extremely 
inequitable choices, whenever those who are marginally more able to benefit (and should then come 
first according to this principle) are also the wealthier, healthier, or both.155. A second exception is 
Culyer and W agstaff s (1993) “minimum amount of resources required to exhaust capacity to 
benefit”. By these means, a consideration of severity of illness is indirectly phased in the definition 
of need as capacity to benefit, and the results obtained are in general more egalitarian than by just 
considering marginal capacity to benefit (see Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993).
However, equity criteria based on an exception of ‘need’ different from ‘capacity to benefit’ are 
possible as well, and they are indeed frequently preferred by individuals and households, when asked 
about priority setting criteria. In Sweden, for example, care for chronically, terminally ill and 
severely handicapped patients which ranked extremely low in terms of cost-effectiveness criteria 
were found to be popular and classified as ‘essential’ care in all household surveys that were 
conducted to inform the government on people’s preferences. 156 Choosing the bottom-right cell,
opinion, which can be arbitrary. The welfare (subjective) assessment of benefits, as well the social evaluation 
of health gains, may be totally different from any “objective” measurement of health gains.
155 This criterion ominously recalls principles originally proposed by Herbert Spencer. Spencer (1820-1903), a 
British sociologist, first applied Darwin’s theory of evolution to the study of human societies. According to his 
views, individuals who contribute more to a society and those who are more fit should be preferred over the 
others.
l56Swedish Parliamentary Priorities Commission, "Priorities in Health Care: Ethics, economy, 
implementation", Fritzes, Stockholm, 1995.
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where need is interpreted as severity of illness, priority is given to those who would be more severely 
ill (would enjoy the “least number of QALYs”), without care, regardless of their ability to gain extra 
health as a result of this care or their ‘objective’ capacity to benefit.
Another principle would be to use the same criteria accepted for education, where everybody is 
given a set amount of free services (equality of inputs), and every extra is given according to merit, 
or it is fully paid for. In the case of health, one should then equalize care received across individuals. 
Alternatively, one could try to equalize health benefits, or QALYs gained from subsidized care157 
over the life cycle, and choose according to the criterion in the top-left cell, Table 6.5, column 2. 
Finally, one might want to bring in considerations linked to the age or the past health condition of 
potential beneficiaries and give priority to the young or to the disabled (those who have enjoyed the 
least QALYs without health care), according to the criterion in the lower-left cell of Table 6.5, 
column 2.
Referring back to the discussion of the trade-offs in Chapter 4, note that all of these equity-motivated 
criteria, with the exception of the marginal capacity to benefit-based redistribution principle, also 
conflict with any possible effectiveness principle, which would tend to put resources first where the 
link between inputs and outcomes can be stronger. In other words, there is in general a trade-off 
between distributing resources for health care to maximize gains in health outcomes, and to achieve 
greater equity (equity-efficiency trade-off).
All of the above discussion should suggest how complicated any equity assessment is. By adopting 
any of the above principles-and consequently a different measure of equity or inequity-, one is lead 
to diverging equity assessments of any given distribution of health or health care resources, or of any 
given change in such distribution. Case study 6.2 below illustrates a concrete example from Ecuador.
Case study 6.2: The equity impact of social health insurance in Ecuador
Waters (2000) estimates the equity impact of a new social insurance program which covers health services for
formal sector employees in Ecuador, and of a plan for its extension to self-employed or to the workers’ 
dependants. He points out that many of the measures currently used to measure “inequity” (see for example, 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000) negatively asses any departure from a state of perfect equality in health 
status or in need-adjusted utilization of health services, without consideration for the “levels” of care achieved
157 The issue here is not to decide priorities starting from a situation where no services are available; rather, to 
evaluate how much additional care should the state allow an individual to receive over and above what he/she 
could afford to pay for.
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by the different groups. Thus, the measures of inequity generally adopted in the literature imply that any pro- 
rich departure from a state of perfect equality is inequitable, even if the poor are positively affected. By using 
two of these “egalitarian” measures of equity158, the concentration index and the Atkinson distributional 
measure159, Waters (2000) shows that distribution of utilization of health services in Ecuador was already pro- 
rich, and it was made even more inequitable by the new social insurance program. The new program would 
still be an adverse impact on equity even if were extended to dependants or self-employed. The benefits of the 
social health insurance program would still be regressive, although less so in case the program were extended 
to the self-employed or to dependants.
However, Waters also considers an alternative view of equity, according to which an intervention that 
improves coverage for the poorer members of society could be considered as equity-enhancing, even if 
increased the level of overall variability in health benefits across the population. As a third measure of 
“inequity” in line with this second view of equity, Waters proposes a weighted welfare function, where the 
utilization of services by the poorer quintile is weighted more than for the second-poorer quintile, etc. Using 
this other measure of the degree of inequity in the distribution of health benefits, Waters shows that equity 
would be unequivocally enhanced by the social insurance program, particularly if the benefits were to be 
extended to the self-employed or dependants. In conclusion, he shows how different notions of equity in the 
distribution of health benefits can be translated into different measures, and how these would lead to a different 
evaluation of the impact on equity of the same interventions.
6 .6  E quity . T heory versu s P rac tice
If we compare the concrete evidence on the distribution of health and health benefits in developing 
countries presented in the first sections with the above conceptual discussion, the contrast between 
the two is palpable. The conceptual literature on health and equity was developed mostly in Western 
Europe, and risks of being irrelevant to judge the situation in poorer countries. For example, much of
158 Let us briefly explain a general formulation of the existing measures of inequity, based on the measurement 
of inter-group or inter-individual differences in access to health. If Hs is a measure of access or health status of 
socio-economic group i, where i= l,...J  ranks individuals or groups in increasing order according to their 
socio-economic status (for instance, their income or expenditure), the degree of inequity is measured by a 
direct function f  of the rich-poor differences: Inequity = f  [ X i  X j  ( H j - H j )] with j>i. In the need-adjusted 
measures based on utilization of services, the above formula is replaced by: Inequity. = f  { X i  X j [ ( H j  | N j ) -  ( H j  
I n , ) ]  j>i }, where H j  is a measure of utilization of services and N ,  is a measure of health need (for instance, 
self-reported health status) for socio-economic group i. Paradoxically, using such measures of inequity, a 
scenario where no person in need could receive any health care would be considered more equitable than a 
scenario where the poor receive good care, but inferior to that received by the rich.
159 The Atkinson distributional measure evaluates the total welfare loss from an unequal distribution of 
utilization of health services.
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the above conceptual literature on health and equity is centred around accessibility problems, in a 
sense giving for granted that health services, once made accessible for all, would also be of 
acceptable quality standards. By contrast, by looking at the evidence from developing countries we 
saw that the quality dimension of services is of great importance (see Chapter 4, section 4.3). 
Government health services may be in theory accessible to (almost) all, but they are of such abysmal 
quality particularly in the peripheral and poor areas that in reality very few utilize them. In these 
settings, a focus on equality of treatment, or equal treatment for equal need is more appropriate than 
just focusing on accessibility.
Second, in analyzing how the current distribution of health and health care benefits can be concretely 
made more equitable in poor countries, one has to take into account their political economic, 
institutional and managerial constraints, which are much tighter than in industrialized countries. For 
example, all the above criteria advocate that priorities ought to be set among individuals and not 
services, but at best what a government can do in a poorer country is to reprioritize across services 
rather than individuals, either because of the political or technical impossibility to exclude the non- 
poor from publicly subsidized services160, or because of the impossibility of assessing people’s socio­
economic status or need for health services. Considering these political-economic constraints, some 
claim that the best strategy to reduce health inequalities would in fact be to expand the scope of 
universal programs. However, the “mapping” from services to individuals is far from perfect. As 
section 6.3 pointed out, without any explicit targeting of the poor, most of the health benefits end up 
being captured by the better off.
6 .7  RAP R eform s: a  review  o f  th e ir  im p a c t
In this section we review the evidence on the impact of the six RAP reforms components introduced 
in Chapter 4, with a particular focus on equity. In doing this we follow the flow of money within the 
system, and we go ‘downstream’, starting from the resource allocation and the priority setting 
components, and then turning to the analysis of the purchasing and payment system components, and 
finally the supply and demand side incentive mechanisms to improve coverage of essential health 
services (see Figure 4.1).
160 For example, it may be impossible to enforce the provision of a basic package of services exclusively for the
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6.7.1 Reforms of the Resource Allocation Criteria
According to Rice and Smith (2000), the main motivation driving those changes has been the 
achievement of tighter cost-control, but the new RA criteria have in fact also introduced a greater 
transparency and equity in the distribution of public funds. The capitation formula has been in 
several cases complemented to take into account the relative health needs of different segments of 
the population. Some services deemed essential were also often ‘top-sliced’ (assigned to national 
vertical programs before allocation of the rest to lower levels), and not included in the RA 
formula161. In some countries the RA formula has been corrected to take into account both individual 
(such as age and gender), as well as social and geographic factors positively related to need for 
health care services. For instance, the RA formula implemented in the ‘90s in Stockholm, Sweden, to 
distribute funds across different health authorities in different neighbourhoods, included age and 
gender of the resident population, housing tenure, marital and employment status, as well as previous 
utilization of health services in the computation of the capitation formula.
The experience from industrialized countries, such as the UK or Sweden, suggests that:
a. Population and need based funding creates a great opportunity to equilibrate distribution of 
resources across regions and districts.
b. Devising a gradual, smooth transition process to the new regime, so that the ‘losers’ in the 
redistribution process have the opportunity to adjust and the ‘winners’ to develop new 
planning capacity is a key but problematic issue. In this respect, in the UK, the Resource 
Allocation Working Party (RAWP) approach is widely perceived as a success. In the ‘70s a 
new capitation-based funding was adopted, which lead to a progressive rebalancing of the 
distribution of resources across the country, by assigning any real growth in the budget to 
under-resourced areas. Previously, the Southeast region and London had received a 
disproportionate share of the total. The transition period was set up so that if a region was 
over-resourced its budget could be cut by 2.5% maximum per year, whilst if a region was 
below target, it could receive an additional maximum funding equal to 5% per year.
poor, because doctors and other government health workers would not deliver it.
161 For instance the share going to services belonging to the Basic Benefit Package (see following section), or 
that going to tertiary care and teaching hospitals.
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Relatively few of the developing countries implemented reforms of their resource allocation criteria 
comparable to Sweden or the UK, while the majority of them continued to allocate public resources 
across regions, districts and health plans on a historical-incremental basis, with some adjustments 
through political negotiation. However, RA reforms were introduced in a number of countries in 
Latin America, Asia and even Africa.
In Latin America, countries that introduced significant changes in the resources allocation criteria, 
by introducing capitation-based financing, include Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.162 
In all these countries, the variables that could be considered to adjust the capitation formula 
according to need were few, because of the lack of population-based data concerning individual and 
social circumstances as well as utilization of services. However, overall the impact of the new RA 
allocation mechanisms was positive and significant.
In Colombia, the government introduced a new RA mechanism based on a capitation formula for 
districts and municipalities, and adjusted it according to the share of the poor in each municipality 
and the fiscal effort at the local level. Brazil adopted a population and need-based formula to 
determine transfers to the states earmarked to finance primary care infrastructure, equipment and 
other capital expenditure (see following case study).
Case Study 6.3: Resource allocation criteria for capital expenditure in 
Brazil163 (Musgrove, 1996)
In Brazil, the formula used to decide the extent of capital investment resources given to each state was 
specified as a weighted average of the state’s share of the total population, and an indicator of the relative 
health need of the state vis-a-vis the country as a whole. The formula was specified as follows (Musgrove, 
1996, p. 3):
Fe/F = a(Pe/P) + (l-a)(Xc/X), where e refers to a particular government level, which, in the Brazilian example, 
was the state level (Estado); F is the investment, or other funds to be pre-allocated; P is population; X is a 
synthesis indicator of need for additional investment, beyond that associated with population alone (ZX,.=X; 
Xe>0;); a, where 0< a <1, is the weight given to the population, as opposed to that assigned to the need 
indicator Xe.
162 Baeza and Cabezas (1999) provide a throughout analysis of the experience with prospective funding and 
risk-adjusters in Latin America.
163 Source: Musgrove 1996 HRO Series, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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Initially X was computed simply as the inverse of total recurrent public expenditure in each state (labelled Ge 
for ‘gasto '), based on the assumption that where little was spent there was a greater need of further 
investment, and on the lack of data that could be used as alternative measures of need. However, using total 
recurrent public expenditure instead of per-capita expenditure, led to grossly overestimate ‘empty’ states’ 
need. For example Amapa, which accounts for 0.21 percent of the total Brazilian population, received about 
eight times more than it would have received based on population alone. Later on, relative recurrent 
expenditure per capita replaced total expenditure in the computation of X e.
The primary aim of the above prospective formula has been to achieve greater cost-control over local 
spending, to bring greater transparency, and to reduce inequities in capital investment across sub-national 
units. States such as Parana, which used to receive a disproportionate share of total capital expenditure had 
their share reduced to the benefit of the poorer states located in the North and Northeast.
In Chile, the government created a Municipal Common Fund (MCF), which is a horizontal 
equalization fund that receives up to 60 % of the wealthier municipalities’ own-source income and 
redistributes it to the poorer municipalities on the basis of a per capita formula. The formula took 
into consideration the percentage of people living in rural areas, as well as the municipalities’ 
capacity to generate their own revenue. As table 6.6 shows, the fund has significantly contributed to 
decreasing variability in per capita funding across different municipalities (the ratio of total public 
health expenditure per capita in the wealthiest to the poorest municipalities was reduced from 2.2 in 
1991 to 1.6 in 1996 [Bossert 2000])
Table 6.6: The Im pact of the Municipal Common Fund in Chile
Income before MCF Income after MCF
Average 24,646 40,823
Variation coefficient 17,437 30,984
Gini coefficient 0.45 0.30
Source: Bossert, 2000b
Chile also provides an interesting example of how the capitation formula can be complemented by 
other funding mechanisms to support specific initiatives at the local level and to achieve specific 
pro-poor impact. The government utilized Matching Grants, piloted in the District of Nuble 
(Bossert, 2000b), to channel local funds towards government priorities164. In Nuble the Matching
164 With a matching grant, the agreement between the central and the local government is the following: if the
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Grant instrument was used to finance a program intended to fight poverty in the area by providing 
new services of public utility, education, as well as health services. The central government covered 
about 60 percent of the total costs of the project, and the local government the rest 40 percent. 
Bossert (2000b) reports that the impact on the poor was positive.
Resource allocation reforms have also been undertaken in South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. In 
these countries, the implementation of the new resource allocation formula was not without 
difficulties, and progress has been uneven. In Zambia a new population-based formula was 
implemented in 1994, with some crude adjustments to reflect cost and need indicators. The absence 
of a fuel station or a bank was used as a proxy for underdevelopment, and districts received an extra 
weight where these facilities were missing. Subsequent research (Lake, Mtonga, and Nakamba 
2002) showed that the correlation between these first crude need indicators and more sophisticated 
measures of relative deprivation (derived through principal components analysis) was significant, 
and that other simple indicators such as population density and remoteness could explain most of the 
provinces’ relative deprivation. One key issue that hindered the impact of the new population and 
need-based formula in Zambia was that a large share of the total public health expenditure was “top- 
sliced” to fund tertiary care facilities, concentrated mainly in Lusaka.
In South Africa, which before 1994 had one of the more inequitable health systems in terms of 
resource allocation (McIntyre and others 2000), in the immediate post-Apartheid period there was a 
strong political commitment in favour of a radical shift of resources away from the relatively 
prosperous areas and toward the poorer provinces, mainly in the Northern and Eastern parts of the 
country. The allocation to the poorest Northern province was expected to increase from between 6 
and 7 percent of the total share to 15 percent over a five-year period, while funds for Gauteng 
province were to decline from 25 percent to between 17 and 18 percent, a significant reduction in 
real terms. Moreover, 30 percent of this shift was expected to occur in the first year. Not surprisingly 
the above targets proved impossible to achieve: Gauteng received extra support in the short term and 
the Northern Province was unable to absorb the additional funds effectively. Also, the devolution of 
powers to the provincial governments (which started to receive a block grant without specific 
allocation to health, and had different spending priorities) and the new macroeconomic policies 
(which were characterised by restrictive fiscal policies in the 1990s) hampered the plan to increase
latter endorses a specific program proposed by the former, and it is willing to contribute a portion of the total 
cost of the new program, the central government assumes the responsibility to cover the rest.
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expenditure in health care and other social services in the poorer provinces (Gilson and others 1999, 
McIntyre and Gilson, 2002).
This brief presentation of the RA reforms indicates that the new population and need-based RA 
funding formula are capable of achieving a strong, positive impact on geographical equity (Bossert, 
2000 and Pearson 2002).It also suggests that there is a great potential for further expanding 
population and need-based RA formula, and for using more articulated risk-adjusters to pursue 
equity priorities. As a first step to develop RA formula, up-to-date demographic census data would 
suffice. In fact, the experience in Zambia (Lake et al., 2002) shows that significant progress can be 
made simply with reasonable census data on population and age/sex breakdowns, plus some proxy 
indicators of deprivation. Then, a need-based RA formula would require information on the 
following variables165:
1. Standardized Mortality Rates;
2. Morbidity measures;
3. Share of population in poverty;
4. The amount of other funding sources, for instance of donors’ expenditure in each sub 
national unit.
Data on the above variables are at least partially available in middle-income countries, but are rarely, 
if ever, present in low income countries. Thus, more sophisticated formulae can be more sensitive to 
health needs, but they are too demanding for low income countries166.
The existing experiences suggest that a number of preconditions must be met in order to support the 
implementation process of the new population and need based RA criteria:
• Government’s funding must be a non-negligible part of total health funding, and the government 
can decide how to allocate geographically.
• Supporting changes and improvements in overall planning procedures need to take place, 
particularly those related to personnel and capital planning and management167. Adequate 
information systems must be developed to guarantee access to timely and reliable data.
• There must be basic capacity to regulate financial flows - i.e. to ensure the resources get to the 
intended destination, and reach the intended beneficiaries.
165 It is important that all the variables used in the RA formula cannot be influenced by the level of government 
receiving the funding.
166 RA formulae can and should then be updated as necessary and when new data become available.
167 The RA formulas should be reflected in a ‘medium term expenditure framework’ and in national 
infrastructure development strategies, where they exist, and in long term planning documents.
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Many of the above conditions may not be feasible in the poorest, capacity constrained countries, 
characterized by $3-4 per capita public expenditure for health, and 80-90 percent of total resources 
for health care spent on an out-of-pocket basis. For example, consider the situation in several of the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, where actual releases bear little relation to budgets, flow of funds is 
erratic, doctors, nurses and other key ‘productive factors’ are in fact engaged in different activities 
and away from where the financial flows records suggest, and most of the resources going to the 
health sector are from patients OOP directs payments. In such a context new RA mechanisms would 
not be able to steer incentives towards more effective and equitable objectives.
6 .7 .2  The Priority Setting Com ponent o f RAP Reforms
Several among low and medium income countries during the decade of the 1990s started to define an 
essential health package (BBP, Basic Benefit Package, or ESP, Essential Services’ Package), heavily 
influenced by the methodologies set out in the 1993 World Development Report (WDR). However, 
in the majority of cases the implementation of the BBP has never passed the preparatory phase, or it 
resulted in some tokenistic change under international donors’ pressure.168
The few existing experiences where BBP-based policies have been really put in place indicate mixed 
results. In several cases essential packages have proven to be vaguely defined, setting out a range of 
services but giving little detail on who is to provide them, how they are to be delivered, how many 
services are to be delivered and to whom. For example, in 1995 the Government of Georgia 
introduced a new rationing policy inspired by the BBP (see Chapter 8). However, the range of 
services included in the BBP (originally only 6 programs) was quickly expanded under political 
pressure. The criteria for inclusion in the list of beneficiaries in the program for vulnerable groups 
(on the 6 programs and the only one where rationing was supposed to be individual and not service- 
based) also became extremely arbitrary. The Government of Georgia plans were never enforced, and 
because of the fiscal collapse of the country informal payments became the prevalent source of 
funding for health services, both for BBP and non-BBP services (see Chapter 8).
168 Bobadilla (1996) presents a review of several National preparatory studies for the definition of an essential 
package of services, based on the analysis of the burden of disease and on the availability of cost-effective 
interventions. He reports that very few of those studies became translated into concrete proposals for
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In theory, the reprioritization of government subsidies to health care should produce a positive 
impact from an equity perspective, increasing the share of the benefits that went to the poor (see 
section 6.3). However, in practice, in designing prioritisation policies countries were inspired largely 
by the cost-effectiveness principle, under the influence of the WDR 1993, which does not at all 
guarantee that health services which address the health needs of the poor with priority, as we 
indicated previously (see Annex 4.1, Chapter 4).169
In West European countries and the USA, in spite of a wide debate on the necessity of rationing or 
reprioritizing public health services because of limited budgets and raising expectations, so far only 
relatively marginal services have been excluded from government financing, such as some mental 
health and rehabilitation services. More significant results and savings have been achieved only in 
containing pharmaceutical expenditure, by defining different categories of drugs subject to different 
reimbursement policies. The experience accumulated so far in several countries and regions (among 
which the more well known are those in the Medicaid Program in Oregon, in Oregon, USA, in 
Sweden, and more recently, the UK) also indicates that exclusively expert-driven, radical 
reprioritization processes are unlikely to be accepted and to succeed, and that articulating new 
rationing policies is a complex political process that is likely to succeed only if it done gradually, 
involving all major stakeholders from the outset. Prioritization policies have been more successful 
when they were based on existing patterns of expenditure, and proposed realistic changes at the 
margin.
6 .7 .3  P urchasing/contracting reforms
In discussing the impact of purchasing reforms, it is useful to distinguish the cases where the 
purchaser is: a) a public agency (a social insurance agency or a sickness fund); b) a group of general 
practitioners; c) a private insurer.
Public Agency (Social Insurance agency or Sickness Fund)
Several countries characterised by universal health insurance, or striving to achieve it, in 
implementing the purchaser-provider split, entrusted new social insurance or sickness funds with the
reprioritization of government services, and even fewer of these proposals were actually implemented.
16 When the focus is shifted from services to people, cost-effectiveness and equity motivated reprioritization 
policies do not lead to equal results, because those that are (marginally) more able to benefit (and should then 
come first according to cost-effectiveness) are generally the wealthier and/or those already in better health.
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purchaser role (see Chapter 4). These countries included the UK (GP Fund holding scheme), the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Georgia, Chile and Colombia in Latin America. The “public” purchasers 
were partially separated from government, and in some case were allowed to directly compete for 
patients (for example in the Czech Republic).
The evidence available indicates that reforms achieved mixed results. On the one hand, they 
contributed to build new managerial capacity, produced some competition, and possibly greater 
quality and more transparency (see below). On the other hand, the need to allocate money to sustain 
the newly created funds diverted scarce resources from other more urgent and productive utilization. 
In addition, where competition was introduced, there is indication of cream-skimming of patients. To 
limit these effects, reforms plans to introduce competition among several health funds and insurance 
companies in countries traditionally characterised by universal social insurance such as Germany and 
the Netherlands, foresaw the creation of a compensatory fund to discourage risk-selection. 
Unfortunately, only demographic criteria such as age, gender and residence, which are poor 
predictors of future health services’ utilization, can be used as risk-adjusters to cross-subsidize 
premiums (see Chapter 2).
In addition, lower income countries still exhibits legal "limbo" in the regulation of health insurance 
(for instance, the absence of a clear bankruptcy law). These limbos, coupled with weaker governance 
and regulatory capacity, may create a situation where financially irresponsible conducts and bad 
management could thrive, as the experience of the Czech Republic demonstrates (se case study 
below).
Case Study 6.4: Competition on the purchaser side? The case of the Czech 
Republic, 1991-2000
In 1991 in Czechoslovakia a new Law, the General Health Insurance Act (ACT 550), shifted health financing 
from the general budget to a payroll tax set equal to 13.5 percent of gross salaries, separated purchasers and 
providers, and create competition on the purchaser side. By 1993,27 new private insurance funds were active 
in the health insurance market, alongside the National Health Insurance (VZP) Company. When the reform 
process was initiated, no explicit discipline for bankruptcy existed and providers were reimbursed according to 
a fee-for-service payment system (a cap had originally been imposed on total expenditure, but it was rapidly 
abandoned under providers' pressure). As a result of the reforms, between 1992 and 1998 per capita health 
expenditure grew in real terms from 5.3 to 7.2 percent of GDP (to 9.2 percent, by also taking into account 
sickness allowances and community level public health programs). In 1995 the first of the newly created 
insurance funds went bankrupt, followed by others. Moreover, as a result of new government regulation
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(setting a minimal number of enrolees, a maximum level of administrative costs etc.) other funds decided to 
merge. By 1998 only 9 insurance funds remained out of the initial 27. In 1995 the National Health Insurance 
Company (VZP) enrolled only 64 percent of the total population. By 1998, the proportion had risen to 80 per 
cent. In the last few years, the extent of public regulation of the insurance market has been substantially 
expanded. It now rigidly disciplines premiums and benefits, and several other aspects. Under such a tight 
regulation, "Insurance funds have the incentive to be more "passive payers" rather than active buyers (Maly, 
1999, p. 4)".
By contrast, where competition among purchasers was not allowed (and only one regional fund was 
created covering the entire population in each district or region), the purchaser reforms did not lead 
to any significant change, or to a rationalization of the delivery system. Many factors contributed to 
this outcome.
>  In some countries, for example in Poland or Georgia, the overlapping of responsibilities 
among the insurance funds, the Ministry of Health, the other Ministries (Finance, Education) 
and the local governments created an uncertain and convoluted governance structure. In 
some cases (ex, in Poland) the government assigned the sickness funds the role of financing 
providers, but maintained or devolved to local governments the ownership of hospitals and 
of polyclinics. The prerogatives of the "funder"(the insurance fund) as opposed to those of 
the "owner" (the central or local government) were never precisely defined. As a result of the 
convoluted governing structure created by the reforms, providers and particularly hospitals 
in practice became non-accountable to anyone (Jakab and Preker, 1999). In the end, in some 
case the sickness funds were “reabsorbed” by the central Ministry of Health, or acted as 
simple “cashers” of the system rather than real purchasers.
>  Moreover, the health financing structure remained very fragmented, both in terms of sources 
of revenue and in terns of power to allocate funds. Sickness funds, financed from payroll 
taxes and social protection contributions, never controlled the majority of sources of revenue 
for health facilities, which remained OOP payments by patients and direct government 
financing. Health care providers that did not receive enough financing -through contracts and 
service agreements- from the sickness funds found a way to be bailed out by the central or 
local governments Allocation of capital expenditure also remained under central 
governments’ control.
>  Finally, absent competitive pressures and accountability mechanisms, in several countries 
the new insurance funds could become as monolithic and consumer-unresponsive as the 
bureaucratic apparatus that they were meant to replace.
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Primary Care doctors as purchasers
In several countries during the decade of the 1990s a new specialty in family medicine was created 
or strengthened, in an attempt to provide more doctors to rural and underserved areas and or to 
reduce costs by restricting access to specialist and higher care. In the latter case, for example in the 
UK or Poland, General Practitioners (GPs) were assigned a gate-keeping role for access to 
subsequent levels of care. Some countries went further and assigned GPs (capitation-based) budgets, 
which they could use them to refer patients to secondary and tertiary care facilities. GPs started to act 
as purchasers of services, and set contracts with service providers. According to the evidence 
available, they were much more innovative purchasers than sickness funds, and lead to improved 
quality of care for their patients (see case study 4.2 in Chapter 4). However, the “purchasing” role of 
GPs has also received severe criticism. The claim is that GP budget-holders under-treated patients 
(see case study below on Poland), and that phenomena of cream skimming and risk-selection 
increased (see first trade-off discussed in Chapter 4). In the 1990s in the USA similar criticism was 
common against Managed Care Organization, which made use of GPs as gate-keepers for specialist 
care.
Case study 6.5: The Polish experience with primary care reform
From January 1999, in Poland each individual primary-care doctor receives an adjusted capitation funding and 
she/he is financially responsible for referrals of patients to most outpatient specialists. At the same time, it is 
compulsory for patients to obtain a referral from their primary care doctor to access specialist care. A similar 
organizational model has been implemented in 1991 in the UK (see Chapter 4). However, while in the UK only 
groups of doctors having at least a minimum number of patients (5,000) were assigned a budget and financial 
responsibility for referrals, in Poland the scheme was introduced at the individual level. In the absence of risk- 
pooling mechanisms, the new referral system creates a strong incentive for primary care doctors to under-treat 
and dump potentially costly patients. Moreover, the only way patients can bypass the cumbersome referral 
system is through emergency admissions. Indeed, in 2000 there was a rapid increase in hospital admissions 
(30-35% increase in one year), immediately after the implementation of the reforms. Tighter regulation and 
limitations to the referral system were subsequently imposed.
Private Health Insurers as Purchasers
In some countries where health financing and provision have traditionally been private, for profit 
health insurers have progressively taken on the role of purchasers, mainly in order to achieve a better 
control over providers and reduce costs. The “purchaser” role emerged either out of a spontaneous
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evolution in the market, or under the pressure of regulatory reforms (see Chapter 4). These 
developments only marginally affected the potential negative effects of competition in the health 
insurance market, which we have extensively analysed in Chapter 2. As we have already seen in 
discussing reforms in Western Europe and Chile (see Chapter 2), the conclusions of the theoretical 
literature seems to be of practical relevance; the evidence shows that competition on the purchaser 
side induces adverse selection and, in the presence of a public insurer of last resort, cream-skimming 
(see discussion of first trade-off in Chapter 4).
Contracting
With the purchaser-provider split, explicit contractual agreements with private or “corporatised” - 
not-for-profit or for profit- providers have become common practice (see Chapters 4 and 5, for an 
explanation of the term “contract”). The three forms of contracts more widely utilized have been the 
following (Loevinsohn, 2001):
• Contracting Out (CO): in which the contractors assumes complete responsibility for service 
delivery, including hiring, firing and setting wages, procuring and distributing essential 
drugs and supplies.
• Contracting In (Cl): where the external contractors are brought in to provide certain specific 
productions inputs, but always within the umbrella of the public health system. NGOs may 
for example be asked to manage the health centres in a particular district, using the logistics, 
drugs and supplies provided by the government. The contractors cannot hire or fire health 
workers, and the use of any surplus is strictly regulated (usually it must be used to improve 
quality of services).
• “Leasing” where an organization offers to manage and finance existing health facilities (e.g. 
an NGO offers to take over and manage poorly performing health centres).
Still very few rigorous studies exist to assess the overall performance of the new purchasing and/or 
contracting arrangements, particularly their impact on equity, and most of the evidence available is 
from non-experimental studies (with no control group) (for Latin America, see the review of the 
evidence by Slack and Savedorf, 2001; for Cambodia, see Mills, 2000). A review by Mills and 
Bloomberg (1998) pointed out that the literature has concentrated more on the promotion of
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contracting policies than on evaluating their results first. Furthermore, performance evaluations are 
often elaborated by the same contractors who are involved in the contract design or implementation.
In synthesis, the available evidence reveals both promising, as well as problematic aspects of the new 
contracting experiences. A study from Cambodia (Bhushan and others, 2002) suggests that 
contracting in and out services to NGOs produced an extremely positive impact on the poor, 
improving coverage and quality of services for lower-socio-economic groups, as the following Table 
6.7 indicates. The benefits were greater for contracted out districts, where government service 
delivery was more expensive ($4.50 per capita, compared with $ 2.82 and $1.5 spent per capita in 
contracted in and control districts), but where private out-of pocket payments were reduced by 27 
percent overall and over 70 percent for the lower socio-economic groups, indicating good targeting 
of beneficiaries.
Table 6.7. Average Change in Service Coverage Indicators in Cambodia (first 2 and Vi years of 
reforms)
Indicator Control
District
Contracted-in Contracted out
Immunization rates-all170 56 82 158
Vitamin A capsule Receipt -all -25.1 18.1 20.9
Vitamin A capsule Receipt -low er 50% 
socio-economic segment of population
-24.1 29.9 23.9
Percent of illnesses Treated in Public 
Health Facility—lower 50% socio­
economic segment of population
81.7 490.5 1096.0
Source: Bhushan and others (2002)
Utilization of curative services in district hospitals by the bottom 50 percent socio-economic group 
increased about twelve fold in contracted out districts, six fold in contracted-in districts and only less 
than double.
The same positive results are reported in local studies which analyzed contracting with not-for-profit 
providers (NFPP) in Bolivia, Bangladesh (nutrition services), and India (TB-DOTs treatment). The 
flexibility in the management of inputs allowed NGOs to improve service coverage, and achieve
170 Baseline immunization coverage was 25.5 percent in contracted out districts (COD), 29.9 in contracted in 
districts (CID), and 34 percent in the control districts (CD). The follow-up survey showed coverage of,
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significant cost savings compared to government standards without compromising quality of 
services. A World Bank analysis by Loevinsohn and Harding (2004) reveals that in India and 
Pakistan, non-governmental entities achieved better coverage of essential services than government 
facilities with similar financial resources. A study of the impact of contracts in South Africa (Palmer 
2001) indicated the importance of maintaining competition among providers, and of defining ex-ante 
the population to be covered by the contract.
By contrast, several other studies have pointed at the significant human capital and information 
systems requirements to specify and to manage contracts effectively (high transaction costs), to be 
contrasted with the limitations characterizing several developing countries (McPake & Banda, 1994, 
Mills et al., 1997, Palmer, 2001, Taylor, 2000, Van Holten, 1998, Vining and Globerman, 1999, 
Waters et al. 2002). From the evidence available, one can say that effectively designing and 
monitoring contracts has proved as demanding as directly managing health services, and that where 
the public sector was not able to effectively ‘row’, it has generally also proved unable to effectively 
‘steer’ independent or semi-independent providers through contracts. Because of lack of funds and 
managerial capacity, absence of competition, and in some cases widespread corruption, contracted 
out services can perform more poorly than government services (Liu et al, 2004). For example, the 
US Medicaid system suffered from different kinds of internal fraud and abuse due to over-billing, 
treatment splitting and other illicit actions by the private practitioners. In Colombia, the contracting- 
out of the administration of the public subsidy for a Basic Benefits Package resulted in the 
registration of many non-existent persons or double-registration thus skimming off public health 
funds for private gains. Countries in which corruption is pervasive will be facing particular 
challenges in this aspect171.
The following case study from Bangladesh illustrates some of the problems encountered in contract 
management.
Case study 6.6: Bangladesh experience with engaging the not-for profit 
sector in delivering nutritional services 172
In Bangladesh, there is an ongoing experience with contracting with NGOs for nutritional and primary care 
services in two large projects, the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project (BINP) and the Urban Primary
respectively, 65.8 (COD), 54.4 (CID), and 53 (CD).
171 For example, in many poor countries, public doctors also work in private practices- often during their 
official working hours, and therefore contracting-out of health services to the private sector could lead them to 
work even less in the public sector during their official hours.
172Source: Loevinsohn (2001).
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Health Care Project (UPHCP). BINP, for example, has contracted with 7 NGOs to provide nutrition related 
services to a population of about 10 million and has been in operation since 1997. Loevinsohn (2001, p .l and 
subsequent pages) reports: “Contract management has been a significant issue under BINP with one NGO 
owed more than $3 million and the other contractors also owed substantial amounts. There have also been 
significant problems with the Government’s procurement and distribution of supplies and equipment, 
particularly in comparison with those materials procured by the NGOs, which have been readily available. 
Field supervision and monitoring by BINP has been problematic. The mid-term review of BINP examined the 
change in nutritional status in 6 project thanas and 2 control thanas as judged by a third party. It appears that 
the decline in malnutrition in project thanas was, at best, only modestly greater than in non-project thanas”.
In conclusion, despite the existence of successful experiences in contracting, particularly in terms of 
improvements in access to health care (see below), valid criticisms persist on the possible impacts of 
such policies, for example in terms of health system equity. Hence, different authors refer to the need 
to generate institutional capacity for negotiating, implementing and monitoring the contracts (Mills 
and Bloomberg, 1998). The experience from industrialized Nations seem to suggest that over time 
contractual relations evolve into long-term relations based on trust; this in turns leads to a decline of 
competitive tenders, and the decreasing importance of prices after the first round of contracting. In 
other words, initial contracting is competitive, but renegotiation is not. Information from the USA 
and the United Kingdom points in the same direction.
6 .7 .4  Paym ent sy s tem s’ reform
This has been one of the reform components that received most attention, and it was assigned a high 
priority in a number of high and middle income countries over the last twenty years. In the first part 
of the ‘90s, several countries (including Italy, Hungary, Czech Republic, Croatia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Thailand and several others) moved from input-based towards case-based PS for hospitals. 
Reformers claimed that the new cost-per-case or fixed price payment system would lead to greater 
efficiency by subjecting providers to a hard budget constraint, and reducing funding for scarcely 
utilized facilities, and would give the incentives for greater patient-responsiveness by implementing 
the principle that “money follows the patient”.
The evidence available on PS reforms is incomplete and not always rigorous, and it is affected by the 
same limitations discussed for the purchasing and contracting component of the RAP reforms. In 
addition, there is almost no information available on the impact of the new PS on the distribution of 
service utilization by different socio-economic groups (impact on equity). Nonetheless, the evidence
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we have on PS reforms suggests that there is no such thing as a unique “ideal” PS, and that 
“institutions matter”. Thus, the empirical evidence on PS points at the existence of trade-offs, 
confirming the theoretical results analysed in Chapter 5. Moreover, an adequate institutional capacity 
and a well-designed and functioning legal and regulatory framework are crucial in determining the 
performance of any PS, and in limiting its potential adverse effects.
Let us briefly summarize here some of our previous theoretical results that are more relevant for the 
analysis of payment systems’ reforms, focusing on the incentives associated with cost-per-case or 
fixed-price payment systems. If we denote by n  the hospital surplus, by x the number of cases 
treated, by p the unit or average payment that the hospital receives, and by c hospital costs, Il(x) = 
p(x)x -c(x), a cost-per-case reimbursement is equivalent to fixing ex-ante the unit price or average 
revenue p. Under this PS, the hospital can increase its surplus either by reducing costs, by treating 
more patients (until price is equal to marginal costs), or by treating more profitable cases, and 
minimizing resources spent on each case treated. Thus, this payment system can either result in 
greater productive efficiency (as in the yardstick competition model, see Chapter 5) and more patient 
admissions, or lower quality and in the extreme case, dumping of patients. In addition, providers 
subject to cost-per-case PS, could try to misreport the existing case mix to increase the payment 
received per unit of service (see model in Chapter 5).
In Former Socialist Countries, where hospital managers had extremely weak control over unit costs 
(mainly because of National laws rigidly disciplining deployment of labour and capital), the new 
fixed-price payments systems generated some efficiency gains such as a reduction in average length 
of stay, but in general they did not contain hospital costs, and lead to significant increases in hospital 
admissions (see following Case Studies).
Case Study 6.7: Reform of hospital payment system  in Hungary
In 1993 Hungary introduced a new payment system for hospitals, which at the time was the most sophisticated 
one in the region, based on the number of discharges according to the DRG classification (Homogen Betegseg 
Csoportok in Hungarian). The new payment system was continuously refined for almost a decade. Despite this 
extensive effort, the new payment system did not generate the results that were expected. There was not any 
significant change in the trend of hospital admissions, which rose from 21.8 to 24.2 per 1000 between 1990 
and 1996 (see Figure 6.); average length of stay decreased from 9.9 to 8 days (a positive result, but in line with 
previous trends), and the share of hospital expenditure over the total remained roughly constant. The national 
case-mix index increased from 0.97 to 1.10 (Dorotinsky, 1998; Orosz and Hollo, 1999). Local administrators
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increased revenues under the new payment system by increasing hospitalisation and by misclassifying patients 
(DRG creep). Finally, between 1991 and 1997, employment in the health sector decreased by only 2 percent.
Figure 6.7: Hungary: Impact of Payment Reform on Hospital Sector
1980 1985  1 990  1995 1997
Source: Langenbrunner & Wiley, 1999
6.7 .5  Supply side Incentives in Pro-Poor Health Programmes
As explained in Chapter 4 (sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6), in some countries RAP reforms introduced 
explicit financial and non financial incentives for providers, patients or both to increase utilization by 
the poor or o f specific essential health services primarily consumed by the poor. In Case study 6.7, 
we review the experience on the use o f enabler and incentive schemes to improve coverage and 
outcome of TB treatment, based on Direct Observed Treatment (Weil et al., 2001).
Case stu d y  6.8: The U se o f Provider In cen tives to  Im prove TB Program  
P erform ance173
Tuberculosis (TB) remains a major killer of adults worldwide, only surpassed by HIV/AIDS, with two million 
persons dying due to TB last year and the toll worsening rapidly in some regions, especially Sub-Saharan
173 The case study is an extract from work by A. Beith, R. Eichler, J. Sanderson, D. Weil.
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Africa with the intimate linking of the two epidemics. The poor are hardest hit by TB, given the nature of 
transmission of infection and breakdown to disease, but all income strata are at risk. A proven cost-effective 
strategy to detect and cure TB that is capable of reducing mortality and morbidity even in very poor settings is 
known as Directly Observed Treatment Strategy (DOTS). Among the top challenges faced by DOTS programs 
throughout the world is ensuring that patients are able to initiate treatment quickly, that they stay motivated to 
complete the full course of therapy, and that providers assist patients in this process, as well as provide safe 
and appropriate care.
Recognizing the need to improve DOTS-based TB control programs, several projects have introduced schemes 
that provide incentives to enable and motivate providers and/or patients to pursue DOTS objectives. Some 
incentives are not linked explicitly to performance, but others relate directly to measures of improved 
performance. Examples of the former include providing improved training opportunities for TB workers or per 
diems for service supervision; examples of the latter include providing financial bonuses to providers for each 
infectious patient that completes treatment, or food packages to patients that present regularly to take their 
medicine. Some of the most successful DOTS programs worldwide, such as in China, Peru and Cambodia, use 
performance-linked enablers and incentives. However, the evidence collected so far on these programs is 
largely incomplete. A preliminary survey of the literature on enabler and incentive schemes linked to TB 
control projects indicated that few schemes involved rigorous design, monitoring or evaluation elements, or 
had clear financing and management plans. No evaluation studies focused on incentives in contractual 
relationships between governments and private, for profit or non-profit, providers, and no studies attempted to 
measure the cost-effectiveness of different schemes (plus, among the existing 23 publications only 2 were from 
developing countries). Design, implementation, and impact of incentives schemes for TB treatment seemed to 
vary significantly174 , but that overall they did influence behaviour and lead to improvements in program 
performance. The survey of the existing experiences also showed that there was considerably more concern 
about formal provider schemes than patient-focused schemes. This apparently related to the strong perceived 
potential unintended negative effects on performance in other areas or for future motivation, if resources for 
incentives are no longer available.
Some of the more significant conclusions reached so far are summarized in the following:
i. Problems in motivating providers and enabling patients are important and relevant to effective TB 
control throughout the world.
ii. These problems may especially inhibit access and utilization by poor patients or participation by 
providers working under difficult conditions.
174 Some schemes are clearly defined and tied to measurable actions or results while others are less regularized. 
Some schemes depend on sporadic funding while others are fully incorporated into their program’s annual 
budget. Some are offered by the public sector and others through NGO or private providers.
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iii. Incentives exist for all stakeholders in TB control -  whether they are explicit or implicit. Some of these 
incentives may inhibit good performance and are not aligned with the objectives of TB control.
iv. Even with DOTS implementation, some functional constraints inhibit patients and providers from 
participating fully and effectively. Formal incentives that encourage actions to be in line with DOTS 
norms may improve performance.
v. Enablers and incentives may be appropriate and help improve coverage and cure rates in DOTS 
programs, which have already achieved cure rates of 70% or more. They may not be right to consider if 
fundamental problems of standards, inputs, training and supervision have not yet been at least partially 
alleviated.
vi. Appropriate enablers and incentives may vary considerably depending on underlying epidemiological, 
economic and social conditions, health system structures and capacity. There is likely a continuum of 
approaches that may be effective from specific local measures to standardized national approaches.
There are potentially serious unintended negative effects of enablers and incentives that must be avoided 
through proper design and monitoring.
In some countries Governments targeted the subsidies to improve service coverage for the poor to 
not-for-profit providers (NFPP). For example, in Uganda NFP hospitals run by religious 
organizations have traditionally been close to poor and marginalized groups service beneficiaries, but 
during the 1980s and 1990s they had to significantly raise user-fees, due to financial difficulties 
(raising costs of provision and reduced donations). In 2000 the Government of Uganda decided to 
offer subsidies in exchange for agreements on service provision and price controls. These subsidies 
did allow NFP hospitals to reduce user-fees, and created a positive impact on utilization (see Giusti, 
2000).
In summary, the evidence of the impact of the supply-side incentives is still largely inconclusive, but 
from the evidence that we have it seems that they are increasing utilization of services by the poor.
6 .7 .6  Demand side In centives in  Pro-Poor H ealth Programmes
In other countries subsidies were directly given to the poor and marginalized groups. For example, 
Gortler et al. 1999 and Armstrong et al., 2002 investigated the impact of vouchers for family 
planning and basic care given to sex workers in Nicaragua, and for mosquito nest in Tanzania. Both 
programs were not without difficulties, but they overall lead to significant increases in utilization and 
improved health outcomes. Case study 6.8 reviews the experience in Nicaragua.
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Case study 6.9: Vouchers for reproductive health services in Nicaragua 
(Source: Gorter et al. 1999)
Since 1995 a voucher programme has been operating in Managua, Nicaragua, with the aim of increasing the 
uptake of reproductive health services by female sex workers. Every 3-5 months approximately 1200 vouchers 
(corresponding to the estimated number of sex workers operating at any given time in the city) are distributed 
by fieldworkers and NGOs at prostitution sites. The vouchers entitle the sex workers to free services at one of 
8-10 private, NGO and public clinics, which are contracted to the voucher agency by competitive tender. 
Approved providers must follow a set treatment protocol, and receive training. Contracts are reviewed after 
each round of voucher distribution, and renewed subject to an assessment of quality of care. The clinics return 
the vouchers to the voucher agency, which reimburses the provider an agreed fee per voucher. The sex 
workers were involved in the design of the programme.
In the evaluation study, in each round of the survey 10% of recipients are interviewed about their experience. 
Initially, sex workers reported that the gatekeepers to care (nurses and receptionists) lacked sensitivity: 
training. Sensitization of this group helped to improve their attitudes towards these clients.
Technical quality of care was also low, and training and treatment protocols were introduced.
While the prevalence of STD is only slightly lower than at the beginning of the project (possibly due to a high 
turnover of female sex workers), incidence of STD among women who have used vouchers more than once 
dropped by 65% in the first three years of the programme. Following a recommendation by the sex workers, 
they now receive vouchers to give to their regular partners and/or clients as well. Sex workers appreciated the 
fact that they could choose which clinic to attend, and made their choice on the basis of distance and 
friendliness. The clinics reported that their main benefit was improvement in the technical quality of their 
services, and that the lessons learned were applied to all of their clients. They felt that their reputation was 
enhanced by being contracted by a prestigious public health agency (the Central American Health Institute).
6 .8  C onclusion
In Chapter 4 we described the principal elements of RAP reforms, and we explained that these 
different elements were likely to produce a distinct impact on the performance of the health system 
in terms of efficiency, equity and quality of services. In this Chapter the focus has been on equity. 
We initially presented the evidence on current distribution of health and health care utilization across 
countries and within each country, which shows striking inequalities between high and low income 
Nations, and between rich and poor in low and middle income countries. Then, we reviewed the 
different equity principles that have been proposed in the literature. Regardless of the notion of
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equity in health that we adopt, the distribution of health outcomes and health care benefits in the 
majority of poor and middle income countries can only be described as abysmally inequitable. By 
contrast, the equity assessment of ongoing RAP reforms is more complicated, particularly when 
these reforms have improved coverage of the poor, but have also increased disparities across 
different socio-economic groups (see case study 6.2; see also discussion of Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4).
In the second part of the Chapter, we have reviewed the empirical literature on the impact of the 
RAP reforms, with a specific focus on equity. We repeatedly underlined that the evidence on existing 
reforms is incomplete, and that ongoing and future reforms need to be subject to more rigorous 
monitoring and evaluation. It is unacceptable that radical health systems reforms -not only in SS 
Africa or South Asia, but also in Central Europe or West Europe- which potentially affected the lives 
of millions of people, have been implemented without any systematic monitoring and without 
rigorous collection of baseline and follow-up information, or a control group, which could allow an 
ex-post rigorous evaluation of their impact. The equity dimension of the reforms has been 
particularly neglected, with hardly any information of the changes in utilization by different socio­
economic groups (a notably exception is Colombia; see Case Study 4.1).
On the basis of the evidence which is available, it is possible to say that the new resource allocation 
formula and the supply and demand subsidies for pro poor programs in general had a positive impact 
on equity, by making the distribution of resources across different parts of any country and among 
different socio-economic groups more transparent, more equal, and in the best cases more need- 
based, and by reorienting public expenditure on services that disproportionably benefit the poor. By 
contrast, the reprioritization reforms were largely irrelevant, and the purchasing and payment system 
components of RAP reforms had either a negligible or a negative impact on equity. Specifically, 
purchasing, contracting and payment system reforms meant to reduce costs, increase efficiency-or 
improve quality of services may in fact have lead to widen quality differentials across services, and 
increase providers’ incentive to cream skim, risk select and under-treat poorer or more vulnerable 
patients. However, in the absence of any solid empirical evidence, the arguments in favour or 
against remain primarily theoretical.
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A nnex 6.1 A ccord in g  to w h ich  c r ite r ia  sh ou ld  resou rces f o r  
h ea lth  ca re  be d is tr ib u te d  am ong in d iv id u a ls?
What does it mean that a certain distribution of health, or health care services, or that a specific 
repartition of the burden for financing health services are equitable or inequitable? In this Annex we 
chose to reconsider the notion of equity starting from basic principles. We believe that attempting to 
present this discussion by broadening our perspective to other sectors and by going back to basic 
principles is useful, for three reasons: a) to provide the means to read with greater awareness the 
assumptions at the basis of the literature on equity in the health sector, equity and reforms, etc.. b) To 
propose in a unitary, synthetic, and hopefully original way several among the most significant 
contributions to the matter of equity and health care produced in the last two decades, which is a 
body of literature not many are familiar with, c) To frame the issue of equity in health care within the 
government versus markets debate. The main points of the discussion are presented here, whilst 
further details are presented in Annexes 6.2 and 6.3.
Since the literature that has analyzed this question specifically focusing on health and health care 175 
draws upon an immense body of literature in economics176, sociology, political science and 
philosophy177, we selectively revisited this body of literature.
The key question we try to address is the following: “According to which criteria should resources 
for health care be distributed among individuals?” First, it is useful to clarify the distinction between 
equity and equality. As Le Grand (1991) correctly points out, the two concepts should be kept 
distinct. Equity, like justice, is a normative concept, whereas equality is an empirical, descriptive
175 Among all the articles and books on the issue of health and equity, I believe two contributions stand out for 
clarity and thoughtfulness, and are thus recommended to those interested in further reading: Le Grand (1991) 
and Culyer and Wagstaff (1993).
176 Le Grand (1991, Chapter 5) provides a clear and insightful review of the main criteria advocated in 
economics, equity as envy-freeness, as equality of income, of utility, or of marginal utility, and as absence of 
rank-reversal.
177 In modem times what characterizes a just or equitable society and a just distribution of resources, assets, 
etc. has been a matter of contention since the early 17th century, when the Iusnaturalist philosophers put equity 
at the centre stage of the philosophical debate. They were so named because they believed in the existence of a 
"Ius Naturalis" a Natural Law, which preceded and was superior to any earthy power. According to such 
Natural Law men were created with some equal non-alienable rights. John Locke (1634-1703) was one of the 
first and more influential Iusnaturalist philosophers. All modem positions based on the notion of human rights 
find their root in the Ius Naturalis philosophy.
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concept. In general, achieving greater equity does not necessarily imply moving towards more 
equality; the opposite may well be true178.
Once the distinction between equity and inequality is clear, the answer to the above question stems 
directly from the analysis of how unequal the distribution of resources for health care is in our 
societies, compared to the “benchmark distribution” that we regard as just. A particular distribution 
is considered inequitable is there is discrepancy between the two and if its causes are amendable.
Hence, the first question to ask is the following: “What would be a just distribution for resources for 
health care? The answer to this question will depend on whether or not we believe that health is a 
fundamental human right (for a further discussion of this point, see Annex 6.2).
In general, the benchmark distribution for any given resource or asset is not perfectly egalitarian, and 
it can be different according to each of us. However, for everything that is considered as a human 
right, matters are different and more straightforward. By definition, individual human rights, unlike 
assets and resources, are inviolable, inalienable (one cannot buy or sell his/her right to vote, or 
his/her right to free speech) and must be equally enjoyed by all. In the literature more specific to 
health, Culyer and Wagstaff (1993), following Sen and a tradition deeply rooted in Europe, claim 
that health ought to be considered as a Positive Individual Right, and thus they conclude that equity 
demands that all equally enjoy it. The same position is echoed in recent official policy documents179, 
and, for certain segments of the population, such as children, in international treaties180. Thus, if 
health is indeed a human right, the answer to our above question is straightforward: resources for
178 Consider the example of a society where everybody is equal in terms of wealth, income, etc.. One may well 
argue that such society is inequitable because individual rewards do not reflect each person’s effort. Then 
increasing equity, as well as efficiency, in such a society would probably require increasing inequality. Note 
that the distribution of all resources, assets, etc is always unequal in our societies, although to a different 
extent. Judging whether this inequality is also equitable or inequitable requires a value judgment based on our 
perception of what would be the ‘fair share of the pie’ that each of us should receive. In general, knowing how 
the pie is divided is not sufficient. An example proposed by Le Grand (1992) describes the situation where 
two sisters, Mary and Anne, receive an equal share of a pie, even if only Mary helped grandmother to bake it. 
In such a situation, giving Mary a greater piece relative to Anne to reward her work would increase equity. 
However, suppose that Anne could not help because she was sick. Then, sharing the pie in half may be just. In 
other words, we cannot judge whether or not a situation is equitable just from information concerning end- 
states (equal or unequal division).
179 See, for example, WHO World Health Report 2000.
180 For instance, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by every country with the exception of the 
United States and Somalia, recognizes health among the fundamental rights of all children (Art. 24).
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health care should be redistributed as much as possible to the benefit of those who currently cannot 
enjoy this right, or cannot enjoy it to the fullest181.
Suppose we do not consider health as a human right. Then, to assess whether the distribution of 
health benefits is equitable or inequitable, one could refer to the criteria utilized for distributing other 
important resources, such as land. Here, all different positions may be ordered along a line, at the 
two extremes of which we find the following two. According to the first, the distribution of assets, 
resources, etc...in our societies is fundamentally just, and those few instances of unfairness are a 
matter of unavoidable chance. Therefore, in order to be just or equitable, any externally imposed 
change must preserve such original evenness. For example, a tax cut needs to be proportional and 
preserve the relative incomes and wealth, or at a minimum not to lead to rank reversal (see Feldstein, 
1976), because that relative income and wealth truly reflect each individual’s relative ‘merit’. 
According to the opposite polar position, our societies and the existing allocation of resources in 
them are fundamentally unjust, largely the fruit of uneven initial conditions, privilege or 
“undeserved” luck182.
Applying the two opposed views to the distribution of health, health resources and services at the 
global level and within each country, one may argue that the existing distribution, which is 
everywhere strikingly in favour of rich countries and of rich people within each country (see 
evidence presented before) is equitable, because access to health services should be part of any 
society’s reward system, or because the existing distribution simply reflects a high income-elasticity 
of demand for health services. Or, taking the opposite view, argue that the existing distribution is 
utterly unjust, because it reflects inequitable privileges and uneven initial conditions.
Rawl’s Theory of Justice (1971) provides an insightful example of the consequences of taking the 
second of the two above positions. Rawls claims that it is not possible to build a theory of justice
181 If we endorse the human rights perspective for health, then equity would demand that health outcomes be 
equalized (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993), which, given the current distribution of burden of disease, would entail 
that the distribution of health inputs should be radically redistributed in favour of the poorer Nations, and in 
favour f the poor in each Nation.
182 For example, considering land-ownership distribution, which is extremely unequal in several countries, 
according to the first perspective one would argue that such distribution is just because it reflects individual 
preferences, effort and marginal productivity, whilst according to the second perspective the current 
distribution is utterly inequitable, the result of privileges consolidated over the course of several generations. 
According to this second view, an equity-enhancing change would demand a radical redistribution of land in 
favour of the land-less and the poor, whilst according to the first one should try not to upset the existing order, 
and just remove impediments to the ‘natural’ exchanges occurring through market interaction.
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based on people’s current position in society, because the latter is arbitrary, and because each 
individual would then choose different guiding principles to maximize her/his own benefit, given 
her/his position. According to Rawls, if instead people could choose under a “veil of ignorance”, 
that is to say without knowing which position they will end up occupying, they would unanimously 
opt for two principles, the first of which guarantees the maximum attainable level of liberties for all, 
and the second of which contains the Difference, or Maximin principle183. Such principle states that 
inequalities may exist if and only if they are to the benefit of the poor. In case of health this would 
imply that we should stop re-equilibrating health care inputs, only when further intervening would 
create a negative impact on the health of the poor.
Note that in our societies assessing how equitable is a certain distribution of any asset or resource 
ultimately requires judging how equitable market mechanisms are in allocating resources. Markets 
and prices perform two main tasks in our economic systems. The first one is to co-ordinate the 
economic behaviour of individuals. By providing signals of the relative scarcities of different 
commodities and assets, market prices are able to achieve allocative efficiency if certain conditions 
hold, as investigated for over one hundred years by economic theory184. However, prices in reality 
perform another task: they ration scarce economic resources among individuals, according to their 
willingness and ability to pay. Given a certain price of a good or service, two individuals, of which 
the first is not willing to pay that price given her preferences and the second is not able to pay that 
price given her wealth and income, are treated in exactly the same way by the market. They are 
excluded from consumption of that particular good or service185. The same logic applies to the 
interaction between countries. If -let us say- access to medicines is regulated by market mechanisms, 
a country who is not interested to introduce a specific drug and another who is not able to pay for it 
are treated in exactly the same way: they are both excluded from consumption of that particular drug.
183 They would choose such second principle out of self-interest and of fear of “later” being destined to occupy 
the place of the most disadvantaged in society. The economist philosopher Harsanyi showed that the 
Difference Principle could be chosen if and only if individuals were extremely risk-averse.
184 If certain conditions are satisfied (among these, price-taking behaviour by individuals and firms, perfect
information, completeness of markets and absence of externalities and public goods), market prices determine 
equilibrium allocations that are Pareto optimal (first welfare theorem).
185 In other words, any of us is able to satisfy any need or preference he/she may develop for any commodity 
constrained by his/her Opportunity or Choice Set, which in our societies is largely determined by our 
“performance” according to market criteria.
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A nnex 6 .2  E qu ity  in  H ealth: The H um an R ig h ts9 P erspective
As we discussed in the previous Annex 6.1, for an equity assessment concerning the distribution of 
any resource or asset in society it is critical to first characterize the “benchmark distribution”. In 
general, the benchmark distribution is not perfectly egalitarian, and it can be different according to 
each of us. However, for everything that is considered as a human right, matters are different and 
more straightforward. By definition, individual human rights, unlike assets and resources, are 
inviolable, inalienable (one cannot buy or sell his/her right to vote, or his/her right to free speech) 
and must be equally enjoyed by all. Thus, perhaps the first question to ask is the following: “Shall 
we consider health as a human right?”
I believe that the critical distinction here is between those that consider as proper human rights only 
the so-called Negative individual Rights, and those that extend the realm of rights to include also 
Positive individual Rights. The former claim that special protection should only be guaranteed to a 
few core rights, such as the right to safety, to freedom of expression, to non-discrimination, etc.186. 
Those are the original human rights that were first articulated in the period of the war for 
Independence in the United States and of the French Revolution187. According to this view, 
governments should protect the above limited group of Negative Human Rights, and for the rest not 
interfere with individuals’ decisions188. More recently, comparable arguments have been forcefully 
re-proposed by the noted American philosopher Nozick (1974), advocate of the so-called Minimal 
State Theory. According to Nozick, what matters to judge over the "fairness" of a society and over 
the allocation of resources resulting from social interaction, is whether or not individuals’ Negative 
Rights have been respected, and whether the "rules of the game" are the same for everybody 
regardless of the initial conditions. Equity is an attribute of the process, and not of the end state.
186 Such rights were considered as "natural", bestowed on each individual by God, first in the 17th century by 
Iusnaturalist philosophers, and then in the 18th century by the Founding Fathers of the U.S.A. and by French 
Enlightenment philosophers. In those times, the government mainly meant "the king", and so those theories 
were actually first meant to protect each person from the arbitrariness of royal power.
187 It is interesting to see how some of the key dividing lines that would subsequently characterize the political 
spectrum up to the present days, described in the text, were already apparent in the interpretation given to the 
ideals of Liberte’ and Egalite' by the different political factions that fought for power in France in the period 
1789-1795.
188 In the period of the industrial revolution, among all the Negative Rights a prominent place was assigned to 
property rights and to the right of free economic initiative.
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On the other hand of the political spectrum are those who claim that it is what each person can 
actually be or do in a specific society that matters, and not so much what the government formally 
allows each of us to be or do. Against a formal view of freedom typical of the Negative Rights 
‘school’, which perceives freedom mainly as the absence of interference from others, the focus here 
is primarily on end-states and Positive Rights. These include such rights as that to adequate 
nutrition, to housing, to education, to health services, to political representation, to the possibility of 
employment, etc. The claim is that a society that respects all Negative Rights may in fact be 
extremely unjust, if it de facto  excludes part of its citizens from the possibility of flourishing as 
individuals because of material constraints189. The typical 19th century Marxist example is that of a 
society that protects Negative Rights, including private property and economic freedom to the fullest, 
but where most people have no choice, but to sell their labour under appalling conditions in order to 
survive. According to this second viewpoint, the answer to the question: “Equality of what?” Is: 
“Equality in Positive Rights and, to an extent, in end-states”.
In development assessments, the shift towards putting people's Positive Rights at the centre came to 
be recognized with the advent of the ‘Basic Needs’ approach (ILO, 1976; Streeten and Burki. 1978, 
Streeten et. al., 1981). This approach emphasizes the priority of meeting the basic needs of people, 
and the content of these needs is seen to include nutrition, health, shelter, water, sanitation, education 
and other essentials (Desai, 1990). More recently, building and elaborating over such theories and 
over Rawls’s 190 "Theory of Justice" (1971), the noted Indian economist and philosopher Amartya 
Sen argued that development should be conceptualized and assessed as peoples’ ability to do things 
that they have a reason to value, what he called the ‘capability’ approach’ 191 (Sen, 1973, 1984, 1985, 
1992). Critical to the capability argument is the notion of human freedom (Sen, 1992, 1999), and 
what characterizes the capability-position is again a peculiar view of freedom. Sen, distancing 
himself from Marx, endorses the ‘intrinsic’ as opposed to the ‘instrumental’ view of freedom (Sen, 
1989). The intrinsic view values freedom for its own sake, whereas the instrumental view considers 
freedom to be important merely because of its significance for other achievements. However,
189 The first to open this perspective on justice was Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788), in his work: ‘The 
Social Contract” (1762). Rousseau imagined that the rules governing a just society must be determined by 
referring to a State of Nature, where individuals still do not know which position they will occupy in society, a 
thesis re-affirmed in modem times by J. Rawls (1971). The first political leaders who referred to Rousseau's 
ideas were the Jacobin leaders, during the revolutionary government in France (1792-1794).
190 Rawls (1971). See discussion of fourth question, hereafter.
191 Sen (1987) argues that a person’s well being is characterized not only by the state (functioning) in which a 
person lives or is living, but also by the existence of a range of alternative states from which the person can 
choose (capability). In empirical studies, it turns out that it is in fact extremely difficult to distinguish between 
capabilities and achieved functionings.
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distancing himself also from the Negative Rights tradition, Sen specifically proposes that 
assessments be based on the ‘positive-intrinsic’ type of freedom. Thus, Sen’s reply to the question: 
“Equality of what?” is: “Equality of capabilities across individuals in society” (Sen, 1993)192. For 
equity-based social assessments dealing with developing countries, Sen proposes a freedom-based 
examination of the level and distribution of relatively elementary, yet important, capabilities, of 
which health is a key component.
The question: “Equality of what?” and the distinction between the Negative and the Positive Rights 
‘schools’ of thought is so important because the broader is the set of Positive Rights that society is 
prepared to protect, the more the government must encroach upon individual’s Negative Rights in 
order to do so. In other words, moving towards more equality over some dimensions, in general 
requires moving away from it over some other dimensions. For example, increasing the range of 
social entitlements to fulfil Positive Rights may entail restricting individual economic freedom, or at 
least some individuals' faculty to spend their money in the way that they see fit. Or, imposing to 
individuals a level of utilization of health services compatible with achieving the right to health 
would entail violating consumer sovereignty193.
Vice-versa, respecting individual preferences would entail violating equality in utilization of health 
services, and even more equality in health, because, given that demand income elasticity is greater 
than one for health services, without government intervention we would expect higher utilization and 
also a higher share of income spent on health services among the rich than the poor. In synthesis, 
there are trade-offs between different values and we, as members of society, are called to choose 
among them. For human rights, we should aim for equality of outcomes, whereas for other 
dimensions inequalities and, given the pervasiveness of trade-offs, indeed ‘trade’ between conflicting 
aims is to be accepted.
In the literature more specific to health, Culyer and Wagstaff (1993), following Sen and a tradition 
deeply rooted in Europe, claim that health ought to be considered as a Positive Individual Right, and 
thus they conclude that equity demands that all equally enjoy it. The same position is echoed in
192 Sen’s thesis has also been widely used by the UNDP for its ‘human development’ agenda See the collection 
of papers in UNDP (1997). Also see Anand and Sen (1994a, 19946,1995).
193 Given the influence of all the other socio-economic determinants, achieving equal health expectancies 
across socio-economic groups would actually entail forcing a disproportionate use of services by the poorer 
members of society (see Annex 1).
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recent official policy documents194, and, for subsets such as child health, in international treaties195. 
Alternatively, some consider that the realm of individual Positive Rights should be limited to a 
minimum level of entitlements against the great risks of life, among which is illness196. The 
emphasis here in on services, rather than outcomes, and on the limits of the human rights’ 
perspective in health to a circumscribed set of services. The extent of protection beyond the 
minimum should instead vary according to the level of socio-economic development, and according 
to the social preferences that characterize each society.
Is it possible to reconcile the two views? Culyer and Wagstaff (1993), argue that health is a Positive 
Right because it is one of the more important material preconditions necessary for each of us to 
flourish as an individual. In this respect their argument is convincing. Unlike other rights, however, 
being healthy or reaching old age in good health is not something that governments can equally 
guarantee to all. Thus, a first obvious qualification of the right to health, as Gakidou, Murray and 
Frenk (2000) point out, is that the maximum achievable target may in fact be to equate individual 
health expectancies (for instance, across socio-economic groups). Variations in healthy life spans 
that are simply due to chance cannot be avoided. More importantly, recent research shows that the 
society’s socio-economic structure (its level of income inequality, for instance), and other causes 
external to the health sector are likely to account for the distribution of health status within a society, 
probably as much as, or more than the quality of medical care per se. This finding has two 
implications. First, that the right to health cannot be guaranteed unless other rights, such as the right 
to adequate nutrition, to healthy housing and healthy working conditions are also guaranteed197. 
Second, one should consider that perfect equality of health expectancies most probably couldn’t be 
achieved, unless all people enjoy the same socio-economic condition and the same life-style.
194 See, for example, WHO World Health Report 2000.
195 For instance, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by every country with the exception of the 
United States and Somalia, recognizes health among the fundamental rights of all children (Art. 24).
196 The emphasis here is on financial protection. This implies that public support should be stronger in those 
situations, such as in absence of family support, when people are generally unable to cope, if left alone. The 
British Social Security System, and in particular, the pension system, was articulated along these lines. It had 
from the beginning the main function of providing only a minimum safety net.
197 A related issue is to determine along which dimension it is best to redistribute inputs (resources) and 
outputs. Is it better to sharpen targeting of health services, or to achieve better education for the poor, or to 
build safer roads in the rural areas, or greater equalization of income and wealth through taxation? 
Interventions channelled through sectors different from the health system may in fact achieve much more 
significant results in reducing health inequalities than those provided directly within the health system (see, for 
example, Hammer, 1998).
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Thus, as we pointed out above discussing Negative vis-a-vis Positive Rights, it is a matter of trading- 
off the aspiration to equal health with other aspirations. But the definition of a human right excludes 
the possibility of trade-off. Thus, here we find a second necessary limitation to the idea of health as 
a human right. For health (as it is for housing or education), there in a continuum between the state 
of perfect health and that of death, and each society needs to draw a line between what is reasonable 
to consider as an individual right and what ought to be considered differently. Following this 
perspective, we may for instance argue that maternal and child health are indeed to be considered as 
human rights, so that equity demands that safe-motherhood and equality in health outcomes among 
children be pursued to the fullest (by implementing strongly pro-poor interventions), whilst certain 
differences in adult health and in utilization of health services across adults should be accepted, 
because eliminating them would severely limit other rights, that we consider more important198.
Finally, we can further qualify the human rights approach to health by taking an empirically oriented 
perspective (see, for example, Willis, 1993, Waters, 2000). Regardless of the conclusions from a 
philosophical point of view as to what extent a human right to equal health should be protected, what 
governments can actually measure and somewhat control are access to and utilization of health 
services, rather than health status per se. This constraint can be rephrased by referring to the 
distinction between inputs, outputs and outcomes, which is so important in health. Equity objectives 
might be posed in terms of outputs or outcomes. However, the public sector may have control only 
over some inputs, but not fully on outputs and even less on outcomes. Thus, to make the right to 
health “operational”, ‘all* governments can do is to enhance access and utilization of health services 
by the poor, promote healthy behaviours and impose universal respect of certain health protection 
measures in production and consumption (at home, in the workplace, on the roads, etc.). Then, our 
equity focus or assessment should be more on the utilization of health services or health care, rather 
than on health outcomes. That is the focus we have decided to take in the text.
198 Of course, the extent of health and health care that constitutes an individual positive right, or of “the 
minimum amount of health care entitlements” is not fixed, but evolves over time. We can draw a parallel with 
education: the extent of the right to education has progressively been extended over time, from simple 
elementary school education, to the present compulsory school curriculum. Yet, part of the higher education is 
still allocated “unequally” in society, according to preferences and merit.
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A nnex 6 .3  P o litica l a n d  E conom ic L im its  to  R ed is tr ib u tio n
This Annex tries to address the following questions: “Is redistribution possible at all?” "To what 
extent are governments capable of improving upon the allocation of resources (including health care) 
which would result ffom luck and socio-economic interaction?" One may even think that we live in 
a very unjust society indeed, but that any government intervention would eventually make things
199worse .
In economics, the state vs. markets research debate, one of the constant themes of contention since 
the mercantilism vs. laissez faire  debate of the 18th century, has in recent years received new 
impetus. On the one hand, information economics has identified new areas for potential 
redistributive and at the same time Pareto-improving public policies 200 (in the context of health 
insurance, see Townsend and Harris, 1981, and Belli, 2001); on the other, new developments in 
micro and macroeconomic theory have further restricted the scope of government intervention in 
redistributing resources. For instance, Second Best theory 201 (for an application to the issue of
199 Some have tried to find a way out of the state vs. markets dilemma, by advocating a greater role for 
voluntary, community-based channels of redistribution. In health, for example, voluntary, community-based 
insurance schemes have been advocated as the way forward by those dissatisfied by traditional government-led 
public schemes and at the same time suspicious of profit-motivated insurers. We will limit ourselves to two 
simple observations. First is that solidarity, unlike equity and justice, is a private virtue and that, as Sidgwick 
wrote (1907, p. 242): “benevolence begins where justice ends”. Thus, equity-motivated (re)distribution is 
different and not in contrast with benevolence-based (re)distribution. Second, we should consider that what 
ultimately characterizes governments (centralized as well as decentralized ones) is that they dispose of a 
monopoly over legal coercive power. Thus, as explained in the text, if we embrace the thesis in favour of a 
substantial redistribution of education, health or even wealth compared to the distribution that would emerge as 
a result of spontaneous social interaction, we must accept public enforcement mechanisms of one sort or 
another to achieve it. Community-based, voluntary schemes will always find a limit in that they demand 
universal consensus of participants. In the language of welfare economics, they will promote only cross- 
subsidies that are also Pareto-improvements.
200 Note that economic theory has traditionally focused on efficiency rather than equity issues, and has adopted 
a particular exception of the notion of efficiency, that of Pareto. The Pareto principle requires unanimity (at 
least potentially, according to the compensation principle) to accept any change as an improvement. Thus, the 
Pareto principle leaves us at a loss for deciding whether any change in the distribution of resources achieved by 
markets is to be considered as an improvement, unless the initial situation is characterised by market failures. 
By excluding interpersonal comparisons of utility, the Pareto principle de facto  assigns an infinite weight to the 
preferences of whoever is negatively affected by any redistributive policy (for instance in case of health, those 
who have to cross-subsidize others' health consumption beyond the level they would spontaneously choose).
201 The theory of Second Best has shown that under conditions of asymmetry of information the relevant 
efficiency concept to be used is that of “constrained Pareto-efficiency”. For example, when there are two 
different groups of individuals characterised by unknown health risk, first best equilibria in the health 
insurance market are no longer sustainable, as they violate the high-risk group incentive-compatibility 
constraint. These constraints entail that, whenever two different contracts are offered to the two groups 
characterised by different health risks, they must be devised so that each group prefers the contract specific to 
its own risk type to the contract set for the other risk group. Second best theory has found some of the more
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optimal taxation, see Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971) has showed that in general allocative efficiency 
and redistribution are part of the same problem. It is not legitimate to consider governments’ 
redistributive policies, assuming that the total size of the resources available will not be affected by 
such policies202. That is to say that there can be a trade-off between maximizing the size of wealth or 
income, and that of redistributing it more equally (and equitably, according to many), through 
progressive taxation and pro poor financing/delivery of services203. As we discussed in Chapter 4, a 
comparable trade-off can arise in health, between policies aimed at maximizing gains in health 
outcomes, and those aimed at distributing health outcomes more equally.
To assess the distributional impact of government intervention it is useful to view the state-versus 
markets options as alternative mechanisms for rationing scarce resources among competing aims. 
We already mentioned how markets function. What about governments? Here, traditionally the two 
extreme positions were exemplified, on the one side, by the Public Choice Theory (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1977), and, on the other side, by various modem versions of the Hegelian view of the 
state (after his first proponent in modem times). Public Choice theory assumes that politicians and 
civil servants are in general self-interested individuals who utilize their public offices to consolidate 
their personal power and wealth, and their decisions hardly reflect their constituencies’ welfare. 
Even when governments pursue benevolent aims, they do so because they are instrumental to 
achieving politicians’, or bureaucrats’ real, egoistic aims204. On the opposite side of the spectrum, 
modem Hegelian views of government assume that in general the latter is able to best synthesize and 
sublimate the different and conflicting individual interests and preferences that characterize civil 
society. As expected, within a Public Choice framework, there is no room for improvement upon the 
results of ‘spontaneous social interaction, while all the different modem political and economic 
positions that are rooted in Hegel’s ‘trust’ in the role of the government reach positive conclusions as 
regards the latter’s ability to redistribute resources in favour of the poor.
interesting applications in the theory of taxation (see discussion in the text)
202 The image of public redistributive programs frequently used is that first put forth by Okun (1975) of a 
‘leaky buckle’. If we try to carry water using this leaky buckle from one place (rich peoples' pockets) to 
another (poorer people), some of the water will be lost along the way. The larger is the quantity of water we 
intend to transfer, the larger the amount that will be lost.
203 Moreover the potential of taxation is severely limited in the first phases of economic development. Taxes 
and payroll-based contributions also introduce distortions in the private economy (see Diamond and Mirrlees, 
1971, Musgrave, 1976 and Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
204 Another political view, that has a completely different origin but reaches similar negative conclusions as to 
the possibility of redistribution, claims that governments simply defend the interests of the underlying society’s 
leading class, or elite group. Thus, government leaders will never champion redistribution of resources in 
favour of the poor, unless this is instrumental to consolidating their own group or socio-economic class’s 
power.
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In the English and American traditions, few theorists have gone as far as Hegel did to assign to the 
government a will and concerns independent and superior to those of the individuals that form it. 
However, there is a long tradition (dating back to Adam Smith) that entrusts governments with the 
role of correcting the so-called market failures (see discussion in Chapter 2), and also of 
redistributing resources and/or providing relief to the poor. Note that much of the theory that 
justifies governments’ intervention to amend market failures implicitly also assumes that 
governments are benevolent welfare-maximizers.205
In the last two decades, new developments in political science have begun to shed some light over 
modem electoral mechanisms and social decision-making processes 206 that determine how real- 
world political and bureaucratic choices are shaped, trying to reconcile and to further articulate the 
above alternative views. A positive analysis of how governments function and political decisions are 
formed is showing that the range of actual goals pursued by public institutions have varied 
enormously across time and across countries, according to the underlying socio-economic and 
cultural structure of society, to the strength of democratic control mechanisms, and to the internal 
organization of governments themselves207. The traditional benevolent view as well as the Public 
Choice view, are both too abstract and simplistic.208 In particular, the Public Choice view provides a 
caricature view of civil servants and politicians, and it fails to recognize that motives other than pure 
self-interest play an important role in determining their behaviour. In the past, several governments 
have been able to forcefully pursue welfare-oriented policies, redistribution of resources in favour of 
the poor, and defence of human rights, in a way not reconcilable with a solely cynical and self- 
interested view of public decision makers.
205 Such an assumption is still at the basis of several contributions in economic theory. For instance, Contract 
Theory and Theory of Regulation microeconomic models for the most part assume that the public sector, 
although subject to the same information constraints as private agents, maximizes welfare (see for example, 
Laffont and Tirole, 1993. See however, theory of Regulatory Capture in the same textbook).
206 In economics, at the basis of the recent developments we find the median voter theory, which explains the 
move “towards the centre” observed in all uninominal electoral systems, and Arrow’s seminal work on the so- 
called Impossibility Theorem (Arrow, K., Social Choice and Individual Values, 1951). Arrow (1951) was the 
first to explicitly investigate the issue of aggregation of individual preferences in social choices.
207 Following is a partial list of the range of criteria that governments can follow, and have indeed followed, in 
the allocation of resources across individuals. 1) Same as markets, willingness and ability to pay; 2) political 
leverage, 3) military force; 4) first-come-first served; 5) same quantity for everybody, (equality of consumption 
across households was more or less achieved in rationing bread and sugar in Europe during world war II); 5) 
some measure of economic need; 6) age and gender; 7) capacity to benefit 8) capacity to bear queues; 9) 
chance; 10) a combination of the above.
208 Results derived in economics under the “government-welfare-maximizer” assumption can be misleading, 
because they ignore the concrete political, economic, and administrative constraints.
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The important point to understand, though, is that dispensing with markets does not automatically 
guarantee a different and more equitable allocation mechanism. Markets may not lead to equitable 
or efficient outcomes, but still:
1) Their limitation/elimination poses enormous problems of finding and sustaining alternative 
resource allocation mechanisms.
2) It is not at all guaranteed that public intervention will achieve more equitable results. The 
evidence presented in this Chapter on the distribution of health benefits from publicly funded 
services in developing countries is a clear illustration of this point.
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Chapter 7: Ten years of health reforms in former 
socialist econom ies
7.1 In trodu ction
This Chapter presents a study and an assessment of health reforms in former socialist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU or CIS), hereafter former 
socialist economies (FSE), thus setting the stage for the more detailed analysis of the Georgian case 
in Chapter 8. In the first part, it provides a synthetic picture of the health systems inherited from the 
communist regimes, and it presents the macro variations in health status, public health expenditure, 
private funding, etc...that occurred over the transition years. This first part draws together evidence 
from several studies and it is intended to provide an information basis for the subsequent analysis of 
the health reforms.
7 .2  H ealth  T h rea ts  an d  H ealth  S ta tu s
Under the communist regimes imposed everywhere after 1945 in Central-Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union health care was declared a public responsibility. By the mid ‘70s the goal of universal 
access to care with broad coverage in terms of services was largely achieved by most socialist 
countries in the region. Their health systems also provided strong public health measures, such as 
compulsory childhood immunization, which helped them to achieve better health outcomes than 
other countries with similar levels of income209. By the mid-1960s life expectancy at birth in 
socialist countries was comparable to that in the West.
However, beginning in the second half of the 70s aggregate health status indicators showed no 
further improvement and adult health indicators in fact started to worsen. Such stagnation and 
deterioration continued in the ‘80s, and in some of the countries in the region accelerated over the 
transition years, with the more well-known and dramatic example involving male life expectancy in 
the Russian Federation (see Case study 7.1). Largely because of increased deaths from cardio­
209 Poland for example, during the period following WWII achieved the best results in term of reduction of 
infant mortality rates (IMRs went down to 40 per 1000 in the ‘60s from 110 per 1000 in the ‘50s (Zatonsky, 
1996, “Evolution of health in Poland since 1988”).
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vascular disease210 and external causes among middle-aged men (mainly deadly injuries, including 
murder and suicide, and alcohol self-poisoning), male life expectancy at birth in Russia declined 7.4 
years (from 64.9 to 57.5years) between 1987 and 1994— an extraordinary change211.
Case study 7.1: Life expectancy in the Russian Federation
Recent evidence shows that, between 1985 and 1987, Russian life expectancy increased from just below 68 
years to 70 years (McKee and Leon, 1997). Then it reversed, plunging to 64 by 1994 (and to 57.5 for men), 
before rising slightly in 1995. The improvements after 1984 reflected reduced deaths from many causes, 
notably accidents and violence, alcohol-related causes, heart disease, and pneumonia. The improvements were 
concentrated among young and middle-aged adults, especially those aged 40-44 years. The subsequent plunge 
involved a reversal of all these trends. The worst years were 1992-1994, when men lost 4.5 years of life 
expectancy. An official Russian report in 1997 by an expert panel of demographers addressed this 
unprecedented increase in mortality in the Russian Federation (Pres. Comm, on Problems of Women, Family, 
and Demography, 1997, The Current Mortality Situation o f  the Population o f Russia). It presented the 
following bleak picture of health status in the Federation: Russian men live 15-17 years less, and women 7-10 
years less than their Western counterparts. 82% of the recorded increase in mortality reflects a real increase in 
age-specific death rates, while only 18% can be attributed to age-structure effects. The subsequent decline in 
the number of deaths between 1995 and 1997 was largely due to effects of age structure and did not represent a 
real decline in death rates. In 1997 life expectancy in the Russian Federation was approximately equal to 66.5 
years.
The Russian Federation case, although particularly striking, is paradigmatic of a trend shared by all 
the countries in the FSU (which became Community of Independent States, or CIS, after the collapse 
of the union in 1991). In Georgia, for example, maternal mortality rates increased by approximately 
45% between 1990 and 1997; deaths caused by cardiovascular disease increased by 35% and the 
overall age-adjusted mortality rate increased by 18%212.
By contrast, over the last decade some of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries were 
able to reverse the previous trends and to achieve significant improvements in life expectancy. The 
improvements in life expectancy were particularly strong in Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovak
210 Standard death rates for circulatory disease among Russian men rose from 658 per 100,000 in 1991 to 837 
per 100,000 in 1995. Among men, the standard death rate from CVD in Russia is higher than the death rate in 
the U.S. for all causes combined (Eberstadt, 1999).
211 Between 1987 and 1994, Russia experienced a 250% increase in adult male (age cohort 25-44) age-specific- 
death rates (ASDRs), and a 200% increase in adolescent and adult female (age cohort 15-44) ASDRs 
(Shkolnikov, 1997).
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Republic and Poland. In Poland, in the first two years of the transition up to 1991, mortality rates 
continued to worsen, especially due to externally caused deaths that rose by 25% from ‘89 to ‘91. 
Then, there was a sharp as well as unexpected improvement, and from 1991 to 1994 the overall 
mortality rate decreased from 1,062 to 971 per 100,000 for men and from 550 to 519 per 100,000 for 
women213. The starkest phenomenon was the decrease in deaths from cardiovascular disease, which 
fell by 25%, in the 20-44 age group, and by 15% in the 45-64 age group. Over the same years 
comparable positive trends were observed in the Czech and the Slovak Republics214.
In other countries of CEE, however, over the decade health indicators continued to deteriorate, 
although the setback in health indictors was not as sharp as in the FSU. A negative trend was 
observed not only in all the war-stricken states of the Balkan region, but also in fast growing 
Hungary (see table 7.1).
Throughout the FSE the leading cause of death has been from cardio-vascular disease215. In the 
worst cases, such as in Hungary, age standardized death rates (SDRs) due to circulatory disease and 
ischemic heart disease among men are nearly double those of the United States. Cancer— 
particularly lung cancer—and injuries are also unusually common among adult males. Ischemic 
heart disease, cerebrovascular disease and lung cancer together explain a third of the total number of 
years lost in the European region of the FSU.216 Another leading cause of death has been from 
external causes, mainly injuries and self-poisoning. By contrast, in the Central Asian region 
communicable diseases (mainly respiratory infections and TB), perinatal and maternal causes are 
still responsible for approximately half of the total burden of disease.217
212 See Georgia Public Expenditure review, World Bank, 2002.
213 Zatonsky, 1996, “Evolution of health in Poland since 1988”.
214 Albrecht, V., Drbal, C., Zdravotnictvf v £R: krize nebo uspech? Zdravotnictvi v Ceske republice, 3/1998, 
s.10-13
215 According to Murray and Lopez (1997) cardiovascular disease is responsible for 26.2 of the total number of 
DALYs lost in former socialist economies.
216 Bobadilla and Costello, 1997.
217 Bobadilla and Murray, 1997, estimate on the basis of 1990 data that communicable disease and maternal 
and child deaths constituted 53% of total burden of disease in Central Asia. Such share does not seem to have 
significantly varied over the transition.
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Table 7.1: Aggregate Health Status Indicators for a Selected Group of FSE218
Male life expectancy Female life expectancy Infant mortality rate
1990 1993 1997 1990 1993 1997 1990 1993 1997
Albania 69 69 70 75 74 75 31 33 27
Azerbaijan 67 65 67 75 74 75 23 28 23
7 • •
Croatia 69 68 68 76 77 77 11 10 9
Czech Rep. 68 69 71 76 76 78 11 9 6
Estonia 64 62 64 75 74 76 12 16 10
Georgia 69 69 76 77 16 22 22
Hungary 65 65 66 74 74 75 15 13 10
Kazakhstan 64 62 60 73 72 71 26 28 24
Kyrgyz R. 64 63 63 73 71 71 30 33 28
Latvia 64 62 64 75 74 75 14 16 15
Moldova 65 64 63 72 71 71 19 22 20
Poland 67 67 69 76 76 77 16 16 11
Romania 67 66 65 73 73 74 27 23 22
Russian Fed. 64 59 60 74 72 72 17 20 18
Slovak Rep. 67 68 69 76 77 77 13 11 9
Slovenia 69 70 71 77 77 78 8 7 5
Sources: Jakab et al., 2001; Kornai, 2000; Shkolnikov, 1997; World Development Indicators, 2002
Note that women continue to fare better than men in terms of absolute levels of mortality and 
morbidity: in 1990, women accounted for 52% of the population, but only for 43% of the estimated 
DALYs219 lost. However, of particular concern is the sharp increase in female lung cancer mortality, 
which demonstrates the very real threat to women’s health posed by smoking - a  threat that is 
expected to worsen as the tobacco industry continues its efforts to expand its market through 
targeting of women and young people. In the ‘80s and ‘90s death rates from cervical and breast 
cancer also continued to rise, and the dearth of screening services and prevention programs for 
cervical and breast cancer around the region is a serious matter of concern. As concerns breast 
cancer, for example, WHO estimates that 30-40 percent of cases in Estonia, and almost 2/3 in Poland 
are still detected at more advanced, and more difficult to treat, stages. Other countries, for which
218 It has not been possible to check the reliability of the primary source.
219 Disability Adjusted Life Years, first used by the World Bank in 1992 (WDR, 1993), is a measure that takes 
into account not only mortality but also morbidity.
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official figures are not available, are likely to perform even worse at early cancer detection. 
Furthermore, the state of reproductive health services is appalling, with a few positive exceptions 
among CEE countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia220. In most countries of the region 
access to modem contraceptive products and accurate information regarding family planning 
alternatives is privy to a small minority of the population221 and abortion remains the dominant 
method of fertility control. Contraceptive prevalence rates in women aged 15-49 are 34% in the 
Russian Federation and 48% in Romania. By comparison, in Thailand, a country at a similar level of 
economic development, it is equal to 74% (World Bank, 2002). It is estimated that on average a 
woman living in the Former Soviet Union undergoes over 3 abortions during her fertile life (for 
instance, in Georgia the estimate is equal to 3,7222). The rate of abortions to live births is more than 
one for the majority of FSE. The largest ratio is in Azerbaijan, with official data showing 2,199 
abortions for 1,000 life births (1995 data)223.
As for infant mortality, during the transition years the trend has been negative in several countries of 
the FSU, whilst has been stagnant or positive in CEE countries. In some of the FSU countries the 
relatively good performance according to official figures (see table 1, based on vital registration 
data) is not confirmed by survey-based evidence. In the Caucasus and in the Central Asia Republics, 
for instance, over the decade the cases of undefined diarrhoea diseases, meningitis, infectious 
mononucleosis, rubella and influenza sharply increased. Thus, one would expect that also infant 
mortality rates deteriorated and not that they improved, as the official figures show in some of the 
countries. On average in the FSU infant mortality is equal to approximately 20 deaths per 1,000 
children, a value almost four times higher than in the industrialized countries. Moreover, the 
aggregate country data mask wide variations across socio-economic groups and geographic areas
220 As regards maternal mortality, over the transition years it does not seem to have grown significantly, and 
the best performing countries have managed to reduce it. Maternal mortality averages 41 deaths per 100,000 
live births in the FSU countries, and 21 per 100,000 in Central and East Europe. The range of variation, 
however, is quite broad; it extends from 17 per 100,000 in Lithuania, to 50, 65 and 70 per 100,000 in Russia, 
Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan respectively, up to 96 per 100,000 in Tajikistan (1995 data). Within Central 
and East Europe, Romania continues to perform worse than any other country, with 41 deaths per 100,000, 
while estimates for Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic are respectively 15,12, and 9 respectively. 
Finally, a rising concern is posed by female death rates from cardiovascular disease that remain significantly 
higher than rates in the European Union (in Central and East Europe 86.3 per 100,000 and in the FSU 98 per 
100,000, as opposed to 33.1 per 100,000 in the EU).
221 Major causes preventing a more widespread use of contraceptives are: 1. recurrent interruptions in the flow 
of supplies; 2. physicians’ resistance to encouraging the use of modem contraceptive methods; 3. persistence of 
deep-rooted cultural and social taboos against the use of modem contraceptives.
222 UNICEF, 1993, Georgian Women’s Health Profile.
223 Even those FSU countries where rates of abortion were lower have witnessed a sharp increase in the number 
of abortions over the last decade. In Armenia, the rate of reported abortions climbed from 316 in 1990 to 627
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within countries. For instance, in the Kyrgyz Republic according to a Demographic and Health 
Survey conducted in 1997 (World Bank 2002) infant mortality was equal to 46 per 1,000 in the 
richest wealth quintile, and 83 per 1,000 in the poorest quintile.
In addition, within the region dormant threats from communicable diseases that affect mainly the 
adult population re-emerged. In the FSU, and particularly in the Central Asian republics, in 
Moldova and in the Caucasus, the incidence rates of tuberculosis, diphtheria, and sexually 
transmitted diseases rose to many times their prior levels224. In Russia, the TB case notification rate 
has doubled between 1991 and 1997, reaching 123/100,000 in 1999 (World Bank, 2002)225. 
Particularly worrying is the situation among Russian prisoners226. HTV infection has also increased 
sharply over the last few years (420,000 reported cases in 1999, according to UNAIDS, 2000), 
especially among injecting drug users. Syphilis incidence is estimated to have increased up to 50- 
fold in the last 10 years227.
7 .2 .2  E pidem iological Studies on th e  Causes o f the D eterioration in  
Health Status
According to the existing epidemiological studies on mortality and morbidity the growth in 
premature death from non-communicable diseases, observed in most FSE countries, is largely due to 
lifestyle factors, such as alcohol and tobacco consumption, diet, stress and lack of exercise. A global 
study228 of risk factors associated with premature loss of years of healthy life (measured by DALYs) 
found that in 1990 in the FSE tobacco accounted for 12.5 percent of all DALYs lost, and alcohol 
accounted for a further 8.3 percent. The third risk factor in order of importance was hypertension 
(5.9 percent), which is also aggravated by the first two. According to this study the first two risk 
factors, tobacco and alcohol consumption, together had a larger impact than the eight next most 
important risk factors combined. These results are confirmed by a 1997 WHO study, according to 
which middle-aged men in FSE are twice as likely than those in Western Europe to die from
per 1,000 live births in 1995.
24 The figures reported in the text are likely to be underestimates of the true incidence rates, as several cases of 
TB and STD are not reported.
225 The TB mortality rate in 1996 was 17/100,000 (in the US is 0.61/100,000). So, a Russian is on average 28 
times more likely to die of tuberculosis than an American.
226 TB is concentrated among marginalize groups. It is the major killer among Russian detainees, most of 
which await due process for several years. 700 per 100,000 citizens are currently in jail in Russia, five times 
more than in Europe (Farmer, P., 1999).
227 Russian Federation AIDS & TB Project Concept documents (1999).
228 Murray, C. and A. Lopez, 1997.
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tobacco-related causes. In 1995 tobacco caused an estimated 41 percent of all deaths among men 
aged 35-69 years229.
Several studies suggest that the second risk factor in order of importance is alcohol consumption. 
For the Russian Federation, Shkolnikov and Nemtsov (1997), and Trems (1997) present the results 
of a number of studies on the effects of alcohol consumption on the burden of disease. Shkolnikov 
and Nemtsov (1997) attribute the oscillating patterns of accidental poisoning230 and accidents in the 
second half of the ‘80s primarily to sharp fluctuations in the availability and consumption of alcohol 
(both licit and illicit), during and after Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1985-87 campaign to reduce its 
availability (1985-1987). By contrast, Treml (1997) argues that the effects of Gorbachev’s anti­
alcohol campaign have been largely overstated. He suggests that the campaign encouraged illegal 
distillation and therefore resulted in even worse health outcomes, due to the poor quality of the 
vodka illegally produced. This could explain the fact that the two years 1985-1987 marked a 
significant health improvement for the well educated segments of the population, but worsening 
health outcomes for the lower socio-economic groups (Shkolnikov, 1997). The lack of reliable data 
for this period makes it impossible to reach definitive conclusions.
The level of alcohol consumption has continued to increase over the ‘90s, and it has now reached 
astonishing levels231 in several FSE countries. Alcoholism is likely to pose an immense burden on 
society, and the number of preventable deaths directly ascribed to alcohol consumption to represent 
just the top of the iceberg of such burden.
Poor nutrition seems to be another important, yet still neglected, factor in explaining the 
deterioration in health status over the last few years. Under-nutrition and micronutrient malnutrition 
232 particularly affect the poorer and more vulnerable segments of the population, and the poorer 
countries, such as those in the Central Asia region (see World Bank, 2000). Moreover, in FSE diets 
have traditionally exhibited iron and iodine deficiencies233 and by the problem of non-availability and
229 WHO, Regional Office for Europe, Fact sheet No 156, May 1997
230 Most cases of self-poisoning occur as a result of excessive vodka consumption in a short period of time.
231 According to a 1993 national household survey, over 80 percent of Russian men were drinkers and their 
alcohol consumption averaged nearly 600 grams per day, roughly equivalent to five bottles of vodka per week, 
every week (Eberstadt, 1999). For the Russian population as a whole, average alcohol intake is approximately 
400 grams per day.
232 Under-nutrition is defined as the inadequacy of food intake to meet a person’s energy and nutrient needs for 
healthy functioning. Micronutrient malnutrition is defined as the insufficiency of essential vitamins and 
minerals in what may be an otherwise healthy diet.
233 Those could easily be addressed by fortifying salt with iodine and wheat flour with iron, as is done in many 
other countries. Goiter, a disease stemming from iodine deficiency disorder, prevalence rates of up to 25% 
have been reported in Bosnia, up to 40% in parts of Russia, and up to 75-80% in parts of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia regions. Iodine deficiency causes impairment of cognitive capabilities, with severe long-term
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non-affordability of vitamin-rich eatables in the countries characterized by a colder climate. In a few 
countries of CEE and among the wealthier segments of the population the opposite problem of over- 
nutrition has also worsened over the transition years234.
7 .3  Q u a lity  a n d  E fficiency o f  th e  D elivery S ys tem
This section focuses on the delivery system and offers a synthetic picture of the situation inherited 
from the communist regimes. Before the transition to a market economy, FSE’s health systems 
shared comparable roots, and a few key characteristics. Resources were used quite inefficiently. 
First, the public health delivery systems were extremely rich in facilities and labour (see Tables 7.2 
and 7.3 below, and Jacab and Preker, 2002), at a level comparable to that of the richest countries of 
Western Europe and North America.
effects.
234 Over-nutrition is defined as an excessive intake of calories relative to energy requirements and as an 
unbalanced intake of other nutrients (generally excess fat and insufficient fibre intake).
Table 7.2: Hospital Beds per 1,000 People in Selected Central and East European, Former
Soviet Union, OECD and Newly Industrialized Nations (1990)
Albania 4.03 Armenia 8.6 Austria 9.90
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Rep.
10.10
7.38
8.10
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Estonia ' .<
9.9
13.16
11.60
Denmark
France
Germany
4.70
8.70 
9.60
Hungary 10.14
. ■ • ; 
Georgia 9.73 Greece 5.00
FYR Macedonia 6.34 Kazakhstan 13.94 Ireland 4.90
Poland 6.60 Kyrgyz Rep. 11.96 Italy 6.50
Romania 8.92 Latvia 14.04 Netherlands 12.0
Slovak Rep.235 7.45 Lithuania 12.41 Sweden 7.60
Slovenia 6.05 Moldova 13.15 UK 6.59
Yugoslavia, Fr.236 5.92 Russian Fed. 13.02
Average 7.35 Ukraine 13.49 Canada 4.20
Uzbekistan 12.43 Japan
USA
16.20
4.50
Average 12.11 Average
countries
Korea
high income 7.7
4.60
Turkey 2.50
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years
235 In fact in 1990 the Czech Rep. and the Slovak Rep. were part of the same country, Czechoslovakia. 
Nonetheless disaggregated data is available for the two parts of Czechoslovakia.
236 In 1990 Croatia and Slovenia were still part of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless disaggregated data is available for 
the two, and it is presented separately from Serbia and Montenegro.
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Table 7.3: Physicians per 1,000 People in Selected Central and East European,
Form er Soviet Union, OECD and Newly Industrialized Nations, 1990
Albania 1.3 Armenia 3.3 Austria 3.0
Bulgaria 3.5 Azerbaijan 3.6 Denmark 3.4
Croatia 2.2 Belarus 4.2 France 2.9
Czech R ep.237 3.0 Estonia 3.2 Germany 3.4
Hungary 3.2 Georgia 4.5 Greece 3.9
FYR Macedonia 2.3 Kazakhstan 3.5 Ireland 2.1
Poland 2.3 Kyrgyz Rep. 2.9 Italy 5.9
Romania 1.7 Latvia 3.4 Netherlands 3.1
Slovak Rep. 3.5 Lithuania 3.9 Sweden 3.1
Slovenia 2.3 Moldova 3.4 UK 1.7
Yugoslavia, Fr.238 2.0 Russian Fed. 4.1 Portugal 3.2
Ukraine 3.5 Canada 2.1
Average 2.5 Uzbekistan 3.1 Japan
USA
1.8
2.6
Average 3.6 Average high-income
countries
Korea
2.9
1.1
Turkey 1.1
Source: World Development Indicators, most recent year available
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 compare countries of Central and East Europe and of the Former Soviet Union to 
those of Western Europe and other middle-income market economies (Korea and Turkey), in relation 
to respectively the ratio of hospital beds and physicians to populations. The comparisons are 
illuminating. All FSE were characterized by a very extensive delivery system. In Central and Eastern 
Europe figures were comparable with those of the West, while in CIS countries, the delivery system 
was really elephantine, especially in relation to their low per capita income (on average, 
approximately 1710th of that of established market economies). The few crude efficiency indicators 
available indicated extremely low levels of efficiency. For instance, average length of stay (LOS) in
237 See note previous table.
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hospitals was much longer than in the West, reflecting a misuse of acute hospital for chronic or long­
term care.
Second, inpatient care was taking a disproportionate share of the public budget (on average, 
approximately 60-65% of the total). In FSE the health delivery systems were based on an efficient 
network of mostly single-specialty hospitals, according to the Siemaszko model of the Soviet Union. 
A vertical and segmented approach to disease management characterized such model, which might 
have been originally appropriate to address communicable diseases but that certainly became 
outdated and unsustainable as the disease burden shifted mostly towards chronic diseases in the ‘60s. 
Moreover, there was no system of peer-review or other means for internal and/or external quality 
control.
Third, the system was characterized by a very convoluted governing structure, where different health 
providers were accountable to different ministries239 and different levels of government, federal, 
regional, district and city level.
Fourth, the FSE’s health systems completely lacked incentives for individual workers, as well as for 
institutions, to improve the level and the quality of services, or to improve efficiency. Given the 
criteria for the allocation of funds across facilities, which was based on existing capacity, historical 
expenditure and reported costs240, the management of health facilities had few incentives to develop 
strategic planning functions, to introduce innovation or to adapt to environmental changes. Salaries 
were low and seniority-based, career progress was unrelated to performance but to political 
affiliation.
Thus, taking the image of an aircraft to describe the health systems inherited from communist 
regimes, one may say that, although to a different extent, in all FSE countries the plane was too big 
compared to need, was highly ineffective in its engines, unsafe and uncomfortable, and was often 
flying in the wrong direction. When the fuel -the money that the government had available to sustain 
this cumbersome delivery system- signalled red at the end of the eighties, the need for health reforms 
able to tackle the issues of excess capacity and inefficiency became compelling.
238 See note previous table.
239 According to rough estimates, in several FSE total medical resources at the disposal of all other ministries 
were almost equivalent to those under the jurisdiction of the MOH (Langenbrunner, Wiley, 1999). Co­
ordination among ministries was extremely poor.
240 No use was made of epidemiological or utilization indicators (with the exception of occupancy rates).
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7 .3  H ealth  F inancing
Four questions about the evolution of health financing over the last decade of particular interest are:
1. How economic growth varied in the different countries and what impact it had on total 
government health care spending;
2. How the proportion of the total financed publicly (through taxes and social security 
contributions), and privately (mainly through OOP payments) varied over the decade.
3. How the incidence of OOP payments varied across different socio-economic groups and how 
severe was the financial barrier to access health services.
For most FSE, reliable data are now available for GDP growth, and total government expenditure in 
health care, but not for total private OOP payments, particularly the informal component.
Looking first at government health expenditure and its relationship with the evolution of income and 
fiscal revenues, one can see that socialist countries started from similar levels of spending in 
proportion to their gross domestic product (GDP), and then tended to diverge over time. In fact, it is 
possible to distinguish between two periods and two groups of countries. In the first years of the 
transition, as Table 7.5 shows, almost all FSE experienced severe economic recessions. The 
weakness of the new democratic and market economy institutions241 compounded the structural 
economic difficulties due to the interruption of the trade and the subsidies within the Soviet Union 
and with neighbouring socialist countries. The governments’ revenue collection capacity was 
blighted, and in some FSU countries, such as Georgia, the extent of the collapse in income and in 
fiscal revenues was enormous, in the order of 50, 60 per cent.
Beginning in 1993-94, most countries in the region started to experience some economic recovery. 
Then, a divergent pattern of evolution between most CEE and FSU countries emerged. While the 
majority of CEE countries were able to move towards a path of stable economic growth, the 
Community of Independent States that formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union (with the partial 
exception of the Baltic States) in 1997 became trapped in another period of economic turbulence242,
241 Under the socialist regimes, the problem of securing enough funds to finance public goods and welfare state 
services was framed under a totally different institutional setting. For example, personal taxation was largely 
irrelevant as the state put most of the burden of financing social services directly on enterprises.
242 The crisis began in 1998, when the East Asia financial crisis spread to Russia. In August the government 
announced a default on its public debt obligations. This crisis initiated a new period of economic recession in 
all countries of the FSU.
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which terminated only in 2000/01. The main reasons mentioned in the literature to explain the 
different economic evolution followed by the two groups of countries during the transition years 
concern the extent of corruption and the way the privatisation process was carried out, the absence of 
rule of law in the FSU countries, and the geographical distance from European Union markets.
Table 7.4: GDP Growth for a Selected Group of FSE (annual real %)
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Poland 
Romania
Russian Federation 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia
Tajikistan
..
Ukraine
-27.7 -7.2 9.6 9.4 8.9 9.1 -7.0 8.0
-11.7 -41.8 -8.8 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.2
-11.7 -0.7 -35.2 -11.8 -24.3 -11.8 1.3 5.8 10.0
-2.2 -1.2 -9.6 -7.6 -12.6 -10.4 2.8 10.4 8.3
-9.1 -8.4 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 -10.1 -7.0 3.5
-11.7 -8.0 5.9 4.8 5.9 6.8 2.5
-1.2 -11.6 -4.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 3.8 0.3 -2.3
-7.1 -8.0 -21.2 -8.5 -1.8 4.3 3.9 10.6 4.0
-14.8 -20.1 -40.3 -39.4 -11.4 2.4 10.5 11.0 2.9
-3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 5.1
-4.6 -6.8 -13.0 -9.6 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 1.7 -1.9
6.9 -9.1 -15.8 -16.3 -20.1 -5.4 7.1 9.9 3.6
-1.3 -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.6
9.5 -5.7 -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1
-16.0 -29.1 -1.2 -31.2 -1.4 -7.8 1.3 -8.6
-9.9 -5.5 3.1 4.3 5.1 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8
-5.7 -12.9
oo00 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.6 -7.5
-3.0 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.1 -3.4 0.9 -4.6
-2.7 -14.6 -6.7 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4
2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.9
-2.4 -8.7 -29.0 -11.3 -19.0 -11.8 -4.4 2.3 8.2
-6.4 -8.7 -9.9 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -6.0 -1.7
Source: World Development Indicators, 2000.
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Table 7.5: GDP Comparison at the Beginning and at the End of the Decade, and Average
Annual %  GDP Growth for a Selected Group of FSE ($ m illions243)
Georgia 12,171 3,029 13.0
Moldova 10,567 1,286 -9.7
Ukraine ; 91,327 31,791 -9.3
Azerbaijan ! 9,837 5,267 -6.3
Russian Fed. 579,068 251,106 -4.8
Kazakhstan 40,304 18,230 -4.1
Kyrgyz Rep. 2,951 1,304 -4.1
Latvia 12,490 7,150 -3.4
Lithuania 13,254 11,314 -3.1
Bulgaria 20,726 11,995 -2.1
Armenia 4,124 1,914 -1.9
Belarus 35,203 29,950 -1.6
Romania 38,299 36,719 -0.7
Estonia 6,760 4,969 -0.5
Croatia 18,156 19,031 0.6
Czech Rep. 34,880 50,777 0.9
Hungary 33,056 45,633 1.5
Slovak Rep. 15,485 19,121 2.1
Slovenia 12,673 18,129 2.7
Albania 2,102 3,752 3.3
Poland 58,976 157,739 4.6
Source: WorldI Development Indicators, 2002
As a result o f the economic difficulties, initially all FSE had to cut real public spending for health, 
and they did so roughly in proportion with the GDP decline, as shown in Table 7.6. The exceptions 
are a few countries that experienced war during this period (for example, Georgia), where public 
spending on health essentially collapsed along with the government’s revenue base244, and, on the
243 GDP is computed at purchaser prices. Conversion in U.S. dollar is done by applying the average official 
exchange rate reported by the International Monetary Fund for the year shown.
244 In these countries even basic services, such as immunization services and prenatal care, which had reached 
standards comparable to those in Western Europe in the 60 through the 80s, could not be sustained. According 
to World Bank, 1999, in 1998 in Georgia only 63% of children were immunized against measles, and none in 
1994-95, because of lack of vaccines. In several of the countries of the FSU and particularly in the Central Asia
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opposite side of the spectrum, a few countries in Central Europe (such as the Czech Republic) where 
health spending could be protected even in the early transition period. In general, governments 
reduced planned spending, but also ran deficits, and payment arrears began accumulating in the 
system.
Table 7.6: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP) for a Selected Group o f FSE
Country Name
Albania 3.3
Armenia 2.8
Azerbaijan 2.6
Belarus 2.6
Bulgaria 4.1
Croatia '%■ 9.7
Czech Rep. 5.2
Estonia 2.1
Georgia 3.0
Hungary 5.7
Kazakhstan £ 3 .2
Kyrgyz Rep. 4.2
Latvia 2.5
Lithuania 3.1
Moldova 4.4
Poland •: •: 4.7
Romania 2.8
Russian Fed. 7 2.5
-
Slovak Rep. 5.0
Slovenia
Ukraine 3.0
4.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.0
4.1 4.9 3.6 1.5 2.7 3.4 3.2 3.4 4.0
3.1 2.3 3.0 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0
3.1 3.4 4.7 5.2 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.6
4.2 5.3 4.8 4.0 3.6 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.9
10.8 9.9 9.3 8.5 8.4 9.3 8.7 9.0 9.5
5.1 5.1 6.9 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.6
7.5 5.3 5.2 5.8 5.8 5.2 4.6 5.1 5.1
4.1 2.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8
6.6 6.6 4.8 5.2 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.7 5.2
4.3 2.1 2.3 2.2 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.7
3.6 3.2 2.6 3.5 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.2
2.6 2.8 4.1 3.6 4.4 4.0 3.5 3.9 4.0
5.2 3.8 3.9 4.8 5.1 6.1 5.0 6.2 4.8
4.0 3.8 4.4 6.2 5.8 6.2 4.8 3.6 2.9
4.8 4.9 4.5 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.2 4.7
3.3 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.6 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.8
2.4 2.5 3.3 5.2 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.5 4.6
4.6 4.6 5.8 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7
5.2 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.1 6.6 6.6 6.8 6.7
3.3 3.5 4.1 5.4 4.9 3.9 4.1 3.5 2.9
Source: World Development Indicators, 2000-2001
In order to respond to the general budget shortfalls and to inject additional resources in the health 
system, several FSE created or increased the rate of a payroll tax earmarked to fund health services. 
The tax was first introduced in Hungary (1991), and Czech Republic (1992), and then several other
republics the administration of vaccines was completely left to International NGOs, and immunizations 
services left out approximately one-third of the total number of children (30% in Kyrgyz Republic and 20 in 
Uzbekistan, according to World Bank, 2000), mostly from the poorer backgrounds and the more remote areas.
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countries followed, including Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, the Baltic States, Georgia (1995), 
Russia and Kazakhstan, and finally, Poland (1999). These countries also created sickness or 
insurance funds, separated from the Ministry of Health, to administer the revenue from the payroll 
tax. The burden of the tax was shared by employers and employees, while the central or local 
governments were supposed to contribute either for the non-contributing population245, as in Russia 
or Hungary, or for specific services, as in Georgia. In most of the Former Soviet Union the tax was 
kept at a relatively smaller rate246 (Russian Fed., 3.6%; Kazakhstan, 3.25%, Georgia, 4%; Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2.5%), whilst in most CEE countries and the Baltic states the payroll tax rate was set at a 
much higher level (Croatia, 18%; Hungary, 18%; Czech Rep., 13.5%; Slovak Rep., 13.75%; Estonia, 
13%, Poland, 7.75%, Romania, 14%). In the former group of countries, the revenue of the payroll tax 
was not able to turn around the disastrous public health financing situation. Due to low tax rate, low 
and shrinking levels of formal employment in the economy, poor collection, and misappropriation, 
the revenue that providers could receive from the sickness funds remained negligible. For example, 
in the Russian Federation, in 1993 the government mandated that local budgets contribute to the 
mandatory insurance fund on behalf of the non-contributing population; two years later, in 1995, 
already 71 percent of all public resources for health originated from local budgets (of the rest, 10 
percent came from the federal budget and only 19 percent from payroll taxes collected at the central 
level). The fiscal capacity and willingness to contribute varied enormously across regions and no 
mechanism to cross-subsidize the poorer regions was put in place.
Table 7.7 presents the total private and public health expenditures in several countries of the region 
at the end of the decade.
245 In Poland, for example, social insurance contributions are waived for 'very poor' farmers, people in receipt 
of unemployment and welfare benefits, serving soldiers and army veterans. The state also provides free 
medical treatment to children of up to seven years of age, pregnant women, the mentally ill, accident victims 
and regular blood-donors. In addition, free treatment is provided for alcoholism, drug dependence, psychiatric 
illness and communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis and AIDS.
246 To compute the overall tax burden and tax wedge on wages, however, the health contribution earmarked for 
health has to be summed to the contribution for pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits. Overall, the 
payroll tax rate is in the range 25-40%.
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Table 7.7:Per capita GDP and Health Expenditure in 2000 for a Selected Group of FSE (US $)
Albania
Armenia
1,112
503
30
45
22
18
8
27
25.9
60.3
Azerbaijan 660 10 7 3 32.5
Belarus 2,985 168 137 30 18.1
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
1,461
4,263
4,940
60
484
356
57
405
326
3
79
30
5.7
16.4
8.5
Estonia 3,445 211 176 35 16.6
Georgia 556 16 4 12 73
Hungary 4,532 308 236 72 23.5
Kazakhstan 1,221 69 33 36 51.9
Kyrgyz Republic 268 12 6 6 50.5
Latvia 2,941 191 118 73 38.3
Lithuania 3,059 190 144 46 24.2
Macedonia, FYR 1,768 111 94 17 15.4
Moldova 300 18 9 9 50.7
Poland 4,081 255 192 64 24.9
Romania 1,635 92 62 30 32.6
Russian federation 1,718 109 79 30 27.8
Slovak Republic 3,544 256 202 54 21.2
Slovenia 9,131 706 621 85 12
Ukraine 636 28 18 9 33.3
Uzbekistan 314 15 11 5 30.6
Source: Own computations based on World Development Indicators, 2002.
As Table 7.8 indicates, in a few FSU countries such as Georgia and Moldova, the amount of 
government health expenditure has been reduced to negligible levels, insufficient to maintain even 
basic public health services. A lso note that all the countries247 that increased level o f real public 
spending over the decade belong to the Central and East European region or to the Baltic. The “best” 
performer is Estonia, which increased public health expenditure by over fifty percent in real terms in 
a period when income fell by 25%.
247 Belarus, not shown in the Table, is the only exception. Belarus has increased real public health spending by 
132% over the period 1990-1997. Belarus has not yet undertaken the transition to a market economy.
7.4 The g ro w th  o f  OOP p a y m e n ts  an d  o f  p r iv a te  p ro v id ers
As a result of the fiscal collapse of the decade of the 1990s, FSU government health systems 
experienced drastic reductions in wage and capital investment expenditures. Increasingly, out-of- 
pocket payments substituted for public funds particularly for drug expenditure and for wages. 
Physicians tried to make up for the reductions of their official salary payments by offering their 
services for private payment, typically doing so from the public facilities in which they had 
previously been employed (see next Chapter).
As table 7.8 indicates, in almost all FSE, formal and informal248 direct out-of-pocket payments by 
patients have become one of the more significant sources of funding for health services, particularly 
in Commonwealth of Independent States countries. In fact, informal payments to doctors and nurses 
were ingrained in the tradition of the FSE, dating back to the communist times249, but they do not 
seem to have been a matter a concern until the last decade.
At the same time, there has also been a growth of the private sector in service provision, so far 
mainly concentrated in primary and in outpatient specialist care. In Krakow, Poland, for example, a 
study by Berman and Chawla (1999) shows that over one third of physician contacts (and over half 
in terms of value) for ambulatory care services take place in private facilities, while 1,096 publicly 
employed specialists spend an average of 10.8 hours a week working in their private practice. In 
Hungary, by 1996 80% of the budget for kidney dialysis was paid to private providers (Komai and 
Eggleston, 2000). The importance of the private sector is likely to be even greater in those countries 
of the FSU where the financial collapse of the public sector has been more pronounced, although we 
lack precise data on the extent of the private delivery sector in this region. Also, in several countries 
the distinction between public and private institutions is increasingly blurred, as public facilities are 
managed independently, receive most of their funding from OPP (formal and informal), and their 
juridical status is undetermined. In fact, some countries (see Georgia, Chapter 8) are struggling to 
articulate precisely the legal status of facilities that were formally public and that are increasingly de 
facto  managed as private facilities.
248 Out-of-pocket payments refer to those payments for health services, which are bome directly by the 
patients, or their households (for a throughout discussion of the meaning of formal and informal OPP, refer to 
Chapter 8).
249 The existence of informal payments was first documented in International publications by World Bank 
studies early in the ‘90s. Such studies estimated that 25% and 20% of the funds for health services respectively 
in Romania and Hungary were out-of-pocket payments and gratuities (WDR, 1993).
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7.5 Im p a ct o f  th e  g row th  o f  OOP p a y m e n ts
A growing body of evidence has looked at these high levels of OOPs and informal payments (see 
World Bank, 2000a and Lewis, 2001; for Hungary, see Gal, 1999 and for Poland, see Shahriari, 
Belli, et al., 2002), in an effort to measure their precise extent, and their impact on accessibility and 
quality of services. Abel-Smith and Falkingham (1996) found that in the Kyrgyz Republic 32% for 
of respondents cash income was not sufficient to pay for health care. In one-fifth of cases the 
informal cost of inpatient care exceeded the total cash income of all household members for that 
month. In Georgia, Gotsadze et al. (2001, p. 37) showed that on average a single episode of 
hospitalisation in Tbilisi costs GEL 879, which, at the exchange rate of 2.1 GEL per dollar, is 
equivalent to US $ 418. This sum is far beyond the average monthly household salary in the 
country, equal to GEL 82.8 (see Chapter 8). In Kazakhstan, according to the 1996 Living Standard 
Survey (Sari, Langenbrunner and Lewis, 1999), inpatient services cost on average 2 and Vz times the 
poorest income group’s monthly income. Reports of inability to afford care in specific 
circumstances, or need to sell subsistence produce or assets to pay for health care, show that the 
equity impact of health payments may indeed be quite relevant in the FSU countries. In 1997, in the 
Russian Federation 41% of those interviewed reported they could not afford drugs (50% among the 
lowest income group) and 13% could not afford medical treatment. Among the lowest income group, 
36% had to forgo outpatient visits. In Georgia, according to the Socio-Demographic Survey 2002, 
only 46% of those who were sick sought professional treatment. 20% of the individuals that self­
treated did so because they could not afford professional treatment. In 1999 in Tajikistan, among 
those who needed health assistance, 32% reported they did not seek such assistance because it was 
unaffordable (Falkingham and Hemming, 1999). The proportion was 42% for the poorest quintile of 
the population. In this group, 63% were unable to buy prescribed pharmaceuticals, and 21.5% did not 
have any consultation or prenatal care during pregnancy, because they were too expensive. One third 
of respondents borrowed money in order to afford health care. In the Kyrgiz Republic, only 41% of 
those reporting ill health in the bottom quintile sought care, while 62% of the top quintile did. One in 
three inpatients borrowed money and in the rural areas 45% sold produce or livestock. 15% of the 
poorest did not seek care even for acute illness because of cost of treatment (Abel-Smith and 
Falkingham, 1996). In Moldova, more than 30% of respondents in the lowest income quintile 
reported having to borrow funds to meet the unexpected costs of illness (UNICEF, 1997).
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There is not enough evidence yet to assess for which type of services OOP payments are more 
commonly made (Lewis, 2001). The only consistent evidence is that informal “envelope” payments 
to physicians constitute the major component of payments for inpatient stays, whereas formal OPP 
prevail for pharmaceutical expenditure, only partially subsidized by governments, and for outpatient 
specialist services, where private providers have become more widespread.
7 .6  C auses o f  Inform al P aym en ts
The most important single factor in explaining the extent of informal payments seems to be the level 
of doctors’ and health employees’ salary (see Chapter 8). The few FSE countries where the existing 
evidence suggests that informal payments are not widespread, such as the Czech Republic, are also 
those where physician salaries have kept pace with average earnings during the transition. Where 
wages are low or even unpaid and the private sector is still underdeveloped, informal payments 
become the only revenue source for doctors. In turn, low salaries are a consequence of the poor fiscal 
performance and the excessive capacity in the delivery, system.
Apart from the level of salaries, the phenomenon has other complex and deep-rooted causes. In 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and more in general where government financing of health 
services has not completely collapsed, informal OOP payments tend to be concentrated in a few 
specific wards and for specific services (for instance, surgeries; see Belli et al, 2002), which are more 
in short-supply (for example, surgical services). In these countries informal payments can be seen as 
signalling devices, which indicate where the greater discrepancies are between the priorities assigned 
through planning and patients' preferences. Thus, they signal where resources are relatively scarcer, 
and conversely where they are in over-supply. If factors of production could shift more flexibly, the 
informal payments would be temporary and they could move around within the system depending on 
where relative scarcities are at any one time. If, as it is, factors are rigid, though, the signalling value 
of the informal payments is frustrated and the payments become pure rents that can persist 
indefinitely. By contrast, in countries of the Former Soviet Union, OOPs seem to be much more 
widespread, and they have de facto become the major source of revenue for the health sector. In fact, 
a high level of informal payments can contribute to maintain the existing unbalances, as no strong 
interest group is likely to demand a real change. First, there is no incentive for governments to 
prevent informal OOP payments, since it allows them to save on labour costs: doctors can 
supplement their low income by charging patients a fee. Second, most people accept the idea that
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the only way to get quality services is to pay directly, so they do not protest. Finally health 
employees and particularly physicians benefit from OOP informal payments because they earn extra 
non-taxed income and they can stay in public facilities where they free ride on expensive equipment. 
Those who are most negatively affected by OOP payments are the poorer and more vulnerable 
groups, as indicated in the previous section, but these groups are too weak and disorganized to 
demand a real change.
7 .7  H ealth  S ec to r  R eform s in  FSE
During the '90s, while undergoing the process of transition to market economies, several FSE began 
to discuss and to implement health reforms in the finance and the organisation of health services. In 
fact, FSE can be divided into three groups according to the pace and the comprehensiveness of the 
health reforms introduced over the last decade. At one extreme of the spectrum we find the 
“committed reformers” countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Georgia), where comprehensive 
health reforms were implemented. At the other extreme one finds the “resilient non reformers” 
countries (Ukraine, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Belarus) that fixed problems with minimal 
adjustments and only when they became critical. In between, there is a third group including the 
majority of FSE, where governments changed parts of their health systems, without touching other 
key components. Within this group one can also distinguish between smaller countries, such as 
Latvia, Hungary and Armenia, which adopted a nation-wide approach to reforms, and larger 
countries, such as the Russian Federation, where reforms were led at the regional level.
The general direction of these reforms has been towards new funding, resource allocation, and 
provider payment mechanisms, greater autonomy for hospitals, and the establishment of semi­
independent sickness funds. The health reforms in FSE shared core features with the reforms 
implemented in several countries other in West Europe, and other lower and middle income 
countries, starting in 1990 in the UK. We already discussed in depth the justification, the main 
characteristics, and the impact of such reforms in previous chapters, and will not repeat the same 
analysis here (see Chapter 1, Chapter 4, 5 and 6). Here, we would like to emphasize a few elements 
that were specific to the FSE countries. First, the social and economic transformation unleashed by 
the socialist system's collapse was highly dismptive and it placed an enormous pressure on health
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services250, making it impossible to maintain the previous standards of accessibility and quality. The 
dramatic situation that prevailed in some of the poorer countries in the first transition years was thus 
described by Wiley and Langenbrunner: “During the transition, drastically worsening hygienic 
norms, shortages of water and electricity, lack of heating caused a daily battle for survival for many 
hospitals, with rural areas being in a worse condition. The supplies of pharmaceuticals and medical 
consumables were considerably reduced. In many cases, humanitarian assistance could only partially 
cover the supply for emergency care, vaccines, and antibiotics” (Wiley and Langenbrunner, 2002).251 
Moreover, the crisis entailed some severe long-term consequences. For example, capital investment 
was drastically reduced and, as a result, premises lacked maintenance and refurbishment. Thus, the 
transition years showed once again that the health sector is part of society and of the whole economic 
system, and it is illusionary to believe that in a context characterized by rapid economic recession 
and social degradation such as that experienced by several FSU countries, it can stand out as an 
island of “success” in a sea of despair.
Second, the experience in the region during the last decade seems to suggest that successful reforms 
inspired by the “managed competition” or “internal market” organization model would comprise a 
package of several key elements able to sustain and reinforce each other, among which are the 
following: 1) well functioning primary care system, able to perform its core "gate-keeping" function;
2) a sound and sophisticated hospital management system to cope with the new payment systems; 3) 
fairness, and independent management on the part of sickness funds; 4) fair and transparent 
competition among different public and private and public providers; 5) an impartial stewardship 
role on the part of government.. All of these factors, which could be summarized as: “strong 
institutional capacity and good governance” were absent or near absent in most FSE countries. As a 
result, in many instances health reforms in FSE introduced some positive innovations in the health 
sector, but these innovations were not implemented properly, or were not accompanied by other key 
components that could sustain them. For instance, the new case-based payment systems for hospitals 
and capitation-based payment for GPs in general represented a positive change from the previous 
input-based criteria, but they were not accompanied by new management and information systems 
able to prevent abuse, and by control over other sources of funding such as those coming from 
informal payments (see Chapter 8, for Georgia; also Case Study on Hungary, Chapter 6).
250 Again, countries in Central Europe such as Poland and the Czech Republic, are somewhat an exception, as 
they were able, shortly after the collapse of the communist regimes, to set the basis for the new democratic 
institutions and for economic development
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7 .8  The w a y  fo r w a r d
A first consideration is that any particular reform plan will have to consider and adapt to individual 
countries’ circumstances. Yet, the FSEs also inherited health systems that share core features and 
problems, and some of the key necessary steps ahead in the reform process are thus the same. All of 
them are characterized by high rates of prevalence of chronic diseases, mainly cardiovascular 
diseases, particularly among the adult male population. All of them must find innovative ways to 
fund their health system within the framework of a market economy. All of them are characterized 
by obsolete and resource-intensive diagnostic and therapeutic methods, as well as by an excessively 
heavy and rigid delivery system. In spite of ten or fifteen years of health reforms, all of them to 
various degrees are still characterized by poor incentives for health workers and facilities within the 
public sector, and by a yet unclear repartition of roles between the public and the private sectors. The 
suggested key components of a strategy to move forward are the following:
1. Strengthen Public Health Measures, particularly in the areas of Non- 
Communicable Diseases and Reproductive Health
The evidence on the burden of disease shows that a few well-focused health policy initiatives in the 
area of non-communicable diseases’ prevention could lead to significant reductions of the burden of 
disease in the region. FSE governments need to do against chronic disease what they were able to do 
against communicable diseases in the ‘50s and ‘60s, when, owing to strong public health measures 
such as compulsory childhood immunization, they achieved better health outcomes than other 
countries with similar levels of income. Health promotion and disease prevention information and 
communication strategies need to influence life-styles and consumption patterns. These are partly 
ingrained in deeply rooted cultural attitudes that are difficult to change, but partly they are 
determined by the level of “health awareness” in the population. For the majority of the population 
in FSE there is ample scope for improvement, even in the short-term and through simple 
interventions. The most effective attacking point for influencing life-styles is of course education of 
the new generation. Healthier life-styles may be promoted through an array of initiatives, ranging 
from basic hygiene and nutritional notions for kindergarten and elementary school children, to 
reproductive health courses for adolescents. For the adult population, probably the most effective 
interventions would be health information and promotion campaigns to be channelled through the 
media.
251 According to Palu (1999) in the Baltic countries also nosocomial infections became very high.
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In the short-term also supply-side interventions are required, such as a stricter control over the most 
lethal threats to FSE population’s health, tobacco and alcohol252, or health motivated restrictions 
meant to improve the quality of the air and the water, and to strengthen safety on the roads, in the 
work place, and in people’s homes.253 As important, health policies should aim at providing families 
with access to a minimum set of assets254 and of services, independently from their socio-economic- 
status. Basic preventive and treatment health services should be part of this set of services.
Finally, reproductive and maternal health is a critical area yet to be addressed, especially in the 
poorer countries of the region. The potential impact of relatively inexpensive health interventions in 
this area is immense. Most of the deaths could easily be avoided by simple measures, such as better 
information and better hygiene in the operating theatres. A striking example is abortion. Education 
and information campaigns on the demand side, greater availability of birth-control methods on the 
supply side, could all play a tremendous role in reducing the incidence of abortions, with negligible 
additional cost for the health system as a whole. In fact, alongside the huge human suffering saved, 
also in monetary terms health systems would most probably benefit from the diffusion of modem 
contraceptive methods.
2. Strengthen Health Financing
The evidence presented above clearly shows that the health financing issues facing the two groups of 
countries, on the one hand the CEE and, on the other, most FSE countries, are of different nature and 
order of magnitude. In the FSU, with the exception of the Baltic countries, the payroll tax earmarked 
for health revenues have been negligible (see Langenbrunner and Wiley, 1999). The “extra- 
budgetary” status of payroll health contributions has made their collection problematic, and tax 
evasion has been rampant. Moreover, in FSU countries only a fraction of the general budget 
assignments to health approved by the Parliament at the beginning of each year have actually been
252 Short-term measures should include raising the excise taxes on tobacco or alcohol products, as well as 
further restrictions such as banning tobacco and vodka advertising. In only a small group of countries in 
Central Europe, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, preventive campaigns against tobacco and alcohol 
consumption and for better lifestyle have been fully put into effect, while in a few others, such as Poland, 
Hungary and Croatia, the first significant steps in the protection of non-smokers have been only initiated.
253 Among these health-motivated restrictions: 1) stricter regulation of motor traffic speed; 2) compulsory use 
of seat belts and helmets for travel and work safety; 3) mandatory food supplements in schools; 4) tighter 
control over food quality.
254 For example, access to drinkable water, heating and basic energy supplies should be universally guaranteed. 
During the transition in FSU countries access to these basic services has radically worsened. This has created a
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transferred to the health sector by the government over the course of the year255. As a result, the 
resources allocated to health by the government have continued to be largely insufficient, erratic and 
shrinking over time in real terms. Thus, one of the major health policy challenges in this group of 
countries is to find alternative health funding sources that are equitable, sustainable, and that do not 
create excessive distortions in the economy.
In the majority of CEE region, on the contrary, health funding has been more stable and even 
increasing in real terms in a few countries, such as in the Czech Republic and in Poland. Presently, 
public health funding predominantly consists of payroll tax contributions. The local and central 
governments’ subsidies finance public health services, current expenditure of the non-contributing 
segments of the population, and capital expenditure. The rest of the health financial resources 
originate from patients' direct out-of-pocket payments (OOP). In the Czech Republic, for example, 
10-15 percent of total health expenditure is financed by general and local budget transfers. Another 9 
percent of the total consists of OOP, and the rest (approximately 80 percent) is funded through the 
payroll tax. In Poland Hungary and Romania, the share of OOP is larger (approximately 23, 25 and 
33 percent respectively).
So, while for several FSU countries the main problem is how to increase the share of government 
health expenditure, for most CEE and the Baltic countries the main problem is to contain total 
government health spending, and at the same time to preserve equity and quality of services.
However, one common key challenge faces both groups of countries: how to strengthen health 
financing sources alternative to the payroll tax contributions. The latter does not seem viable as an 
exclusive nor a principal source of funding for the health sector in the medium-long term: in some 
CEE countries the rates of the payroll tax earmarked for health have reached extremely high levels, 
and yet its revenue is still insufficient, whilst in most FSU countries the revenue from the payroll tax 
is negligible and insufficient to fund even a minimum level of health entitlements. At a deeper level, 
the payroll tax would be practical in economies with high shares of formal employment and with 
relative economic stability, while the evolution of FSE points in exactly the opposite direction. The 
share of the economy and of employment that are “informal” is continuously rising, also because 
high payroll taxes in CEE countries have contributed to encourage enterprises to stay “underground”.
severe health impact, especially for the most vulnerable groups (elderly and children).
255 Whenever revenues could not match the amount forecasted, the Ministry of Finance set a limit on the cash 
transfers to each budget line lower than the amount assigned by the budget approved by Parliament.
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Moreover, in international perspective, CEE and FSU economies largely base their comparative 
advantage on the availability of relatively inexpensive but at the same time well-trained labour. 
Thus, the potential growth-thwarting impact of high health and social security contributions 
exclusively linked to wages is likely to become a more important factor to consider as the process of 
globalisation and of economic integration within the European Union advances.
Alternative means of financing health services on a pre-payment basis that could and should be 
strengthened consist in general budget transfers for the public component, and in voluntary insurance 
contributions for the private component. However, there is no silver bullet, as these two sources of 
funding for health care alternative to the payroll tax are also extremely constrained. The 
government’s spending capacity through the general budget is ultimately determined by its fiscal and 
tax collection potential, which are still very poor in most FSU countries, particularly the direct tax 
component. It is important to consider that in socialist economies the personal income tax was not a 
significant source of revenue, because government expenditure was mainly funded through revenues 
from government owned enterprises (for example, oil exporting public companies), or through 
indirect taxes. Social services, including health, were directly funded by productive units (Kolkhoz, 
firms, etc.). It will take time before a well functioning fiscal system based on direct taxation is in 
place. In turn, voluntary insurance schemes are currently limited to a small wealthier minority 
segment of the population, and any plan to strengthen them would encounter several difficulties. 
First, the existing qualitative evidence from the FSU shows that, because of financial scandals and 
collapses of the past decade, people in general do not trust private for-profit financial or risk- 
management institutions (see Belli et al., 2002). Second, adverse selection and moral hazard would 
potentially thwart the growth of any voluntary scheme, unless the government guarantees 
universality and continuity of enrolment.256 Despite all the above difficulties, voluntary health 
insurance schemes still seem to have a great potential to grow in several of the former socialist 
economies because there is a large unmatched demand for health insurance, particularly against 
catastrophic events (see Chapter 8).
Finally, to contain the phenomenon of informal payments and reduce their negative impact a 
multiplicity of interventions is required (see following Chapter), including the strengthening of pre­
payment and insurance schemes. Among the other interventions mentioned in the literature are the 
following:
256 On this point, see Chapter 2.
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• Align the scope and scale of health entitlements and of the public delivery system with the 
available amount of resources. Guarantee a sustainable level of funding for public services and 
an adequate level of payment for health employees.
• Establish socially acceptable policies concerning formal user charges.
• Improve patients’ information and awareness concerning their health entitlements; empower 
patients’ representative groups.
• Reform the criteria according to which health personnel are paid, providing additional financial 
resources linked to performance, and move away from fee-for-service PS.
• Strengthen transparency and accountability at the different levels of government and within the 
delivery system. “Objective” resource allocation criteria are preferable to discretionary ones, 
particularly in contexts characterized by widespread corruption (see Chapter 6 ) .257
3. Further Downsize the Delivery System
The "soft" restructuring policies pursued over the last decade, based on the slow financial strangling 
of under-used facilities through the use of output-based payment systems, have not achieved the 
expected results.258 The capacity of the delivery system has indeed been reduced, but extremely 
slowly and not along all dimensions, and excess capacity still prevents the possibility to adequately 
finance all existing facilities and personnel.259 Several countries (including Latvia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, some Oblasts in the Russian Federation and Georgia) are currently moving 
towards more direct supply re-planning and restructuring policies, managed by the central 
government (see following Case study). The new official policy documents, known as “hospital 
restructuring or master plans", outline courageous projects for downsizing the delivery system by: 
(1) closing idle or only partially operational facilities; (2) relocating and merging numerous single 
specialty facilities under general hospitals; (3) substituting acute and sub-acute care beds with day­
care, rehabilitation and long-term care beds; (4) privatisation of non-strategic facilities and utilization 
of the revenues for renewal of a few strategic ones. To our knowledge no rigorous evaluation of the 
results so far achieved in restructuring the delivery system has been published. Anecdotal
257 For instance, if services for vulnerable groups are for free, it is necessary to specify precisely who the 
“vulnerable groups” are. Otherwise, as it is presently the case in Georgia, most resources (approximately 2/3) 
of the program supposedly for vulnerable groups are in fact used to pay for expensive treatments in favour of 
the Ministers’ entourage and their families (see following chapter).
258 Adjusting capacity at the margin (by closing beds) has not worked either.
259In many cases, the amount of financial resources received by under-utilised facilities has been just sufficient 
to keep them alive, but insufficient to unable them to renew their equipment and to provide reliable and timely 
services.
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information suggests that the plans are encountering political difficulties and opposition, and are not 
yet fully implemented.
Case study 7.2: Hospital restructuring plans
In Kazakhstan reductions in beds and facilities have been in the order of 40-50 percent. Between 1994 and 
1997 in the Dzheskasgan region, the organizational and management reforms led to a decrease in the number 
of beds from 6,225 to 2,919 and to the reduction in the number of hospitals from 55 to 22 (Horst, 1998). 
Georgia and some regions within the Russian Federation (Tver, Kaluga, Novgorod Oblast and Chuvash 
Autonomous Republic) have recently implemented hospital-restructuring plans that originally foresaw a 
profound downsizing of the delivery system through consolidation and privation of facilities. However, few of 
the planned hospital closures have actually been completed. One of the more contentious aspects of the 
restructuring plans concerns the problem of labour force "re-deployment". The health sector is a major 
employer in the region and physicians representative groups are politically very influential. In order not to be 
paralysed by physicians’ opposition and to succeed, restructuring plans ought to utilize severance pay schemes 
and other financial incentives for retirement or re-qualification.
4 New Payment System Reforms
The first generation of payment systems’ reform was characterized by the introduction of activity- 
based payments system, fee-for-service or, more frequently, fixed price. As we explained, such 
payments systems led to some reduction in unit costs, but also to a proliferation of the number of 
cases treated, and to an overall increase in hospital costs.
More recently, there has been a shift from activity-oriented payment systems to global or capped 
budgets and capitation funding (Croatia, Slovak and Czech Republic, Kaluga, Tver and Kemerovo 
region in the Russian Federation; see following Case study), as a means to achieve a tighter control 
over hospital costs. It is now interesting to monitor this second generation of payment system 
reforms, such as the Koprevnica pilots in Croatia and the global budgets payments for hospitals in 
the Czech Republic. Adopting a prospectively-determined global budget, or a capitation funding to 
achieve more stringent cost-control may induce providers to under-treat or dump costly patients, 
particularly if payment is unrelated to any performance measure.260
260 A separate issue concerns the necessity to align individual incentives with institutional incentives (for 
Georgia, see Chapter 8).
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Case study 7.3: The Kaluga and Tver Regions in the Russian Federation. A 
recent successful experience of payment system reform
In the Kaluga and Tver Regions regional governments recently introduced global budgets for a pilot group of 
hospitals and a partial GP Fund holding scheme as an attempt to reduce volume of admissions that had been 
soaring under the previous cost-per-case reimbursement system. 70-80 percent of the total health budget was 
assigned to hospitals on a global budget basis, and hospital directors were granted greater autonomy on the use 
of these funds. The changes have been accompanied by other minor organizational reforms strengthening the 
power of administration and their control over costs. Early results suggest that:
>  cost per patient significantly decreased (15-30 percent);
>• number of inpatient and outpatient specialist visits dropped;
number of beds was reduced by 40% and staff was also significantly reduced.
7 .9  C onclusions
Restructuring the health systems of FSE so that they can adequately serve all the residents still 
represents a major challenge. All but a few of those countries are still struggling to re-shape core 
parts of their health systems, in financing, definition of priorities for public funding, re-organization 
of services, human resource training. As Western industrial countries with less radical health reform 
agendas and within a much more facilitating social and economic environment have found, such 
reforms are economically institutionally and politically difficult. However, it must also be clear that 
ultimately for FSE countries the choice is not between reforming their health sectors and leave them 
unchanged. Fiscal and other pressures make sect oral change inevitable, removing the option of 
leaving things as they are. The real choice is whether policymakers will allow change to occur 
haphazardly or will instead try to orient it rationally.
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Chapter 8: Out-of-Pocket and Informal Payments in 
the health sector: evidence from Georgia*”
8 .1  In trodu ction
“The results o f  the health reform s are terrible. It left p a tien t w ithout doctors and
doctors are left w ithout m oney to l iv e ”.
Focus Group Participant
Georgia has a population of 4.4 million in a geo-graphical area of 70,000 km2, bounded by the Black 
Sea, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. Since the independence of the country from the 
Soviet Union on 9th April 1991, Georgia appeared to be a relatively well-off Republic with 
promising potential for growth. Instead, soon after independence the country suffered from a period 
of political turmoil and civil war, which resulted in the influx of approximately 350,000 displaced 
people from the Abkhazia region near the Black Sea coastline. It also experienced an extremely 
severe economic decline, caused by the disruption of trade within the former Soviet Union (FSU), 
and by the difficulties encountered in the transition to a market economy. As a result, over the period 
1991-1995 economic output fell by up to 75% (see Chapter7, Table 7.5). Moreover, by the end of 
the 1993, annual inflation had reached 8400%.262
The economic decline and the political and institutional turmoil in the first year immediately 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union produced a fiscal collapse, and this in turn produced an 
immensely negative impact on the health care system of the country. Public expenditure on health 
was reduced to US$ 0.81 per person per annum in 1994.263 The raising levels of poverty also directly 
affected the health status of the population, particularly of those that fell into unemployment. IMR, 
MMR and other priority health outcome indicators worsened dramatically (see Chapter 7).
261 This study was commissioned to me by the World Bank in June 2000, as part of a multi-country research 
project involving Poland and Kazakhstan. To conduct the study, I devised the questionnaires, I hired local 
consultants (PMI and Curatio Consulting Company), trained them in conducting in-depth interviews and focus 
groups in June 2001, and then followed the data collection and analysis. I am fully responsible for the final 
report, submitted in Summer 2002 to the World Bank.
262 Both J. Health care financing strategy in Georgia 2002-2007. Tbilisi: TNO; 2002.
263 World Bank. Georgia poverty and income distribution. Report no. 19348-GE, vol. 1. Washington, DC:
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As explained in the previous Chapter, the health care delivery system in Georgia was characterized 
by a structure known in the literature as “Semashko” model, common to all former Soviet Union 
countries and based on a capillary territorial network of hospitals and polyclinics. It was a 
centralized delivery system, which grew over time, during the 1970s outnumbering in terms of beds, 
facilities, physicians, and nurses per capita, the health systems of the wealthier Western European 
countries (see Table 7.3 and 7.4 Chapter 7). Financing from the government was primarily based on 
inputs (bed-days, human resources, equipment, etc.) and resources were used extremely inefficiently.
The economic and fiscal collapse of the first transition years made it impossible to continue to 
financially sustain the government delivery system.
In 1995-96, in parallel with a new program of macroeconomic and fiscal adjustment, the 
Government of Georgia decided to introduce major health sector reforms. These included 
(Gamkrelidze et al, 2002):
1. Removal of entitlement to free health care from the Constitution that was enacted in 
1996.264 Public insurance coverage was limited to services included in a basic benefit package 
(BBP).
2. Introduction of a social insurance contribution, earmarked to fund health services, set at a 
rate equal to 4% (3% being employers’ share and 1% employees’). Any shortfall in the revenue from 
this social insurance contribution would be compensated by direct transfers from the general budget 
(see Box 8.1).
Box. 8.1: Different sources of revenue, and total spent by the government on health
a. General budget: In 1999, health expenditure was equal to 3.6% of total central budget expenditure (total 
expenditure on health care was equal to Gel 33.2 million, and total central budget spending was equal to Gel 
904.8 million) 265.
b. Payroll taxes: Georgia introduced social health insurance (SHI) in 1995, and a semi-autonomous 
organization -State Medical Insurance Company (SMIC) was created to administer the funds collected for 
health through the payroll tax, and to set contract for services with health care providers. Participation in SMIC
World Bank; 1999. p. 9
264 GoG officially introduced out-of-pocket payments in 1996 and even amended the first constitution drafted. 
The constitutional right to free health services was removed.
265 Center for medical statistics and information (CMSI). Healthcare in Georgia, 1999: statistical yearbook. 
Tbilisi; 2000.
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is mandatory for all formal sector employees from the public and private sectors. Revenues for SMIC come 
partially from employees (who pay 1% of their salaries), and from employers (who contribute 3% of the formal 
wage bill). The shortfalls for payroll tax are matched with transfers from general budget.
c. Allocations from municipalities: Municipalities are the third main source of public financing for health care 
services. Note that the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs (MoLHSA) would mandate that 
municipalities spent on health care at least Gel 2.5 per capita per year (or 10% of their budget, whichever is 
greater), but most of them do not comply with this regulation. On average they spend approximately 4.9% of 
their total expenditure on health care (in 1999, total spending by local governments was equal to 320.1 million 
Gel, and their expenditure on health care was 16 million, according to Kenneth, 2002), with great variability 
across municipalities. Some of them, such as Tbilisi, spend almost 10%, while others, such as Kazbegi, spend 
less than 1% of their total on health care (Preker et al, 2002).
Overall, the three above public sources of revenue for health care services were equal to 1.38 of GDP in 2001, 
as figure 8.1 illustrates.
Figure 8.1: Public and Private Shares of Total Health Expenditure as % of GDP
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3. Redefinition of central and local governments’ responsibilities for health by distinguishing 
between the central and the municipal portions of the BBP. The role of regions and municipalities
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was significantly expanded both in health financing and in the management of service provision.
4. Separation of purchasers and providers. Purchasing responsibilities were transferred to the 
State Medical Insurance Company, to the Municipal Health Funds266 and to the Public Health 
Department (PHD). 267 At the same time, hospitals and other service providers were transformed into 
autonomous juridical entities. They were asked to negotiate service delivery agreements with the 
public purchasers and would be paid accordingly, on a cost-per case basis for services that were part 
of the BBP, and from patients’ direct payments for all the other services. All health care personnel 
were removed from the civil service and from the government’s payroll. For all the services not part 
of the BBP providers were allowed to charge patients on the basis of approved fee-for-service (FFS) 
price lists, and were given the right to retain all generated revenue.
8 .2 . The e x te n t o f  o u t-o f  p o c k e t p a y m e n ts  in  G eorgia
With the 1995 reforms OOPs were officially ‘introduced’ as a source of funding for health services, 
both as a reward to private practice, as well as in the form of co-payments and user-fees. In fact, 
informal OOPs were most probably existing during the Soviet times, but with the economic and 
fiscal collapse of the early 1990s they became much more prevalent. Currently, according to recent 
estimates, OOPs (formal and informal) are the major source of health financing, equal to 
approximately 2.3 percent of GDP and 75% of total health expenditure (THE) (see Figure 8.1 
above).
As a result of these high OOP payments, health care services and particularly inpatient hospital care 
services have become extremely expensive. For example, Gotsadze et al. (2001, p. 37) found that on 
average a single episode of hospitalisation in Tbilisi costs GEL 879 (equivalent to US $ 418), 
approximately equal to 10 times the monthly average salary in the country.
Moreover, it is estimated that almost half of the total revenue from OOPs is informally paid (Georgia 
State Department of Statistics, 2000). Georgia is not an exception in the region. The same trend is 
observed in several other former socialist countries (see Chapter 7). Private OOP spending is
266 Municipal Funds contribute, alongside SMIC, to pay for services included in the BBP.
267 The PHD is part of the Ministry of Health, and it is responsible for administering public health programmes 
(e.g., disease surveillance, immunization, etc.).
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estimated to be equal to 82% of THE in Azerbaijan, 80% in Moldova and 60% in Kyrgyz Republic 
(Balabanova and McKee, 2002), which are comparable to the poorest countries of South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 6)
8 .3  The S tu d y  O bjectives
The phenomenon of OPP and particularly of informal payments in former socialist economies has 
been well documented (see Lewis, 2000). However, there is still very little qualitative research on 
the process collection, on the determinants of IPs and their impact on providers and on the 
population.268 Understanding these issues could inform the policy debate, and contribute to articulate 
new strategies to address the issue of informal payments. This study is meant to: (a) provide an in- 
depth analysis of the nature, the process of collection and of distribution of OOPs, and particularly of 
the informal component; (b) identify and explain some of the key factors that can explain the 
prevalence of OOPs and IPs as a share of the total health financing; (c) understand their 
consequences, especially on access.
8 .4  The s tu d y  m eth odo logy
This is a qualitative study complemented with the quantitative data presented in the previous Chapter 
(see State Department of Statistics, 2000, and Mossialos, 2002 ). The qualitative study considered 
two target groups: patients and service providers. Patients were engaged in in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions, while for providers only in-depth interviews were conducted. Two 
geographical localities were selected for the study:
1. The capital city of Tbilisi, which houses almost a third of the whole population of Georgia. In 
addition, the most important healthcare facilities of the country are located in this city: 74 hospitals, 
123 polyclinics and 16 dispensaries. The doctor to population ratio is one doctor per 118.6 
individuals, and there is one hospital bed per 135 resident, with utilization rates being only 32%. 
Almost 45% of the total National health spending occurs in Tbilisi (Mossialos et al., 2002).
268 1 carried out together with Helen Shahriari one of the few qualitative studies similar to that presented here 
(Shahriari, Belli and Lewis, 2001). This study shows that the nature, extent and causes of OPP and of informal 
payments are very different in Georgia and in Poland.
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2. A country-representative Rayon (district) -Gori- with its urban and rural locations, where choice 
of services is limited relative to Tbilisi. Gori is of one of the six Rayons (districts) in the Shida Kartli 
region. The city of Gori, with a population of up to 60,000, is the administrative and cultural Centre 
of the district. The whole district houses 181,988 individuals, who are served by four hospitals 
(including a 90 bed maternity home), with a total bed capacity of 586 beds, 2 rayonal polyclinics and 
22 rural ambulatories (village clinics) located in the surrounding villages. There is a doctor for every 
398 individuals in the district, and one hospital bed per 310 (Centre for Medical Statistics and 
Information, 2000).
The principal aim of in-depth interviews with patients was to understand the level and pervasiveness 
of OOPs, formal and informal, whether or not and to what extent OOPs create a barrier to access 
health services, and the dynamics of payment. The interviewers asked specific questions on when, 
how, to whom, and why payments generally occurred. Guides for in-depth interviews included 
questions concerning illness and non illness related episodes (such as pregnancies or preventive 
services), services included and not part of the BBP, cases when services were fully utilized, as well 
as cases when treatment was forgone, or delayed or interrupted because of financial or other reasons 
(see modules for interviews and focus group discussions in the Annex 8.2).
Focus Group discussions reiterated some of the same questions of the in-depth interviews, but also 
concentrated on more general policy-related issues concerning service provision and payments. The 
responses given during the Focus Groups were compared with those given during the in-depth 
interviews. The objective was to ascertain whether confidentiality (obviously absent in a focus group 
discussion) made any difference and to further probe the results of the in-depth interviews. Contrary 
to what was found in Poland (see Shariari and Belli, 2001), in Georgia responses during focus group 
discussion perfectly matched those during in-depth interviews, suggesting that people are willing to 
speak openly about their experiences with paying for health services.
In the second part of the Focus Groups, questions about the perceived causes of payment, and 
households’ perception concerning the viability of different policy interventions to contain IPs were 
discussed.
In-depth interviews with providers aimed at exploring the dynamics in the flow of funds within 
health facilities, including the mechanisms of payment collection, distribution, and utilization of 
revenues from OOPs (formal or informal), and health workers’ perception of the causes and
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consequences of IPs. Pre-testing of the questionnaire indicated that providers were also willing to 
speak openly about their experiences with IPs.
For the in-depth interviews with households (HHs), a “snow-ball” sampling method (see Denzin, 
Lincoln, 2000) was used to select those HHs where at least one member had used hospital services or 
outpatient services over three months prior to the interview. The total number of individuals residing 
in the HHs that were interviewed was equal to 406, out of which 146 individuals (36%) reported 
having used health services (because of illness, prevention or because they were pregnant) during the 
3 month prior to interview. The sample-selection criteria were also meant to capture the urban/rural 
differences and the differences between different economic, age and gender groups.
Table 8.1: Sample Distribution for the Focus Groups
Poor Rich
Tbilisi 3 3
Gori 3 3
Total 6 6
Table 8.2: Sample Distribution for Providers and Households selected for in-depth interviews
Providers Households
Hospital Outpatient Urban Rural
staff facilities’ staff
Tbilisi 21 10 58
Gori 6 3 15 26
Total 27 13 73 26
The sample of users from urban and rural areas was further disaggregated into sub-sets according to 
inpatient-outpatient, pregnancy and child delivery, paediatric, and male-female (the detailed 
breakdown of HHs selected for in-depth interviews is presented in Annex 8.1 on page 267 and 
subsequent pages). HHs’ economic status was estimated through questions concerning total HH 
monthly expenditure and income. Reported income was related to region/city specific income levels 
reported by the State Department of Statistics. A specific tool (pre-questionnaire) was developed and 
administered by the surveyors for the respondent recruitment for the in-depth interview or for focus 
group discussion.
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The pre-questionnaire allowed adequate representation of various groups to be reached. A total of 12 
focus groups with 119 individuals, and 186 in-depth interviews were carried out.269 Obviously, given 
the limited sample interviewed and the qualitative methods utilized, this study does not aim to 
provide statistically representative data.
The fieldwork was carried out during June-August 2001. The data analysis was carried out during 
September-December 2001.
The limited sample size, the impossibility to carry out follow up interviews, and the qualitative 
methodology utilized limited the scope of the results we found. As previously explained, our aim 
was to reach a more in-depth understanding of the dynamics, causes and consequences of informal 
and formal direct payments in the Georgian context. Our study findings complement the evidence 
from other studies, which included a household health expenditure quantitative household survey 
carried out in 2000 (see State Department of Statistics, 2000).270
8 .5  D efin ition  o f  Out-of-Pocket P a ym en ts  (OOP) an d  o f  
Inform al P aym en ts .
Out-of-pocket payments (OOPs) refer to those payments for health services that are borne directly by 
the patients, or their households. The emphasis of this definition is on the direct nature of the 
payments, which distinguish them from the other major sources of health care financing, private 
health insurance, compulsory social insurance and taxation. The latter all share the common feature 
of being pre-payment mechanisms: people pay in advance, according to different criteria (according 
to their health risk in case of private insurance, or to their ability to pay in case of social insurance or 
taxes), in order to have their health consumption partially or fully subsidized at the point of service. 
The informal component of OOPs is defined as the payments (cash or in kind) made to service 
providers (person or institution) by those people who are entitled to the services, in addition to any 
legally defined payment.271 This can take several forms, including direct cash payments to medical
269 146 in depth interviews were with individual patients, and 40 with providers (30 doctors and 10 nurses). 
The results of FG were video taped and in-depth interviews recorded on tape recorder.
270 Some of the results from this quantitative survey are presented in Chapter 7.
271 In order to facilitate a common understanding of informal payments, we would emphasize the following key 
elements of this definition Belli and Gaal, 2002):
1. Informality: Informality means that the economic activity is not registered. This is a common feature of all
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doctors, gift to nurses, or the in kind provision of certain elements of services, such as drugs, nursing 
or meals in inpatient care, which should otherwise be the responsibility of the provider.
According to the above definition, given the set of health entitlements in each country, namely the 
rights to free or subsidized access to health services as defined by law, it is to be considered as 
formal any payment for those services that are not included, and as informal any payment for 
services that are included in the set of these health entitlements (or above the legal co-payment, in 
case of services only partially subsidized by government).
This seemingly straightforward distinction, however, is extremely difficult to apply empirically in 
the case of Georgia. In theory, the law on health entitlements states that patients have the right to 
services included in the Basic Benefit Package (BBP) for free or in exchange for low co-payments, 
and that for all other services every medical provider should determine the prices at the point of 
service. These prices vary according to type of service and facility, and should be posted in health 
facilities and publicly known. However, in reality we found that patients are unable to distinguish 
formal or informal payments, because they do not know what their entitlements are.272 Thus, the 
study investigates into all OPP, and not specifically the informal component, although some sections
types of informal payments. But not all unregistered payments given to service providers are informal 
payments according to the above definition. We are not interested for instance in those payments that are due 
to the provider according to a set price for a determined service, but for which the provider does not give a 
receipt to avoid paying tax.
2. Illegality: A second important defining dimension of informal payments is legality/illegality. Laws and 
regulations in each country determine the definition of informal payments, by determining entitlements for 
health services. They define (or should define) who is entitled to which services, in exchange for what (i.e. 
what could be charged formally for the services). Not all informal payments, though, are illegal. They are not 
illegal if patients give them spontaneously, as an expression of gratitude or of appreciation for an extra-service 
received, without any pressure from the provider (such liberal payment can be compared to an extra-tip given 
to a waiter in a restaurant). On the other hand, it is true that everything that is illegal payment is also informal 
by definition.
In general, it is empirically impossible to ascertain whether a certain informal payment (a payment for a 
service to which the patient is entitled for free, or a payment above the legally set fee) is also illegal. Thus, the 
definition of informal payments in the text, which is the only one empirically viable, also includes legal but 
unrecorded payments. Moreover, it is easier to ascertain informal payments when patients are entitled for a 
service completely free of charge. It is more difficult to identify informal payments if a nationally defined 
formal co-payment can be charged for the service concerned, and it is even more difficult when each provider, 
as in the Georgian case for all services that are not part of the essential package of services (BBP), can charge a 
different price for the same services.
272 First, the population has sometimes a vague idea of their rights to free services, or they do not know the 
official co-payment rates, nor they know the official prices for the services not included in the BBP. Second, 
with the exception of the services, which are part of the BBP, it is also impossible to separate formal from 
informal payments in the phase of data-analysis from households’ responses concerning the amount paid for 
different type of services, because prices vary in different facilities. Furthermore, we discovered that it is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two also from providers’ interviews.
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are exclusively dealing with the informal component of payments. From providers’ interviews, the 
study was able to capture some interesting information linking formal and informal OPP273. In 
summary, all the episodes of care where payments occurred investigated in this study can be 
classified in 5 different categories:
1. Fee-for-service payments for the services that are not part of the BBP. In principle official fee 
schedules are set by each single medical provider, according to lists reviewed and approved by 
the MoHLSA licensing department during the process of licensing.
2. Private payments for drugs purchased from pharmacies. Private spending on pharmaceuticals is 
estimated to be somewhere between 26% and 53% of total private spending on healthcare 
(Gotsadze et al. 2001, SDS 2000b, Skarbinksy 1999, Mays and Schaefer 1999). Except for drug- 
prescriptions within services that are part of the BBP (for instance, pain-killers for terminally-ill 
patients, or drugs for emergencies)274, there is no other form of drug provision on a pre-paid 
basis.
3. Co-payments for services partially covered by private insurers. In Georgia a few private medical 
insurance companies are operating, although their scope is still extremely limited. During 1998- 
1999 the share of private health insurance over the total private insurance premium collection 
rose from 5% to 7.9%. However, in 1999 health premiums totalled only 468,000 GEL (= US$ 
234,000, ISSS 1999), which in per capita terms is hardly US$ 0.045, and approximately 0.15% 
of total estimated private spending.
4. Co-payments for those services that are part of BBP, but are not fully subsidised by government. 
This happens for services, such as emergency services, which belong to the Municipal part of the 
BBP. For instance, in year 2001, hospital services for adults (15+) that were part of the 
Municipal BBP were subject to a fifty percent co-payment.
5. Informal payments to physicians and other personnel for services that are part of the BBP and 
should be provided for free at the point of service.
273 See section: 8.2.1.6: ‘How Much Is Paid? Relationship Between the Formal and Informal Components of 
OPP.
274 In fact, a minimum share of expenditure within the BBP is allocated to drugs (only 5% of public funds).
8 .6  R esu lts
8.6.1 How payments are made
“...There are various forms o f payment and various reasons why patients pay informal fees: gifts, 
money demanded or voluntarily paid. I have not researched into this issue but I am sure all these 
forms exist in our facility”. Hospital Provider Interview, Tbilisi.
Payment occurred in 123 of the 146 cases investigated, and almost universally respondents agreed 
that paying for health services in Georgia is a really common and accepted practice. The general 
perception among those interviewed was that, unless a patient had good connections with somebody 
in the government (local administration) or directly with doctors, s/he had to pay to get treated:: 
“You go to a policlinic to get registered and have to pay, you see a doctor and have to pay, call 
ambulance and have to pay, need the drug and have to p a y”. FG, Low Income”
The study also captured several forms of OOPs, as well as various circumstances in which they 
occur. For services that are not part of the BBP, patients are charged either according to official price 
lists, or according to informal fees negotiated with providers with approximately equal frequency 
(see discussion hereafter). For services that are part of the BBP and for which patients should not 
pay according to the existing laws, payments occur informally, and doctors and nurses use various 
methods, some “softer” and other more direct and coercive in order to be paid. Patients report that 
doctors and nurses explicitly complain about the economic hardships they face, or they do not pay 
adequate attention or are rude to them until they pay, or -more often- explicitly ask them or their 
family to pay.
When payment is explicitly demanded, it is generally requested ex-ante or during treatment. A 
significant number of individuals recalled stories where physicians and sometimes nurses demanded 
payment from the patient as a pre-condition to access treatment or to complete it: “When you call an 
ambulance, before they even inquire about the patient's condition, they ask you if  you have 10 Gel275, 
and they will come only if  you have money to pay. ” FG, Gori. In few cases, patients felt so directly
275 Gel=Georgian Lari is the Georgian currency. At the time of the study, its value of 1 Gel was approximately 
0.5 US$.
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forced to pay that they remembered the experience as “extortion”: “...They made it clear that if  I did 
not pay I would not be treated. In fact this was simple extortion". FG, Gori.
Money is not only demanded for treatment or drug purchases, but it is sometimes demanded also to 
provide sickness certificates or exemptions from military service. We encountered cases where 
providers exploited to their advantage existing laws or regulations that were meant to favour patients. 
For instance, SMIC issues an “insurance card” for all children who are entitled to free public 
coverage under the Children 0-3 Program 276. Providers should distribute the insurance card at no 
cost whenever they attend to a delivery, or an eligible newborn seeks care at their facility for the first 
time. However, the study documented cases where parents were charged for the insurance card, and 
then, despite showing the card to another provider, they also paid for the health services received by 
their children. A young mother in Gori said: “I had to pay fo r  the insurance card 25 Gel. The card 
said that treatment fo r  my child was free. I think the government pays the cost. I was told that i f  I do 
not accept the card I had to pay a fine in the amount o f  100 US$. Now I have this insurance card, 
but I still have to pay every time I go to the hospital. Everybody who goes to that facility has the card 
and everybody has to p a y ”. FG, Gori
The study also captured few instances where payment was apparently given in a completely 
voluntary way, as an expression of gratitude or/and because it is perceived as the “norm”: “It is a 
habit to pay doctor in order to express thankfulness. As an example my co-worker took the child fo r  
vaccination that is free, but she paid money. When I asked why she did so, she responded that she 
fe lt uncomfortable not to pay the doctor”. FG. Tbilisi. Voluntary payments seem to be more 
prevalent in rural areas, and for outpatient services rather than for inpatient services. “...W e are very 
pleased with our village doctors. They are doing well; they are knowledgeable and available 
whenever we need them. We try just to thank them at the best o f our ability”. Household Interview, 
rural area, Gori district.
Informal charges are paid with cash, or by ‘exchanging’ goods or services (barter), or by offering in- 
kind contributions or gifts. All of these forms were found in the study, even if cash payments largely 
prevailed. Gifts are common when there is a personal relationship between the patient and the 
physician/nurse. In these cases, offering cash would be embarrassing for the patient, but at the same
276 One of the programs in the BBP
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time leaving the doctor’s office without expressing gratitude would be culturally not acceptable. 
Gifts are usually of symbolic value (such as a chocolate box, or cheese, or flowers).
It is also common for households to contribute some of the supplies needed for hospital treatment (in 
kind contributions), most often medicines and food, but also syringes, bandages, sheets or blankets, 
and even blood for transfusions. These contributions make up for inputs that are frequently missing 
within facilities, and households can sometimes find it extremely difficult to find them in the market. 
Some patients were given blood by other family members and/or their relatives.
8 .6 .2  How m uch is  paid?
Prices vary according to the facility, the type of service, and providers’ assessment of patient’s 
ability to pay. Sometimes price negotiation takes place between providers and patients. The study 
captured two distinct occasions when such negotiations took place. The most common one is for 
delivery services. Physicians are approached well ahead of time to secure their availability for the 
delivery, and the price of their service becomes subject of negotiation. The other case concerns 
negotiations over the price of inpatient or outpatient curative services. In their in-depth interviews, 
physicians said that during these negotiations they utilize the official price list that sets a price for 
each service (which is known to them, but usually not to the patient) as a benchmark for charging. 
They also seem to be guided by their perception of the patient’s ability to pay. These negotiations 
serve two distinct purposes:
a. To determine prices that will be “affordable” to the patient. A significant number of interviewed 
providers said that they feel uncomfortable about asking for payment, and try to provide services to 
the poor at “affordable” prices or even for free. Forgone revenues on treating poorer patients are 
often compensated by charging wealthier patients more. As a result of this positive price- 
discrimination, poorer patients seem to be able to receive the same services at significantly lower 
prices than the better off: "...The price is set after negotiations with the patient and according to 
her/his ability to pay. However the price does not determine what kind o f services the patient will 
receive”. Gori, Provider Interview. In a few cases, also patients from well-off households 
complained that they were asked to pay more, when doctors suspected they were relatively wealthy: 
"...I think we had to pay 500 Gel, but they asked us to pay 1,000 Gel. Probably they noticed that we 
had money and demanded more". Patient Interview, Tbilisi. Note that by reducing price for the poor
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and increasing it for the rich doctors enhance access for the poor; however, these cross-subsidies are 
completely left to each provider’s good-will, and each physician’s willingness to collect informally 
is an important factor as well to determine the price each patient is charged. As rightly argued by 
Ensor and Killingsworth 277: “The poor are unambiguously subsidized by the better-off in case of 
explicit cross-subsidies, whilst in the case of informal price discrimination willingness to pay 
determines contribution. While willingness to pay may often accord with ability to pay, this need not 
be the case. Those on lower income with fewer opportunities to obtain treatment elsewhere, and an 
immediate need for medical care, may show a strong willingness to pay to the extent that they 
borrow or sell goods in order to obtain the necessary funding”. Moreover, it is not clear whether the 
criteria used by providers to judge their patients’ wealth are accurate or not. In rural areas doctors 
know their patients’ economic situation, but in urban areas they base their assessment mainly on 
questions to their patients about their profession and area of residence, and look at their attire.
b. To reach an agreement through which physicians reduce the official part of payment, in exchange 
for some “informal” income that they can directly pocket. Physicians receive a low share of all the 
revenue that hospitals collect officially (see below), and at the same time official charges for services 
outside of the BBP have raised dramatically over the last few years (see for example, State 
Department of Statistics, 2000). Thus, both physicians and patients have an incentive to ‘informalise’ 
their transactions. Physicians can pocket a higher personal income by not reporting their revenues to 
the facility administration, and patients can receive services at a lower price if the physician does not 
report her/his service, or manipulates the diagnosis so that their service becomes partially or fully 
funded under a publicly paid program. Thus, physicians frequently arrange payments in a way that is 
advantageous for both (patient and doctor): "We were told that officially the surgery would cost 
1,200 Gel, and that we would be expected to pay more to various staff. However, the doctor 
proposed to change the diagnosis, and in that case the government would partially cover the cost o f  
treatment. We would have to pay only 600 Gel to the doctor ". Patient Interview, Tbilisi. A 
specialist, describing his outpatient activities in a hospital in Tbilisi, said: “Sometimes patients 
approach doctors directly, when they want to avoid official fees. For example official fee fo r  a 
doctor consultation is set at 15 Gel and fo r  a professor consultation at 20 Gel. When patients strike a 
deal with the doctor they pay less (e.g. 5-10 Gel). O f course this payment bypasses the cashier, so 
payment is not recorded, and the money becomes the doctor’s personal income". Provider, Tbilisi.
277 Ensor T, Killingsworth J, editors. Paying for health: unofficial payments for health care in low and
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This finding, namely IPs are not always paid “on the top o f ’ official fees but may at times contribute 
to reduce the total cost of treatment for patients, is one of the most interesting and new in our 
research. It is also remarkably different from the findings of similar studies conducted in countries 
where IPs are not as widespread as in Georgia (in Poland, see Shahriari and Belli, 2001, and in 
Bulgaria see Balabanova and McKee, 2002) and where authors found that IPs increased the total 
amount paid by patients.
In the Georgian context, proposing to further raise official fees (see Lewis, 2000) as a means to 
contain IPs may in fact contribute to further increase the incentive to maintain informal transactions.
8 .6 .3  Paym ents for services that are part o f the BBP
According to the law, services included in the BBP (see Annex 8.4) should be provided for free 
(small co-payments exist only for services funded by municipal governments). In reality, our study 
found that in general patients pay for services that are part of the BBP, although they may report to 
have received a ‘discount’ for these services: "My sister has a child, and she has the SM1C 
insurance card fo r  0-3 years o ld  Her child needed surgery and the cost was 800 GEL. The (public) 
insurance partially covered the surgery cost, and we had to pay only 300 GEL. Due to the financial 
assistance received under the SMIC scheme the cost o f  the surgery was bearable fo r  our fam ily”. 
FG, Tbilisi.
Furthermore, our findings confirm results from previous studies (Gotsadze et al., 2000) that the 
population does not precisely know which services are part of the BBP. For instance, a mother who 
had heard about the program for children 0-3 was still sceptical when she joined the Focus Group: 
"My friend told me that in their polyclinic children receive services fo r  free... I do not know if  there 
is any age limitation. I think this is an initiative o f  their polyclinic”. FG, Low-income.
Thus, our study found that several households had heard in the media messages about ffee-health 
services, but that there was a widespread confusion as to what services were part of the BBP, and 
distrust towards these information campaigns. The messages given were in stark contrast with the 
daily experience of all respondents, where in fact no service is (almost) ever given for free: "We 
hear on the media that services fo r  pregnant mothers and small children are fo r  free. Probably some 
lab test are free, or maybe something else, but our experience is that when we go to hospital they 
always charge us”. FG, Gori, Low income.
middle-income countries. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000:8.
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For example, all couples that we interviewed who were planning to have children were accumulating 
savings in order to pay for delivery services, which supposedly they could receive for free in public 
facilities. A mother, who had given birth in a maternity home in Tbilisi, seemed to know and to 
accept to have to pay for services in maternity hospitals: “For the delivery we had to pay the doctor 
200 Gel... We agreed the price with the doctor. They also told us that as long as we arrange fo r  their 
guaranteed assistance during delivery several month prior to delivery, the public coverage does not 
work, and we are not eligible fo r  free services". Patient Interview, Tbilisi.
Physicians also admitted to ask for payment to provide BBP services. They justified themselves by 
complaining that their low official income forced them to do so.
8 .6 .4  Paym ent co llection  and distribution m echanism s
The dynamics of payment collection captured by the study are quite diverse, though some common 
characteristics can be found. The process of payment also varies by type of ownership. Established 
private providers only collect payments through cashiers, according to posted prices: “In private 
clinics staff immediately informs you about the price o f  services and only after receiving treatment 
you pay your dues at the cashier, fo r  which you get receipt". Provider interview, Tbilisi.
In public facilities [in both localities Tbilisi and Gori] payments are given either to the cashier, or 
directly to the doctor (nurse). The latter form prevails in outpatient facilities, while the two forms 
occur in approximately equal proportions in hospitals: “...Out o f 20 such transactions only 10 are 
recorded on the official books (deposited with cashier), while revenues from the other 10 are shared 
among various physicians who were involved in the patient’s treatment process". Provider 
interview, Tbilisi.
Payments not officially recorded are either collected and pocketed by the physicians who treats the 
patient, or (less frequently) shared among physicians who work in the same ward. Separate and 
smaller ‘side-payments’ are then also offered to one or two of the nurses who contributed to the 
patient’s care. In inpatient cases sharing arrangements are more frequent. The study also encountered 
physicians who claimed that part of the informal cash collected was used to pay for essential non­
labour inputs, primarily drugs. These investments seem to be guided by the desire to improve 
quality of care and thus attract more patients. “Part o f  the informal income generated by the medical 
staff was accumulated in a special fund. The money from the fund was used to do little maintenance
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to the ward and its equipment. Also, it contributed to purchase some stock o f most needed 
medicines. ” Hospital Provider Interview, Tbilisi. “Our head o f  department collects money from the 
staff, which is spent to purchase cleaning materials, lamps, paper and pencils and fo r  the other 
things that are needed. Otherwise nobody provides these things to our department”. Hospital 
Provider Interview, Gori.
Overall, our study found some sense of unity or solidarity among different medical staff employed in 
the same ward or the same facility. This is confirmed by another interesting finding: given the 
scarcity of patients who seek care at facilities, sometimes physicians who work in the same ward 
agree on informal “rotations”, so that part of the staff who is supposed to be on duty on any specific 
day is in fact absent, substituted by other colleagues. By these means, each physician can expect to 
be reasonably busy during the time he/she spends in the facility, collect at least some informal 
revenue, and at the same time have more time to look for other employment opportunities outside the 
facility: “We are too many compared to the workload, and our remuneration depends on how many 
patients we treat. Thus, doctors have an internal agreement, whereby we ‘rotate’: one week one 
doctor serves all patients, and the following week another one comes in. The exceptions only exist 
when a patient asks fo r  a specific doctor”. Hospital Provider Interview, Tbilisi.
8 .6 .5  Causes o f th e  prevalence o f OOP paym ents
This section specifically focuses on the reasons why OOPs seem to be so widespread in Georgia, and 
why a large share of payments seems to occur informally. A plurality of factors, which can be 
grouped into three broad categories, can contribute to the present situation. These three broad 
categories are: b) demand side factors; b) contextual factors; c) supply side factors.
8.6.5.1 Demand-side factors
Factors linked with patients’ tastes, expectations and fears, as well as cultural norms ingrained in the 
Georgian tradition, contribute to maintain a high level of OOPs and IPs. The two main demand- 
related factors are patients’ willingness to get additional or better-quality services relative to the 
average level, and to skip long waiting lists. However, unlike other former socialist countries where 
OOPs are not so widespread, in Georgia these demand side factors do not seem to be critical, and 
cannot explain why IPs constitute such an important share of the total OOPs. The fact that in Georgia 
the general attitude among the population is one of surrender to OOPs, seems to be a consequence
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rather than a cause of their pervasiveness. Because currently almost everybody pays directly for 
health, formally or informally, this has become by and large socially acceptable. Other demand- 
related factors include:
a) Cultural norms and traditions: It seems that directly paying doctors and nurses has been a 
cultural norm in Georgia for a long time, since socialist times and even before. Several 
patients admitted that they used to pay providers also during the “old Soviet days”, 
although on a different scale. “When I do not have money I do not go to a doctor. I will be 
embarrassed to show up and not be able to pay. We have always paid fo r  health services", 
Patient interview, Gori.
b) Gratitude: Several patients were willing to pay something extra as a sign of gratitude: 
“...When a doctor saves your life you want to thank them”. “...W e are paying to express 
our thankfulness and respect fo r  the doctor’s work”. Patient Interviews, Tbilisi.
c) Desire to Support Doctors: In general, the Georgian population believes that health 
workers are suffering from the same economic hardships as all others after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Thus, people are willing to support them by paying them directly in 
exchange for medical services: “Doctors suffer and they do have families that need 
support. This is the reason they are forced to charge IPs. If they could have higher 
incomes, I am sure they would never do this”. FG, Tbilisi.
d) Lack of Trust: The vast majority of the respondents as well as of providers interviewed 
expressed a complete distrust in the government, central and local. ’’The government 
cheated us so many times, that there is no way we can trust them. Just looking at the 
experience o f  our savings that disappeared (in banking crisis in the mid '90s) is a sufficient 
example fo r  this". FG, Gori. The majority of them did not trust private for-profit insurers 
either: "Today it is impossible to trust anybody. Nothing is stable in this country. If you 
have money you better keep it at home". FG, Low income, Tbilisi. "These companies 
[private insurance companies] will disappear like the banks did in the past and we will be 
left with nothing". FG, Well off, Gori. Thus, people distrust insurance and any other type of 
pre-payment mechanism; they prefer to pay directly for services, because that is the only 
way they believe they would receive something in exchange. Such deeply rooted distrust 
was highlighted by other studies (Bennet et al., 2001).
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8.6.5.2 Systemic Factors
The key factors in explaining the prevalence of OOPs and IPs are systemic or contextual factors. 
These were captured in our interviews with providers and patients, as well as in our discussions with 
government officials, and are also identified by other studies used as a basis for our investigation. 
These factors are the following:
a) severe under-funding of health services by government after 1991;
b) poor definition of the benefit package (BBP);
c) overcapacity in the delivery system.
a) All health care providers lamented government’s continuous under funding of the health 
sector during the last decade. In turn, this was due to the economic and fiscal collapse that 
followed the transition from communism. The government not only ceased any further 
capital investment, but it could not continue to fully finance essential items in the current 
expenditure budget, such as medicines and salaries. For instance, a nurse employed in the 
maternity home in Gori expressed her frustration, shared by several of her colleagues, by 
saying: “It has been several years since the government, supposedly due to limited financial 
resources, has paid in full the amount dues to our facility ”. All providers interviewed in 
Tbilisi as well as Gori voiced similar complaints. One senior physician thus described the 
financial situation in his department: “We have not received our official salary since last 
August (almost 12 month) due to delayed payments from Tbilisi municipality. Our doctors 
sometimes do not have money to purchase a loaf o f bread”.
b) The list of services included in the BBP is extremely complex, convoluted, and it has been 
revised almost every year since it was first introduced in 1996 (see Annex 8,4). As a result, 
only a minority part of the population, those who are more educated and informed, know 
which health services should be available for free, and which people should pay for. For 
example, the study found that, whilst some mothers, mainly from wealthier backgrounds, 
received immunizations for free, others were paying for these services. A mother from a 
poor household grieved: “Immunization that used to be free can now be charged. They 
demand money fo r  syringe and other things”. FG Low income. Sometimes even health care 
professionals did not know precisely which services were part of the BBP, and which were 
not, or what rates or co-payments they were supposed to charge.
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c) Finally, the problem of excessive capacity and resulting under-utilization of the delivery 
system has contributed to exacerbate the impact of the disastrous fiscal and health financing 
situation. A thin government budget is spread over a large number of facilities, which are 
also competing for a limited number of patents with ability to pay. The excessive capacity of 
the public delivery system has been well documented elsewhere [see Zoidze et a l, 1999, and 
Gotsadze et al. 2000]. The problem is still largely unresolved, in spite of a large downsizing 
which took place during the last decade (see KPI, 1999). The perception of a severe under­
utilization of the delivery system also emerged in our interviews with providers: “...On  
average we see 6-8 patients a day. Personally I see 2-3 patients a day. The occupancy rate is 
not high. We are idle most o f  the time, even if  currently we only have 2 doctors and 4 nurses, 
half the staff we used to have before. ” Provider from  Hospital in Tbilisi.
8.6.5.3 Supply-side factors
“Doctors are presently in a very poor condition. Petty traders on the street earn more than doctors. ” 
Provider Interview, Gori.
Two supply-related factors emerged as critical in our research to explain the prevalence of IPs. These 
were:
a) inadequate official income of health personnel, and
b) lack of transparency in the administration and management of provider units.
a) According to formal rules, since 1995 the Government of Georgia does not finance health 
facilities according to their inputs, nor pays salaries to healthcare workers. Staff is directly employed 
and paid by each facility, and the latter are paid by government on a cost-per-case basis (see Chapter 
4) only for their provision of services that are part of the BBP (such as deliveries or treatment of 0-3 
year old children). The main source of revenue for provider facilities are the user fees charged to 
patients for the services that are not part of BBP. Thus, according to the rules these two sources of 
revenue (government funds for BBP services and official user fees for all other services) should 
cover all recurrent costs for health care facilities. In reality, these official sources of funds are 
insufficient to cover all competing claims, and in addition facility directors or managers seem to 
enjoy a sort of “monopoly power” over their distribution (see next section). Medical and paramedical
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staff is usually employed under output-based contracts, whereby they receive a proportion of the 
total revenue they are able to generate for their facility (see Chapter 4). Because of lack of funds, 
corruption and excess supply of physicians and paramedical staff, in fact physicians receive a share 
equal to only 7-8 percent of the total official revenue they generate, and nurses only 4 percent or 
below.278 Given the prevailing activity levels, according to our findings this would translate into an 
average monthly net income of approximately 55 GEL (=26.5 US$), well below the average monthly 
salary in the country, which is GEL 82.8 for formal sector employees. In reality, it is a common 
practice (and sort of accepted by all within the facility) that doctors would make most of their 
revenue from IPs. In fact, these are not only paid over and above official fees, but at times “replace” 
them according to informal agreements reached between patients and physicians (see section 8.5.2). 
In all our interviews, medical staff complained that their official remuneration was insufficient, and 
did not adequately reflect their contribution. As a result, most of them admitted that whenever 
possible they tried not to report the real volume of activities and revenues they are able to generate to 
their administrators. For example, a surgeon from Tbilisi said: “When I perform surgery and I report 
it, I have to deposit 300 Gel with the accounting office. These funds should provide income for the 
anaesthesiologist, for nurses, and for other staff, and pay for all the other costs in the ward. 
However, I prefer to keep this money and share it with the other staff, rather than to deposit it with 
the accounting office. The reason is that I only receive 46 Gel for every 1000 Gel I generate for the 
facility. This is unacceptable". Another doctor in Tbilisi so described the situation: “Doctors are not 
pleased that they generate 8 Gel fo r  the facility and get less than 1 Gel as their income. They prefer 
to receive 3 Gel informally, which is cheaper fo r  patients. The situation forces them to act this way. 
At the same time everybody knows about it [IPs], but nobody reacts because it serves everybody's 
interests: the administration's as well as doctors’." Provider Interview, Tbilisi. The financial 
situation of nurses is even more difficult than for physicians, because nurses seem less able to make 
up for their low official income by asking IPs. As Annex 8.3 indicates, the number of nurses has 
been drastically reduced over the last decade. One of the nurses interviewed said: “Nurses' income is 
very low. It could be at around 4% o f  the unit price o f  service. My monthly net official income 
amounts to only 9-15 Gel". Provider Interview, Tbilisi.
278 This is an extremely low share by any standard in a labour-intensive sector such as health. Note that 
regulation of contracting with the medical staff varies from one facility to the other, so that the study found 
high variability in the share of revenues generated that physicians reported to receive in different facilities.
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b) The 1995 reforms led to the “corporatisation”279 of health provider units. In fact, Government of 
Georgia retained ownership of most provider units, but the latter became incorporated under private 
law, governed by a Board and managed by an executive director. These took on day to day 
management of health facilities. In the intentions, self-management would empower provider units to 
administer resources more effectively, and direct input-based control by government would be 
substituted by results (outputs and outcomes) based control mechanisms. In reality, the reform failed. 
Decentralization of power to the provider institutions was not accompanied by efforts to develop 
better capacity to adequately manage services, and at the same time regulatory/accountability 
mechanisms based on results or performance remained extremely weak. In addition, even basic 
principles of sound corporate governance practices have been altogether ignored (Gotsadze et al., 
2001) not just in the health sector, but in all sectors of the economy. Thus, in practice the 1995 
“corporatisation of provider facilities gave unlimited power to these facilities’ executive directors. 
Not surprisingly, such unlimited power seems to have been frequently abused, according to our study 
findings. The study found a striking consistency in physicians’ and nurses’ allegations of non- 
transparency and of misuse of official funds within their facilities by their directors. First, practically 
all interviewed medical staff said that funds were administered secretively, and that only directors 
controlled and knew how official revenues were utilized. For example, a specialist in Gori said “The 
administration says that generated revenues are spent fo r  utility costs, medical supplies, fo r payroll 
and that a portion goes to pay fo r  taxes. However, what it is really spent on which budget items 
nobody knows but administrators. We only see how much patients are paying and how much o f  that 
we do receive". Another physician from a different provider institution said.- “...I do not know where 
the rest o f the money went, and if  I decided to find this out I would be told by management to back 
o f f ’. Hospital Provider Gori. Our attempts to get for a sample of hospitals official budgets (which 
should have been public documents, hospitals being still under government ownership) were 
frustrated.
279 Terminology used form Preker, AS, and A Harding, Eds., Innovations in Health Service Delivery: Volume I 
- The Corporatisation of Public Hospitals, Washington: World Bank, 2001.
8. 6.6 Impact of OOPs and of IPs
The study documented two important phenomena that result from the prevalence of OOPs and of 
IPs: 1) severe financial access barriers for the population; 2) the deteriorating condition of the health 
facilities.
1) Our study confirmed that households find it difficult to pay for health services, and often forgo, or 
delay or interrupt treatment because of financial reasons. Official figures show a dramatic decline in 
service utilization rates over the last decade. From 1990 to 1999 hospital admission rates plummeted 
by 68%, hospital Bed Occupancy Rate (BOR) decreased from 51% to 29% [GEPLAC-TACIS, 
2001], utilization of outpatient services declined by 81% (from 7.3 visit per person per year to 1.42), 
and calls for ambulance services fell from 0.22 to 0.03 per person per year [CMSI, 1999]. Our study 
also found a significant difference between the burden posed by outpatient and inpatient services. 
Outpatient consultations, diagnostic tests and medications seemed to be relatively “affordable” for 
the majority of the population. Only the poorest (such as elderly or landless peasants) said they were 
forced to borrow from friends and relatives, or to sell valuables, to pay for outpatient services. For 
example, in a focus group, a representative from a poor household in Gori complained: “...Two 
weeks ago I had poisoning and I needed 12 Gel fo r  the medicines. My monthly salary is 15 Gel, and 
it is usually paid with significant delay. I had to borrow money and now I have to pay it back". By 
contrast, inpatient care cases, and particularly catastrophic ones (serious injuries and exacerbation of 
chronic diseases) are in general disruptive for households’ finances for all socio-economic groups, 
with the exception of the very richest segments of the population. In cases of illnesses which require 
hospitalisation, the primary source of financing for patients is borrowing from relatives or friends. 
For example, a young man from a relatively well-off household in Tbilisi reported: “My grandfather 
had urgent abdominal problems and we took him to the hospital. He had surgery, which cost 
approximately 1,100 Gel. This was quite significant fo r us and we had to seek support o f friends in 
order to meet the costs”. Other households said they had sold family assets and valuables to pay for 
health services. For example, a poor woman in Tbilisi reported to have sold her family’s jewels to 
pay for health services: “When I fell sick I was unemployed and had to borrow from relatives to 
cover the cost o f treatment. Later on I sold some o f my fam ily’s jew els to repay the debt. ”
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2) A second important result of IPs prevalence is that key inputs are severely under-funded. A couple 
of providers interviewed reported to use part of the revenue from IPs to improve quality of services 
(by purchasing extra-drugs, emergency tool-kits, etc.), but the majority admitted to pocket IPs as 
personal income. Important non-labour input components, particularly capital, are almost not funded 
at all, and as a result essential medical equipment or failing infrastructure cannot be adequately 
maintained or replaced280.
8 .7 . D iscu ssion  a n d  Conclusion
Figure 8.2 describes the vicious cycle in which the Georgia’s health sector is trapped. In 1995, when 
the health reforms were launched, public financing for the sector was approximately US$ 0.8 per 
capita per annum, after the government’s fiscal collapse in the first transition years (World Bank 
1996). The Government of Georgia followed “the manual” in implementing Purchasing Reforms 
(see Chapter 6): it separated purchasing from provision; excluded health employees from the civil 
service, granted full-managerial autonomy to providers, moved from an input to an output-based 
payment system, and officially introduced user-charges. However, in the context of a catastrophic 
public health financing crisis and of extremely weak governance, such reforms de facto gave the 
government imprimatur to an unrestrained (wild?) market for health services that was at time taking 
shape in the country (Belli et al., 2002). Specifically, the new output-based payment system for 
providers contributed to generate an increasing reliance on formal and informal payments, by 
making health workers’ income totally dependent on utilization of services. Health staff became 
progressively used and to some extent “forced” to ask patients to pay directly for services in order to 
make ends meet. In addition, the poor performance of public purchasers, the unclear definition of 
services in the BBP, and the widespread corruption among facility administrators and their 
‘regulators’ created a situation where no accountability, no rules were left, and health care providers 
de facto became managed as private companies, with extremely high-powered economic incentives 
for their employees to attract patients, and to charge them as much as possible.
In addition, the rapidly declining GNP (Georgian “lost” approximately three quarters of its per capita 
real income during the first transition years.) and the dramatically increasing economic inequalities
280 This progressive deterioration of the health system’s infrastructure has been also documented elsewhere
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severely limited patients’ ability to pay and health providers’ ability to raise revenue, particularly in 
rural areas. Hence, the emergence of OOPs as the main source of revenue for health care, under 
economic duress lead to a drastic decrease in demand, and further widened the gap between demand 
and supply, which was there under the communist regim e.281 The health sector became trapped in a 
plummeting spiral, where demand and supply are both progressively decreased, but where the gap 
between the two is never reabsorbed, described in Figure 8.2. As a result, presently in Georgia there 
is a vast area of unmet medical need, which is paradoxical given the country’s excessive potential to 
supply health services.
Unless the above contextual or systemic factors are addressed, unless governance within the health 
sector and health financing of basic services are addressed, it will be difficult to contain informal 
payments. Other proposed changes may not render the expected results. For example, the policy 
recommendation to legalize user charges to avoid informal transactions would not lead to the desired 
results. On the supply side, it is important to strengthen the current process of rationalization, so far 
only timidly implemented. The elimination of existing duplications and of a significant number of 
under-utilised facilities and personnel will free some resources that can be used to improve quality of 
services in the facilities that the government decides to maintain. However, interventions on the 
supply-side are not sufficient. Priority should also be given to reverse the decline in demand, which 
can be done by increasing pre-paid resources for health, lowering prices at the point of service for 
essential and costly services such as hospitalization, and by empowering consumers through 
increased awareness about free entitlements in the BBP. The latter will also require revision of BBP 
to make it technically sound and easy understandable for the public.
[Zoizde et al. 1999].
281 As discussed previously, the Georgian health system was characterized by excess capacity, both in terms of 
human as well as capital resources.
Figure 8. 2: The Vicious Cycle in the Georgian Health System
DEMAND SUPPLY
Decreased
demand
Excess 
supply of 
providers 
relative to 
demand
Financial
access
barriers
c
<:
CONTEXT
Overcapacity
Fiscal under 
performance and low 
level of priority 
assigned to health 
sector low level of 
public funding
Poor performance of 
public purchasers
Unclear definition of 
the BBP
Lack of accountability 
in management of 
public facilities
Emergence 
o f informal 
payments
Low income 
of providers
Policy Change
1. Introduction of official OOP Payments
2. Purchaser-provider split
3. Autonomization o f providers
A nnex 8.1 D escrip tio n s o f  S tu d y  P a r tic ip a n ts
Description of in-depth interviews participants (patients)
Description of households (HHs) that were selected for the in-depth interview is summarized in the 
following tables:
Table 8.3: Sample Matrix for In-depth Interviews with Patients
Location Income Group N Percent
Tbilisi Poor 2 1 36.2
Rich 37 63.8
Subtotal 58 1 0 0 . 0
Gori Poor 13 86.7
Rich 2 13.3
Subtotal 15 1 0 0 . 0
Villages Poor 2 2 84.6
Rich 4 15.4
Subtotal 26 1 0 0 . 0
Total Poor 56 56.6
Rich 43 43.4
Grand Total 99 1 0 0 . 0
Table 8.4: Average HH Monthly Total Expenditure per Geographic Location (Gel)
Location Mean
95% Confidence Interval
Median
for Mean
Minimum Maximum
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
Tbilisi 422.3 337.0 507.6 400 50 2 0 0 0
Gori 149.9 100.5 199.2 1 0 0 28 300
Villages 153.8 58.5 249.0 75 14 1 2 0 0
Sample Average 310.5 249.2 371.8 2 0 0 14 2 0 0 0
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The total number of individuals residing in the HHs that were interviewed was equal to 406, out of 
which 146 individuals (36%) reported having used health services (because of illness, prevention or 
because they were pregnant) during the 3 month prior to interview. The average size of HHs 
differed by income groups and by type of residence, as follows:
Table 8.5: Average Size of HHs
_ Poor Rich
Residence Total for Sample
Tbilisi Gori Villages
N 56 43 58 15 26 99
Mean
size
3.8 4.6 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.1
Considering that only HHs that had used formal health services were selected for the interviews, 146 
cases of service utilization were recorded. Details of service utilization are presented in the following 
tables:
Table 8 .6 : Type of Services Used by the Individuals from  Selected HHs
Type of Service used N %
Outpatient polyclinic/ambulatory 35 24.0%
Specialist at hospital 39 26.7%
Private doctor 26 17.8%
Hospitalised 19 13.0%
Diagnostic Service 15 10.3%
Home visit by doctor/health professional 8 5.5%
Surgery 4 2.7%
Total 146 1 0 0 . 0
Table 8.7: Description of Cash Expenses by Different Income Groups (Gel)
Poor Rich
N. of Mean N. of Mean
cases payment cases payment
Total number of cases where cash
payment occurred 58 186.7 65 543.0
Total number of cases 72 150.4 74 477.0
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Table 8.8: Description of Expenses by Type of Residence (Gel)
Tbilisi Gori Villages282
N Mean N Mean N Mean
Total number of cases where cash
payment occurred 80 450.3 16 119.3 27 303.2
Total 97 371.4 18 106.1 31 264.1
Table 8.9: Description of Expenses by Type of Services Used (Gel)
Number N. cases Drugs Doctor's Hospital Surgery Diagnostic In-
of cases in which Fee admission/stay service kind
Type of service 
used
cash
payment
occurred
supply
(bed
linen,
food,
etc.)
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Outpatient
polyclinic/ambulatory
35 27 35.3 39.0 - 20.2 27.0 -
Specialist at hospital 39 34 75.9 21.4 31.0 36.0 31.8 1.5
Private doctor 26 24 40.9 17.7 0.2 - 47.7 -
Hospitalisation 23 18 154.0 46.9 75.7 234.1 40.4 18.2
Diagnostic Service 15 13 51.2 4.0 - - 37.2 -
Home visit by
doctor/health 8 7 147.1 30.4 - - 3.1 -
professional
282 Includes transportations costs
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Description of Focus Group Participants
A total of 119 individuals were selected to participate in the focus group discussions. Average age of 
participant was 39.2 years. The participant distribution by various age groups is presented in the 
following table:
Table 8.10: Focus Group Participant Distribution by Different Age Groups
N %
25-35 Years old 52 43.7
36-45 years old 32 26.9
46-55 years old 28 23.5
56-65 years old 5 4.2
6 6  + years old 2 1.7
Total 119 1 0 0 . 0
Participants were chosen according to the criteria discussed in the introduction:
Table 8.11: Participant Distribution by Various Groups and their Characteristics
Group N % Mean HH Monthly Spending Gel
Tbilisi rich 29 24.4 634.8
Tbilisi poor 30 25.2 219.0
Gori rich 30 25.2 396.5
Gori poor 30 25.2 126.3
Total 119 1 0 0 . 0 344
Table 8.12: Educational Level of Participants by Income Groups %
,
Tbilisi
rich
Tbilisi
poor
Gori rich Gori poor
0 1  to 1 1  years of secondary school completed 10.3 43.3 23.3 36.7
Completed technical school (PTU or SPTU) 10.3 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 23.3
Completed higher/bachelors 79.3 33.3 60.0 40.0
Incomplete higher/bachelors 3.3 6.7
Total 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
N 29 30 30 30
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Table 8.13: Primary occupation of FG Participants by Income Groups %
Tbilisi rich Tbilisi poor Gori rich Gori poor
Unemployed 3.4 3.3 13.3 16.7
Self-employed 16.7 26.7 3.3
Business person/entrepreneur 13.8
White collar worker 62.1 23.3 46.7 40.0
Agricultural worker 6.7 1 0 . 0
Retired/pensioner 33.3
Domestic work 20.7 23.3 6.7 30.0
Total 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
N 29 30 30 30
Description of Providers
The study interviewed 30 individual providers, 20 physicians and 10 nurses. Among 
average doctors had 18.2 years of experience and nurses 22.4.
Table 8.14: Distribution of Interviewed Doctors and Nurses by Specialty Area (%)
Physician Nurse
Obstetrics 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0
Trauma 1 0 . 0
Surgery 3.3 1 0 . 0
Department of general medicine 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0
Laboratory 3.3
Intensive care unit 3.3
Department of the anaesthesiology 3.3
Outpatient department 1 0 . 0
Insurance department 3.3
Paediatric (children) department 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0
Rehabilitation department 3.3
Neurology department 6.7
Cerebral palsy rehabilitation centre 3.3
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Diagnostic centre 3.3
General medicine (adults) 1 0 . 0
Women's consultation 3.3
Department infected pregnancy undelivered 1 0 . 0
Cardiology department 3.3
Allergy department 1 0 . 0
Total 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
N 30 1 0
Most providers complained that their official salary was insufficient even for a normal existence, 
thus indicating a situation of profound unbalance in the system. Informal payments have been the 
way doctors and nurses have coped with the situation, transferring on patients most of the burden for 
financing government services.
Table 8.15: Sufficiency of Providers Income Perceived by Providers Themselves
Physician Nurse
Sufficient only for basic needs 6 1
Insufficient for a normal existence 24 9
A nnex 8 .2  R esearch  Tools  
F ocus Group G uideline
Introduction
M oderator: Good evening and thank you for coming. We invited you to participate in this group 
discussion on the issues related to the costs of obtaining medical services in our country. This 
project is financed by the World Bank and it is aimed at improving the situation in our health care 
system, by developing with your assistance new policy recommendations. We are interested in 
patients’ attitudes toward the following issues: how they evaluate recent health care reforms, what
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experience they have in relation with different medical institutions, their experiences and perceptions 
on the costs of medical services. Our discussion will continue for 1 hour, and we will record it. In the 
final report we will describe your ideas only in general form, with confidentiality. In addition, we 
would like to stress that there is no right and wrong statements; we only want to hear your ideas 
about the issues.
Now please shortly introduce yourselves: name, age, profession and occupation.
W arm -U P
L et’s discuss the curren t situation on health care in  Georgia
What do you think has changed in Georgia’s healthcare during past several years?
What are positive and negative new elements (strong and week points) these changes 
brought about?
Users’ perceptions about medical care and payment
Do you know of any free health services, financed by the government? Have you or any 
of your HH members and/or relative/friend recently received free services and if not, 
why?
For those who received service for free, which medical services were provided for free 
and why? (Probe: provider was friend; friend/relative paid fo r  the services; public 
financiers paid  the services; patient had private insurance that covered the cost o f 
treatment).
In your experience, were services for children 0-3 less costly than the others?
Do you think that in general it has been difficult for you or your family to meet your health bills (ask 
about their family experience)?
- Do you see any relationship between quality and cost? If “yes”, in which cases? Can you 
name specific examples?
If the government had enough money to provide just 3 services for free which ones do you think it 
should guarantee? Rank then (1,2 and 3)
-Outpatient and long-term residential care for the elderly
-Emergency and hospitalisation services
-Surgery.
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-Maternity and child services.
-Medicines
-Outpatient care for children under 15.
Why? (Probe: Services who are best fo r  improving health, services who are more costly, or people
who deserve more)
♦ Now, for all the other services, we must find other ways to fund them. What do you think it is the 
best way to pay for these other services?
♦ Do you prefer to pay when you get sick, or would you prefer to pay something each month in 
order to get services for free when you get sick?
♦ If you are willing to pay something each month, whom would you trust more for managing this 
money (pre-payment scheme, explain what we mean by it), so that when you get sick you are sure 
of getting (almost) free services:
Central Govemment/MoLHSA
Sakrebulo -Municipal government
Polyclinic for Tbilisi, and health centre for rural areas
Private insurance
School
Employer
Labour union
Other. Who?
Why?
♦ Which change would be needed to increase your trust? Can something be done to increase your 
trust in any of the above agents?
♦ Do you know how much different health services would cost you before you go? Do you think 
that having a price list posted at the door of any facility (polyclinic and hospital) would be 
helping you?
♦ If you were told that your health care expenses would be paid you back if you can present 
receipts, would you be able to demand and get receipts/formal confirmation from a doctor and/or 
a health care institution?
Attitude towards physicians, their motivation and regulation of payments
♦ How would you rate the size of a physician’s income?
274
Privileged 1
Sufficient for a good standard of living 2
Sufficient only for basic needs 3
Insufficient for a normal existence 4
♦ How would you assess physicians’ and nurses’ income, in comparison to other professions? Are 
their income really so low? Please describe physicians and nurses separately.
♦ How would you assess incomes of people working in the area of the health administration?
♦ Do you think that informal payments/gifts increase substantially the incomes of physicians? 
Nurses? Health facility administrators? Please describe separately.
♦ What do you think, should the giving of presents or cash payment as an additional remuneration 
of physicians be regulated in some way, or banned, as a system? What is your recommendation, 
how should this be arranged?
Moderator: Thank you once more for coming.
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Interview guide for medical providers
INFORMAL HEALTH PAYMENT IN GEORGIA
We are conducting a study financed by the World Bank and my name is
The study concerns the Georgian health care system, and it is about the cost of obtaining medical 
services in our country. We are interested in provider’ attitudes toward the following issues: 
how they evaluate recent health care reforms, what do they think about the existing economic 
situation of health care professionals, and, if there are informal payments in the system, why they 
exists, what impact they create on the profession and on the patients. If you know of such 
payments in your or in any other facility, we would also like to ask you how they are shared, and 
how they are used.
If you accept, we would like to interview you. Our discussion will continue approximately 45 
minutes; and we will record it. In the final report, we will describe your ideas only in general 
form, without mentioning your name. We guarantee that the confidentiality of your statements 
will be always maintained. In addition, I would like to stress that there is no right and wrong 
statements. We only want to hear your honest views about the above issues.
Profile of respondent
1. Age  I_I_I_I years
2. Sex male female
3. Years of experience _J_I_I_I years
4. The specialty of the doctor/nurse __________________________________
5. The facility she/he works__________ __________________________________
6 . The department/ward she/he belongs__________________________________
7. How many patients do you see every day? How many in total in the department where you 
work?
8 . Do you think that in your department the numbers of doctors is adequate for the current level 
of activities/workload?
9. Does he/she have evening or night calls?
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10. Can you please just describe your daily activities as a doctor/nurse (share of work in the 
ward, in the ambulatory within the hospital, outside, and at home)
Physicians’ perceptions and experience
11. What are the daily difficulties in the physician’s/nurse’s work at your facility (PROBE: 
work-load, quality and/or o f  medical supplies, conditions o f the facility, the amount and the 
way they are paid, relationship with management, relationship with colleagues, relationship 
with patients etc...)?
12. Has it changed since the health reforms started? In what way? Please provide details. Please 
describe separately physicians and nurses
13. How much and according to which criteria is she/he paid officially? (e.g. fixed salary, 
capitation, fee fo r  service, fee fo r  procedure, mixed system)
14. How would you rate the physicians/nurses’ total income?
Physicians’ N urses’
Sufficient for a good standard o f 
living
1 Sufficient for a good standard of 
living
1
Sufficient only for basic needs 2 Sufficient only for basic needs 2
Insufficient for a normal existence 3 Insufficient for a normal existence 3
15. What changes have occurred in your income since the reforms?
Financing of the facility/waiting lists
16. Do you think that your health facility has sufficient financial resources in order to 
provide the patients with the services they need?
Payments and Gifts
17. In your facility are there payments made by the patients? How frequently officially, 
and unofficially?
277
18. Can you please describe in which form these payments occur [PROBE: cash directly 
paid to doctor/nurse; there is always a person designated to collect all payments from  patients; 
payment is made at the cashier’s desk and there is a system to distribute the funds between 
providers, etc]
19. Can you please give us as many details as possible about the informal component of 
payments -  (Probe: ex-ante or ex-post, the form o f payment gifts, in kind or money, whether 
patients in general accept to pay, how payment is determined, etc)
20. What is the percentage of payments that goes officially to the facility? Give just your 
estimates; we are not looking for precise figures.
21. For all the rest, who benefits? [PROBE: the individual who receives; the money is 
distributed among various facility staff; to facility administrators; patient (please 
inquire why patient should benefit)
22. Who precisely administers these funds and how? When money is paid, is it distributed 
across a group of people, or it is paid individually to medical staff? If it is goes to team, 
is the distribution fair? Can you please describe the process in detail? [PROBE: there is 
a set amount that every doctor/nurse should give to the facility, administration imposes 
the rules, collects the funds and makes decision; doctors/nurses accumulate agreed 
amount make joint decision how to spend it, etc]
16. Does any portion of the amount paid by the patient go for drugs, or for the improvement of 
the services provided in your facility? If “yes” who decides how much should go for these 
purposes.
17. Can you explain how the rates for informal payment are set at your facility? (Probe: Who 
sets rates? How rates are set? Is it negotiated on ad-hoc basis, or there are some established 
rates? Nobody sets the rates but patients pay as much as they can).
18. Do you charge different prices for the same service to poor and rich? How do you 
discriminate rich and poor?
19. Do you prescribe more services from rich than from poor?
20. Would you say that payments are made voluntarily by patients or that providers demand 
these payments [PROBE: check maybe doctors are not demanding, but nurses are, maybe 
administration demands, maybe there are other people demanding or other reasons fo r  
paying. Try to collect information on various individuals/departments in the facility]
21. If  providers demand, then ask: ‘What are the reasons for their existence? [PROBE: 
insufficient income fo r  providers; widespread corruption; poor governmental policies; 
demands placed by facility administrators; short supply o f  equipment/material; high taxes.]
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22. Please prioritise them. Which one of the above reasons is most important?
23. I f  patients pay voluntarily, then ask: ‘Whv are patients accepting to pay voluntarily? 
[Probe: they pay to skip queues, to receive more careful attention, to receive additional 
services, to express gratitude, to buy drugs or other materials/consumables while under 
treatment, etc...
24. Do they think a treatment can be interrupted/stopped if a patient refuses or is unable to pay? 
Does this happen at your facility, and if yes how often?
Potential solutions, given the present financial constraint on the public side:
25. Do you think that informal payments are a serious problem? For patients? For doctors? Do 
you think the system as it is frustrates your expectations/ethical believes? Who really 
benefits from the existing situation?
So far, we have discussed how the situation is. Can we spend a few minutes discussing possible 
changes to the current system?
33. Do you think it would be advisable/desirable to legalise informal payments that occur at your
facility? Please explain why you think so?
26. If all informal payments are legalized, what consequences they may have on providers and 
on patients? [Probe: prices are more transparent, but health care might become more 
expensive].
27. Do you think that the delivery system should be organized such that some services are 
provided for free and others are paid for? How should it work? For example, hospitals could 
develop private wards for paying patients alongside public wards for poor patients. Have you 
thought about this possibility? How do you think services in the two kinds of wards should 
be regulated?
28. Do you think it would be better to guarantee public insurance coverage for 
primary/outpatient care or for inpatient care, and for which reasons? Other possibilities?
29. Another possibility is to allow and encourage private practice outside the hospital, or inside, 
as intra-mural activity after regular working hours). Would it be easy for physicians/nurses 
to find patients outside the hospital? Is it a risky step?
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Interview  guide for u sers/p a tien ts
Interview C ode_______________________
INTERVIEW  GUIDE FO R USERS OF HEALTH SERVICES FOR THE INFORMAL 
PAYMENT FOR HEALTH IN GEORGIA
Interviewer : Good evening and thank you for coming. We invited you to participate in this group 
discussion on the issues related to the costs of obtaining medical services in our country. This 
project is financed by the World Bank, and it is aimed at improving the situation in our health care 
system, by developing with your assistance new policy recommendations. We are interested in 
patients’ attitudes toward the following issues: how they evaluate recent health care reforms, what 
experience they have in relation with different medical institutions, their experiences and perceptions 
on the costs of medical services. Our discussion will continue for 1 hour, and we will record it. In the 
final report we will describe your ideas only in general form, with confidentiality. In addition, we 
would like to stress that there is no right and wrong statements; we only want to hear your ideas 
about the issues.
Now please shortly introduce yourselves: name, age, and occupation
1. Have you or any member of your household (HH, we will define as members of the same 
household people who live under the same roof and that share the same budget) used 
medical services during past 3 month?
Yes Continue administering the questionnaire
No Move to different HH
MODULE 1
2. For which particular health problem or any other reason (for example, pregnancy) did you 
use medical services?
3. Which medical services were used?
280
A. Outpatient (includes visit to polyclinic, Continue administering the
ambulatory, health or, diagnostic service) questionnaire
B. Hospitalised for more then 1 day Continue administering the
questionnaire
D. Alternative healthcare provider 4  Move t0 Different HH
Profile of respondent
4. Age  I_I_I_I years
5. Sex Male Female
6 . What is the highest level of education that you have attained? Instruction: fo r  those with only 
secondary school education, please indicate the number o f years o f  education (from 01 to 
11). For others use proposed coding.
No education 00 Completed higher/bachelors 13
01 to 11 years of secondary Incomplete higher/bachelors 14
school completed 01 to 11 Other 15
Completed technical school (PTU or SPTU) 12 Don’t know/Refused to answer 99
7. What is your primary occupation? Interviewer: if  a respondent is engaged in several 
occupations, then ask “which one does the person spend the most time a t” and report this as 
primary occupation.
Pre-school 01 
Pupil or Student 02 
Unemployed03 
Self-employed 04 
Business person/entrepreneur 05 
White collar worker 06 
Blue collar worker 07
Unskilled worker 08 
Agricultural worker 09 
Retired/pensioner 10 
Domestic work/homemaker 11
Other 12
Don’t know/refused to answer 99
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8 . What sector is the person employed in? (Please ask this for only those respondents that are 
engaged in paid work)
Agriculture 01 
Mining 02 
Manufacturing 03 
Electricity, gas, water 
Construction 05 
Trade 06
04
Hotels and Restaurants 07 
Transportation and communication 
Financial services and real estate 
Public administration and defence 
Education 11 
Health and social services 12 
Other personal services 13
08
09
10
9. How many people live in your household ? (Interviewer: if someone has been visiting, and 
staying with, the household for most of the last 3 months, then they should be included as 
household members)
10. Approximately how much your HH spends on various things per month? Please come up 
with total figure and include all expenses that your HH faces (PROBE: food, utilities,
transportation, education, leisure, healthcare, cigarettes and alcohol, presents etc) I I 1 I
lari
11. Please can you give us more details about the major episodes of utilization of health services 
(for simplicity referred to as “episodes of illness”) in you household over the last three- 
month (complete table 1 below)
Table 1: M ajor episodes of illness tha t occurred during last 3 month in  the HH, 
followed by a t least one doctor visit.
CODE Name of 
person
Age Health
problem
Type of 
services 
used **
Total
price
paid
0 1 1st Episode 
of illness
0 2 2 nd episode
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03 3r episode
04 4th episode
Instruction: Interviewer please fill-out the table for at most 4 episodes of illness, which required at 
least seeing a doctor. It is not mandatory to always collect 4 episodes.
** Use following codes fo r  the Type o f  Service:
a. Outpatient polyclinic/ambulatory,
b. Specialist at hospital,
c. Private doctor
d. Hospitalised,
e. Diagnostic
f  Home visit by doctor/health professional 
g. O ther________________________ (please specify)
Instructions for interviewer: M ODULE 2 o f the tool is administered separately for each 
episode o f illness. For every new episode please take new set o f the M ODULE 2. W henever 
you inquire about the episode please take a note o f the name o f the person from Table 1, the 
disease they had, and the services they used. Ask all the questions for this person and for 
the given episode. Only and when you finish administering this MODULE 2, take new 
one and start with the next person and/or episode.
M ODULE 2
Interview C o d e ________
Person/Disease Code from  Table 1
Information, accessibility and affordability
12. After the onset of illness d id _____________________ (the name o f  person from Table 1
immediately go to a provider or did s/he wait? If yes, why? [PROBE: the illness was 
serious; had illness fo r  a long time and knew how to treat it; had no money; provider is not 
available in close proximity, etc.]
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13. Can you please describe how s/he selected the provider? (Probe: according to quality, 
proximity from residence, cost, through friendship, etc). Please provide as much details as 
possible fin the case of outpatient, ask the individual who received care directly, if possible!. 
or other member of household (HH)]
14. Have the criteria of selection changed during past years? If “yes” how and why?
15. What are the main difficulties your HH faced while had to go to a physician/hospital? 
[Probe: such as transportation costs, waiting lists, inability to pay for services, registration 
procedures, bad quality of available medical services, not having provider/hospital in close 
proximity.
Contact with clinical staff
16. Has he/she interrupted or not fulfilled completely treatment? How? [He/she was referred to a 
diagnostic service, but did not go, he/she did not buy all the drugs that were prescribed and 
he/she did not take all the drugs that he/she bought].
17. For what reason did he/she interrupt treatment? [Probe: such as transportation costs, 
waiting lists, inability to pay for services, registration procedures, bad quality o f  available 
medical services, not having provider/hospital in close proximity].
18. Whom did you go to receive treatment/care instead? [PROBE: drug shop, private physician, 
healer, friend/neighbour, other].
19. Has he/she aware of the possible consequences for her/his health of this interruption/ change 
of service?
Payments and gifts
20. Please give a description of expenses for that particular episode of illness [PROBE: collect 
information separately fo r  the payments made to facility; doctor; nurse; diagnostics; 
pharmaceuticals; other; specify which, private or public/?
Drugs Physician Hospital Surgery Diagnostic Nurse In kind Other Total
consultation admission/ services service supply of 
services
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283 Includes everything else. Unfortunately, we did not single out a few other key cost items, such as 
transportations costs, and we are thus unable to precisely state what these ‘other’ expenses are. However, our 
impression is that transportation costs in fact was the largest item in the ‘other’ category.
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stay (bed linen, 
food in 
hospital, 
etc)
Episode of 
illness:
21. Please give as many details as possible -  the form of payment, for what services, when? To 
whom? Has he/she received any services for free? [PROBE; was payment voluntary or 
demanded; was payment in cash or in-kind; were they asked to pay before (ex-ante) treatment or 
after (ex-post) treatment was completed etc]
22. How did he/she receive information about payment and prices -  (ex. they know this from  
friends before visiting hospital/polyclinic, they saw the price list there, they sign the contract (?), 
the personal gave them information verbally, they saw price list).
23. What was the consequence of payment on level/quality of service? Have he/she received 
better service? What would happen if he/she did not pay?
24. Did he/she recover fast? Was full recovery achieved?
25. Did he/she buy all the drugs that the doctor prescribed? If not, why?
26. During/after treatment, did he/she give gifts? If “Yes” did he/she give gifts besides payment 
or instead of them? To whom, in which form (Probe: e.g. flowers, chocolates, cash or in another 
way?)
27. How would they assess the fee for this episode of illness (unaffordable, very high, high, just, 
etc)?
28. What was the consequence of fee on family budget? [Probe: they had to spend all cash 
income, all savings, take loan, and sell car, land, or house, borrowing from family and friends, 
borrowing elsewhere. If several sources were used, give precise share o f each].
29. Would you go to the same facility again? Why would you do so can you please explain?
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MODULE 3
Interview C ode_______________________
MODULE 3 OF THE TOOL IS ADMINISTERED FOR THE WHOLE HH AND NOT FOR THE 
INDIVIDUAL EPISODE OF ILLNESS
Willingness to pay for insurance, attitude towards government, perception of changes in the 
health system
30. Do you know any person in Georgia who received your same health services completely for free? 
(Probe: provider was friend; friend/relative paid fo r  the services; government paid the services; he 
had social or private insurance that covered the cost o f  treatment).
31. Did you or any member of your household ever receive health services for free in the past, and if yes, 
why? (Probe: provider was friend; friend/relative paid fo r  the services; government paid the 
services; he had social or private insurance that covered the cost o f treatment).
32. Do you have children in your household under 3 years old?
If no. skip next three questions:
32.1 If  yes, has he/she ever received medical services for free?
32.2 Have you im m unized him/her? Against which infection have you im m unized?
32.3 Have you paid anything to the health facility for this immunization?
Yes 1 How much? __________________________________
No 2
33. What do you think has changed in the Georgian healthcare system during past few years?
34. What are advantages and disadvantages (strong and week points) these changes brought?
35. What sum would you willing to pay monthly for all member of your HH for the convenience 
of a physician to be at your disposal 24 hours per day and to receive services when you need 
them at no cost?
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36. If you are willing to pay something each month for health insurance, whom would you trust 
more for managing this money, so that when you get sick you are sure of getting free 
services:
♦ Government: Central or Municipal
♦ Social insurance (SMIC)
♦ Private insurance
Polyclinic for Tbilisi, and health centre for rural areas
Private insurance
School
Employer
Labour union.
Other. Specify?
Why?
37. Which change would be needed to increase your trust? Can something be done to increase 
your trust in any of the above agents?
Attitude towards physicians, their motivation and regulation of payments
38. How would you rate the size of a physician’s income?
Privileged 1
Sufficient for a good standard of living 2
Sufficient only for basic needs 3
Insufficient for a normal existence 4
39. How would you assess physicians’ and nurses’ income, in comparison to other professions? 
Are their income really so low? Please describe physicians and nurses separately.
40. How would you assess incomes of people working in the area of the health administration?
41. Do you think that informal payments/gifts increase substantially the incomes of physicians? 
Nurses? Health facility administrators? Please describe separately.
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42. Should the giving of presents or cash payment as an additional remuneration of physicians 
be regulated in some way, or be banned? What is your recommendation, how should this be 
arranged?
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A nnex 8 .3  The evo lu tion  o f  th e  h e a lth  d e livery  s y s te m  in  
G eorgia
In this Annex we present some additional information concerning the evolution of the human 
resources employed in the health system over the last decade. Since initiation of health sector 
reforms in 1995, human resources have changed significantly. By 1999 the actual number of 
practicing physicians had decreased by almost 25% compared to 1991 levels, and the number of 
nurses by 59% (See following figure). However, due civil conflicts in some regions of Georgia, 
economic hardship that forced significant portion of population out of the country, declined birth 
rates, etc, which took place in the country during 1991-1999, total population sharply declined, so 
that physician to population ratio has not been affected significantly, hovering around 4.5 per 1,000 
(this is one of the highest doctor to population ratios in the FSE; see Error! Reference source not 
found, below.
The situation with nurses proves to be very different, and characterized by a sharp decline of the 
nursing staff to population ratio (579 per 100,000 pop. in 1999 from 1058 in 1991). Presently, 
Georgia has one of the lowest nursing staff to population ratio, together with Armenia and Tajikistan 
(461 and 480 per 100,000 population respectively). Also the nurse to doctor ratio declined sharply 
and currently Georgia has the lowest ratio in the region -1.19 nurses per one doctor (compared to an 
average 1.84 for NIS) (See Figure below)
These changes resulted in a lower decline of nurses’ income relative to doctors’. However, real value 
of annual officially reported income is still extremely low for bo th 284 (420-3,600 Gel for doctors and 
360-720 Gel for nurse), and it hardly compares with the minimum individual annual subsistence 
level of 1,080 Gel (World Bank 2001).
284 These figures are derived from our study and vary significantly by type of facility (e.g. general hospital, 
maternity home, polyclinic and also by geographic location).
Figure 8.3 Georgia's Health Human Resources circa 1991-1999
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Figure 8.4 Nurses to Physician Ratio (1999 Data)
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Table 8.16: Provider Network of Georgia, Circa 1988-1999
Type of Medical Facility ( including non
1988
199 199 199 199 199 199
MoLHSA Facilities) 4 5 6 7 8 9
Hospitals 402 321 289 264 287 272 287
Outpatient facilities in the hospitals 301 247 185 1 1 1 115 114 94
Independent outpatient facilities 
(ambulatories &polyclinics)
841 805 828 840 829 859 977
Dispensaries285 99 82 79 82 83 81 79
Independent dental clinics 56 53 53 51 51 56 62
Medical posts 613 502 180 33 47 53 33
Midwife posts
1,19
8
748 781 479 386 512 438
Independent ambulance stations 1 1 7 5 5 24 25 2 1
Blood banks 8 7 6 5 6 6 8
Infant orphanages 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
Scientific research institutes 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
Medical Centres 2 2 27 49
Source: Zoidze et al. 1999
285 Dispensaries = Specialized outpatient facilities (e.g. TB Dispensaries, STD, Psycho-Neurological, etc.).
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A nnex 8 .4 : The B asic  B en efit P ackage
The BBP design is very convoluted. It is hard even for healthcare professionals to understand what 
services are covered and what are not (Gotsadze and Rose 2000). Eligibility criteria for inclusion in 
the BBP are according to four criteria:
♦ special disease or condition (e.g. TB, Kidney failure, Oncology Disease, etc. under the State 
Medical Insurance Company, and a positive list of emergency conditions that cause catastrophic 
expenses under Municipal funding);
♦ age (e.g. children 0-3 years old);
♦ specific geographical location (e.g. residents of high mountainous areas, Tskhinvali residents);
♦ vulnerable status.
The historical evolution of the BBP also contributed to create its complex design. Initially only 6  
programs were financed by SMIC portion of BBP (MoHLSA 1998). For the year 1999, the total 
number of programs included in the BBP increased to 14 (Schaapveld K. 2000). Partly, some high- 
value low-impact services were included (such as paediatric cardiac surgery, kidney transplantation, 
ischemic heart disease), and partly the BBP was expanded because some of the programs that 
initially were financed directly by the MoLHSA were included. With this increase, one trend 
became obvious -  financial means did not meet ends. So, the balance was artificially achieved by 
lowering unit cost of reimbursement for services included in the BBP. All of this forced providers to 
seek resources directly from the population.
Services included in the BBP can be separated in three parts, based on the public purchasers that 
manage them (SMIC, PHD and Municipalities. See discussion in the text, Chapter 8 , section on 
Health Reforms).
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Table 8.17: Development of Central Government Funding and BBP During 1997-1999
1997 1998 1999
SMIC Programs
1 .Treatment of Psychiatric Patients
2.Treatment of TB Patients
3.Prenatal Care and Delivery
4.Treatment of Children Under 1 
years
5.Pro gram for Vulnerable Population
6.Treatment of Oncology Patients
SMIC Programs
1.Treatment of Psychiatric Patients
2.Treatment of TB Patients
3.Prenatal Care and Delivery
4.Treatment of Children 0-2 years 
old
5.Program for Vulnerable Population
6.Treatment of Oncology Patients
7. Paediatric Cardio surgery
8. Renal dialysis
9. Infectious diseases
SMIC Programs
1.Treatment of Psychiatric Patients
2.Treatment of TB Patients
3.Prenatal Care and Delivery
4.Treatment of Children 0-3 years 
old
5.Program for Vulnerable Population
6.Treatment of Oncology Patients 
7.Infectious diseases
8. Renal dialysis
9. Surgical Treatment of Ischemic 
Heart Disease
lO.Organ transplantation
11. Provision of Selected Chronic 
Patients with Pharmaceuticals
12. Rural PHC Program
13. Special medical program for 
Tskhinvali*
14. Additional Medical Care for 
Highlanders**
MoHLSA Programs
1. Additional Medical Care for 
Highlanders
2.Renal Dialysis
3.Diabetis Mellitus Program
4.Additional Medical Care for War 
Veterans
5.Medical program for mandatory 
military service
6.Medical program for orphans in 
orphanages
7. Paediatric cardio surgery program
8.Medical Emergency Programs
9.Medical science and education
10.Critical medical facility
MoHLSA Programs
1. Additional Medical Care for 
Highlanders
2.Program for State border regions
3.Diabetis Mellitus Program
4.Program for special patients
5.Medical program for mandatory 
military service
6.Medical program for orphans in 
orphanages
7. Surgical Treatment of Alchemic 
Heart Disease
8.Medical Emergency Programs
9.Medical science and education
10.Critical medical facility
MoHLSA Programs
1.Medical program for mandatory 
military service
2.Medical Emergency Programs
293
1997 1998 1999
rehabilitation program 
11.Management of reforms 
12.State sanitary surveillance
rehabilitation program 
11 .Management of reforms 
12.State sanitary surveillance 
13.Medical criminal expertise
'
3.Medical science and education
4.Critical medical facility 
rehabilitation program
5.Management of reforms 
6.State sanitary surveillance 
7. Medical criminal expertise
PHD Programs
1.Expanded Program of 
Immunization
2.Prevention of Infectious Diseases
3.Health Promotion 
4.STD Program
5.AIDS Program
6.Medical Information program
7.Prevention of drug addiction
8.Radiation and Iodine Deficiency 
9.Safe blood program
10. Active screening of diseases
PHD Programs
1 .Expanded Program of 
Immunization
2.Prevention of Infectious Diseases
3.Health Promotion 
4.STD Program
5.AIDS Program
6.Medical Information program
7.Prevention of drug addiction
8.Radiation and Iodine Deficiency 
9.Safe blood program
10. Active screening of diseases
11. Micronutrient deficiency 
program
PHD Programs
1 .Expanded Program of 
Immunization
2.Prevention of Infectious Diseases
3.Health Promotion
4.STD, AIDS & safe blood program
5.Medical Information program
6.Prevention of drug addiction
7.Radiation and Iodine Deficiency
8. Active screening of diseases
9. Micronutrient Deficiency
10. Screening of cancer diseases
11. Screening of cardiovascular 
diseases
12. Trauma prevention
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Chapter 9: Conclusions
The thesis has analysed the resource allocation and purchasing reforms implemented over the last 
two decades in several high, middle and lower income countries from an economic perspective. The 
premise has been the investigation of the equilibrium achieved by markets in health financing and 
health provision without government intervention, described in the first three chapters. These 
chapters have also anticipated some of the later results, by showing the impact of a plurality of 
possible mechanisms, including quality regulation, taxes and subsidies to private provision, which 
the government can implement to correct market outcomes.
In its central part, the thesis has focused on the impact of the new incentive system introduced with 
the RAP reforms on efficiency and on equity. Our analysis of the impact of health reforms has two 
important limitations. One is due to lack of rigorous, experimental evidence on the impact of 
reforms: with few exceptions, it seems that an extremely limited amount of resources have been 
devoted to monitor and evaluate ongoing reform efforts, even in high income countries such as West 
European countries. The quantitative evidence available is generally limited to a few aggregated 
indicators, such as number of beds, or number of physicians, or number of inpatient and outpatient 
cases, or average length of stay in hospitals, on the basis of which it is very difficult to ascertain 
whether health reforms achieved their intended results. This essay is very much constrained by such 
dearth of rigorous micro-level experimental data, and several of its conclusions are based more on 
direct experience, qualitative investigation, policy documents or on theoretical speculation rather 
than on conclusive empirical evidence.
The second limitation is self-imposed, and it stems from the thesis’s attempt to draw some 
conclusions of general validity from the experience with health reforms. Focusing on the unifying 
features across so many and so diverse regions and countries, the thesis cannot and does not fully 
take into account all the important individual differences, and it does not investigate in detail single 
reform components in individual countries.286
286 An introduction to single reform components in individual countries is in the Case Studies presented in 
each of the chapters.
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In an attempt to gain in specificity, we have limited our attention to the resource allocation, 
purchasing and payment systems dimensions of the reforms. These reforms are a means to respond 
to the combination of market and government failures which prevent health systems from achieving 
better performance in terms of efficiency equity and quality of services. In Chapter 4 we discussed in 
detail the efficiency and quality and in Chapter 6  the equity deficiencies that affect health systems. 
We also described the main components of RAP reforms. Our interpretation is that RAP reforms 
lead to the emergence of trade-offs among potentially equally desirable aims, such as consumer 
responsiveness, cost consciousness, efficiency and equity. We have shown how each RAP reform 
component (for example, a particular payment system as described in Chapter 5) is in general 
appropriate to achieve one of those aims, and, by doing so, it moves the health system further away 
from achieving one or more of the other ones. Given the existence of trade-offs, we indicated that 
“optimal” health reforms should find a second-best equilibrium -o r a balance- between the above 
trade-offs, and should find within the reforms’ tool-kit a mix of interventions able to maximize 
positive impact and to control potential adverse effects.
In Chapter 6  we showed that the existing allocations of inputs and practices within the public sector, 
which have disproportionably benefited the rich in low and middle income countries, have proved 
exceedingly difficult to change. The purchaser-provider split, the new resource allocation and 
payment systems per se are insufficient to induce the rapid change that is expected. However, we 
also reviewed evidence showing that the new allocations mechanisms and incentives characterized 
by more transparent geographical distribution of resources, output/outcome orientation, arms-length 
relationship with providers, etc. have in several cases lead to real improvements in resource 
allocation, better quality of services and greater coverage of the poor. Their principal merit has been 
to increase the focus on results and performance (mainly in terms of outputs), away from passive, 
input based allocation mechanisms, and thus to increase the “value for money” for any given level of 
spending. At the same time, their full potential is not yet exploited. We have also indicated that 
successfully implementing RAP reforms requires governments able to exercise their 
steering/oversight role, which in turn presupposes a health financing framework and other 
preconditions which may not be yet feasible in the poorest, capacity constrained countries.
When adequately implemented, RAP reforms have also been able -through the 
purchasing/contracting mechanisms- to make a better use of private providers and to increase 
coverage of privately provided essential services, also to the benefit of the poor (see Chapter 6 , 
analysis of the contracting out and in experiences). The private sector is potentially able to bring
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about a more efficient and consumer responsive delivery system, provided the government can put in 
place a credible and enforceable regulatory framework. Enhancing quality of care, through MQS (see 
Chapter 3), containing phenomena of supply-induced demand (Chapter 5), and providing incentives 
(financial and others) to expand coverage to the poor and all those unable to pay on an OPP basis, 
should be priority goals in regulation of the private sector.
Finally, the analysis of the last two chapters indicates that the link of RAP mechanisms with the 
sources of revenue and pooling arrangements287 is crucial: RAP reforms change the criteria according 
to which health resources are allocated and services purchased and paid, but they are embedded 
within a specific revenue collection or resource mobilization system, which determines the limits of 
what any RAP mechanism can achieve. The fundamental limitation of the reform process in several 
former socialist economies (FSE) countries, including Georgia, has been precisely the lack of a clear 
health financing strategy, to change the organization and the share of the different sources of revenue 
for health. Several sources of revenue collection have continued to be in place, each of them 
responsible for financing different services for different population subgroups: (a) contributions to a 
social insurance fund, for those in formal employment; (b) taxes and direct transfers pooled by 
Ministry of Finance and channelled through Ministry of Health, supposedly for the poor and 
destitute, in reality spread out to finance a plurality of programs and allocated according to arbitrary 
mechanisms; (c) direct transfers to public providers by local governments, to subsidize specific 
services, such as emergency services in Georgia; (d) private insurance contributions, for the rich, and 
(d) OOPs for all those non formally employed, such as rural workers. In fact, during the decade of 
the ‘90s, OOP payments have become the prevalent source of revenue, as all have been asked to pay 
directly for health services in the countries which were hit the hardest during the transition years.
Health financing reforms are to confront the scarcity of resources and not only inefficiency in 
resource allocation and use, which would include the mobilization and the pooling elements (see 
Figure 4.1 and Gilson et al. 2000). As we saw in Chapter 2, governments have a key role to play in
287 The principal revenue collection systems are: (a) Out-of-pocket payments; (b) Voluntary insurance 
contributions (usually risk-related) with competing insurers; (c) Tax-based public funding; (d) Mandated 
employment-based insurance. The prevalence in the funding of any health system of one of the above funding 
systems determines the overall efficiency/equity impact in the distribution of the health financial burden. 
International evidence from industrialized countries shows that the only progressive funding mechanism is 
direct taxation. Employment-based social insurance contributions are generally proportional or mildly 
regressive, whilst private insurance contributions tend to be regressive (Van Doorslaer, 1997).
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addressing these issues of resource mobilization288, to guarantee an equitable risk sharing across 
individuals. By contrast, as the evidence presented in Chapter 8 demonstrates, where out-of-pocket 
payments are the prevailing source of revenue for health services, and/or health funding system is 
extremely fragmented, RAP mechanisms are largely irrelevant, and RAP reforms are doomed to fail. 
Market failures similar to those analysed in the first three chapters, namely exclusion of patients 
from insurance coverage and essential services, market segmentation and low quality of care for the 
poor, supply induced demand, cannot be eliminated.
Also within a funding system exclusively based on voluntary insurance premiums, cross-subsidies 
across risk/income groups are extremely hard to maintain due to risk-selection and adverse selection 
problems (Chapter 2). The only way the government can pursue equity-motivated corrections to 
market outcomes is through direct subsidies to the poorer and/or higher risk individuals, or to health 
plans that accept to offer coverage to the poorer, and higher risks. All pooling schemes based on 
individual voluntary participation will always be highly constrained in the amount of redistribution 
they can achieve precisely because they demand universal consensus of participants.289
The experience with health reforms in FSE also indicates that the new organizational model 
proposed for health, known as "managed competition" or "internal markets", is perhaps too fragile 
and institutionally demanding for countries with poor legal and administrative underpinnings, or 
weak governance. Only in the few countries where such pre-conditions were at least partially in 
place, such as some Central and East European countries and Colombia, have health reforms’ results 
been more promising.
288 Resource mobilization addresses questions regarding the introduction or removal of user fees; restructuring fees; the 
development of exemption policies; the development and introduction of insurance schemes, such as social, community- 
based, or private insurance; and the introduction of prepayment schemes.
289 In the language of welfare economics, they will promote only cross-subsidies that lead to Pareto- 
improvements.
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